In this paper, we study the properties of equilibria in an aggregative growth model with intergenerational altruism.' In this model, each generation is active for a single period. At the beginning of this period, it receives an endowment of a single homogeneous good which is the output from a made by the previous generation. It divides the endowment between consumption and investment. The return from this investment constitutes the endowment of the next generation. Each generation derives utility from its own consumption and that of its immediate successor. However, since altruism is limited, in the sense that no generation cares about later successors, the interests of distinct agents come into conflict. Models of this type have been used to analyze a number of issues concerning intergenerational altruism. One line of research, pursued by Arrow (1973) and Dasgupta (1974a) elucidates the implications of Rawls' principle of just savings. Others, beginning with Phelps and Pollak (1968), have addressed the question of how an altruistic growth economy might actually evolve over time. Topics of subsequent investigation have included the efficiency and optimality of equilibrium programs, and the implications of intergenerational altruism for the distribution of wealth. Unfortunately, the positive features of equilibrium programs have received little attention from previous authors. Aside from a few comments by Kohlberg (1976), virtually nothing is known about the asymptotic behaviour of capital stocks in these models. In particular, will the long-run capital stock which arises from intergenerational conflict be higher or lower than the turnpike associated with the solution to the optimal planning problem? On a priori grounds, the answer is not clear. Agents who take only a limited interest in the future will tend to bequeath less than those who are far-sighted. However, since each generation views its children's bequest as pure waste, it must bequeath a larger sum to obtain the same consumption value. In this paper, we obtain steady-state results for equilibrium capital stocks completely analogous to the well-known optimal planning results. By comparing steady-states, we