Intentional Feelings Research Articles

A Qualitative Phenomenological Philosophy Analysis of Affectivity and Temporality in Experiences of COVID-19 and Remaining Symptoms after COVID-19 in Sweden.

This article explores affectivity, temporality, and their interrelation in patients who contracted COVID-19 during the first wave of the pandemic in Sweden and with symptoms indicative of post-COVID-19 Condition (PCC) that remained one year after the infection. It offers a qualitative phenomenological philosophy analysis, showing how being ill with acute COVID-19 and with symptoms indicative of PCC can entail a radically altered self-world relation. We identify two examples of pre-intentional (existential) feelings: that of listlessness and that of not being able to sense what is real and not real, both of which, in different ways, imply a changed self-world relation. We offer an analysis of intentional feelings: how the fear of not "returning" to one's previous self and the hope of such a return weave together the present and the absent, as well as the past and the future, in ways that make the future appear as constricted, disquieting, or lost. We argue that a phenomenological differentiation among experiences of living with symptoms indicative of PCC-through attention to the way intentional affectivity and pre-intentional affectivity help shape the embodied self's attunement to the world-is apt to yield a better understanding of the variations within these experiences and contribute to clinical practice.

Intentional Feelings, Practical Agency, and Normative Commitments

A dominant approach to conceptualizing a role for emotions in practical agency has been to focus on a relation between emotions and reasons, whereby emotions are claimed to track reason-giving considerations via their intentional content. Yet, if we reflect on the phenomenology of emotional consciousness and take seriously a growing consensus that emotions involve intentional feelings then, I argue, such a reason-tracking approach at best only provides part of the story and at worst is fundamentally misguided. This does not mean that emotion has no role in practical agency, however. I tentatively propose that the normative category of commitments offers a promising alternative for thinking about the role of emotions in practical agency, an alternative that has the potential to do justice to intentional feelings while avoiding the problems of a reason-tracking approach.

The Origin of the Phenomenology of Feelings

ABSTRACT This paper accomplishes two goals. First, I present a distinct interpretation of the inception of the phenomenology of feelings. I show that Husserl’s first substantial discussion of intentional and non-intentional feelings is not from his 1901 Logical Investigations, but rather his 1893 manuscript, “Notes towards a Theory of Attention and Interest”. Husserl there describes intentional feelings as active and non-intentional feelings as passive. Second, I show that Husserl presents a somewhat unique account of feelings in “Notes”, which is partly different from his later theories of feelings found in Lectures on Ethics and Value Theory and Studies Concerning the Structures of Consciousness. In contrast to those mature writings, in “Notes”, Husserl describes intentional feelings while avoiding cognitivism and he analyses non-intentional feelings without employing the content-apprehension schema. On this basis, I argue that “Notes” is an important untapped resource for constructing original phenomenologies of feelings.

Feeling as Consciousness of Value

A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences.

Parent’s acceptance on wearable technology for children’s safety

<span>This paper presents a study on parent’s acceptance on wearable technology for children’s safety. Recently, there are many applications of wearable technology used in ensuring children’s safety, such as GPS tracking devices that are seen to be related to the safety of the children. However, the Malaysian parents have not been using these technologies to protect their children due to lack of knowledge on the wearable technology, non-familiarity with the devices, privacy and also security concern of data in wearable technology. Thus, the objective of the present research is to identify the significant factors that influence parents’ acceptance on wearable technology for their children’s safety and to identify the greatest influence factors for the acceptance of these wearable technologies for children’s safety. These factors are expected to bring about usefulness, ease of use, trust, privacy risk, financial risk and intention to use these technologies. As such, quantitative survey method was employed in the present study to obtain the result for the factors acceptance. The analysis and findings were done using IBM SPSS Version 25 tools via Pearson Correlation Analysis and Multiple Linear Regressions to get the result for the acceptance and to achieve the research objectives. Based on the result, it is discovered that the factors significant to intention to use of the wearable technology are perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use and trust while privacy and financial risk are factors seen to be non-significant to intention to use the wearable technology. Lastly, trust is discovered to be the greatest factor influencing parents to accept wearable technology and intention to use the technology. However, it is recommended for further study to employ experimental method in carrying out the research in order to get the real trust feeling of intention to use the wearable technology.</span>

The phenomenology of respect: with special attention to Kant, Scheler, and Confucianism

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I focus on analyzing the manifestation and significance of respect. I first illustrate the two (or three) meanings of jing 敬 and their connection in Confucian classical texts, which is helpful to understand the Confucian phenomenology of respect. The two (or three) meanings are (1) seriousness as a mind-state and (2) respect (and attention) as an intentional feeling. After clarifying this point, I undertake a phenomenological analysis of respect, in order to show that respect helps one to achieve moral pursuit. This analysis takes the Kantian notion of respect as a starting point but further is accomplished by the phenomenology of value and feeling. The respect for duties and affairs, the respect for personhood and dignity, and the respect for the worthy with merit motivate one to take moral actions. For example, respect contributes in taking one’s duties seriously, appreciating human beings’ spiritual values and good tendencies even when they have not been actualized, supporting the worthy to play a role (offering them important positions), and emulating the worthy to make a contribution and serve others. In Subsequently, I clarify how respect helps one to achieve religious pursuit in one form of Christianity, in light of Max Scheler’s discussion on humility and reverence. Through revering God one respects others; through serving God and participating in God’s humble spirit one serves others. I elucidate the Confucian classics’ discussions on religious experience, in order to show how respect helps one to achieve religious pursuit in one form of Confucianism, and how it is similar and different from Max Scheler’s clarification. The concrete relation between respect and li 禮 in the Confucian tradition will be treated in another work.

