Interest Group Model Research Articles

The Politics of Accounting Standards: A Comment on Ramanna’s “Unreliable Accounts: How Regulators Fabricate Conceptual Narratives to Diffuse Criticism”

Abstract Karthik Ramanna recounts how the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) dropped “reliability” as a fundamental property of accounting in 2010. He offers two possible explanations for this change: (1) The FASB removed reliability to clarify its conceptual framework, and (2) It sought to reconcile its framework with the growing use of fair-value accounting. Ramanna does not give total victory to one explanation over another, nor does he assign purely public- or private-interest motives to the actors in the story. Yet this very ambiguity tells us a lot about the distinctive politics of accounting and other technical realms of regulation, and exposes some of the shortcomings of more standard interest-group models in political science.

Research on the teaching principles and strategies of physical education in winter primary schools

Winter physical education in northeast China has always been a topic. With the onset of winter, it brings new challenges to the primary school physical education class. This paper discusses the principles of teaching flexibility, classroom safety, load moderation, student fun, and temperature adaptability to be followed in winter primary school physical education classes. In order to ensure the smooth development of winter physical education classes, meet the needs of enhancing students' physical health, and improve the interest of primary school students in winter sports, sports games and special courses can be integrated to comprehensively improve the teaching quality of winter primary school physical education classes. This paper proposes that winter physical education should be based on the interest group model; Use sports games to effectively stimulate fun; Improve quality and efficiency with special physical education classes; Broadening horizons with off-campus outreach is the teaching strategy of winter physical education classes. It is hoped that the content of this paper will have reference value for winter physical education.

Disclosing Influence: Hydraulic fracturing, interest groups, and state policy processes in the United States

This paper examines copy-and-paste regulating in hydraulic fracturing (HF) fluid disclosure regulation across US states. Using text analysis, cluster analysis and document coding, we compare HF regulations of twenty-nine states and two “model bills” drafted by the conservative American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF, an environmental NGO). In contrast to recent studies that have documented ALEC’s widespread influence across policy domains, we find limited evidence of ALEC influence in HF fluid disclosure regulations. Instead, elements of the EDF bill are more prevalent across state regulations. Yet, text similarity scores between states are higher than similarity scores between states and the EDF bill. In particular, Colorado and to a lesser extent Pennsylvania functioned as leader states for other states to follow. This indicates that state-to-state communication was a more influential channel of policy diffusion than interest group model bills in this instance. Future research should better examine processes of information sharing amongst state oil and gas regulators as regulatory text is but one channel of policy diffusion. The cluster analysis also reveals that contiguous states, often within the same shale basins, frequently have different regulations. This finding calls for a reconsideration of the current state-led environmental regulatory framework for HF, which has resulted in a patchwork of regulations across the US. Finally, through the use of novel text analysis tools, this paper adds methodological diversity to the study of policy diffusion within energy policy.

Corporatism and Civil Society

This paper develops an alternative view of corporatism. The dominant view of corporatism, as espoused by Edmund Phelps in his recent book Mass Flourishing, views corporatism as an advanced form of state capture. The alternative view developed here instead argues that corporatist institutional arrangements are aimed at curbing special interests. Corporatist institutional arrangement seek to achieve this, not by insulating the state from special interest groups as traditional models of interest groups often implicitly try to do. Instead these institutional arrangements are aimed at channeling the interest of powerful (encompassing) interest groups toward the common good, or rather away from harm and domination. Through a historical case-study of the school struggle in the Netherlands this paper demonstrates that corporatism is closer to private-interest self-governance, than state capture. Although corporatism has been associated with episodes in which the state mobilizes civil society for its own goals, the perspective developed here emphasizes that 2 we can learn from current and historical corporatist institutional arrangements, which have been able to limit state power. Building on recent work by Levy in his Rationalism, Pluralism and Freedom which distinguishes between rationalist liberalism and pluralist liberalism, we argue that the view developed here is closer to the pluralist tradition of liberalism which emphasizes the constructive role of civil society and its role in limiting state power. The standard account on the other hand is suspicious of social power and hence of interest groups, and is closer in line with what Levy calls rationalist or individualist liberalism.

Interest Groups, County Characteristics, and Local Growth Management Policy Instruments

The primary intent of this study is to investigate what factors drive local governments to implement growth management policy instruments. To answer this research question, this study chose Colorado counties, where local governments voluntarily adopt and implement growth management policy instruments. That means that a wide variation in growth management policy instrument implementation appears among Colorado???s local governments. That is to say, some counties more actively implement growth management policy instruments while the rest of counties do not. Utilizing a statistical tool, this article tests seven hypotheses based on the interest group model and county characteristics to empirically explicate this uneven implementation phenomenon of growth management policy instruments across Colorado. The analyzed results prove that counties with many anti-growth management policy interest groups are less likely to implement growth management policy instruments. In addition, the analyzed results demonstrate both that counties earning more income from tourism and counties with highly educated residents are more likely to implement growth management policy instruments, while counties supporting the Democratic Party are less likely to implement growth management policy instruments.

