Intentional Binding Task Research Articles

Altered sense of agency in schizophrenia: the aberrant effect of cardiac interoceptive signals.

Schizophrenia (SZ) is characterized by abnormalities in self-representation, including a disturbed sense of agency (SoA). The continuous processing of sensory information concerning the internal state of the body (interoception) is argued to be fundamental to neural representations of the self. We, therefore, tested if aberrant interoception underpins disturbances in SoA in SZ, focusing on cardiac interoceptive signaling. Forty-two SZ and 29 non-clinical participants (healthy controls; HC) performed an intentional binding task to measure SoA during concurrent heartbeat recording. The effect of cardiac interoceptive signals on SoA was measured by the difference in intentional binding effect during systole and diastole. This measure was standardized based on the overall intentional binding effect to control for non-cardiac factors, and then compared between SZ and HC. Our study revealed a significant difference between SZ and HC groups, with opposite effects of cardiac systole on SoA. Specifically, cardiac systole disrupted SoA in SZ, contrasting with the enhanced SoA in HC. Across the SZ group, the extent to which SoA was disrupted by cardiac systole correlated significantly with a clinical proxy for symptom instability, namely the number of hospital admissions for hallucinations and delusions. Furthermore, the disruption was particularly observed in patients with severe hallucinations. This study revealed a disturbance in the impact of cardiac interoceptive signals on an implicit index of SoA in schizophrenia. This supports the notion that pathophysiological disruption of the central integration of interoceptive information increases vulnerability to disturbances in self-representation and the associated expression of schizophrenic symptoms.

Impaired perception of temporal contiguity between action and effect is associated with disorders of agency in schizophrenia

Delusions of control in schizophrenia are characterized by the striking feeling that one's actions are controlled by external forces. We here tested qualitative predictions inspired by Bayesian causal inference models, which suggest that such misattributions of agency should lead to decreased intentional binding. Intentional binding refers to the phenomenon that subjects perceive a compression of time between their intentional actions and consequent sensory events. We demonstrate that patients with delusions of control perceived less self-agency in our intentional binding task. This effect was accompanied by significant reductions of intentional binding as compared to healthy controls and patients without delusions. Furthermore, the strength of delusions of control tightly correlated with decreases in intentional binding. Our study validated a critical prediction of Bayesian accounts of intentional binding, namely that a pathological reduction of the prior likelihood of a causal relation between one's actions and consequent sensory events-here captured by delusions of control-should lead to lesser intentional binding. Moreover, our study highlights the import of an intact perception of temporal contiguity between actions and their effects for the sense of agency.

Sense of agency predicts severity of moral judgments.

Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to the awareness of being the agent of our own actions. A key feature of SoA relies on the perceived temporal compression between our own actions and their sensory consequences, a phenomenon known as "Intentional Binding." Prior studies have linked SoA to the sense of responsibility for our own actions. However, it is unclear whether SoA predicts the way we judge the actions of others - including judgments of morally wrong actions like harming others. To address this issue, we ran an on-line pilot experiment where participants underwent two different tasks designed to tap into SoA and moral cognition. SoA was measured using the Intentional Binding task which allowed us to obtain both implicit (Intentional Binding) and explicit (Agency Rating) measures of SoA. Moral cognition was assessed by asking the same participants to evaluate videoclips where an agent could deliberately or inadvertently cause suffering to a victim (Intentional vs. Accidental Harm) compared with Neutral scenarios. Results showed a significant relation between both implicit and explicit measures of SoA and moral evaluation of the Accidental Harm scenarios, with stronger SoA predicting stricter moral judgments. These findings suggest that our capacity to feel in control of our actions predicts the way we judge others' actions, with stronger feelings of responsibility over our own actions predicting the severity of our moral evaluations of other actions. This was particularly true in ambiguous scenarios characterized by an incongruency between an apparently innocent intention and a negative action outcome.

