Money is a fundamental attribute of power. Its international use depends on whether and how it is supported by a strong econ- omy, which determines a substantial part of the resources of power (the other being the military). Given the resources, the operating power of money is closely linked to the strategic objectives of govern- ments in international politics. The dynamic interaction amongst countries between resource changes (hard power) on the one hand, and policy doc- trines on international governance (soft power) on the other hand, shapes the international monetary system.China's ascent is disturbing in international relations, not only because it is catching up fast in hard power, but also because Chinese ideas of human authority in soft power, stressing international norm-binding in the pursuit of global harmony, is at odds with Western theories of interna- tional relations based upon the stabilising power of a single hegemon. (1) The strategic move to internationalise the renminbi (RMB) is best under- stood within this alternative view. It is not being done to replace the dollar with the RMB as a new key currency, but rather to build up a large consen- sus to abolish hegemony altogether.The balance of forces between domestic constraints and foreign opportunities: Creation of the Hong Kong RMB marketIn October 2008, the apex of the first round of the financial crisis en- tailed a traumatic shock for so open a country as China. The wholesale dol- lar money market seized up entirely, leading to the collapse of interna- tional trade. The Chinese leadership was convinced that China should no longer trust in the robustness of international banks. Furthermore, having studied the lingering Japanese crisis, Chinese leaders correctly diagnosed that the financial crisis was the symptom of a much more serious phe- nomenon: the end of the credit-induced consumer spree that had boosted Western capitalism since the heyday of financial deregulation. The debt deflation process in Western economies will last for years. Therefore the export-led growth regime of the post-WTO decade will no longer support China's development. Foreign trade had to be redeployed partly to devel- oping countries, China had to become the fulcrum of Asian integration, and trade relations had to be based on long-term contracts. On the financial side, long-term loans and a system of payments no longer based on the vagaries of the dollar should back the new phase of globalisation.However, full RMB convertibility is far from being at hand. It must be pre- ceded by the liberalisation of financial services and therefore of the whole structure of interest rates. Such a dramatic change cannot be accom- plished overnight, all the more given that local governments (especially counties and municipalities) are overwhelmed with debt. Interest rates cannot become market-determined before those debts are cleared and the solvency of local governments has been firmly consolidated. Meanwhile, monetary authorities have recourse to regulating bank lending rates and subjecting bonds to bank rates, so that the cost of public finance is min- imised. Of course, this inefficient financial regulation is costly for the na- tion. Too low a cost of capital distorts investment patterns and fosters overcapacities in heavy industries. Regulated interest rates channel all fi- nancing into a handful of state-owned banks, which enjoy secure profit margins because household saving is poorly rewarded. They have no incen- tive for efficient risk management, without which the shock of capital lib- eralisation would be hazardous and might entail devastating losses, as happened in Japan and several European countries in the early 1990s.The main reason for this dismal state of affairs is fiscal. Because China has no political consensus for agreed-upon rules to transfer fiscal revenues amongst regional and local governments, the latter suffer huge discrepancies between their fiscal resources and their commitments to provide basic pub- lic services. …