Interest Group Theory Research Articles

The Politics of Health Promotion: Insights from Political Theory

Health promotion is inherently political. Not only is it largely funded by government, but the very nature of the enterprise requires shifts in power. Political theory has much to contribute to an understanding of the politics of health promotion. In this paper three key political theories are explained and their insights for health promotion explored. They are then applied to the development of a National Drug Policy in New Zealand. The theoriesÐpluralist interest group theory, the new institutionalism and neo-Marxist theoryÐare each at a different level of analysis. The significance of interests, institutional factors and class as political influences on health promotion are discussed. It is concluded that to ensure good practice health promotion practitioners need to be aware of these influences on their work. They need to strategise to ensure support from key interests, build capacity for health promotion into their institutions and recognise the macro-political context within which they work in order to influence it.

The history of the institutions of Mercosul

SUMMARY In this article, Maria Claudia Drummond discusses the recent phenomenon of representative institutions which become part of the machinery of free trade areas, or economic unions between groups of sovereign states in the continent of South America. After the failure in the 1960s of ambitious schemes to establish a Latin American Free Trade Area a more modest project emerged, starting with the Declaration of Iguaçu of 1985 signed by Argentina and Brazil. This became the starting point for establishing a common market in the southern cone of South America, and was enlarged to include Paraguay and Uruguay to constitute the Mercosul union of the four nations, formalized in the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991. The article describes the institutions of Mercosul, a Council, an Executive, a Trade Commission and a Joint Parliamentary Committee, which could be developed later into a full Mercosul Parliament. These are completed by a Consultative Forum for the independent representation of corporate economic and social interest groups.

Lobbying for conflict accommodation — a contingency model

Presents a modern definition of lobbying suitable for the use of organizational lobbyists and a theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation which arouses ethical considerations. A contingency model of effective lobbying strategies and dynamics of lobbying is developed and tested in a multiple‐case study. Finnish interest group representatives are interviewed to construct cases based on their lobbying efforts on political issues at the national and the EU‐level of political decision making. It is concluded that the definition of lobbying corresponds well to the activities of the interviewees' associations and that it is fruitful to apply the theory of conflict resolution in the study of lobbying. The new model of lobbying reflects the reality excellently. It can be used as a tool for planning and evaluating lobbying in different political issues and at different levels of political decision making.

The Creation and Development of an Interest Group: Life at the Intersection of Big Business and Education Reform

Responding to calls from the president of the United Sates and the Business Roundtable, business leaders have become increasingly involved in setting the education reform agenda. Using five interest group theories and longitudinal data; the authors examined the formation, agenda setting, and maintenance of an organization of business leaders. Moderate support was found for each of the theories. Analyses further revealed that policy interests and to a lesser degree, functional interests were important to the formation and activity of the interest group. To forge successful partnerships and to implement effective reform, educators, policy makers, and researchers must better understand the motives and actions that impel business involvement in education

Cervical Cancer

INTRODUCTION: This Consensus Statement on Cervical Cancer was offered to the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology by the Communications Division of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Bethesda, Maryland, United States of America. The NIH Consensus Program Information Service asked our help to disseminate what they believe to be useful information for our readers.The report was prepared by a panel of experts who considered scientific evidence presented at a Consensus Development conference at NIH. It contains recommendations and conclusions concerning Cervical Cancer.NIH consensus conferences bring together researchers, practising physicians, representatives of public interest groups, consumers, and others to carry out scientific assessments of drugs, devices, and procedures in an effort to evaluate their safety and effectiveness.Our oncology reviewers considered that this Consensus Statement was appropriate for the Journal and provided table 1 so that the details of the FIGO staging would add meaning to the section on treatment.

From regulatory capture to regulated competition: An interest group analysis of the regulation of housing associations in England

This paper suggests a framework in which the key influences on the regulation of social housing providers can be understood. It draws on a wider literature to locate and describe the types of regulation found in the English social housing sector. It develops an approach based on interest group theories which see regulation as “an exercise among groups and between groups and the state” (Francis, 1993, p. 8). The development of the English regulatory regime is examined over time from the perspective of a number of different interest groups. The regime is shown to have been strongly influenced by the interests of the providers themselves, indicating a degree of ‘regulatory capture’. However, this relationship has been increasingly challenged by external pressures and interests and the promotion of competition by government. Special issues arising from the proposed, but as yet unimplemented, introduction of competition from profit distributing companies are discussed.

