Corporations lobbied for the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) to limit private enforcement of the US securities laws. While the PSLRA has achieved this goal to a certain extent, it has also impacted securities litigation, and related Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and derivative litigation, in ways that its proponents never intended. This paper discusses the impact of institutional investor participation in securities litigation, which increased significantly as a result of lead plaintiff provisions in the PSLRA that evince an intent to have institutional investors play a larger role in securities cases. Specifically, the paper focuses on the ability of institutional investors to obtain corporate governance reforms and the contribution of personal funds by outside directors, as components of securities litigation settlements. The paper also provides an overview of ERISA actions that are often litigated in parallel with securities fraud actions. While these actions concern different legal theories, pleading standards and damages formulations to those of securities actions, there is an interplay between the two types of actions in at least two major areas — settlement and discovery. Indeed, the presence of parallel ERISA litigation in several high-profile securities actions has enabled the securities plaintiffs to obtain relief from the PSLRA's discovery stay allowing them to have early access to any materials that have been produced to the ERISA plaintiffs.