Direct Democratic Institutions Research Articles

Zero-Sum Democracy? The Effects of Direct Democracy on Representative Participation

Direct democracy has received increasing attention in the past decades, from both the academic and political spheres. Moreover, institutions of direct democracy have also been introduced more frequently throughout the world, often with the aim of improving the democratic process. However, the impact of direct democracy on the behaviour of the citizenry in representative democracy is not yet clear. This study therefore focuses on the relationship between the institutions of direct democracy and turnout in representative elections. I expect that when institutions of direct democracy fulfil a task that is traditionally part of representative democracy, electoral participation declines (zero-sum proposition). Conversely, institutions where citizens are free to add new issues to the political arena (initiatives) would positively affect turnout (positive-sum proposition). I test my argument for a panel of democracies between 1980 and 2005, and find that some institutions of direct democracy compete with representative democracy while others complement it.

The hidden cost of direct democracy: How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives

Citizen initiatives and referendums play an important role in modern democracies, from treaty ratifications in the European Union to gay marriage in California, to the control of foreign workers in Switzerland. Departing from the classic opposition between direct and representative democracy, we study the equilibrium effects of direct democracy institutions on the incentives and selection of elected officials. We find that facilitating direct democracy induces a negative spiral on politicians’ role and contribution to society, which may dominate any direct benefit. The theory offers predictions on reelection probabilities and politicians’ performance consistent with recent evidence from the US states.

Are Opinion Leaders Better Represented?

Few studies have analyzed the effect of political engagement on legislators’ responsiveness. This article focuses on opinion leaders defined as citizens who regularly discuss politics and who attempt to persuade others to change their viewpoint. It investigates whether opinion leaders are better represented compared to other voters. Taking advantage of the Swiss institution of direct democracy, we combine roll call votes and information from popular votes to compare the voting behavior of legislators and citizens on exactly the same policy proposals. We thus overcome limitations pertaining to the lack of identical information on elites’ and citizens’ preferences that is common in the literature. Our findings show that opinion leaders are better represented than the rest of the electorate on those instances where both sub-groups disagree, and that issue salience does not increase responsiveness to rank-and-file voters. These findings have important implications for understanding unequal representation.

Are opinion leaders better represented?

Few studies have analysed the effect of political engagement on legislators’ responsiveness. This article focuses on opinion leaders defined as citizens who regularly discuss politics and who attempt to persuade others to change their viewpoint. It investigates whether opinion leaders are better represented compared to other voters. Taking advantage of the Swiss institution of direct democracy, the article combines roll-call votes and information from popular votes to compare the voting behaviour of legislators and citizens on exactly the same policy proposals. It thus overcomes limitations pertaining to the lack of identical information on elites’ and citizens’ preferences that is common in the literature. The findings show that opinion leaders are better represented than the rest of the electorate in those instances where both sub-groups disagree, and that issue salience does not increase responsiveness to rank-and-file voters. These findings have important implications for understanding unequal representation.

Political Conflict and Direct Democracy: Explaining Initiative Use 1920‐2011

AbstractPolitical competition is the engine for representative democracy. Within the representation mechanics I look at the political space, the dimensionality of political conflict, and how parties try to affect the relative salience of different dimensions by using direct democratic institutions. The leading question is how we can explain initiative use. The paper asks how the costs and benefits of using initiatives affect parties when they decide whether to use this instrument or not. The major argument is that when party competition increases, we will see higher initiative frequencies because parties try to affect the saliency of specific issues to increase their electoral bases. I analyze annual submission rates, the content of proposed initiatives, and the changing share of partisan actors behind initiatives. The findings highlight that the consequences of direct democratic institutions go beyond changing policy outcomes. For the specific case at hand, Switzerland from 1920 to 2011, it is shown that despite numerous opposite claims, there has been no underlying change in strategy or equilibrium but just a slow evolution of underlying factors such as institutional requirements and partisan competition.