National health care reform and the 103rd Congress: the activities and influence of public health advocates.

This study examined the activities and influence of public health interest groups and coalitions on the national health care reform debates in the 103rd Congress. Congressional staff and representatives of public health interest groups, coalitions, and government health agencies were interviewed. Content analysis of eight leading national health care reform bills was performed. The public health community coalesced around public health in health care reform; nearly all the major interest groups and government health agencies joined two or more public health or prevention coalitions, and half joined three or more. The most effective influence on health care reform legislation was early, sustained personal contact with Congress members and their staffs, accompanied by succinct written materials summarizing key points. Media campaigns and grassroots mobilization were less effective. Seven of the eight leading health care reform bills included one or more of the priorities supported by public health advocates. The public health community played an important role in increasing awareness and support for public health programs in the health care reform bills of the 103rd Congress.

Top Bureaucrats and the Distribution of Influence in Reagan's Executive Branch

How did career executives think influence was distributed in their agencies during the Reagan administration? Who would top bureaucrats have preferred to exercise influence? Which actors did career executives believe had too much influence and which too little? This article investigates the attitudes of a sample of career members of the senior executive service regarding these questions. The dominant view of presidential-bureaucratic relations in the public administration literature emphasizes the influence exercised by bureaucrats, key members of Congress, and representatives of interest groups at the expense of hierarchical guidance by agents of the president. The findings reported here suggest that top bureaucrats (1) thought that political appointees were very influential in their agencies and, (2) wanted more influence to be exercised by key political executives. The Reagan team's administrative strategy was apparently successful in gaining the support of top members of the higher civil service. One of the most important developments in the conduct of the presidency in recent years has been the increased use of the administrative tools to pursue presidential policy objectives (Nathan, 1975; 1983). With presidential-legislative stalemate becoming routine and bureaucratic performance widely seen as critical to presidential success, gaining control of the administrative apparatus has been a top priority of modern presidents as diverse as Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan. Each of these presidents attempted to centralize policy and implementation decisions in the executive office of the presidency and to politicize the agencies and bureaus of the executive branch by placing political appointees in many top leadership positions (Waterman, 1989; Rourke, 1991a; Hart, 1987). The conventional view that hierarchical control of federal bureaucracies is difficult if not impossible was called into question by President Ronald Reagan's apparent success in reducing administrative discretion in some of the most critical domestic policy agencies of the federal government (Barnett, 1982; Goldenberg, 1984; Wholey, 1984; Lynn, 1984; Rubin, 1985; Huddleston, 1987). Immediately after taking office, Reagan and his inner circle of White House aides embarked on an ambitious and energetic program designed to seize control of policy making and implementation in the executive branch. Budget and regulatory clearance power was centralized within the executive office of the President, key administrative positions in the departments and agencies were staffed with loyal appointees who were philosophically unsympathetic to most forms of government activism; and political executives were encouraged to exclude career professionals from important policy-making duties and responsibilities (Moe, 1985; Benda and Levine, 1988; Aberbach and Rockman, 1990). While the elements of Reagan's administrative strategy have been well documented, the actual effects of these efforts on the distribution of influence in the executive branch have not been. This is an important area of research for several reasons. If executive branch decision-making was dominated by political executives, policies may have been formulated and implemented without the appropriate contributions of career officials (Williams, 1993). The rough balance between responsiveness and competence that we expect our administrative structures to strike may have broken down. In addition, the lack of policy-making responsibility and poor relations with political appointees may have caused low morale and dissatisfaction with government service among career bureaucrats (Mosher, 1984; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1987b; Ban, 1987; U.S. House of Representatives, 1989; Martino-Golden, 1992; Wilson, 1994). In this article, I report the views of a sample of career members of the senior executive service (SES) concerning the distribution of influence in their agencies during the later stages of the Reagan administration. …

Community based and multiple purpose protected areas: A model to select and manage protected areas with lessons from the pacific Islands

