Intelligence Committee Research Articles

BEFORE NBER: WARREN NUTTER’S SOVIET RESEARCH AT THE CIA

Warren Nutter’s work as director of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) Soviet growth project is his best-known contribution to economics and public affairs. Many histories of Sovietology note the oddity of Nutter’s selection as project director, given his apparent lack of prior experience studying the Soviet Union. This paper provides new context for Nutter’s selection to lead the NBER effort. From 1951 to 1952 Nutter was the acting chief of the Economic Capabilities Branch of the CIA’s Office of Research and Reports (ORR), and chairman of the Economic Analysis Subcommittee of the interagency Economic Intelligence Committee. In this capacity he managed at least three major research efforts, including an input-output analysis of the Soviet Union and contributions to two national intelligence estimates. Nutter may have been proposed as director of the NBER project by Robert Amory, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, in 1953. Nutter’s research for the CIA cultivated new analytic capacities for the agency and provided a foundation for his own work on the Soviet Union.

The era of artificial intelligence: what implications for the board of directors?

Purpose Artificial intelligence (AI) is a cutting-edge new reality already having an unprecedented impact on society, the economy and businesses. Its future developments and long-term influence are still largely unknown. This article aims to examine AI’s potential benefits and challenges to corporate governance mechanisms, focusing on the board of directors. Design/methodology/approach The paper theoretically explores the influence of artificial intelligence on the board of directors’ capabilities, roles and functions. Findings Concerning rethinking board functioning in the era of artificial intelligence, the paper analyzes how artificial intelligence can impact the board of directors. It proposes some recommendations on how directors can more effectively integrate artificial intelligence into the boardroom, including establishing an internal artificial intelligence committee composed of experts with technical knowledge dedicated to managing artificial intelligence-related potential threats and opportunities. Practical implications Companies are invited to have some technical knowledge and expertise on artificial intelligence on the boards, fostering directors to upskill themselves in the new artificial intelligence technologies and establishing an ad-hoc internal committee. Policymakers are expected to keep pace with the growing proliferation of artificial intelligence solutions, defining a sharp regulatory framework. Originality/value The study advances knowledge in the corporate governance literature by shedding light on the effects of artificial intelligence on boards of directors and suggesting a set of best practices for its effective implementation.

Engaging industry effectively and ethically in artificial intelligence from the Augmented Artificial Intelligence Committee Standards Workgroup

Engaging industry effectively and ethically in artificial intelligence from the Augmented Artificial Intelligence Committee Standards Workgroup

American Society of Retina Specialists Artificial Intelligence Task Force Report.

Since the Artificial Intelligence Committee of the American Society of Retina Specialists developed the initial task force report in 2020, the artificial intelligence (AI) field has seen further adoption of US Food and Drug Administration-approved AI platforms and significant development of AI for various retinal conditions. With expansion of this technology comes further areas of challenges, including the data sources used in AI, the democracy of AI, commercialization, bias, and the need for provider education on the technology of AI. The overall focus of this committee report is to explore these recent issues as they relate to the continued development of AI and its integration into ophthalmology and retinal practice.

Deepfakes: The Legal Implications

The development of deepfakes began in 2017, when a software developer on the Reddit online platform began posting his creations in which he swapped the faces of Hollywood celebrities onto the faces of adult film artists, while in 2018, the comedic actor Jordan Peele posted a deepfake video of former U.S. President Obama insulting former U.S. President Trump and warning of the dangers of deepfake media. With the viral use of deepfakes by 2019, the U.S. House Intelligence Committee began hearings on the potential threats to U.S. security posed by deepfakes. Unfortunately, deepfakes have become even more sophisticated and difficult to detect. With easy accessibility to the applications of deepfakes, its usage has increased drastically over the last five years. Deepfakes are now designed to harass, intimidate, degrade, and threaten people and often leads to the creation and dissemination of misinformation as well as creating confusion about important state and non-state issues. A deepfake may also breach IP rights e.g., by unlawfully exploiting a specific line, trademark or label. Furthermore, deepfakes may cause more severe problems such as violation of the human rights, right of privacy, personal data protection rights apart from the copyright infringements. While just a few governments have approved AI regulations, the majority have not due to concerns around the freedom of speech. And while most online platforms such as YouTube have implemented a number of legal mechanisms to control the content posted on their platforms, it remains a time consuming and costly affair. A major challenge is that deep fakes often remain indetectable by the unaided human eye, which lead to the development by governments and private platform to develop deep-fake detecting technologies and regulations around their usage. This paper seeks to discuss the legal and ethical implications and responsibilities of the use of deepfake technologies as well as to highlight the various social and legal challenges which both regulators and the society face while considering the potential role of online content dissemination platforms and governments in addressing deep fakes.

