Instances Of Evil Research Articles

Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil

ABSTRACTGiven plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is evidence against God, then seeing no justifying reason for some particular instance of evil must be evidence for its truly being pointless. I think that this dialectic is mistaken. In this paper, after drawing a lesson about fallibility and induction from the preface paradox, I argue that the force of the evidential problem of evil is compatible with sceptical theism’s being true. More exactly, I argue that the collection of apparently pointless evil in the world provides strong evidence for there being truly pointless evil, despite the fact that seeing no justifying reason for some particular instance of evil is no evidence whatsoever for its truly being pointless. I call this result the paradox of evil.

“Ethics” of Interval

Abstract In the Christian imaginary, the ternary representation of the universe is reiterated by appealing either to the Platonic texts, or to the Stoic ones. The triadic scheme of the worlds certifies an ambiguous status of man, of an individual placed neither here nor there, by the force of some circumstances which he cannot resist. Situated at equal distance from sidereal heights - credited as having the monopoly on perfection - and from the terrifying shadows, managed in a totalitarian manner by the instances of evil, in “the world between the worlds”, he thinks of the interval as of a space of communication, filled with signs, shapes and characters, by means of which distances can be “neared, compressed and “humanised”. Each step, stage, climb or descent is perceived as a “rupture of level”, as overcoming of the human condition by assuming a trans-mundane axiological repertoire

Skeptical Theism and the Threshold Problem

In this paper I articulate and defend a new anti-theodicy challenge to Skeptical Theism. More specifically, I defend the Threshold Problem according to which there is a threshold to the kinds of evils that are in principle justifiable for God to permit, and certain instances of evil are beyond that threshold. I further argue that Skeptical Theism does not have the resources to adequately rebut the Threshold Problem. I argue for this claim by drawing a distinction between a weak and strong version of Skeptical Theism, such that the strong version must be defended in order to rebut the Threshold Problem. However, the skeptical theist’s appeal to our limited cognitive faculties only supports the weak version.

Augustine, the origin of evil, and the mystery of free will

AbstractThe question of why humanity first chose to sin is an extension to the problem of evil to which the free-will defence does not easily apply. In De libero arbitrio and elsewhere Augustine argues that as an instance of evil, the fall is necessarily inexplicable. In this article, I identify the problems with this response and attempt to construct an alternative based on Peter van Inwagen's free will ‘mysterianism’. I will argue that the origin of evil is inexplicable not because it is an instance of evil, but because it is an instance of free will.

Of Evil and Other Figures of the Liminal

Inspired by research on the Rwanda genocide and the decapitation, in July 2008, of a passenger on a Canadian Greyhound bus, this occasional paper explores the shared agitation with which we may respond to two seemingly disparate instances of evil such as these. Arguing against discontinuous claims that distinguish between pre- and post-metaphysical conceptions of evil pivoting around the figure of Kant, the article identifies three logics suggestive of continuity in Western thought on evil: negativity, functionalism and the messianic. Focusing on the theme of negativity, the article argues that the essentially apophatic doctrine of the privation of evil is reconstituted in postmodern thinking as the liminal nature of evil. While acts of evil relate to what is both/either mathematically or qualitatively sublime (Kant), and while this experience may account for our agitation, we nonetheless employ figures like ‘hubris’, the ‘uncanny’ (Freud) and the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben) to traverse the liminal in order to interpret instances of human praxis which, given their liminal nature, will always remain brute fact. The article argues that these figures, in particular the temporal structure implicit in Freud’s account of the uncanny, can usefully be explored to account for the agitation with which we respond to instances of evil as diverse as the two that inspired this article.

Moral Evil and Leibniz’s Form/Matter Defense of Divine Omnipotence

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Leibniz’s form/matter defense of omnipotence is paradoxical, but not irretrievably so. Leibniz maintains that God necessarily must concur only in the possibility for evil’s existence in the world (the form of evil), but there are individual instances of moral evil that are not necessary (the matter of evil) with which God need not concur. For Leibniz, that there is moral evil in the world is contingent on God’s will (a dimension of divine omnipotence), with the result that even though it is necessary that God exerts his will, there are particular products of his will that are contingent and unnecessary—including human moral evil. If there are instances of evil which are contingent on God’s will and yet unnecessary, then the problematic conclusion for Leibniz’s view must be that human evil depends upon divine concurrence, not just for its possibility in the world (which is necessary) but for its instance (which is contingent). If the form/matter defense of omnipotence contains a true paradox, then God concurs in the form as well as the matter of evil. To assuage this difficulty for Leibniz, I will argue that he could either give up an Augustinian notion of evil, or rely upon a distinction between *potenta absoluta* and *potenta ordinate*, which was popular among important thinkers in the medieval period.

De hel en het probleem van het kwaad Opmerkingen bij een analogie

It is often suggested in recent philosophical discussions on the problem of hell that an analogy exists between the specific problem of hell and the more general problem of evil. Hell, it is said, constitutes an evil, and like other instances of evil, raises the question of how an omnipotent and perfectly good God can allow it. In this article the author queries what exactly it means to speak of hell as an evil, and stipulates the way in which it may be said to be analogous to ordinary, mundane evil. The question is then raised as to whether some of the answers available in response to mundane evil can be made fruitful in response to the evil of hell. After a discussion of the problem of hell construed as a logical and evidential problem of evil respectively, the author concludes that, recent suggestions notwithstanding, none of these answers can mutatis mutandis be applied to the evil of hell.

Reply to Richard Gale

I am most grateful to Richard Gale for the detailed attention which he has paid to my detailed arguments, and for the kind remarks between which he sandwiches his hard-hitting criticisms. The first of the latter is that I ‘slosh back and forth’ (211) between different theses, Ss, Sw, and W. I hope not, but I agree that I may not have made the relation between these sufficiently clear. I am certainly committed to, and sought to argue for, the strong version of the strong thesis:Ss For every instance of evil, God is justified in allowing it.But I cannot examine every instance of evil in order to show that – I do not know of all the evils, let alone have time or space to discuss each of them. So I need to produce an inductive argument for Ss, and I seek to do so by considering the various kinds of evil, and trying to show that God is justified in allowing any evil of that kind. Hence I consider the evils of having bad desires, making wrong choices which cause suffering to oneself, making wrong choices which cause suffering to others, suffering occurring through natural processes, ignorance of God etc. I divide evils into kinds, in such a way that the morally significant differences between evils of a given kind is simply one of degree – different instances of suffering occurring through natural processes differ in respect of their intensity and the period of time they last.