Interest Group Influence in Policy Diffusion Networks

Scholars have suggested that interest groups affect the diffusion of innovations across states by creating a network of information between the states that aids in the spread of policy ideas. Still, the unique role that interest groups play in policy diffusion networks is not fully understood, in large part because the current methodology for studying diffusion cannot parse out interest group influence. We address this problem by analyzing the actual text of legislation, moving away from binary adoption to a more nuanced measure of policy similarity. This allows us to distinguish whether states emulate other states or interest group model legislation. We use text similarity scores in a social network analysis to explore whether early-adopting states or interest groups are more central to the network. We apply this analytical framework to two policies—abortion insurance coverage restrictions and self-defense statutes. Based on this analysis, we find that a fundamentally different picture of policy diffusion networks begins to emerge—one where interest group model legislation plays a central role in the diffusion of innovations.

Informal Political Networks and Putin’s Foreign Policy: The Examples of Iran and Syria

While many analysts use an informal political network perspective to describe Russian domestic politics under Vladimir Putin, almost none have applied that framework to Russian foreign policy. This article explains why Russia is a useful case to use in developing such a framework, and then proposes a preliminary set of arguments about what a foreign policy based on informal politics would look like. While a realism or state interest framework still explains a lot, this article argues that an informal politics perspective explains Russian actions better than realism can alone, and explains why a personalized network approach is different from a more classic interest-group model. It cites a variety of examples from the Putin era to begin to illustrate the arguments, and then provides longer illustrative case-studies of Russian policy toward Iran and Syria to show how the arguments can be used in practice. It concludes by asking whether the perspective is useful in understanding Putin’s actions in Ukraine in 2014.

The political economy of unfunded public pension liabilities

This paper applies a public choice approach to the problem of unfunded pension liabilities and adopts the methodology of Congleton and Shughart (1990) to model underfunding of state-level public pension plans using the median voter theorem, along with the theory of “capture” by special interest groups, and a combined model of the two. With panel data from 2001 to 2009, the paper finds that the combined model provides the strongest explanation for the current levels of unfunded liabilities; hence, both median voter preferences and special interest group influence are affecting political outcomes. The special interest group model slightly outperforms the median voter model in direct comparisons.

Discretion v. Independence: Distinguishing Two Forms of Autonomy in Models of Judicial Behavior

Existing scholarship offers competing accounts of judicial independence, alternatively seeing it as a by-product of the number of veto players in a political system, its electoral competitiveness, or its use of common law. This paper tests directly these three prominent models of judicial independence against one another in both a cross-national context and across the American states. Results suggest that the veto players approach better accounts for the discretionary power judges possess in a cross-national context, while the interest group model explains when judges will operate independently of other political actors, particularly in the American states. I demonstrate how scholars can better explore the liberty afforded judges by separating the concepts of judicial discretion and judicial independence.

The Night the Raving Died: The Social Construction of a Local Drug Panic

Scholars have recently reformulated the moral panic framework (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994, 2009). We employ this new framework in an evaluation of Gainesville, Florida's adoption of the anti-rave law. Our findings suggest that both individuals and groups were vital in the construction of an interest group model moral panic that led to the adoption of this law. Although researchers have utilized the moral panic framework in analyzing many social and legal changes over the past 40 years, it has also garnered much criticism. In an effort to further advance the framework, we provide several modifications to Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) most recent reconceptualization and recommendations for future moral panic research.

The Politics of (Anti-)Globalization: What do We Learn from Simple Models?

Our focus is a preliminary investigation of the link between democratic politics and the stability of globalization in three steps. First, we briefly develop two key distinctions that provide an analytical framework for our discussion. Specifically, we argue that most of the literature on political economy of trade and immigration fails to distinguish between the average level of a policy (say, a tariff) and the variance of that policy (e.g. the dispersion of the tariff across sectors), and we will distinguish between two very broad classes of political economy model (Weberian models and interest group models). Second, we will consider how well these models account for policy outcomes (both mean and variance) in trade and immigration policies. We conclude that the pattern of successes and failures is difficult to account for within any of the standard political economy frameworks. This will lead us to the third part of the paper in which we propose what, for want of a better label, we call the social values extension of both the Weberian and interest group models.

