Insurgency In Afghanistan Research Articles

The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISK): an assessment of current operations

ABSTRACT The rise of the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISK) from 2015 to the present began largely unnoticed as an insurgency in Afghanistan and has recently been observed as a growing terrorist threat around the globe. This assessment examines the historical precedent, evolution, and strategic objectives of ISK by way of delving into its origins in the jihadist extremist template, and into its operations by area, which increasingly are those outside of its immediate provincial boundaries, expanding into regional and beyond. Tied to its kinetic operations is a robust and modern media capability and strategy that is serving to elevate the status of the group, enable it a global networked capacity, and draw recruits and other resources. While remaining tied to the hierarchy of IS central, ISK is free to perpetuate extremist ideology and brutal tactics as envisioned by early IS originator Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The upward cycle of, and battlefield momentum gained by ISK in both the physical world and online presents both a challenge and an urgent necessity for counter-terrorism strategies in both temporal realms.

Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: Characteristics, actions and battlefield operationalization

The longest war in the history of America resulted in an Afghan Taliban victory. Despite astronomical material and capacity superiority of the American-led NATO forces vis-à-vis Afghan Taliban, the latter overcame the greater forces and captured Kabul in a lightning-fast sweep across the country. Failure of the US to realize a superior military force in achieving a political victory on the field lies in the characteristics, actions, and effective operationalization of Afghan Taliban’s warfare tactics on the battleground. Tribalism, networked structures, and innovative recruiting principles, coupled with the Afghan government(s) own inefficiencies and rampant corruption led to the demise of American power in Afghanistan.

Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: a comparative analysis between 1996 and 2021

The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 has significant implications for the country, the region, and the international community. The group's past government was marked by human rights abuses and support for terrorism, which raises concerns about their ability to govern effectively and address the country's challenges. Comparing the different approaches taken by the Taliban in 1996 and 2021 to achieve power, as well as the group's behavioral differences in both moments, through their speeches and concern for the image caused abroad, it is possible to notice that the new established government breaks, at least in public image, with the group's stereotype, trying to adapt to the new international scenario, which is very different from the late 1990s. The veracity of the statements made by Taliban representatives in Afghanistan regarding the measures that would be taken and the caution for the maintenance of human rights is not the subject of study in this work. It only seeks to demonstrate the government's intention to establish connections with the international community and the unprecedented concern for the repercussion of their actions abroad. The Taliban's relationship with neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Iran, and China will also shape Afghanistan's future, as well as commercial agreements with countries such as Russia, which can be decisive for managing the Afghan economy (BHATIA, 2021).

ISAF and European military transformation: German, Swedish and French counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2003–2014

This article examines the role of a subset of European militaries in responding to the Afghan insurgency during their deployment as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While part of a multinational coalition, their heterogeneous military transformation was crucial to fighting the insurrection and confronting American pressure. In comparing the counterinsurgency innovations of Germany, Sweden, and France, we find that Germany acted reluctantly, Sweden largely emulated American doctrine, and France became a counterinsurgency pioneer. We argue that these developments took time and were accompanied by conflicts within ISAF and between the respective national military and political leaderships.

“Аль-Каида” и “Талибан”: амбивалентное партнерство

The nature of the Taliban–al-Qaeda relationship has long been a major controversy among experts. Some argue that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are synonymous in many respects and that their ideology and objectives are closely intertwined. Some believe that this is a relationship of convenience or necessity for both groups, while others insist on deeper personal and ideological ties. Given this public discourse, the author analyzes the ambivalent relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban over the past 25 years, which has always been of business nature (comprehensive assistance in exchange for sanctuary), but never a political alliance. Al-Qaeda’s globalist plans to create a mythical caliphate have always contradicted the Taliban’s modest goals: to restore order in the country by pacifying corrupt warlords, to form an efficient government that enforces Sharia law, and to achieve international recognition. At the initial stage, the al-Qaeda leadership did not comply with the restrictions imposed on them by the Taliban and behaved independently, which resulted in foreign intervention and the loss of power. The author concludes that the strategic goals of al-Qaeda posed a direct threat to the nationally oriented goals of the Taliban. However, in the 2000s, the Taliban’s ties to al-Qaeda were important for spreading the insurgency in Afghanistan, although al-Qaeda’s military contribution on the battlefield was very modest. The author focuses on the weakening of opportunities and the degradation of the influence of al-Qaeda under powerful pressure from the coalition forces, the Afghan and Pakistani governments. In recent years, al-Qaeda, amid the victories of the Taliban, has begun to rebuild its positions in Afghanistan. The article shows the dependence of the al-Qaeda leadership, which has nowhere to hide, on the new regime in Kabul, which allows the Taliban to better control the militants of this terrorist organization.

