Abstract

The final months of World War II brought the end of Anglo–Polish cooperation in special operations. Intelligence aspects of this partnership were also important. The scale of wartime intelligence cooperation is shown by Secret Intelligence Service officer Commander Wilfred Dunderdale’s report and the achievements in a special operation in the history of the Polish Section of the Special Operations Executive. The British were concerned that the files of Polish intelligence and the Sixth Bureau dealing with special operations would fall into Moscow’s hands. They also did not intend to provide the authorities in Warsaw with technical achievements of Polish–British cooperation. The Foreign Office and Joint Intelligence Committee did not want to jeopardize efforts to solve the Polish question with the help from the Soviet Union, which controlled most of the prewar area of Poland. The problem was analyzed based on primary sources: archival documents and memories. Analysis shows that the British were not interested in using the resources of the Sixth Bureau and Polish resistance in Soviet-controlled Poland to prepare for a possible conflict with the Soviet Union. Polish émigrés and their agents were an obstacle in relations with Moscow.

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