The Quixotic Quest for a "Unified" Theory of the Administrative State.

This essay comments on the impact of Richard Stewart’s seminal article, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law.” It posits that the most long-lasting contribution of that article was not its primary thesis that the interest group model of the administrative state is flawed, but rather its expression of doubt that any single unifying theory could adequately explain or justify administrative law. This essay surveys attempts that scholars have made subsequent to the publication of Stewart’s article to provide an overarching theory of the administrative state and describes flaws with each of these attempts. The essay evaluates whether, in light of Stewart’s contribution doubting the adequacy of any such model, looking for such models makes sense. It concludes that despite the inevitability that such models will be flawed, they will provide those who develop administrative law with insights and ideas that at the margins will be able to improve the operation of the administrative state.

The Role of Government in The Redistribution of Property Rights: The Case of The Korean Greenbelt

This study addresses Korean Greenbelt revision. This revision may be labeled a puzzle based on the fact that although the Greenbelt had been considered to be one of the most impregnable institutions in Korea it is now faced with a complete reformulation following the previous government reform initiation six years ago. In order to solve the puzzle, this study adopts an approach that focuses the role of the government in the redistribution of property rights. To do so, this study first describes in detailed fashion the process of the Greenbelt revision from 1997 up to the present. Secondly, this study delineates three models on the role of government in the redistribution of property rights: the naive model, the interest group model, and the strong state model. Thirdly, this study attempts to empirically assess the most adequate model to explain the role of the government in the revision of the Korean Greenbelt. Finally, this study draws policy implications using both theoretical and empirical analyses. The major policy recommendation drawn from the analyses is that, as the major impetus behind the revision of the Korean Greenbelt appears to be the realization of the private interests of the ruler at the costs of the general public, a mechanism should be strengthened to restrain the exercise of power by the ruler of the government with regards to the redistribution of property rights.

Legislative Victory, Electoral Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the Battles over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights

AbstractPrevious studies indicate that in cases of relatively low issue salience, the interest group model best explains lesbian and gay antidiscrimination policy in the American states. The analysis of state and local public policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation concludes that for cases of high issue salience, the morality politics model best describes outcomes. The interest group politics model is used here in a case study of Wisconsin's passage of a comprehensive antidiscrimination policy, while the morality politics model is used to investigate the electoral outcomes of anti‐gay ballot initiatives in several states. The results of this analysis conform with prior research—when lesbian and gay issues are not salient, the interest group politics model best explains resulting policy, however, under salient conditions, the morality politics model best describes outcomes. Finally, the implications of this research for social scientists and activists are discussed.

The Impact of Nonrevenue Maximizing Factors on State‐Level Cigarette Tax Rates

This article examines the influence that certain publicly and privately funded programs have on state‐level cigarette tax setting behavior. The article finds that the impact of Project ASSIST (a federally sponsored program designed to decrease cigarette consumption) has had a marginal impact on taxes in selected states in the United States. In addition, private giving to the American Cancer Society has had a statistically insignificant impact on tax‐setting behavior. (JEL H20, H29)

Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950-1994 (review)