Sovjetska intervencija u Avganistanu u početnoj fazi rata sa gledišta jugoslovenske vojne nauke

The paper analyses the attitude of Yugoslav military science to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the initial phase of the war based on the materials developed at the Department of Strategy of the School of National Defense at the Center of Higher Military Schools of the YPA "Marshal Tito". The authors of the classified learning material "The military intervention of the USSR in Afghanistan, 1979-1989" sacrificed the informational and analytical side to the needs of propaganda. At the beginning of the 1980s Yugoslav military science expressed no vision in this material, they neglected the analysis of tactics of anti-partisan operations in the mountainous areas and did not notice modern phenomena in the guerilla operations of the Afghan insurgents. The predictions were obvious.Also, they did not mention the existence of militant fundamentalism as a factor in the guerrilla operations in the East.

De-Talibanization and the Onset of Insurgency in Afghanistan

This article examines the reasons for the rise of the Taliban and the onset of the insurgency in Afghanistan after the 2001 U.S. invasion, using counterfactual and path dependence analysis to bolster its arguments. We argue that the U.S. decision to de-Talibanize was a critical juncture, after which the rise of insurgency was far harder to prevent. The total rejection of the Taliban translated into the under-representation of Pashtuns in the Afghan government, delivering power to ethnic minorities at their expense. De-Talibanization led the United States to support strongmen to hunt the Taliban, but they were predatory, creating grievances that the Taliban exploited to recruit. Finally, de-Talibanization led many Taliban to flee to Pakistan, pushing them into the country most opposed to Afghanistan new political order. The lessons of the U.S. experience in Afghanistan suggest the necessity of a strategy for managing defeated enemies after an initial military victory.

Support of the Afghan Resistance Movement by the Administration of US President J. Carter (1978–1980)

The aim of the article is to investigate, on the basis of American sources, the forms and means of support provided by the United States of America (both unilateral and mediated by the Allies) to the Afghan Resistance Movement in 1978–1980, as well as the factors that influenced the nature of that support. At the core of the research methodology is the method of a content analysis of historical sources, problem-chronological, typological and comparative methods. Main results and conclusions. The US support for the Afghan opposition from 1978 to 1980 in the USSR was exaggerated and became only an excuse used to justify the Soviet intervention in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. From April 1978 to December 1979, Carter Administration limited itself to an information campaign and to providing non-military assistance to the Afghan insurgents. This support included medicines, food rations, communications equipment, etc. It was not until the early 1980s that the United States developed the Hidden Action Program with a budget of $ 30 million which provided the Mujahideen with Soviet-made small arms, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China and Egypt had been involved in the implementation of the Program. However, the volume of military assistance as well as the quality of the weapons could not significantly increase the Mujahideen’s combat capability. The military and technical superiority of the Soviet and Afghan troops remained significant. The US politicians, analysts as well as the Mujahideen field commanders noted insufficiency and lack and effectiveness of the US aid. However, the Carter Administration had managed to forge contacts with the Afghan opposition, to form a coalition of states around the Hidden Action Program, to develop and test ways to acquire weapons and their delivery routes to Pakistan and beyond to Afghanistan. This experience would later be taken into account and used by the R. Reagan Administration. In addition, the US support had a positive effect on the moral and psychological state of the Afghan insurgents. Practical significance. The main conclusions and factual material can be used to study the Afghan crisis as part of the Cold War. Originality. The US policy regarding the Afghan Resistance Movement is examined against the backdrop of deteriorating Soviet-American relations in connection with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Scientific novelty. The ways and forms of the US support for the Afghan Resistance Movement at the initial stage of the Afghan crisis are specified for the first time. Type of article: descriptive.

The Afghan “Fog of War”

Abstract The terrorist attacks of 9/11 took the USA and NATO by surprise, as they are still under the euphoric effect of celebrating the fall of the Eastern European ideological walls and the collapse of the communist bloc. The immediate response of the military operations led to the neutralization of the Taliban forces or more precisely to their removed from political power and denial the influence of Al Qaeda. The purely military approach dominated the initial kinetic clashes and conquered the physical terrain but failed to dominate the society marked by perennial conflicts, widespread corruption, poverty and multiple ethnic and tribal fragmentations. The Afghan insurgency that formed seems to have managed to slow down and finally block the reconstruction and development effort made by the strong NATO-centred coalitions. The article examines the causes of the Afghan “fog of war” that led to this great failure and makes recommendations that must be taken into account in future military conflicts.