Sense of agency during and following recovery from anorexia nervosa

The need to feel in control is central to anorexia nervosa (AN). The sense of control in AN has only been studied through self-report. This study investigated whether implicit sense of control (sense of agency; SoA) differs across AN patients, recovered AN (RAN) patients and healthy controls (HC). Furthermore, we assessed whether state anxiety is influenced by negative emotional states. SoA was measured with the intentional binding task (IB) and state-anxiety levels through a questionnaire. We did not find any evidence of differences in SoA between groups. Furthermore, state anxiety was not a significant predictor of SoA. Further research into SoA in AN should focus on other features of the SoA that are not targeted by the IB task.

Studying sense of agency online: Can intentional binding be observed in uncontrolled online settings?

Intentional binding is often used as an implicit index of the sense of agency. However, intentional binding research has primarily been conducted in controlled lab environments. During the COVID-19 global pandemic, there has been a shift to implementing studies using online platforms and it is an open question whether the intentional binding effect can be found using an online experimental set-up and participant sample. Here, we address this question by asking online participants to complete the Libet clock version of the intentional binding task, which we make freely available to researchers as a jsPsych (De Leeuw, 2014) plugin. Intentional binding was observed in the form of later keypress estimates and earlier auditory tone estimates, when the auditory tone followed the keypress. These findings confirm that intentional binding can be assessed in online contexts. We discuss these findings in relation to the broader intentional binding literature.

Neural correlates of implicit agency during the transition from adolescence to adulthood: An ERP study

Sense of agency (SoA), the experience of being in control of our voluntary actions and their outcomes, is a key feature of normal human experience. Frontoparietal brain circuits associated with SoA undergo a major maturational process during adolescence. To examine whether this translates to neurodevelopmental changes in agency experience, we investigated two key neural processes associated with SoA, the activity that is leading to voluntary action (Readiness Potential) and the activity that is associated with the action outcome processing (attenuation of auditory N1 and P2 event related potentials, ERPs) in mid-adolescents (13–14), late-adolescents (18–20) and adults (25–28) while they perform an intentional binding task. In this task, participants pressed a button (action) that delivered a tone (outcome) after a small delay and reported the time of the tone using the Libet clock. This action-outcome condition alternated with a no-action condition where an identical tone was triggered by a computer. Mid-adolescents showed greater outcome binding, such that they perceived self-triggered tones as being temporally closer to their actions compared to adults. Suggesting greater agency experience over the outcomes of their voluntary actions during mid-adolescence. Consistent with this, greater levels of attenuated neural response to self-triggered auditory tones (specifically P2 attenuation) were found during mid-adolescence compared to older age groups. This enhanced attenuation decreased with age as observed in outcome binding. However, there were no age-related differences in the readiness potential leading to the voluntary action (button press) as well as in the N1 attenuation to the self-triggered tones. Notably, in mid-adolescents greater outcome binding scores were positively associated with greater P2 attenuation, and smaller negativity in the late readiness potential. These findings suggest that the greater experience of implicit agency observed during mid-adolescence may be mediated by a neural over-suppression of action outcomes (auditory P2 attenuation), and over-reliance on motor preparation (late readiness potential), which we found to become adult-like during late-adolescence. Implications for adolescent development and SoA related neurodevelopmental disorders are discussed.

Influence of arousal on intentional binding: Impaired action binding, intact outcome binding

Emotional states have been indicated to affect intentional binding, resulting in an increase or decrease as a function of valence and arousal. Sexual arousal is a complex emotional state proven to impair attentional and perceptual processes, and is therefore highly relevant to feeling in control over one’s actions. We suggest that sexual arousal affects intentional binding in the same way as highly negative arousing states such as fear and anger. Ninety participants performed the intentional binding task before and after watching an either sexually arousing or emotionally neutral film clip. Analyses were conducted for the subcomponents action and outcome binding separately including the change in arousal before and after the emotion induction as a continuous measure. Results showed an interactive effect for time of measurement (before and after emotion induction) and arousal change on action binding: a decrease in action binding was noted in participants who reported to be more aroused and an increase in action binding was observed for participants who reported to be less aroused. Results emphasize that alterations in action binding are likely to reflect the deficits in the dopaminergic system involved in action execution. An impaired feeling of control in aroused states may play a crucial role for the underlying psychological mechanisms of impulsive violent behavior.

