Intensity Of Product Market Competition Research Articles

Institutional investor horizon and stock price synchronicity: Do product market competition and analyst coverage matter?

This paper provides new insights into the relation between institutional investment horizon and stock price synchronicity and investigates whether this relationship depends on the intensity of product market competition and analyst coverage. Based on a sample of French listed companies, we find that long-term (short-term) institutional investors are associated with lower (higher) stock price synchronicity. The results also show that the negative effect of long-term institutional investors is more accentuated for firms in less competitive markets and with high analyst coverage. An additional analysis shows that the synchronicity reduction effect does not vary during the financial crisis. Overall, these findings suggest that unlike their short-term counterparts, long term investors reduce asymmetric information and help disseminate firm-specific information into stock prices.

Product Market Competition and Voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures†

ABSTRACTThis study examines whether and how firms' voluntary forward‐looking nonfinancial disclosure, specifically their corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure, is associated with the intensity of product market competition (PMC). Despite the importance of the proprietary cost argument in explaining corporate disclosure incentives, there is little empirical evidence of the relationship between firms' proprietary cost concerns and their voluntary nonfinancial disclosure decisions. Using a reduction in industry‐level import tariffs as an exogenous shock to competition intensity, we find that the likelihood, frequency, and length of stand‐alone CSR reports decrease in response to heightened PMC. We also find that higher PMC intensity is associated with a reduced likelihood of CSR disclosure with external assurance, CSR disclosure in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines, and CSR disclosure integrated with financial statements. Our results are robust to multiple alternative measures of PMC—namely, the level of nonprice competition, product similarity, and managers' perceptions of competition. Further analysis suggests that firms facing intense competition tend to commit more resources to advertising activities after reducing their CSR disclosure, presumably to mitigate the effect of this reduction. Overall, our findings suggest that proprietary cost concerns reduce firms' incentive to report their competition‐sensitive CSR activities.

Product market competition and carbon disclosure: Evidence from China

Based on a sample of Chinese publicly listed firms in eight high energy-consuming industries from 2015 to 2019, this study investigates the relationship between the intensity of product market competition and carbon disclosure and explores the moderating effect of earnings pressure and environmental legitimacy pressure on this relationship. Using content analysis to construct an integrated measure of corporate carbon disclosure, we find that the intensity of product market competition is negatively associated with carbon disclosure. The negative relationship between the intensity of product market competition and carbon disclosure is more pronounced among firms facing fewer earnings pressures and greater environmental legitimacy pressures. The additional tests also show that the effect of product market competition on carbon disclosure is more pronounced among state-owned firms and large firms. Our results are robust to various robustness tests. This study extends the literature on carbon disclosure and has important implications for different stakeholders to promote corporate climate-related disclosure in China.

Intensity of product market competition, institutional environment and accrual quality

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the joint effect of product market competition (PMC) and institutional environment on accrual quality.Design/methodology/approachThe sample covers a large data set of 52,138 firm-year observations from 35 countries over the period of 2011-2015. Using the weighted least square regression, the study estimates PMC and institutional environment on accrual quality. The study measures PMC based on Herfindahl-Hirschman index, anti-director rights index (ADRI) based on the revised and updated La Porta et al.'s (1998) and accrual quality using the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model proposed by McNichols (2002). The study also uses a series of specification tests using alternative measures for each variable.FindingsThe study finds that highly intensified PMC relates to a lower quality of accruals. The results also show that accrual quality is better in countries with stronger institutional environment, specifically countries with higher ADRI, investor protection, judicial independence, protection of minority shareholders’ interests, protection of property rights, strength of the auditing and reporting standards, efficacy of corporate boards and corporate ethics. The findings suggest that institutional factors weaken the negative impact of PMC intensity on accrual quality, hence suggesting that institutional environment has a significant role to enhance accrual quality among firms in highly intensified industries.Practical implicationsThe findings provide additional insights to policymakers and regulators on the importance of strong institutional and industry environment that can provide incentives and extra governance mechanisms besides the conventional firm-level corporate governance.Originality/valueThis study contributes in understanding the impact of intensity of PMC on accrual quality internationally and subsequently highlights the role of institutional environment as significant country-level governance in determining financial reporting quality, particularly accrual quality.

The impact of product market competition on GDP per capita growth in the EU countries: does the model of capitalism matter?

This article assesses whether the intensity of product market competition is a factor affecting economic growth (measured by the growth rate of real GDP per capita) and whether this impact depends on the model of capitalism. The study covers the 1997–2015 period and all EU28 countries. Product market competition is measured by two types of variables: product market regulation indicators and the number of enterprises. New elements in the analysis include, among others, nonlinear impact and overlapping observations. The regression equations are estimated on the basis of Blundell and Bond’s GMM system estimator. The results generally indicate that stronger product market regulations (and theoretically lower product market competition) are linked with faster growth of output. However, the impact of product market competition on economic growth depends on the type of capitalism. For post-socialist countries, unlike the Western European model of capitalism, more regulation tends to reduce the rate of economic growth.

