In the past two decades, diverse political forces have debated environmental issues in the Soviet Union. These forces may be referred to as based on their commonality of interest, although by other criteria (degree of organization, institutionalization of communications, patterns of interaction among members) they scarcely merit this appellation. The pervasiveness and diversity of such groups are readily apparent in certain policy areas. The Soviet environmental policy process is so replete with examples of group activity that it provides an excellent critique of the totalitarian model of Soviet politics. According to the totalitarian model, policy is formulated by a small group of leaders or a single dictator, devoid of any meaningful input from the public, and implemented with complete ruthlessness and total disregard for public preferences.' Studies of Soviet environmental policy, on the other hand, have emphasized the multiplicity of bureaucratic and specialist organizations exercising some role in the formulation and implementation of policy.2 This article contends that both the totalitarian and the interest group models distort the essence of the policy process, at least in the field of environmental protection. Whether or not this model is applicable to Soviet labor relations, legal policy, or other policy areas is problematic.3 We will comment on the broader utility of the state corporatist model at the conclusion of this article.