UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYEES INSURANCE PROGRAM, CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY FORM INEFFECTIVE ABSENT SIGNATURE OF INSURED; WITNESS AFFIDAVITS INMATERIAL Hightower v. Kirksey, __ F.3d __, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS (7th Cir. Oct. 8, 1998) Pink Kirksey, a U.S. Postal Service employee, obtained a life insurance policy from Metropolitan Life under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA). FEGLIA is a group life insurance program available to federal employees administered by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, which purchases private life insurance policies under the program for the employees. Pursuant to FEGLIA and his coverage under the Metropolitan Life policy, Mr. Kirksey named his wife Maude beneficiary a 1978 designation of beneficiary form. Maude Kirksey died June 1989. Under the terms of the policy, if a designated beneficiary predeceased the insured, the proceeds of the policy belong to any children of the decedent insured. When Pink Kirksey died 1995, his daughter Charlene Hightower sought benefits but was opposed by Lessie Kirksey, sister of Pink Kirksey. To support her claim for benefits, Lessie Kirksey relied on a designation of beneficiary form dated July 19, 1989 naming her beneficiary replacement of Mr. Kirksey's widow, Maude. Although two witnesses had the form, Mr. Kirksey himself had not. The Court ruled this omission to absolutely bar any effect of the form. The Court consequently upheld Ms. Hightower's claim as daughter-beneficiary. According to the Court, the statute establishing the FEGLIA program requires that any beneficiary change form be by the insured. The statute, 28 U.S.C. [section] 8705(a), provides that a beneficiary designation be in a and writing received before death the employing office, and expressly provides that beneficiary designations wills or other documents have force or effect. See 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24897 at *5. The Appeals Court enforced the language literally, stating that both signature and witnessing were required to designate a beneficiary. In the absence of a change of beneficiary from the deceased wife to the sister, the policy was to be paid to the insured's children by default as provided the statutory scheme. The Court further ruled that the insured's intent to designate a beneficiary could not be legally established by affidavits of the witness or other extrinsic evidence of insured intent. Without a signature, the beneficiary change was a nullity. In addition to basing its decision on the literal language of the statute, the Appeals Court noted that the current language of Section 8705(a) was enacted a 1966 amendment to the FEGLIA statute. Prior to the amendment, the statute did not specifically require that insurance policies issued to federal employees covered by FEGLIA be and witnessed. (see 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS at * 6). Prior to the 1966 amendment, courts had found substantial compliance with beneficiary designation procedures to be sufficient, a view accord with the common law of life insurance beneficiary designation most states. According to the 7th Circuit, the substantial compliance precedents of FEGLIA were no longer valid because of the express language of the 1966 amendment. The Court reasoned that if Congress had wanted to adhere to the pre-1966 precedents, it would not have added the relatively clear words signed and witnessed to the statute. Other recent federal court decisions support this aspect of the Kirksey holding. See, e.g., Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 810 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd, 324 U.S. App. D.C. 204, 111 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, _____ U.S. _____, 118 S.Ct. 167, 139 L.Ed. 2d 111 (1997) (partially completed beneficiary change form ineffective absent insured's signature); Ward v. Stratton, 988 F. 2d 65, 67 (8th Cir. 1993)(by adding requirement of signature 1966 amendment, Congress intended to eliminate practice of permitting beneficiary change by less formal documentation such as unwitnessed holographic note); Metropolitan Life Ins. …
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