Insurgency in Afghanistan: Challenge to Liberal Peace and State Building

Insurgency in Afghanistan: Challenge to Liberal Peace and State Building

Introduction – Foreign fighters and multinational armies: from civil conflicts to coalition wars, 1848–2015

ABSTRACTThe last two decades have seen the term ‘foreign fighter’ enter our everyday vocabulary. The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Syrian Civil War and the rise and fall of the Islamic State group have sparked public interest in the phenomenon of people choosing to leave their own countries and fight in a foreign conflict. Foreign fighters, their origins, motives, activities and potential danger to their home countries have become subjects of debate, attracting contributions from politicians, military personnel, the media, security analysts, political scientists and legal scholars, but to a much lesser extent from historians. The 10 articles of this special issue showcase new historical research on foreign military labour, including an overview of the early modern period and numerous case studies which cover the last 165 years and stretch over five continents. The aim is to better understand the experiences and challenges faced by both the foreigners and the host country, particularly its armed forces, and to highlight the significance of these trends to the contemporary debate on foreign fighters. Designed after a conference held in June 2018 at the Centre for History at Sciences Po, Paris, the issue is inspired by a number of key questions. What motivated individuals to join a foreign conflict or army? How were they treated and perceived by their hosts, and, when taken prisoner, by the enemy? How complete was their integration in the host’s combat formations? How did foreigners perform in battle? What happened to them after the war ended?

An investigation into microcycles of violence by the Taliban

This study investigated the notion of near-repeat victimisation in the context of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Applying methods originally developed for epidemiological research the current study found strong evidence that attacks by the Taliban insurgency occurred in microcycles of localised bursts of terrorist events. Nearly 40% of the 305 attacks analysed by the Taliban in 2016 took place within 5 miles and 2 weeks of each other. A binary logistic regression showed that, compared to other strategies, attacks were more likely to occur in microcycles when they were on national or provincial capitals, non-fatal and included bombings or armed assaults. These findings are in accordance with previous research conducted in other countries, suggesting that globally, terrorist organisations face similar strategic options and constraints. The results have implications for the understanding of terrorist campaigns at a more disaggregated level, for the prediction of future attacks and for counter-terrorism strategies.

Aid, exclusion, and the local dynamics of insurgency in Afghanistan

Can developmental aid bring peace to war-torn communities? The current literature is divided on this issue. One line of reasoning suggests that aid is likely to decrease violence by improving employment and prosperity, thereby making participation in conflict more costly. Another view cites evidence showing an association between aid projects and increased insurgent activity. Addressing this contradiction, we argue that different types of aid projects lead to different outcomes, as some projects foster an unequal distribution of benefits within communities. Our reasoning draws on qualitative accounts from conflict zones, recent research on how grievances associated with exclusion can foster civil war onset, and experimental findings regarding perceived inequity and punishment. Building on this scholarship, we use a recently developed event-matching methodology to offer insight from contemporary Afghanistan. Aid projects that tend to exclude portions of the community yield more insurgent activity in their wake than more inclusive projects. These results shed light on why some aid projects reduce violence while others do not, emphasizing that efforts to ‘win hearts and minds’ can be a source of both contentment and contestation.

Forces of heresy versus forces of conservation: making sense of Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan’s and the Taleban’s positions in the Afghan insurgency

ABSTRACTEthnicity and ideology are frequently used to determine whether an armed group is hostile or friendly vis-à-vis the state. By contrast, I argue that the social structure of insurgent movements holds more explanatory power for their respective positions than ethnicity or ideology. To illustrate this, I apply Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of a contest between forces of ‘conservation’ and forces of ‘heresy’ to the current Afghanistan war. I demonstrate that the social structure of the Taleban renders them prone to ‘heresy’, while the formerly second biggest insurgent group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s party, has rather been an impeded force of ‘conservation.’

An Analysis of Insurgency in Afghanistan (2001- 2016)

Afghanistan has been wrapped in insurgency since the Russian withdrawal in 1979, followed by civil war. The emergence of Taliban to power with their self-styled type of imposition of Islamic law compelled the great powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. September 2001 was a turning point in the history of Afghanistan as the NATO forces made their entry under the garb of security. The establishment of a democratic government in the country could not help in uprooting terrorism and insurgency from the country. Since the period of Russian Withdrawal, the country witnessed different eras of Taliban and the democratic governments coupled with the NATO mission. It is a fact that during the long stay of the presence of coalition forces in Afghanistan, insurgency could not be completely uprooted since new threats from different groups of insurgents have overpowered the country. Some of the provinces are hit hard by insurgency and terrorism. Efforts to hold peace talks were always dashed to the ground when the ISAF started its military operations against the terrorists.