Reviewed by: Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950–1994 Susan Kathleen Freeman Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950–1994. By Elizabeth A. Armstrong. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. xix + 272. $60.00 (cloth); $22.50 (paper). In Forging Gay Identities, Elizabeth Armstrong narrates and conceptualizes the shift from homophile organizing to gay liberation to a gay identity-based movement during the second half of the twentieth century. Using primary and secondary sources, Armstrong addresses her work to sociologists interested in social movements and social change. Her analysis of San Francisco's gay movement serves to revise existing theories of organizational sociology, political process/resource mobilization theory, and new social movement theory. Although mostly derived from existing historical research and interpretations, the book offers an analytical perspective that is distinctive. From the vantage point of the turn of the twenty-first century, Armstrong demonstrates how the gay movement came to focus on identity and valorize individual expression. As displayed since the 1970s in the ubiquitous gay pride parades, the process of "coming out" has brought together a heterogeneous population to celebrate various identities and lifestyles, more recently including bisexual and transgender along with gay and lesbian. Whereas ideological, gender, race, and class differences have fragmented other recent social movements, the success story of organizers' unification of the gay movement around gay identity and visibility is the central focus of this book. Armstrong self-consciously departs from the sociological tradition of evaluating movement outcomes in terms of formal political gains and institutionalization; rather, she examines the informal realm of identity and culture while tracing the growth of the gay movement in San Francisco. [End Page 637] After laying out her theoretical premises in chapter 1, the author proceeds chronologically to demonstrate the often overlapping transitions from a homophile ("interest group") logic in the 1950s and 1960s to a short-lived revolutionary ("redistributive") logic in the late 1960s and early 1970s to a visibility ("identity") logic from the 1970s to the 1990s. She illustrates her model with original quantitative data compiled from resource guides and directories, using several charts and graphs to display her information on organizational growth and decline; on the whole, however, this is a qualitative study that draws from movement periodicals and scholarly research. Historians will not find much new empirical information, and even the differences in argument are often slight. John D'Emilio's research on the homophile movement and San Francisco gay liberation is much in evidence. Armstrong concurs with D'Emilio that the homophile movement of the 1950s and 1960s solidified a concept of collective identity among homosexuals. (See John D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 [Chicago, 1983].) Yet she conceptualizes the emergence of a gay identity as a definitive point in the creation of a gay/lesbian "field," her terminology for the process of "creating and expanding gay social and political space" (13). While sensitive to the political and cultural climate and change over time, Armstrong nevertheless reiterates throughout the book that the homophile movement adopted a "limited" interest group model (41). Although homophile groups did resemble interest groups in several respects, electoral and legal battles for homosexual rights were only part of the homophile agenda. Just as significant but largely neglected by the author were education (of professionals and other homosexuals) and ending social isolation. Political action—pursuing the right to congregate, publish newsletters, and secure telephone directory listings—was a means to an end, not the end in itself, and this Armstrong recognizes. Yet closer attention to a wider range of activities and evidence might have led the author to less reductive conclusions about homophile politics. Whereas homophiles "could not take that final step" (56) toward publicly announcing their sexual orientation, gay liberation activists did. New Left-influenced radicalism and notions of authenticity, Armstrong argues, contributed redistributive and identity-politics logic to the movement a full year before New York City's 1969 Stonewall Riots. Unlike gay movement scholars who treat the New Left as a context for the emergence of revolutionary ideas and militant action, Armstrong views the New Left as responsible for...

Baptists? The Political Economy of Political Environmental Interest Groups

It has been argued that environmental regulation can be best understood as the product of an unlikely alliance of Baptists and Bootleggers - public-interested environmental activist groups and private-interested firms and industries seeking to use regulation for competitive advantage. It is now well-understood how special-interests can manipulate regulation for competitive advantage. Moreover, economics has provided models of the results of private self-interest in markets and in politics. But, until now, economists have not provided a workable model of private self-interest by environmental non-profit organizations, nor have there been efforts to test a private interest model versus the predictions of public interest models of environmental activists. Some have gone so far as to suggest that environmental activists are motivated by a spirit of civic republicanism that causes them to subordinate their self-interest to the pursuit of the public good. This article provides a first effort at testing the implications of public interest versus private interest models of environmental interest groups. In particular, it specifies three testable implications of a public interest model of the activities of environmental interest groups: (1) a desire to base policy on the best-available science; (2) a willingness to engage in deliberation and compromise to balance environmental protection against other compelling social and economic interests; and, (3) a willingness to consider alternative regulatory strategies that can deliver environmental protection at lower-cost than traditional command-and-control regulation. On all three counts, it is found that the public-interest or civic republican explanation for the activities of environmental interest groups fails to convincingly describe their behavior. On the other hand, the evidence on each of these three tests is consistent with a self-interested model of the behavior of environmental interest-groups. Their activities can be understood as being identical to those of any other interest group - namely, the desire to use the coercive power of government to subsidize their personal desires for greater environmental protection and to redistribute wealth and power to themselves.

Why the United States does Not Have Universal Health Insurance: A Public Finance and Public Choice Perspective

This article examines possible reasons based on public choice, voting, and constitutional theory to explain why the United States does not have universal health insurance. It is argued that, compared to countries that have adopted such institutional structures, the current high levels of medical insurance costs and the high proportion of the population insured in the United States help to explain why closing the gap in coverage has not occurred. An interest group model is used to explain why the political equilibrium appears to remain the status quo.

The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital

This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdepen- dent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting.

The political economy of gambling regulation

AbstractThis paper presents an interest group model of gambling regulation and applies it to major changes in the regulation of US gambling markets. Gambling markets are among the most restricted and politicized markets in the American economy, yet economists interested in the economics of regulation have paid them little attention. Applying the economic theory of regulation to gambling markets can lead to greater understanding of current public policy. In addition, this application may shed light on the discipline itself, as to its ability to explain recurrent fluctuations in the extent of regulatory intervention over long periods of time. Broadly speaking, the interest group model is consistent with changes in the extent of regulation, including the recent period of liberalization and consequent growth in gambling. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.