Intensional Contexts Research Articles

Comparing Comparatives: The Argumentative Force of Comparative Quantifiers

This study investigates the difference between more than n and at least n + 1. It is observed that these two quantifiers can generate different implicatures in intensional contexts due to their exhaustivity properties. Building on theoretical notions of argumentation in discourse, it is proposed that more than n, but not at least n + 1, is associated with positive argumenatative orientation (an attempt to convince the addressee of something). In a large-scale corpus investigation, more than n is shown to be associated with much larger numerical values than at least n (as well as other comparative quantifiers). Based on a qualitative investigation of the data, I propose that more than n is used more commonly to convey subjective positions that are being made more convincing by larger values of n, while at least n + 1 is used more commonly to convey objectively informative content. The quantifiers’ behavior in intensional contexts is explained as a combined effect of their respective argumentative orientation and the exhaustivity implicatures they generate.

Putting pain in its proper place

In a series of articles in this journal, Michael Tye (2002) and Paul Noordhof (2001, 2002) have sparred over the correct explanation of the putative invalidity of the following argument: the pain is in my fingertip; the fingertip is in my mouth; therefore, the pain is in my mouth. Whereas Tye explains the failure of the argument by stating that “pain “creates an intensional context, Noordhof maintains that the “in” in ‘the pain is in my fingertip’ is not spatial, but has state-attributing character. In this paper, we offer a third account, explaining the failure of the argument through state-attributing pragmatic implicatures. Empirical evidence is provided in support of this account.

Presentation and the Ontology of Consciousness

The idea that we can understand key aspects of the metaphysics of consciousness by understanding conscious states as having a presentational character plays an essential role in the phenomenological tradition beginning with Brentano and Husserl. In this paper, the author explores some potential consequences of this connection for contemporary discussions of the ontology of consciousness in the world. Drawing on Hintikka’s analysis of epistemic modality, the author argues that the essential presentational character of consciousness can be seen as accounting for the familiar failure of substitutivity of identicals in intensional contexts of conscious presentation and further provides for an ontology of conscious presentation that avoids metaphysically problematic commitments to “special” intentional objects. The author next considers how the irreducibility of intensional contexts, if grounded in the presentational character of consciousness, also may provide for a kind of irreducibility of the “first-person” perspective to third-person or objective description across possible worlds. Finally, drawing on Chalmers’ “two-dimensionalist” semantic framework, the author argues that attention to the presentational aspect of consciousness as thus understood, while it provides significant motivation for the existence of the “hard problem” of the irreducibility of consciousness to physical and structural description, is nevertheless consistent with a globally monist, rather than dualist, ontology.

Семантика компаративных предикатов в интенсиональных контекстах: двумерный подход

Семантика компаративных предикатов в интенсиональных контекстах: двумерный подход

Why Don'T 2D Jokes Fall Flat? A Two-Dimensional Interpretation of Russell's Joke About the Yachts

In recent critical comments on “On Denoting”, Saul Kripke says that Russell's famous analysis of joke about yachts in terms of degrees and graded positives is incorrect. His criticism has given rise to a number of issues related to interpreting cross-world comparisons like “Х might have been greater than it is” in doxastic contexts like “John believes that P”. The main goal of this paper is to compare two approaches to cross-world predication in intensional contexts. One is Wehmeier’s subjunctive modal framework which distinctive feature is the use of two explicit mood markers. The other is Chalmers’s generalized epistemic two-dimensionalism, based on the idea of assigning all our expressions two kinds of intensions. Despite the fact that these approaches have of lot in common, they provide different interpretations of belief reports about cross-world comparisons. I argue that epistemic 2D framework is philosophically more relevant here than subjunctive markers approach.

Lessons from Descriptive Indexicals

Two main methods for analysing de re readings of definite descriptions in intensional contexts coexist: that of evaluating the description in the actual world, whether by means of scope, actuality operators, or non-local world binding, and that of substituting another description, usually one expressing a salient or ‘vivid’ acquaintance relation to an attitude holder, prior to evaluation. Recent work on so-called descriptive indexicals suggests that contrary to common assumptions, both methods are needed, for different ends. This paper aims to show that there is indeed a division of labour between the two methods of analysis and to identify criteria for choosing among alternative ways to model the second, substitutional method

Alternatives as sources of semantic dependency

This paper focuses on the properties of the Romanian determiner 'vreun', and has two objectives. First, it seeks to provide an adequate description of its restricted distribution. Refining previous observations in the literature (Farkas 2002, 2006), I argue that the occurrence of 'vreun' in intensional contexts is sensitive to epistemic alternatives, and put forward a generalization that captures its use (‘the epistemic constraint’). Second, we aim to provide an explanation for the observed pattern, in a way that situates 'vreun' in a broader typology of dependent indefinites. The proposed account is couched in a unified, alternative-based approach to polarity-sensitivity, due to Chierchia (2006 et seq). In line with this theory, we reduce the differences between 'vreun' and other dependent indefinites to essentially two factors: (i) the types of alternatives these items activate and (ii) the way these alternatives are factored into meaning by alternative-sensitive operators. The present paper can be regarded as part of a more general research program which aims to understand the parameters of variation among dependent indefinites and to seek a principled explanation for the attested diversity.

Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis

This is a response to Charles Travis's article "Is Seeing Intentional?" In it, I argue that while seeing differs from other intentional states in a variety of ways, seeing is indeed intentional, at least in the philosophically central sense of "intentional" introduced to us by Brentano and Husserl. Seeing is, quite often at least, the consciousness of something. I spend the majority of the paper discussing Travis's arguments that it is not, and providing reasons for thinking they are inconclusive. That seeings do not harbor ambitions and that "sees (NP)" is not an intensional context do not entail that seeings are not intentional. Furthermore, I argue that Travis's contention that states of seeing are relational is inconclusive, and also argue that even if that is so, the proper conclusion to draw is not that seeing is not intentional, but that some intentional states are relational.

Psychological features of symbolization among the deaf in the period of youth

The article deals with results of a diagnostic study of revealing the distinctions in symbolization among the deaf and the hearing in the period of youth. More than half of deaf respondents demonstrate the simplest way of symbolization. Symbols-properties prevail in their individual consciousness; these symbols-properties do not make it possible to reveal qualitative differences of a symbol and a sign, which indicates the interpretation of symbolical values on the basis of a single significant sign. They have difficulties when comparing symbols even in a single subject area, cannot interpret it in various intensional contexts. Findings indicate the necessity of the development of the aimed didactic technologies which, considering the specificity of the sense sphere of the deaf, will initiate the development of their symbolical function.

It wasn’t up to Jones: unavoidable actions and intensional contexts in Frankfurt examples

In saying that it was up to someone whether or not she acted as she did, we are attributing a distinctive sort of power to her. Understanding such power attributions is of broad importance for contemporary discussions of free will. Yet the ‘is up to…whether’ locution and its cognates have largely escaped close examination. This article aims to elucidate one of its unnoticed features, namely that such power attributions introduce intensional contexts, something that is easily overlooked because the sentences that express these attributions admit of both intensional and extensional readings. I argue that this kind of power attribution should inform discussions of Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy, in that an alternative possibility should not be considered robust unless it’s up to the agent whether or not it’s realized. I argue, as well, that understanding robust alternatives in this way sheds light on the relationship between the Frankfurt literature and the Luck Objection to libertarianism.

An approach to the interpretation on intensional contexts

The paper introduces a non-standard analysis of intensional contexts on the ground of generalized approach to semantics construction. The principles of building such kind semantics are consider. As far as I can see it is an idea on domains and anti-domains that lays in the ground a semantics of intensional contexts. Intensional contexts differ from extensional by ascription of specific values to intensional predicates (operators) and, what is more important, by a way of their combination with arguments. Thus constructing operations play the leading role in proposed analysis. The peculiarities of IPL: any expression including intensional predicates and operators has an intension as well as an extension.

Inscriptionalism and Intensionality

Intensional contexts are typically characterised by an apparent failure of either (A) the principle of the inter-substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate, or (B) existential generalisation. The difficulties which are seen to occur do so in contexts involving either modality or the propositional attitudes. In this paper attempts are made to determine whether or not Scheffler’s inscriptional analysis can provide a viable means of accounting for the problems which are thought to occur in intensional contexts. Somewhat unexpectedly, little effort has been made in the past to address this issue. In this paper it is shown that Scheffler’s theory may be employed to account for the difficulties mentioned above, though further work needs to be done to show precisely how his analysis may be adapted so as to handle modal statements. Popular objections to Scheffler’s inscriptionalism are also addressed, particularly in the light of his theory being used to account for the problems of intensionality. It is found that, with certain qualifications, the aforesaid objections do not show Scheffler’s theory to be an unviable means of accounting for the intensionality problems.

On a flawed argument against the KK principle

Externalists in epistemology often reject the KK principle – which says that if a person knows that p, then they know that they know that p. This paper argues that one standard argument against the KK principle that many externalists make is fallacious, as it involves illicit substitution into an intensional context. The fallacy is exposed and discussed.

Xunzi'sSanhuo(Three Types Of Cognitive Delusions)

This article explicates Xunzi's three types of cognitive delusions in Xunzi's Zhengming Pian. The followings are my conclusions: first, general names such as “a white horse,” “a horse,” “a thief,” and “a man” are thought of as proper nouns because the classic Chinese theory of language concerned pragmatics rather than semantics. Second, classic Chinese epistemology does not address conceptual (logical) knowledge or knowledge based on argumentation distinguished from the art of description. Third, Gongsun Long believes in an extreme form of one-name-one-thingism. Fourth, Neo-Moists' theory of inference is based on intensional contexts. Fifth, Hui Shi's position presupposes the art of knowing objects before any verbal expression and suggests the arbitrariness in the expressions of known objects. Sixth, Xunzi's logic and semantics are extensional.

