Much of the contemporary theorizing about the growing and diverging body of global regulatory regimes conspicuously avoids dealing with problems of their legality. However, it would be erroneous to think that the mission of this scholarship will be completed if theorists identify criteria that regulatory instruments must satisfy in order to qualify for the status of ‘law’. If this were the case, a number of the existing regulatory instruments would remain under the radar, destined to be classified as “unidentified normative objects” (UNO). This essay contains two main parts. The first part tackles the problem of normativity. If UNOs are really normative instruments, as they are commonly taken to be, it is necessary to elucidate in what ways they can be said to display normativity and how, if at all, this is any different from the normativity of paradigmatic legal rules. In this part, I will unload the two how questions of normativity. Whereas the first refers to the epistemological problem of how we are to ascertain normative statements (norms) and differentiate them from “is-statements”, the second opens up the perspective of practical rationality, by asking how norms provide us with reasons for action. The first part of the paper concludes that there is nothing special about the normativity of law. It will be demonstrated that law’s normative force competes with the normative force of other normative orders, and that its higher level of efficiency should not be attributed to its special sort of normativity, but to the combined effects of law’s normativity and its other typical features – institutionalization and (coercive) guarantees. The second part will be concerned with applying the findings of the first part to two paradigmatic cases of UNOs – regulatory instruments of the World Health Organization and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This analysis will reveal that although the former qualify for the status of traditional international legal instruments, their degree of normativity – understood as the capacity to give rise to obligations – is very low. On the other hand, although latter instruments do not appear to pass the threshold of ‘legality’, they manage to display a surprisingly high level of normative force. Results of the undertaken analysis will, hopefully, bring more clarity in the burgeoning GAL literature.
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