Intentional Binding Effects in the Experience of Noticing the Regularity of a Perceptual-Motor Task

Noticing the regularity of the task is necessary to enhance motor performance. The experience of noticing further motivates improvement in motor performance. Motor control is explained by a comparator model that modifies the motor command to reduce discrepancies between sensory predictions and actual outcomes. A similar model could apply to sense of agency (SoA). SoA refers to the sensation of controlling one’s own actions and, through them, the outcomes in the external world. SoA may also be enhanced by the experience of noticing errors. We recently reported gradual enhancement of SoA in participants with high perceptual-motor performance. However, what component of the motor task changed the SoA is unclear. In this study, we aimed to investigate the influence over time of the experience of noticing during a motor task on SoA. Participants performed an implicit regularity perceptual-motor task and an intentional binding task (a method that can quantitatively measure SoA) simultaneously. We separated participants into groups after the experiment based on noticing or not noticing the regularity. SoA was gradually enhanced in the noticing group, compared with that of the non-noticing group. The results suggest that the experience of noticing may enhance SoA during perceptual-motor tasks.

Mindfulness Meditation Weakens Attachment to Self: Evidence from a Self vs Other Binding Task

Mindfulness meditation is based on Buddhist teachings and meditation practices that promote a reduced identification with thoughts and mental states. Mindfulness meditation is also suggested to promote self-other integration, either by decreasing preference for self-related processing or by rebalancing self and other-related processing. However, it is not clear how meditation practice influences attachment to self and more specifically sense of agency. Hence, we investigated how mindfulness meditation (Vipassana or insight meditation) practice influences an implicit measure of sense of agency known as intentional binding effect with self- vs other-associated stimuli by comparing long-term meditators with non-meditators. This study had two phases. The first phase consisted of a perceptual matching task using self-related and other-related shape-label pairings so that participants can learn the shape-label associations. In the second phase, participants performed an intentional binding task with the same self-associated and other-associated stimuli displayed as target outcome of self-generated action. While meditators did show faster responses to self vs other shape-label processing similar to non-meditators, they did not show stronger binding (reduced temporal estimation between action and outcome shape) for self-associated compared with other-associated outcome. The results indicate that even though meditators preferentially process self-related information, they are less attached to self-associated stimuli as indicated by an implicit measure of sense of agency. These results have implications for theories of action and agency based on contemplative traditions that emphasize less attachment to outcomes of our actions.

Self-associated stimuli produce stronger intentional binding.

Self-generated actions are important for survival; they influence perception, especially the subjective time between the action and its outcome, known as intentional binding (IB). Whereas most studies on IB have examined the role of action being associated with the self or not, the role of the outcome being associated with the self or not has received less attention. The major models or mechanisms proposed to explain IB do not explicitly discuss the role of self-association without confounding it with intentionality, causality, and prediction. In this study for the 1st time, we used the self-related processing paradigm to investigate the importance of self-association in IB and the potential importance of postdictive mechanisms in self-associated IB. We used a shape-label matching task to associate different identities like self, friend, and stranger with different geometrical shapes like circle, square, and triangle. After the shape-label matching task, participants performed an IB task, in which they estimated the perceived magnitude of the duration between the action and the ensuing outcome. All the outcomes in this task were unpredictable and were not causally related to any particular action. Results revealed that participants reported the perceived interval between their action and the self-associated outcome to be shorter (i.e., stronger IB) compared to a friend- or stranger-associated outcome, demonstrating that mere labeling of a neutral geometrical shape with self leads to stronger IB. The results point to a potentially important role of postdictive mechanisms in IB and agency associated with self-related processing, which is independent of causality and prediction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Uncovering effects of self-control and stimulus-driven action selection on the sense of agency.

The sense of agency refers to feelings of causing one's own action and resulting effect. Previous research indicates that voluntary action selection is an important factor in shaping the sense of agency. Whereas the volitional nature of the sense of agency is well documented, the present study examined whether agency is modulated when action selection shifts from self-control to a more automatic stimulus-driven process. Seventy-two participants performed an auditory Simon task including congruent and incongruent trials to generate automatic stimulus-driven vs. more self-control driven action, respectively. Responses in the Simon task produced a tone and agency was assessed with the intentional binding task - an implicit measure of agency. Results showed a Simon effect and temporal binding effect. However, temporal binding was independent of congruency. These findings suggest that temporal binding, a window to the sense of agency, emerges for both automatic stimulus-driven actions and self-controlled actions.