Xunzi’s Sanhuo (Three Types Of Cognitive Delusions)

This article explicates Xunzi’s three types of cognitive delusions in Xunzi’s Zhengming Pian. The followings are my conclusions: first, general names such as “a white horse,” “a horse,” “a thief,” and “a man” are thought of as proper nouns because the classic Chinese theory of language concerned pragmatics rather than semantics. Second, classic Chinese epistemology does not address conceptual (logical) knowledge or knowledge based on argumentation distinguished from the art of description.Third, Gongsun Long believes in an extreme form of one-name-one-thingism. Fourth, Neo-Moists’ theory of inference is based on intensional contexts. Fifth, Hui Shi’s position presupposes the art of knowing objects before any verbal expression and suggests the arbitrariness in the expressions of known objects. Sixth, Xunzi’s logic and semantics are extensional.

Reassessing crosslinguistic variation in clausal comparatives

This paper looks at one area of potential crosslinguistic variation in comparatives. It has recently been claimed that Japanese clausal comparatives lack degree abstraction structures in the complement of yori ‘than’. Based on data from several empirical domains such as predicative adjectival comparatives, intensional contexts, and negative islands, this paper shows that Japanese clausal comparatives do not in general contrast with their English counterparts in the way predicted by the above claim. The syntactic and semantic phenomena observed in Japanese clausal comparatives receive straightforward accounts if we assume that they do involve degree abstraction and degree comparison, along the lines familiar from analyses of their English counterparts.

Fiction and Fictionalism

What is a fictional character? Nothing, according to Mark Sainsbury. Yet it is true to say that there are fictional characters. How? Because there are fictions according to which there are specific individuals. And it can be true to say that Anna Karenina is more intelligent than Emma Bovary. How? Because the truth-value of the sentence is to be assessed under the (false) presupposition that there are such people as Emma and Anna. And it is true to say that Conan Doyle's novels represent Sherlock Holmes, that I have been thinking about Holmes, and that Holmes is a famous character. How? Because such sentences either involve, or can be explained in terms of, intensional verbs or operators, and intensional contexts do not require that something be the thing which is represented, or thought about, or regarded in such a way as to make it famous. Sainsbury offers these strategies as ways for an irrealist—somebody who denies that explaining the nature of fiction requires us to believe in objects which are the characters of fictions—to explain away certain sentences which appear to require exactly such objects to make them true. These irrealist explanations are designed to defuse certain motivations for realism: namely, the apparent commitments of certain sentences to an ontology of fictional characters. Sainsbury's arguments for the adequacy of irrealism are complemented by arguments for the inadequacy of realism, targeted at three major realist views: that fictional characters are abstract things (unlike you and me, who are concrete); that they are occupants of other possible worlds (unlike you and me, who live in the actual world); and that they are non-existent things (capable of being referred to and quantified over as we are, but nevertheless things of a different ontological status).

Pure quotation and general compositionality

Starting from the familiar observation that no straightforward treatment of pure quotation can be compositional in the standard (homomorphism) sense, we introduce general compositionality, which can be described as compositionality that takes linguistic context into account. A formal notion of linguistic context type is developed, allowing the context type of a complex expression to be distinct from those of its constituents. We formulate natural conditions under which an ordinary meaning assignment can be non-trivially extended to one that is sensitive to context types and satisfies general compositionality. As our main example we work out a Fregean treatment of pure quotation, but we also indicate that the method applies to other kinds of context, e.g. intensional contexts.

Alternatives as sources of semantic dependency

This paper focuses on the properties of the Romanian determiner 'vreun', and has two objectives. First, it seeks to provide an adequate description of its restricted distribution. Refining previous observations in the literature (Farkas 2002, 2006), I argue that the occurrence of 'vreun' in intensional contexts is sensitive to epistemic alternatives, and put forward a generalization that captures its use (‘the epistemic constraint’). Second, we aim to provide an explanation for the observed pattern, in a way that situates 'vreun' in a broader typology of dependent indefinites. The proposed account is couched in a unified, alternative-based approach to polarity-sensitivity, due to Chierchia (2006 et seq). In line with this theory, we reduce the differences between 'vreun' and other dependent indefinites to essentially two factors: (i) the types of alternatives these items activate and (ii) the way these alternatives are factored into meaning by alternative-sensitive operators. The present paper can be regarded as part of a more general research program which aims to understand the parameters of variation among dependent indefinites and to seek a principled explanation for the attested diversity.

Liar Paradox and Substitution into Intensional Contexts

John Barker, in two recent essays, raises a variety of intriguing criticisms to challenge my interpretation of the liar paradox and the type of solution I propose in 'Denying the Liar' and 'Denying the Liar Reaffirmed.' Barker continues to believe that I have misunderstood the logical structure of the liar sentence and its expression, and that as a result my solution misfires. I shall try to show that on the contrary my analysis is correct, and that Barker does not properly grasp what my solution to the liar paradox involves. Additionally, I argue that Barker makes fundamental errors in the explanation of liar sentence formulations in intensional contexts and in the classical metatheory he invokes to support his criticisms.