Rola uczuć w procesie wartościowania, czyli Maxa Schelera pojmowanie miłości jako podstawy chrześcijańskiej moralności

The fundamental topic of the farticle is to present the role of feelings in the process of assessment. The major point of reference is Max Scheler’s phenomenology of feelings together with his comprehension of love as the basis of the Christian morality. I start my analysis with the short presentation of a system of values, which is formulated by Scheler from the point of axiological absolutism, and proceed to the influence of emotional functions onto our perceiving values, which the philosopher considers to be the intentional feelings of values. Together with the consideration of human emotional life, Scheler’s conception of a human being as a spiritual centre that is the background for developing a particular bond between the man and the God should be paid attention to. The objective of the article is to present the outline of Scheler’s conception of love as a cornerstone for getting to know the absolute, i.e. the experience of love as the essence of Christian faith.

Max Scheler’s Phenomenology of Pain

This paper offers a systematic account of Scheler’s phenomenology of pain, addresses its place in the history of the phenomenology of pain and traces its significance for pain research . Against the popular view, which maintains that for Scheler pain is a feeling-state, this paper argues that Scheler conceives of pain as an irreducibly ambiguous phenomenon : as both a non-intentional feeling-state and an intentional feeling. This paper further shows how this ambiguity leads Scheler to qualify pain as a stratified phenomenon , composed of causal , sensory , emotive and cognitive dimensions. This paper demonstrates how such a stratified conception enables one to draw meaningful distinctions between pain and other emotive phenomena, such as suffering, illness, and despair. This paper concludes with some remarks concerning the significance of Scheler’s phenomenology of pain for pain research.

The Jamesian Appeal of Scheler's Felt Metaphysics

I attempt to solve a problematic feature of Scheler's intentional feeling. Spiritual feelings are disembodied and elements of William James's pragmatism offer a way to make elements of Scheler's phenomenology more concrete than Scheler's phenomenology allows. I then further develop this insight since contact between both Scheler and James opens up possible trajectories and affinities that, in the end, reveal both thinkers share an affective underpinning to their respective metaphysics. In both thinkers, reality is given as felt. As such, this underpinning becomes a basis for interpreting Scheler's later metaphysics through Jamesian pragmatism.

The Intentional Structure of Emotions

This paper approaches the intentional structure of the emotions by considering three claims about that structure. The paper departs from the Brentanian and Husserlian ‘priority of presentation claim’ (PPC). The PPC comprises two theses: (1) intentional feelings and emotions are founded on presenting acts and (2) intentional feelings and emotions are directed specifically to the value-attributes of the presented objects. The paper then considers two challenges to this claim: the equiprimordial claim (EC) and the priority of feeling claim (PFC). The EC asserts that the presentational and affective dimensions of intentional feelings and emotions are equiprimordial. I respond to this challenge to the PPC by revising it, claiming instead that the founding relations exist between the presentational and affective senses (rather than the acts) in an experience whose presenting and affective aspects are equiprimordial. The PFC grants priority to the affective, a grant which presupposes the independence of the affective from the presentational. I argue that the PFC is mistaken, and that the revision of the PPC can handle the examples on which the PFC is based.

Abnormal sense of intention preceding voluntary movement in patients with psychogenic tremor

Psychogenic tremor is the commonest psychogenic movement disorder, yet little is known of its pathophysiology. Given the presence of movements that appear from their physiological properties to be voluntarily produced, and yet are not experienced as such by the patients, we hypothesised that patients might have an abnormal conscious experience of volition with regard to self-generated movement. Nine patients with psychogenic tremor were asked to judge the timing of a self-paced button press relative to a clock displayed on a computer screen. In separate trials they were asked to judge the timing of their internal feeling of intention to move. These results were compared to those of healthy control participants. Patients with psychogenic tremor judged their feeling of intention to move significantly later compared to control participants. As a result, the interval between the perceived time of intention and the perceived time of action, which was highly significant in the control participants, was numerically smaller and non-significant in the patients. This study provides novel data that the sense of volition prior to movement is impaired in patients with psychogenic tremor. This fits with a pathophysiological explanation for this disorder based on an impairment of neural mechanisms that generate the conscious experience of action: actions that are voluntary in terms of their physiological origin might be experienced as involuntary.

스마트 서비스: 개인의 앱스토어 사용의도에 영향을 주는 요인과 가치의 조절효과

As knowledge-based society comes to the fore, sharing knowledge becomes a hot issue. Among various types of knowledge, a significance of software(applications) and contents is a huge in a current society. Moreover, along with appearance of smartphone, for instance iPhone, Application Store(also known as AppStore) utilized as a common gateway for sharing software and contents, brings a big interest for many users and developers. However, prior research to understand users' behavior on AppStore has been a scant. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of key smart service environmental factors on AppStore in order to empirically explain users' psychological feelings of intention to use AppStore. Based on a well-known technology adoption model, TAM, the study incorporates three main characteristics(user, society, and service) with six constructs(Innovation, Enjoyment, Subjective Norm, Information Level, Content variety, and Cost), influencing perceived usefulness, which then affects users' intention to use AppStore. Results provide evidence that support the tested hypotheses. The implications of the findings suggest a new theoretical work for future AppStore research and offers suggestions that the researchers and practitioners of AppStore should consider regarding the development of application and contents.

The foundation of phenomenological ethics: Intentional feelings

E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.

Affective intentionality and the feeling body

This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy of mind.