Altered awareness of action in Parkinson\u2019s disease: evaluations by explicit and implicit measures

Deficits in the integration of motor prediction and its feedback have been reported in Parkinson’s disease. Conscious awareness of action is proposed to emerge under the integration of motor prediction and its feedback. Thus, it may lead to changes in the awareness of the authorship of action (in other words, the sense of agency) in Parkinson’s disease. We have employed both explicit and implicit measures to assess the awareness of action in Parkinson’s disease and matched controls. As an explicit measure, an action recognition task requiring explicit judgments was used. Patients showed less attribution of their movements to non-biased and angular-biased visual feedbacks. As an implicit measure, the temporal attraction between the perceived time of actions and their effects, which is known as intentional binding task, was used. While action-effect association was observed in the control group, actions were not experienced as having shifted towards their subsequent effects in the patient group. These tendencies were consistent regardless of the side of the asymmetrical motor symptoms. These results may reflect an underlying abnormality in the awareness of voluntary action in Parkinson’s disease.

Acting without being in control: Exploring volition in Parkinson's disease with impulsive compulsive behaviours

BackgroundSeveral aspects of volitional control of action may be relevant in the pathophysiology of impulsive-compulsive behaviours (ICB) in Parkinson's disease (PD). We aimed to explore multiple aspects of action control, assessing reward-related behaviour, inhibition (externally and internally triggered) and sense of agency in PD patients, with and without ICB compared to healthy subjects. MethodsNineteen PD patients with ICB (PD-ICB), 19 PD without ICB (PD-no-ICB) and 19 healthy controls (HC) underwent a battery of tests including: Intentional Binding task which measures sense of agency; Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) measuring capacity for reactive inhibition; the Marble task, assessing intentional inhibition; Balloon Analog Risk Task for reward sensitivity. ResultsOne-way ANOVA showed significant main effect of group for action binding (p = 0.004, F = 6.27). Post hoc analysis revealed that PD-ICB had significantly stronger action binding than HC (p = 0.004), and PD-no-ICB (p = 0.04). There was no difference between PD-no-ICB and HC. SSRT did not differ between PD groups, whereas a significant difference between PD-no-ICB and HC was detected (p = 0.01). No other differences were found among groups in the other tasks. ConclusionsPD patients with ICB have abnormal performance on a psychophysical task assessing sense of agency, which might be related to a deficit in action representation at cognitive/experiential level. Yet, they have no deficit on tasks evaluating externally and internally triggered inhibitory control, or in reward-based decision-making. We conclude that impaired sense of agency may be a factor contributing to ICB in PD patients.

Multi-scale control influences sense of agency: Investigating intentional binding using event-control approach.

Control exercised by humans through interactions with the environment is critical for sense of agency. Here, we investigate how control at multiple levels influence implicit sense of agency measured using intentional binding. Participants are asked to hit a moving target using a joystick with noisy control followed by an intentional binding task initiated by the target hitting action. Perceptual-motor level control was manipulated through noise in the joystick controller (experiment 1) and goal-level control in terms of feedback about successful hit (experiments 2a and 2b). In the first experiment, intentional binding increased with amount of joystick control only when goal was not achieved and independent otherwise suggesting that the two levels interact hierarchically. In the second experiment, the estimated duration was dependent on when participants knew about goal completion. The results are similar to those obtained with explicit measures of sense of agency indicating that multi-scale event control influences agency.

Discrepancy between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency: Implications for sense of agency and its disorders.

The sense of agency refers to the feeling of authorship that "I am the one who is controlling external events through my own action". A distinction between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency has been proposed theoretically. However, there has not been sufficient experimental evidence to support this distinction. We have assessed separate explicit and implicit agency measures in the same population and investigated their relationships. Intentional binding task was employed as an implicit measure and self-other attribution task as an explicit measure, which are known to reflect clinical symptoms of disorders in the sense of agency. The results of the implicit measure and explicit measure were not correlated, suggesting dissociation of the explicit judgement of agency and the implicit feeling of agency.