Industry Competition, Credit Spreads, and Levered Equity Returns

This paper examines the relation between industry competition, credit spreads, and levered equity returns. I build a quantitative model where firms make investment, financing, and default decisions subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. Firms operate in heterogeneous industries that differ by the intensity of product market competition. Higher competition reduces profit opportunities and increases default risk for debtholders. Equityholders are protected against default risk due to the option value arising from limited liability. In equilibrium, competitive industries are characterized by higher credit spreads, but lower expected equity returns. I find strong empirical support for these predictions across concentration terciles.

Product market competition and analyst following

In this study, we investigate the link between product market competition and the extent of a firm’s analyst following. Our research is motivated by prior studies on analyst coverage, as well as the literature pertaining to the informational and monitoring role of product market competition. Using a sample of 520 French listed firms over 2000–2013, we find support to the hypothesis that the number of analysts following a firm decreases with the intensification of competition. This result suggests that the disciplinary power of product market competition makes investors more confident that firms are well monitored, which reduces their incentives to seek additional private information produced by financial analysts. In short, our findings corroborate previous evidence that there is a substitution effect between competition and other external corporate governance mechanisms, especially analyst following. Our results also shed more light on how the quality of firms’ monitoring mechanisms and information environment is affected by the intensity of product market competition.

Intra-industry momentum and product market competition around the world

This paper examines the relationship between product market competition and intra-industry momentum returns. Based on 12,982 firm observations from 19 developed markets for the period of 1990–2010, I find that buying winners and selling losers in competitive industries generates significantly higher momentum profits than that in concentrated industries. The higher the intensity of product market competition, the larger are the intra-industry momentum returns. The results are robust to sub-samples (periods) of the U.S., non-U.S. countries, the G7 countries, 1990–2000, and 2001–2010. I further employ the nearness of a stock's price to the 52-week high to determine past winners and losers and find stronger results. I also compare intra-industry momentum returns with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) individual stock momentum and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) inter-industry momentum strategies. My results suggest that intra-industry momentum strategy outperforms the latter two strategies in most cases. The overall results are consistent with the notion that severe product market competition induces managers to improve financial performance.

Competitive Pressure and Corporate Crime

AbstractThis paper explores the relationship between the intensity of product market competition and firms’ incentives to resort to illegal means to lower their production costs. To this end, our framework combines a crime model à la Becker with a Salop circle. When law enforcement includes a fixed fine for illegal conduct, more intense competition due to a higher number of firms in the industry reduces the prevalence of crime, whereas more intense competition due to better substitutability between products may increase or decrease crime. In contrast, when the fine for corporate crime is proportional to profits, more intense competition unambiguously increases the prevalence of crime. In addition, we discuss the implications of the link between product market competition and corporate crime decisions for market entry and optimal law enforcement and elaborate on the relationship between law enforcement and a firm’s ability to commit to refraining from the use of illegal practices.

The Relationship Between Competition and the Fraction of Firms Using Stock-Based Compensation in an Industry

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates the relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the fraction of firms that use stock-based compensation in an industry. By employing the relationship between a firm's risk-taking behavior and the use of stock-based compensation, we theoretically show that when the fraction of firms using stock-based compensation is less (more) than one-half, there is a positive (negative) relationship between the fraction and the intensity of product market competition and further provide some supportive empirical evidence. Our results imply that there is more heterogeneity in firms' stock-based compensation policies in the more competitive industry.

CEO Overconfidence and Overinvestment Under Product Market Competition

How does product market competition influence whether CEOs with greater or lower levels of overconfidence are hired and whether CEOs overinvest in innovation? In a Cournot model in which firms hire a CEO to take charge of research and development (R&D) investment and production decisions, this paper shows that CEO overconfidence and overinvestment can be explained as an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, the intensity of product market competition and the equilibrium CEO overconfidence level (and R&D investment) exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship. As the product market tends toward perfect competition, all firms hire a realistic CEO and do not overinvest. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

How product market competition affects dividend payments in a weak investor protection economy: Evidence from Taiwan

We examine the link between the intensity of product market competition and the dividend models of agency conflicts in an economy with weak investor protection (Taiwan). Product market competition can substitute for governance mechanisms. Our results show that the outcome agency model of dividends is applicable only when the product market is highly competitive. However, the substitute agency model of dividends is supported when the product market has low competitiveness. Product market competition alleviates the effects of agency conflicts and corporate governance practices on dividend policies.

CEO Overconfidence and R&D Investment under Product Market Competition

How does product market competition influence whether CEOs with greater or lower levels of overconfidence are hired and whether CEOs overinvest in innovation? In a Cournot model in which firms hire a CEO to take charge of research and development (R&D) investment and production decisions, this paper shows that CEO overconfidence and overinvestment can be explained as an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, the intensity of product market competition and the equilibrium CEO overconfidence level (and R&D investment) exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship. As the product market tends towards perfect competition, all firms hire a realistic CEO and do not overinvest.

Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin

Using the persistence of corporate profits as a measure of the intensity of product market competition in 19 countries for the period 1995-2005, we find that civil law systems are more competitive, in this sense, than common law ones. Greater shareholder protection increases competition between firms in common law countries, but reduces it in civil law ones. We conclude that shareholder rights act as complements to product market competition in the common law world but not in the civil law world, and explain this result by reference to the common-law origins of shareholder-orientated corporate governance.

The Color of Money: A Start-Up's Choice Among Venture Capitalists

Venture Capitalists (VCs) differ significantly from one another with respect to the non-financial resources -- from business expertise to the network of contacts with potential suppliers, customers, employees and IPO underwriters -- they offer their portfolio firms. In this paper, I develop a theoretical model incorporating such differences in resources to examine an entrepreneur's choice among VCs. By relating the costs and benefits of associating with a VC ab initio to the resources offered by the VC, the model examines the conditions under which financing by a more resourceful VC is optimal. The results rationalize the empirical findings that: (1) Startups prefer more resourceful VCs even though they have to offer equity at a considerable discount to such VCs. (2) More resourceful VCs may not only create successful startups but are also able to appropriate the benefits from the same and thereby consistently outperform their less resourceful competitors. However, the model points out that these results may only hold locally depending upon the intensity of product market competition and the entrepreneur's and VC's ability to hold each other up. The model generates the following new predictions: (1) In contrast to the hold-up by an informed bank, hold-up by a VC does not necessarily dampen entrepreneurial incentives and can therefore be value-adding. (2) While hold-up involving physical assets is zero-sum, hold-up involving intangible assets is not necessarily so. (3) Financing from a more (less) resourceful VC is optimal when product market competition is low (high) and the likelihood of hold-up is low (high).

Product Market Competition, Managerial Incentives, and Firm Valuation

This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyze the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand-collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002 to 2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.

Product Market Competition, Managerial Incentives and Firm Valuation

Abstract This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyse the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand‐collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002–2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.

AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC INCENTIVES TO SHARE KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge‐sharing arrangements are an important part of the innovation process as they help firms acquire technological capabilities, shorten development time, and spread risk and cost. A question central to the study of knowledge‐sharing arrangements is the impact of competition on cooperation. While cooperation has the benefit of avoiding duplication, it may have an adverse effect on the competitive advantage of a leading firm. Hence, firms face a difficult challenge during the innovation process while deciding which components of it, if any, to carry out in collaboration with other firms. This paper reports the results of controlled laboratory experiments which identify how the decision to form research joint ventures changes with both relative progress during the R&D process and the intensity of product market competition. The design is based on a modified version of Erkal and Minehart “Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development.” Research Paper 1038, University of Melbourne, Department of Economics, 2008. The results indicate that if expected profits are such that the lagging firms always stay in the race, cooperation unravels as firms move forward in the discovery process and as monopoly profits become more attractive. These results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions. (JEL C91, L24, O30, D81)

An Experimental Analysis of Dynamic Incentives to Share Knowledge

Knowledge sharing arrangements are an important part of the innovation process as they help firms acquire technological capabilities, shorten development time, and spread risk and cost. A question central to the study of knowledge sharing arrangements is the impact of competition on cooperation. While cooperation has the benefit of avoiding duplication, it may have an adverse effect on the competitive advantage of a leading firm. Hence, firms face a difficult challenge during the innovation process while deciding which components of it, if any, to carry out in collaboration with other firms. This paper reports the results of controlled laboratory experiments which identify how the decision to form research joint ventures changes with both relative progress during the R&D process and the intensity of product market competition. The design is based on a modified version of Erkal and Minehart (2008). The results indicate that if expected profits are such that the lagging firms always stay in the race, cooperation unravels as firms move forward in the discovery process and as monopoly profits become relatively more attractive. These results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions.

Product Market Competition and Accounting Conservatism

This study examines the relation between product market competition and accounting conservatism. Extant research offers three reasons why intense competition can lead to more timely recognition of economic losses in accounting income. First, intense product market competition improves the flow of firm-specific information and hence limits managers' ability to conceal bad news. Second, product market competition, by increasing liquidation risk, contributes to a firm's demand for accounting conservatism to achieve more efficient contracting. For instance, it allows for better debt contracting and hence enables firms in a competitive setting to obtain funds at a lower cost. Third, intense product market competition induces greater demand for conservatism because sub-optimal managerial decisions contrary to shareholders' interest can quickly lead to costly firm liquidation. Timely loss recognition serves to discourage negative net present value investments and to encourage quicker abandonment of loss-making projects. An alternative prediction is that product market competition reduces the severity of agency conflicts and hence limits the demand for accounting conservatism. We attempt to shed light on the competing views by investigating the association between product market competition and the asymmetric timeliness of economic loss recognition. Using a sample of 99,315 firm-year observations over the period 1964-2006, we find asymmetric timeliness of economic loss recognition to increase with the intensity of product market competition. Moreover, this relation is not qualitatively affected by the inclusion of various controls for the demand for conservatism, in particular, managerial ownership. We also find an inter-temporal increase in asymmetric timely recognition of economic losses following industry deregulation. Overall, our evidence points to a relation between product market competition and properties of accounting numbers.