Listening to Cairo: British radio monitoring and intelligence gathering, c. 1953-1967

ABSTRACT This article examines the BBC’s radio monitoring service, its relationship with Whitehall, and the CIA’s Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS). Radio monitoring was invaluable for analysing broadcasting in states, such as in Egypt, where the media became state controlled. Listening to radio broadcasts provided invaluable open-source intelligence concerning internal economic and political developments that might have been difficult to collect by more orthodox mechanisms. This article focuses on Anglo-American monitoring of Egyptian ‘political’ broadcasts by Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs) that were widely listened to across the Middle East and East Africa. Egyptian transmissions were characterised by their hostility to Britain’s allies and interests in Iraq, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf, which explains why they were examined in detail by the Joint Intelligence Committee. The evidence shows radio monitoring reports were invaluable for officials on the ground and in Whitehall, but the impact of intelligence analysis of Egypt’s intentions on high level decision making in Whitehall is contestable.

When Oversight Went Awry: Congress and Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century

Congress’ intelligence oversight has gone off the rails. The legislative branch has taken its constitutional responsibilities of surveying and guiding national intelligence and instead practiced rampant partisanship. The formerly bipartisan and sober intelligence committees have become a political battleground for most of the twenty-first century, although each body will occasionally exhibit rationality and responsibility. Congress began by treating intelligence as another issue to be addressed in the context of contemporary politics. In the Trump era, intelligence itself became a central battleground, and the oversight structure was the forum for a presidential impeachment. Seen in three phases, intelligence oversight in Congress has gone from partisanship (2003–2004) to hyperpartisanship (2004–2014) to intermittent dysfunction (2017–present). This assessment considers Congress’ intelligence oversight through numerous case studies and offers positive examples for reform.

A partner, not a combatant: the U.S. Congress, intelligence reform, and civil liberties after Vietnam

ABSTRACT In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, scholars and commentators concerned about civil liberties looked back to the 1970s with an air of nostalgia. Back then, they argued, Congress exposed and constrained executive abuses of civil liberties, most notably through the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the ‘Church Committee’) and the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); whereas, since 9/11, Congress has largely accepted a variety of constitutionally dubious activities as part of the ‘War on Terror.’ This article argues that these accounts get the history wrong. Drawing on the Church Committee’s hearings and reports, internal executive branch communications, and the legislative history of FISA, it makes three core claims. First, the Church Committee was more valuable as a source of historical documentation rather than real-time exposure. Second, executive officials took crucial steps towards intelligence reform before the Church Committee was established. Third, the two legislative fruits of the Church Committee – FISA and the creation of permanent intelligence committees in Congress – were forged in a cooperative, rather than adversarial interbranch environment. Thus, the post-Vietnam Congress is best described as a partner, rather than a combatant, in the process of intelligence reform.

ROLE AND PURPOSE OF NSICOP IN CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

On November 17, 2023, Lisa-Marie Inman, Executive Director, Secretariat, and Jennifer Kleniewski, Senior Review Analyst and Team Lead, at the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), presented the Role and Purpose of NSICOP in Canadian National Security for this year’s West Coast Security Conference. The presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives. The key points discussed were the committee's mandate to provide increased parliamentary oversight over the activities of Canadian intelligence agencies, the content and release of its annual and special reports, and the nonpartisan and representative nature of the committee's composition.
 
 Received: 01-04-2024
 Revised: 01-26-2024

Partisanship and congressional intelligence oversight: the case of the Russia inquiries, 2017-2020

ABSTRACT What patterns of behavior can we observe among the leading figures of US congressional intelligence committees’ Russia inquiries? We argue that current typologies to study the roles of legislators in intelligence oversight do not fully capture the impact of partisanship on overseers’ behavior. Revisiting Loch Johnson’s typology of ‘role definitions’ to account for the behaviour of these legislators, we define four types of congressional investigators to understand how partisanship affected legislators’ behavior during the congressional investigations on Russian interference. We conclude by showing how our role definitions could be used to study congressional intelligence oversight on other high-profile issues.

‘Making the intelligence product of greater use to those for whom it is produced’: lessons from the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, 1971–1976

ABSTRACT This article examines the role played by the National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) and its working group in responding to senior policymaker criticism of IC analytic products. Established in December 1971 and abolished four years later, the NSCIC has received scant attention from intelligence historians despite representing in some ways the most ambitious initiative ever attempted to involve consumers in determining what intelligence was produced and evaluating its quality and usefulness. The NSCIC’s problematic history highlights the challenges still confronting the IC and the study of it may suggest ways to make future intelligence products more useful to consumers.

