Support of the Afghan Resistance Movement by the Administration of US President J. Carter (1978–1980)

Abstract

The aim of the article is to investigate, on the basis of American sources, the forms and means of support provided by the United States of America (both unilateral and mediated by the Allies) to the Afghan Resistance Movement in 1978–1980, as well as the factors that influenced the nature of that support. At the core of the research methodology is the method of a content analysis of historical sources, problem-chronological, typological and comparative methods. Main results and conclusions. The US support for the Afghan opposition from 1978 to 1980 in the USSR was exaggerated and became only an excuse used to justify the Soviet intervention in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. From April 1978 to December 1979, Carter Administration limited itself to an information campaign and to providing non-military assistance to the Afghan insurgents. This support included medicines, food rations, communications equipment, etc. It was not until the early 1980s that the United States developed the Hidden Action Program with a budget of $ 30 million which provided the Mujahideen with Soviet-made small arms, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China and Egypt had been involved in the implementation of the Program. However, the volume of military assistance as well as the quality of the weapons could not significantly increase the Mujahideen’s combat capability. The military and technical superiority of the Soviet and Afghan troops remained significant. The US politicians, analysts as well as the Mujahideen field commanders noted insufficiency and lack and effectiveness of the US aid. However, the Carter Administration had managed to forge contacts with the Afghan opposition, to form a coalition of states around the Hidden Action Program, to develop and test ways to acquire weapons and their delivery routes to Pakistan and beyond to Afghanistan. This experience would later be taken into account and used by the R. Reagan Administration. In addition, the US support had a positive effect on the moral and psychological state of the Afghan insurgents. Practical significance. The main conclusions and factual material can be used to study the Afghan crisis as part of the Cold War. Originality. The US policy regarding the Afghan Resistance Movement is examined against the backdrop of deteriorating Soviet-American relations in connection with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Scientific novelty. The ways and forms of the US support for the Afghan Resistance Movement at the initial stage of the Afghan crisis are specified for the first time. Type of article: descriptive.