It’s Not My Fault: Postdictive Modulation of Intentional Binding by Monetary Gains and Losses

Sense of agency refers to the feeling that one’s voluntary actions caused external events. Past studies have shown that compression of the subjective temporal interval between actions and external events, called intentional binding, is closely linked to the experience of agency. Current theories postulate that the experience of agency is constructed via predictive and postdictive pathways. One remaining problem is the source of human causality bias; people often make misjudgments on the causality of voluntary actions and external events depending on their rewarding or punishing outcomes. Although human causality bias implies that sense of agency can be modified by post-action information, convincing empirical findings for this issue are lacking. Here, we hypothesized that sense of agency would be modified by affective valences of action outcomes. To examine this issue, we investigated how rewarding and punishing outcomes following voluntary action modulate behavioral measures of agency using intentional binding paradigm and classical conditioning procedures. In the acquisition phase, auditory stimuli were paired with positive, neutral or negative monetary outcomes. Tone-reward associations were evaluated using reaction times and preference ratings. In the experimental session, participants performed a variant of intentional binding task, where participants made timing judgments for onsets of actions and sensory outcomes while playing simple slot games. Our results showed that temporal binding was modified by affective valences of action outcomes. Specifically, intentional binding was attenuated when negative outcome occurred, consistent with self-serving bias. Our study not only provides evidence for postdictive modification of agency, but also proposes a possible mechanism of human causality bias.

Ketamine administration in healthy volunteers reproduces aberrant agency experiences associated with schizophrenia

Introduction. Aberrant experience of agency is characteristic of schizophrenia. An understanding of the neurobiological basis of such experience is therefore of considerable importance for developing successful models of the disease. We aimed to characterise the effects of ketamine, a drug model for psychosis, on sense of agency (SoA). SoA is associated with a subjective compression of the temporal interval between an action and its effects: This is known as “intentional binding”. This action–effect binding provides an indirect measure of SoA. Previous research has found that the magnitude of binding is exaggerated in patients with schizophrenia. We therefore investigated whether ketamine administration to otherwise healthy adults induced a similar pattern of binding. Methods. 14 right-handed healthy participants (8 female; mean age 22.4 years) were given low-dose ketamine (100 ng/mL plasma) and completed the binding task. They also underwent structured clinical interviews. Results. Ketamine mimicked the performance of schizophrenia patients on the intentional binding task, significantly increasing binding relative to placebo. The size of this effect also correlated with aberrant bodily experiences engendered by the drug. Conclusions. These data suggest that ketamine may be able to mimic certain aberrant agency experiences that characterise schizophrenia. The link to individual changes in bodily experience suggests that the fundamental change produced by the drug has wider consequences in terms of individuals' experiences of their bodies and movements.

Impaired decision making in individuals with Parkinson's disease

Several aspects of volitional control of action may be relevant in the pathophysiology of impulsive-compulsive behaviours (ICB) in Parkinson's disease (PD). We aimed to explore multiple aspects of action control, assessing reward-related behaviour, inhibition (externally and internally triggered) and sense of agency in PD patients, with and without ICB compared to healthy subjects.Nineteen PD patients with ICB (PD-ICB), 19 PD without ICB (PD-no-ICB) and 19 healthy controls (HC) underwent a battery of tests including: Intentional Binding task which measures sense of agency; Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) measuring capacity for reactive inhibition; the Marble task, assessing intentional inhibition; Balloon Analog Risk Task for reward sensitivity.One-way ANOVA showed significant main effect of group for action binding (p = 0.004, F = 6.27). Post hoc analysis revealed that PD-ICB had significantly stronger action binding than HC (p = 0.004), and PD-no-ICB (p = 0.04). There was no difference between PD-no-ICB and HC. SSRT did not differ between PD groups, whereas a significant difference between PD-no-ICB and HC was detected (p = 0.01). No other differences were found among groups in the other tasks.PD patients with ICB have abnormal performance on a psychophysical task assessing sense of agency, which might be related to a deficit in action representation at cognitive/experiential level. Yet, they have no deficit on tasks evaluating externally and internally triggered inhibitory control, or in reward-based decision-making. We conclude that impaired sense of agency may be a factor contributing to ICB in PD patients.