End of Anglo–Polish Cooperation in Special Operations between April and December 1945

The final months of World War II brought the end of Anglo–Polish cooperation in special operations. Intelligence aspects of this partnership were also important. The scale of wartime intelligence cooperation is shown by Secret Intelligence Service officer Commander Wilfred Dunderdale’s report and the achievements in a special operation in the history of the Polish Section of the Special Operations Executive. The British were concerned that the files of Polish intelligence and the Sixth Bureau dealing with special operations would fall into Moscow’s hands. They also did not intend to provide the authorities in Warsaw with technical achievements of Polish–British cooperation. The Foreign Office and Joint Intelligence Committee did not want to jeopardize efforts to solve the Polish question with the help from the Soviet Union, which controlled most of the prewar area of Poland. The problem was analyzed based on primary sources: archival documents and memories. Analysis shows that the British were not interested in using the resources of the Sixth Bureau and Polish resistance in Soviet-controlled Poland to prepare for a possible conflict with the Soviet Union. Polish émigrés and their agents were an obstacle in relations with Moscow.

EMERGING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND BUILDING STATE RESILIENCE

On November 22, 2022, the Honourable David McGuinty, Chairman of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), presented on Emerging National Security Concerns and Building State Resilience. The key points discussed were what is NSICOP, how NSICOP conducts reviews into Canada’s National Security and Intelligence community, and the future of NSICOP’s mandate. The presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives. Received: 20223-01-02Revised: 2023-01-12

"The Houston Plan": an Unrealized Project of Interaction between American Intelligence Agencies in the Early 1970s

An article based on recently declassified documents from the U. S. National Security Archive reveals the so-called “Houston Plan”. Prepared by the White House and U. S. intelligence officials, it envisioned a range of covert operations from surveillance of political radicals and criminal organizations (such as the Black Panthers) to breaking into the offices of social organizations suspected of disloyalty. The plan, named after Tom Charles Houston, a young White House liaison to the Interagency Intelligence Committee (IIC), played a role in the impeachment of President Richard Nixon by providing evidence of his abuses of the FBI and other executive branch agencies.

The perilous prerogative: An argument for legislating defence intelligence in Canada

AbstractThe National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) has twice reviewed the intelligence activities of CAF/DND and recommended the government provide explicit legislative authority for those activities. In “Defence intelligence and the Crown prerogative in Canada,” Philippe Lagassé rebukes NSICOP's argument and defends the continued reliance on the Crown prerogative. This article proposes that the critiques raised by Lagassé minimize the importance of the legal and operational concerns raised by NSICOP and do not reflect the legal history of Canadian intelligence activities. It also introduces the argument that the DND/CAF may no longer rely on the Crown prerogative for signals intelligence.

Establishing a Hospital Artificial Intelligence Committee to Improve Patient Care.

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in health care is increasing and has shown utility in many medical specialties, especially pathology, radiology, and oncology. Many barriers exist to successfully implement AI programs in the clinical setting. To address these barriers, a formal governing body, the hospital AI Committee, was created at James A. Haley Veterans' Hospital in Tampa, Florida. The AI committee reviews and assesses AI products based on their success at protecting human autonomy; promoting human well-being and safety and the public interest; ensuring transparency, explainability, and intelligibility; fostering responsibility and accountability; ensuring inclusiveness and equity; and promoting AI that is responsive and sustainable. Through the hospital AI Committee, we may overcome many obstacles to successfully implementing AI applications in the clinical setting.

Fungible Citizenship

Fungible Citizenship

Joint Intelligence Committee and Reading the Russian Mindset

On November 23, 2021, Professor Michael Goodman of King's College London, presented on The Joint Intelligence Committee and Reading the Russian Mindset at the 2021 CASIS West Coast Security Conference. The key points discussed in this presentation included an overview of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), evaluation of their predictions and actions against Russian threats, and the conditions they put forward to demonstrate that a country would wage war.

National Security and Parliamentary Review Four Years On

On July 15, 2021, the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Vancouver hosted a digital roundtable titled National Security and Parliamentary Review Four Years On: Is it Working? The presentation was conducted by the Honourable David J. McGuinty, founding chair of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP). The presentation was followed by a question and answer period with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives, which were directed to both Mr. McGuinty and Lisa Marie Inman, Executive Director, Secretariat of NSICOP.

Defence intelligence and the Crown prerogative in Canada

AbstractThis article examines the role of the Crown prerogative in the intelligence activities of the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. Defined as the legal authorities of the Crown as recognized by common law, the prerogative was at the centre of two reports by Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP). These reports questioned the prerogative as a source of authority for defence intelligence and argued for its displacement by parliamentary statute. This article critiques NSICOP’s findings about the prerogative, notably regarding its continuing relevance and the comparisons that were drawn between defence intelligence and Canada's civilian intelligence services. In addition, the article argues that the prerogative is democratically legitimate, being subject to parliamentary limitation and scrutiny, and to judicial review when appropriate. The article concludes that expanding the scope and authorities of defence intelligence is the strongest rationale for displacing the prerogative.