Vetoing and Inaugurating Policy Like Others Do: Evidence on Spatial Interactions in Voter Initiatives

A sizeable literature studies whether governments strategically interact with each other through policy-diffusion, learning, fiscal and yardstick competition. This paper asks whether, in the presence of direct democratic institutions, spatial interactions additionally result from voters’ direct actions. The proposed mechanism is that the voters’ actions in vetoing a decision or inaugurating a preferred policy by a binding initiative in their jurisdiction can potentially have spillover effects on the actions of voters and special interest groups of neighboring jurisdictions. Utilizing data on around 1,800 voter-petitions across over 12,000 German municipalities in 2002-09, we find that a jurisdiction’s probability of hosting a petition is positively driven by the neighbors’ direct democratic activity. These effects are persistent, and are stronger for more visible instruments of direct democracy. The interactions are also mostly driven by petitions in same or similiar policy areas, and are stronger in towns with relatively more per capita newspapers.

The impact of direct democracy on state spending priorities

Do direct democracy institutions affect governmental policy? Previous research on the American states has generated a disparate variety of findings, so there is no scholarly consensus on this question. We argue that many earlier works were limited by their focus on single policy areas or static analyses. To overcome these issues, we analyze yearly data on governmental spending priorities across a full array of policy areas in the 50 states from 1982 through 2011. Our results clearly show that direct democracy states devote more resources to collective goods policies while non-direct democracy states emphasize particularized benefits. This difference occurs because public preferences in direct democracy states are more closely aligned with policy priorities than is the case in states without direct democracy institutions.

Does direct democracy make for better citizens? A cautionary warning based on cross-country evidence

It has been shown that both formal existence and actual use of direct democratic institutions have effects on a number of variables such as fiscal policies, quality of governance but also economic growth. Further, it has been argued that direct democratic institutions would not only have an impact on policy outcomes but influence citizen participation and attitudes toward politics. For the first time, these conjectures are tested in a large cross-country sample here. Overall, we do not find strong effects and some of the significant correlations are rather small substantially. In contrast to previous studies, voter turnout is not higher when direct democracy is available or used. Further, and also in contrast to previous studies, citizens do not express a greater interest in politics in countries with direct democracy institutions. Finally, they display lower trust in government and parties but not in parliament. These results shed some doubt on the hope that direct democracy would make for better citizens.

How to tame two Leviathans? Revisiting the effect of direct democracy on local public expenditure in a federation

We explore how the presence of direct democracy across hierarchical levels of government in a federation affects the level of public expenditure. In so doing we revisit the effect of direct democratic institutions on public policies. Particularly, we are interested whether the effect of upper-level (state) direct democratic institutions on lower-level expenditure varies with lower-level direct democracy. Empirically, we exploit the large institutional variation in the degree of direct democracy both for state (cantons) and local governments (municipalities) in Switzerland. Considering 119 municipalities belonging to 22 cantons for the period 1993–2007, we find that the cantonal fiscal referendum increases local spending for those municipalities without fiscal referenda, while this effect is significantly reduced for municipalities that also avail of referenda. This suggests that upper-level fiscal restraint can be undone by lower-level profligacy if direct-democratic control is limited to the upper level.

Correlates and Determinants of Direct Democracy

This paper studies correlates and determinants of direct democracy institutions (DDIs), such as referendums and initiatives, based on the premise that constitutions themselves are endogenous. Our sample covers as many as 132 countries from 1950 to 2006. We find that the likelihood that a country includes DDIs in its constitution increases over time, particularly during the 1990s and 2000s. In our econometric analysis, we employ a two-tier approach, the first tier analyzing the time-invariant factors associated with the existence of DDIs, the second tier focusing on changes in time-variant factors. We discover that (i) new constitutions make the introduction of DDIs more likely; (ii) the degree of democratization is positively related to constitutions containing DDIs; (iii) an increase in the number of riots and assassinations raises the likelihood of constitutionally anchoring DDIs; (iv) if political leaders achieved power or were removed from office through irregular means, the introduction of DDIs is more likely; if they leave office due to health reasons, DDIs are less likely to be included in the constitution; and (v) religious fractionalization is negatively associated with the possibility of referendums.