An Analysis of Insurgency in Afghanistan (2001 - 2016)

An Analysis of Insurgency in Afghanistan (2001 - 2016)

The Value of Respect: What Does it Mean for an Army?

ABSTRACTThe Australian Army has adopted “respect” as a new addition to the existing trio of values, “courage, initiative and teamwork.” This article explores what respect may mean as an army value. The significance of respect surrounding two incidents involving Australian Defence Force personnel while on duty in Afghanistan is considered. The first is the so-called “green on blue” attack by an Afghan National Army soldier killing three Australian soldiers on 29 August 2012. The second concerns allegations of mutilation of suspected Afghan insurgents’ corpses by soldiers attached to an Australian Special Forces Unit on 28 April 2013. The incidents have resulted in internal military investigations: in the second incident, with a view to possible prosecution for breach of the law of armed conflict and related disciplinary offences; and in the case of the green on blue attack, leading to a civilian coronial inquest. This article discusses the training and modelling of behaviour required to instil such a value as respect.

The Cost of War

Spending almost US$700 billion to combat insurgents in Afghanistan, the U.S. population should be hopeful that they “bought” something of value as the Afghan War concludes. This exploratory study focuses on evaluating operations within Afghanistan by accounting for enemy and civilian losses. Integration of civilian losses offers an opportunity to evaluate operations that represent societal losses to the Afghan people. Regression estimates using zero-inflated negative-binomial models indicate that military operations resulted in more civilian casualties than enemy losses.

The Revenge Game: U.S Foreign Policy During Afghan-Soviet War and Afghan-Pakistan Falling Into Hell

<p>The U.S Foreign policy during the Soviets encroachment of Afghanistan at the height of Cold War has been evaluated, as well as its negative effects in Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak). During 1979, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R) landed on Afghanistan in order to secure Warm Water Ports and Persian Gulf Oil. (This was called as the “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan”). By having this situation, The U.S government established a mission in Afghanistan which consisted on two main purposes. One of them was to stand against the invasion of Afghanistan provoked by U.S.S.R. and the second one was to provide Afghan Mujahedeen Movements with some help and be prepared for the coming situation. So, the provision of the most dangerous weapons and the need of billions of dollars were made to these fundamentalist Afghan mujahedeen. Thus, they could protect themselves and fight against the U.S.S.R invasion. As a matter of fact, the Taliban groups were founded due to U.S policy. Nevertheless, the establishment of them has become the biggest general threat to global peace, particularly for Afghanistan and Pakistan. This research consists of three parts which are going to be developed in the order as follows: The internal milieu of Afghanistan and the intervention by U.S.S.R, The U.S policy interests and the outcomes of these policies, The Afghan and Pakistan consequences which were gotten by these policies. This Research is going to be a new source of knowledge for understanding the U.S foreign policy during this War and their negative effects on Afghanistan and Pakistan such as refugee’s settlement and number of other problems. Although Americans just revenge from Soviets but this game also destroyed the Pakistan. Also as an explanation on the nowadays coming international terrorism and how the Afghan insurgents have become strong enough. </p>

Cognitivism, prospect theory, and foreign policy change: a comparative analysis of the politics of counterinsurgency in Malaya and Afghanistan

This article investigates the cognitive limitations on policy change in counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts by examining why American decision-makers failed to revise their government strategy substantially while fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan in 2003–2014 and why their British counterparts were more successful in adjusting their policies in the Malayan insurgency in 1948–1954. Unlike most of the COIN literature that concentrates on military strategy and tactics, the analysis of government policy-making in Malaya holds some important political lessons for American leaders today despite differences between the insurgencies in Afghanistan and British Malaya. As a response to the criticism of COIN studies in general that they lack theoretical guidance, this article utilizes an integrated cognitivist-prospect theory framework. It is argued that some of the COIN literature mistakenly suggests that a more difficult strategic situation was primarily responsible for American failure in Afghanistan. Instead, American decision-makers faced a more difficult task cognitively than their British counterparts, as policy change in Afghanistan would have required greater ideational change. American principals were much more attached to their beliefs emotionally, had no alternative problem representation, and had to shift between frames in order to engineer a response that was more in line with events on the ground in Afghanistan. Regarding prospect theory, findings indicate that gains frames appear to be unhelpful in monitoring progress until catastrophic failure endangers the reference point, and that decision-makers often have more than one reference point to attune their policies to, which often results in suboptimal choices with regard to at least one reference point.