Reviewed by: A Platonic Theory of Moral Education: Cultivating Virtue in Contemporary Democratic Classrooms by Mark E. Jonas and Yoshiaki Nakazawa Frederic Clarke Putnam JONAS, Mark E., and Yoshiaki Nakazawa. A Platonic Theory of Moral Education: Cultivating Virtue in Contemporary Democratic Classrooms. New York: Routledge, 2021. viii + 202 pp. Cloth, $128; eBook, $39.16 The introduction recapitulates the authors’ 2012 article (with James Braun), “Appetite, Reason, and Education in Socrates’ ‘City of Pigs’” (also the appendix to this volume), and points out that nearly all discussions of Socrates’ “ideal society” focus on the kallipolis described in the Republic, assuming that it embodies Socrates’ “perfect” or “ideal” polis, even though he never praises it, and even though he calls it a “luxurious” city with a [End Page 380] “fever.” This approach also tends to dismiss his description of the city that Socrates praises as “true,” “happy,” and “healthy” (Republic 369d–373b)— the egalitarian city of book 2, often (unfortunately) called the “City of Pigs,” because Glaucon says that their diet suggests a “city for pigs” (372d). They further note that the purpose of the conversation about cities in the Republic was not to design a political entity but, rather, to “illuminate justice in the soul,” Socrates and his interlocutors agreeing that it is easier to see justice in something large (a city) than in something small (the soul). The city of the philosopher-kings is not intended to outline a theory of education; the Republic needs to be read alongside, for example, the Laws and the Statesman, both of which argue that every citizen should be taught to be virtuous, because everyone can become more virtuous. Plato believed that moral education has two requirements: moral epiphanies and habituation. The majority of the book fleshes out these two ideas, drawing freely from many of Plato’s writings (the authors’ approach to Plato is “Unitarian” rather than developmental). Chapter 1 defends Socrates and Plato against “intellectualism”—the charge that knowledge alone leads (inevitably) to correct actions and that wrong choices signal a lack of knowledge. Although individual statements can be cited to support the “intellectualist” reading (for example, Protagoras 352b–e), Socrates’ analogies of craftsmen (cobblers, athletes, musicians, orators) show that he believed that habituation—obeying a master over time—is mandatory for growth in virtue (for example, Crito 47b–d, Protagoras 312b, Gorgias 500c–d). Whoever fully knows the right thing will do it, because full knowledge means that one has “rationally assented” and “developed the desire and dispositions [that is, the skills] that provide the motivational impetus to perform the act.” Chapter 2 shows that the chiseling off of the soul’s “encrustations” calls for stories, myths, poetry, music, gymnasia, and games (Republic 377a–c, 399a–c, 404d–e, 410b–411e), a process that cultivates the cardinal virtues (Republic 401d–402a) and leads to (chapter 3) “kinship” between the individual and the virtues (see Laws 653b–c). Based mainly on the Seventh Letter, but also the Republic, Symposium, Lysis, and Alcibiades I, chapter 4 concludes that the role of dialogue in cultivating virtue is not to argue students into doing what is right but, rather, to induce an “epiphanic flash” in the student (this is not the “aha!” of intellectual discovery), which entails the momentary desire and motivation to do what is right (Seventh Letter 341c). Glaucon, for example, sees that he has misunderstood justice (Republic 586a–b). For students who submit to habituation under the direction of a wise mentor, this flash may lead to the pursuit of virtue (but does not always, as both Glaucon and Alcibiades show [Republic 494d–e, Symposium 216b–c]). Using Glaucon as their primary example, in chapter 5 the authors analyze Socrates’ pedagogy—his method of inducing epiphanies, which has three aspects: (1) the philosophical (the mentor knows what virtue he hopes to inculcate); (2) the psychological (the mentor understands his students’ barriers to epiphanies, as well as his own shortcomings); and (3) [End Page 381] the pedagogical (the mentor develops a means to overcome those barriers and induce an epiphany). Chapters 6 and 7 apply this Platonic pedagogy to cultivating virtue in young people in a classroom, beginning with a lengthy discussion of...