During the past several decades, the concept of power has fueled continuing de? bate among social scientists. Although that debate derives in part from the com? plexities associated with "power," philosophical impoverishment also contrib? utes to the irresolute status of the term. In general, social scientists approach the concept of power through preconceptions about the topic of power. They define power with a view toward interpersonal or intergroup outcomes, or what they broadly want to account for through theories of power. Thus definitions of power usually lay grounds for discourse about decision making, influence, control, dom? ination, coercion, authority, and related concerns. Social scientists need to dis? close and refine their presuppositions about the topic of power, and then define the concept on those bases. Until then, their approaches to power will remain commonsensically appealing but theoretically wanting. Clegg (1975, p. 76) points out that the topic of power is distinct from the con? cept of power. Using Cicourel's (1973) "surface" and "deep" structures, he schematizes the relationships between the topics of exchange, rationality, and economic activity, on the one hand, and the concepts of power, rules, and domi? nation, on the other hand. Although he pinpoints what most social-scientific dis? course implies about the topic of power, Clegg ignores the conditions that make possible the processes and structures he treats. He deepens rather than punctures the circle of concerns that preoccupy social scientists interested in power. Clegg's work nonetheless shows that we need to examine the grounds as well as the out? comes associated with an object of inquiry (topic). It alludes to the necessity of continuously refining our presuppositions if we seek a full-fledged theory of power. Most social scientists fail to question the conditions of the possibility of power as a topic. Two theoretical approaches do deviate from that pattern, however. The strategic-contingencies theory of Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, and Pennings (1971) relates power to uncertainty. From their viewpoint, uncertainty is a neces? sary but insufficient condition of power. Thus the topicality of power presupposes uncertainty as a root feature of social life, even within formal organizations. Emerson (1962) conceives the topicality of power in relation to interdependence. He regards mutual dependence as a necessary condition of power, even though 183