Public Opinion and Judicial Behavior in Direct Democracy Systems: Gay Rights in the American States

AbstractAlthough the U.S. judiciary is designed to be an independent and counter-majoritarian arbiter of the law, many states feature electoral institutions that may expose judges to public pressure. Scholars have demonstrated that judicial elections provide a clear link between public opinion and judicial decision making that may undermine the ability of courts to act in counter-majoritarian ways to protect minority rights. We extend this line of inquiry by examining whether direct democracy institutions have a similar effect of enhancing the impact of public opinion on judicial behavior and reducing the likelihood of judges voting in favor of minority rights. Empirical results from an analysis of gay rights cases in the American states from 1981 to 2004 provide evidence that direct democracy, in conjunction with electoral retention methods, significantly increases the effect of public opinion on judicial decisions.

Participation and Political Equality in Direct Democracy: Educative Effect or Social Bias

AbstractThis paper analyses the moderating effect of direct democracy on the relationship between socioeconomic status and electoral participation. A sceptical position holds that direct democracy increases social bias in the electorate as issues are too complex and demanding. Participatory democrats in contrast invoke an educative effect of direct democratic institutions, thus decreasing social bias within the electorate. To test both arguments we use data from the Swiss cantons and estimate cross‐level interactions of socioeconomic and direct democracy variables on electoral participation. First differences between effects in the least and most direct democratic cantons are not statistically significant. This result may be seen as relief for sceptics as well as dampener for proponents of direct democracy.

O niektórych osobliwościach Konstytucji V Republiki Francuskiej

In the article, the distinctive features of the Constitution of the 5th Republic are abalyzed. A brief discussion on some of the constitutional institutions showed the originality and novelty of the political system that was adopted after 1958. Built in the spirit of the French republican tradition, the system was based, on the one hand, on a strong and central constitutional position of the President, a twofold executive, and a parliament limited in its competences, and on the other hand, on parliamentary accountability of the government and well-developed direct democracy institutions. The French example could be considered excellent evidence of how the powerful and historic constitutional institutions could be adopted in a modern democratic state even under a concise constitution of a hybrid charakter.

Fiscal effects of putting initiatives on the ballot: evidence from the last 20 years in the United States

This paper investigates both the indirect (i.e. the existence) and the direct effects (i.e. the usage) of direct democracy institutions on major fiscal outcomes across the United States over the 1992-2009 period. Being based on a more recent time span than previous contributions, our work includes detailed information such as the type of institution (i.e. direct or indirect initiative), the voting outcome, and the topics of concern. The main results suggest that States permitting initiatives spend and tax less than those without, confirming some previous findings. However, when initiatives are effectively used, their practice contributes to increase spending among those States allowing them. The intensity of different initiatives also matters for fiscal outcomes as well as the nature of topics involved.

Концептуальні засади реформування місцевого самоврядування в Україні

Встановлено необхідність вирішення проблеми понятійно-категорійного забезпечення та вибору базової парадигми і теорії місцевого самоврядування. Проаналізовано основні положення Концепції реформування місцевого самоврядування та територіальної організації влади в Україні, яка визначає напрями, механізми і строки формування ефективного місцевого самоврядування та територіальної організації влади для створення і підтримки повноцінного життєвого середовища для громадян, надання високоякісних та доступних публічних послуг, становлення інститутів прямого народовладдя, задоволення інтересів громадян в усіх сферах життєдіяльності на відповідній території, узгодження інтересів держави та територіальних громад. Встановлено необхідність формування законодавчої бази з питань діяльності органів місцевого самоврядування та органів виконавчої влади на новій територіальній основі з визначенням їх повноважень та ресурсного забезпечення відповідно до вимог Концепції. Розкрито зміст етапів реформування місцевого самоврядування та територіальної організації влади в Україні.

Allure or alternative? Direct democracy and party identification

This article presents the first investigation of whether and how party identification is influenced by direct democratic institutions. The concept of party identification is of central interest to political science. Despite declining partisan attachment and increasing dealignment among voters, little systematic evidence exists as to which factors influence individual party identification. Our article contributes to improving on this lacuna by considering the educative effects of direct democratic institutions. Theoretically, two competing hypotheses are plausible. On the one hand, direct democracy might strengthen political parties and promote the need for cues so that voters succumb to the allure of partisan attachment. On the other hand, direct democracy might provide an alternative to the representational function of political parties thus rendering party identification less essential. Drawing on recent data from the Swiss cantons, we estimate multi-level models. Our analyses, though giving support to the alternative hypothesis, yield some surprising findings.