Overuse and misuse of coastal systems in the Pacific Islands are causing natural resources to dwindle. During the past two decades, governments have attempted to establish protected areas in recognition of the limits to growth on islands and the negative impacts to the coastal zone from anthropogenic activities. However, protected areas have not always been successful because most models used by these governments to create protected areas have been flawed. This article presents a model to select and manage protected areas in the Pacific Islands that proposes two changes to traditional concepts of protected areas where the aims primarily have been to provide recreational opportunities, protect areas with aesthetics, and protect nature from humans. The two new concepts proposed by this model are community based decision making and permitting multiple purpose protected areas whose main goals are determined by the local community: (1) Representatives of interest groups and local level agencies collaborate to coordinate the processes to establish and administer protected areas, and to make decisions; (2) the model's process to select and manage a protected area considers the social, economic, environmental, and political context. Protected areas established using this model permit multiple uses that are compatible with the goals of the protected area. This method presents a comprehensive process to establish protected areas. Examples are drawn from several political entities of the Pacific Islands: the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Philippines, the Federated States of Micronesia, Guam, the Republic of Palau, Hawaii, and American Samoa.

The politics of mixing older persons and younger persons with disabilities in Federally assisted housing.

Beginning in the late 1980s, government-assisted housing for elderly persons, a popular and successful housing type, began to experience an in-movement of younger persons with disabilities. Advocates for the elderly population expressed alarm about the negative consequences for elderly persons of such "mixing" and of the turnover of this housing to other groups. Based on interviews with key participants and an analysis of documents, this article uses interest group theory and a model of agenda setting to explain why "mixing populations" attained prominence on the Federal housing agenda, the different perspectives of advocates for elderly individuals and younger persons with disabilities concerning the issue, and the implications of the conflict for housing policy and interest group politics.

The Politics of Gay and Lesbian Rights: Expanding the Scope of the Conflict

Morality politics theory predicts that gay rights policy will reflect the influence of religious groups, party competition, and partisanship while interest group theory suggests that these policies will correspond with interest group resources, elite values, and past policy actions. Using multiple regression on a 50-state data set and a county-level data set for gay rights initiatives in Oregon and Colorado, we found gay and lesbian politics are no different from those for other policy issues. When gay and lesbian rights are not salient, the pattern of politics resembles that of interest group politics. If individuals opposed to gay and lesbian rights are able to expand the scope of the conflict, the pattern of politics conforms to morality politics.

The Study of Business and Politics

This article reviews the literature on business-government-society relations during the past three decades. It describes the growth of scholarship on business power, business political activity, the changing political agenda, interest group representation, and changing social expectations and explores in detail three approaches to the study of the political and social role of business: a comparative perspective, an emphasis on the contemporary political and social environment of business, and an exploration of the nature of business power. While we have clearly learned much about this important subject, the intellectual fragmentation of this field prevents it from realizing its full scholarly potential.

Patrons and Entrepreneurs: A Response to "Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories of Groups Mobilization"

Patrons and Entrepreneurs: A Response to "Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories of Groups Mobilization"

Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories of Group Mobilization

The bulk of the literature on group mobilization focuses on why individu als join groups and virtually ignores the group leader (entrepreneur). Thus, we argue that there is a gap in the literature on group development: while entrepreneurs are critical in the process of group mobilization, little is known about what they do and why and how they do it. Studies of group mobilization continue to focus on group supporters-the patrons and members who provide groups with the resources they need. We take a different approach. We examine the process of group mobilization from the perspective of the entrepreneur. Utilizing data from a survey of public interest group founders we test the effectiveness of three theories of group formation. Our analysis leads to four basic conclusions: (1) We should reject any strong version of Jack Walker's argument about the importance of patrons in group mobilization. While many public interest groups do form at the behest of patrons, most do not. (2) Most public interest groups form because aggressive, independent entrepreneurs form them. The large number of groups which cannot trace their origins to patrons or distur bances attests to the importance of entrepreneurs in group formation. (3) Many public interest group founders form groups in response to specific and easily identifiable events or series of events. Disturbances may not spur individuals to join groups, but they play an important role in stimulating entrepreneurial activity. (4) The "free-rider" problem is not operative for most groups "just starting out." Our data suggest that individuals-especially entrepreneurs and their friends-are the driving force behind public interest group formation.

Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories of Group Mobilization

Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories of Group Mobilization

Patrons and Entrepreneurs: A Response to "Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories of Groups Mobilization"

Public interest groups are small percentage of the universe of all interest groups, yet they play critical representative role in American democracy (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Groups with agendas as diverse as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Religious Roundtable fall into the general category of public interest groups-lobbies which seek a collective good, the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists of the (Berry 1977: 7). An environmental group pursuing ban on seal hunting, for example, returns to members and nonmembers alike the ideological satisfaction of knowing that they are doing something to protect seal pups. Yet the collective action problem makes it difficult for organizers to convince potential members that they should be the ones to pay for protecting the baby seals. One way public interest group entrepreneurs attempt to circumvent the free-rider problem is by pursuing large contributions from wealthy individuals as well as foundation, corporation, and government grants (Salisbury 1983; Walker 1991). Many groups formed since the surge of public interest organizing began in the 1960s have become stable and important participants in national policymaking. Yet at the same time many public interest organizations fold quickly as the fervor of activists cannot sustain an organization over time (Piven and Cloward 1979; Pope 1989; Salisbury 1989; Woliver 1993). It falls to political entrepreneurs to translate surges in public interest into vehicles for lasting political change (McAdam 1982; Pope 1989). Drawing upon questionnaire data collected from the founders of 60 public interest groups, professors Nownes and Neeley call our attention to the critical process of public interest group formation. Founders were asked about their motivations in forming their organizations. Were they moved to act by

A Niche Theory of Interest Representation

The theory of organizational niches may provide important bridging concepts upon which an integrated theory of interest groups might be developed. After discussing Hutchinson's (1957) n-dimensional niche concept, we develop several hypotheses about the reliance of interest organizations on multiple resource dimensions. These are tested with survey data on interest group leaders in the American states. On the basis of preliminary evidence of niche partitioning, we conclude that internal resource dimensions--exclusive access to members and finances--may be more critical than securing exclusive access to officials in a balkanized policy process in defining viable interest group niches. We conclude by outlining a research agenda using niche theory.

Can regulation improve long-term care insurance? Lessons from the Medigap experience.

This article uses recent experiences from the Medigap market to draw conclusions about the advisability of alternative methods of regulating the market for long-term care insurance. The analysis is based in part on interviews of state insurance regulators, insurance companies, and interest-group representatives. The authors conclude that some regulation of the market is appropriate, but that the structure and extent of regulation found in the Medigap market would likely be inappropriate for the long-term care insurance market at this time.

Generational Tensions in the Parti Democratique de Cote d'Ivoire

Laurent Dona Fologo, Fraternit, Matin, 19 April 1991 The theme of the Ninth Congress of the PDCI, which opened 1 October 1990 in the president's village of Yamoussoukro, was renovation and continuity (Fraternite Hebdo, 4 October 1990). With three thousand activists taking part, it was the most widely attended congress ever held. Earlier that year, the leader of the Parti Democratique de CUte d'Ivoire, President Felix Houphouiet-Boigny (deceased 7 December 1994), had announced an end to one-party rule. The goal of the congress, then, was to revamp the PDCI so that it could compete effectively against the electoral challenge it would now face from opposition parties. Ten commissions were organized to restructure the PDCI and formulate a platform to deal with the political and economic problems plaguing the nation. When the delegates emerged, five days later, the party had been reorganized. Among other things, it now included a broader representation of generations, professions and interest groups in each of the party organs and committees. Not surprisingly, differences of opinion have emerged within PDCI ranks as to how an open, efficient, and improved party should function. Far from entering this new era of Ivoirian politics as a monolithic entity, as victorious election figures might suggest,' the PDCI came rife with tensions between loyal members. In local commentary and the print media, as well as in informal conversation, the differences of opinion have been viewed within a fourfold classification. The anciens represented the oldest and most conservative wing of the party and generally wish to maintain the status quo; the reformers favored moderate change; the renovators supported a complete revamping of party organs; and the radicals, or jeune loups (literally, the young wolves, or, in English idiom, the Young Turks), were seeking to ensure their entry into the party leadership. These differences not only revealed continuities with

Educational Change in Alberta, Canada

Alberta, Canada, is the site of large-scale educational change initiatives legislated by the provincial government. The mandates have sparked heated public debate over the appropriateness, wisdom, and utility of the reforms. This article summarizes the views of representatives of several educational interest groups and offers suggestions for making change more meaningful and successful.