Abstract

In this paper I articulate and defend a new anti-theodicy challenge to Skeptical Theism. More specifically, I defend the Threshold Problem according to which there is a threshold to the kinds of evils that are in principle justifiable for God to permit, and certain instances of evil are beyond that threshold. I further argue that Skeptical Theism does not have the resources to adequately rebut the Threshold Problem. I argue for this claim by drawing a distinction between a weak and strong version of Skeptical Theism, such that the strong version must be defended in order to rebut the Threshold Problem. However, the skeptical theist’s appeal to our limited cognitive faculties only supports the weak version.

Highlights

  • T I : If, a er thorough analysis, we can’t think of any Godjustifying reasons for some instance of horrific evil, there probably aren’t any such reasons

  • ✍ Yishai Cohen, 541 Hall of Languages, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1170, USA 📧 yacohen@syr.edu antecedent of the conditional by a empting to provide plausible Godjustifying reasons for the various evils exemplified in our world

  • Since the T proponent affirms the lexical priority of the absence of instances of Horror over any quantity or quality of other goods, the T proponent starts with the question of whether permi ing the Falun Gong children’s suffering is so intrinsically bad that is beyond the threshold of evils that are in principle justifiable

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Summary

Introduction

T I : If, a er thorough analysis, we can’t think of any Godjustifying reasons for some instance of horrific evil, there probably aren’t any such reasons. I focus on evils of this kind for the following reason: if there are any persons to whom God cannot be justified in permi ing horrific suffering, surely innocent children are among them.

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