Demokracja bezpośrednia na poziomie lokalnym: Czy obywatele chcą partycypacji?

Contemporary theory of democracy places great emphasison direct forms of citizens' participation in political life. Direct democracy is the core of the functioning of democratic systems. It is a general rule in making deci- sions, even those controversial or connected to public affairs, taking place in the common vote. What kinds of institutions of direct democracy are practiced, it mainly depends on historical, cultural and economical conditions. The aim of the research is an attempt to specify the level of support forcitizens' participation in new forms of direct democracy such as participatory budgets, as well as the purpose of the research is the diagnosis for citizens' abilities to participate in the possible institutions of direct democracy that function in the local government. To summarize conducted research, it can be concluded that citizens declare the irsupport for the possibility of co-deciding on municipality budgets and possibility ofstrengthening the irparticipation through the available institutions of direct democracy in local governments, such as the referendum or locals' consults. This support is generally independent from sympathizing with the different political parties or ideological view points.

Citizens’ initiatives in Switzerland

The aim of this study is to determine the role of popular initiative in the political system of Switzerland. The term ‘popular’, or ‘citizens’ initiatives’ refers to the procedures that allow citizens to bring new issues to the political agenda through collective action, that is, through collecting a certain number of signatures in support of a policy proposal. Citizens’ initiative in Switzerland allows for any group outside parliament to put a proposal on the table. The proposal has to suggest a constitutional amendment. Changes to laws or any other government regulations cannot be the subject of a popular initiative at national level in Switzerland. Of the 174 initiatives that have made it to the polls, only 18 (10 per cent) had been approved prior to 2010, all the others were rejected. Initiatives are launched for numerous reasons. The agenda-setting effect is relevant for all initiatives. Parties and interest groups also launch initiatives for more strategic reasons. In Switzerland the institutions of direct democracy, including the popular initiative on constitutional amendments, play a most prominent role, both in terms of frequency and in terms of impact, in a political system shaped by consensus politics and a rather stable party system.

Referendum w opinii elit politycznych III RP

This draft was inspired by the intention to describe the attitude of the political elites of contemporary Poland to referendums at the national level. To this end, reference is made to the opinions voiced in the period 1989–2011. Consequently, the analysis spans the experience of twenty two years, which is a sufficient period to identify certain regularities. The surveys conducted indicate that Polish citizens have the right to participate in a referendum, but they do not have a right to referendum, that is to initiate a public vote. This shape of the legal foundations for national referendum is a consequence of the fact that political elites are inclined to apply this institution of direct democracy only provided that it is beneficial to them. Therefore, at the national level there is only a top-bottom referendum (supervised by the political elite). It appears that it contradicts the possibility of treating this institution of direct democracy as equal to representative forms of governance.

The impact of federalism on the healthcare system in terms of efficiency, equity, and cost containment: the case of Switzerland.

According to the economic theory of federalism (Oates 1999), a decentralized decision to collectively fund and supply the quantity and quality of public services will increase economic welfare as long as three conditions are fulfilled: preferences and production costs of the different local constituencies are heterogeneous; local governments are better informed than the central agency because of their proximity to the citizens; and the competition between local governments exerts a significant impact on the performance of the local administration and on the ability of public agencies to implement policy innovation. Federalism also presents some negative aspects, including the opportunity costs of decentralization, which materialize in terms of unexploited economies of scale; the emergence of spillover effects among jurisdictions; and the risk of cost-shifting exercises from one layer of the government to the other. Finally, competition between fiscal regimes can affect the level of equity. The literature considers fiscal federalism as a mechanism for controlling the size of the public sector and for constraining the development of redistributive measures. The present paper reviews the impact that federalism has on the efficiency, equity, and cost containment of the healthcare system in Switzerland, a country with a strongly decentralized political system that is based on federalism and the institutions of direct democracy, a liberal economic culture, and a well-developed tradition of mutualism and social security (generous social expenditure and welfare system). By analyzing the empirical evidence available for Switzerland, we expect to draw some general policy lessons that might also be useful for other countries.