For different reasons, some modern and postmodern psychologists are skeptical about the of psychological phenomena as irreducible, influential entities. Nonetheless, much psychological inquiry presumes precisely such a reality. We present a of reality approach to psychological that we believe can assuage some of the concerns of psychological skeptics. Our approach treats psychological as inseparably embedded in sociocultural, biological, and physical levels of reality, without being reducible to any of these other levels. We develop our of reality approach in relation to four different doctrines of realism, and elaborate its implications for understanding psychological phenomena. As we enter the twenty-first century, we psychologists are having trouble with reality. Some of us who hold more or less traditionally modern views with respect to psychological science want to treat psychological as if it were akin to physical (e.g., Matthews, 1998) and are therefore anxious to reduce psychological phenomena of interest to their presumed neurophysiological, chemical, and biological correlates. Some of us who hold postmodern and related views with respect to psychology as a human social construction are skeptical about psychological and physical alike (e.g., Gergen, 1994), especially when psychological is asserted to be natural or essential. To complicate matters, many of the reality-concerned of modern or postmodern persuasions appear to hold rather different conceptions of realism. In this article, we describe a of reality position that we believe might illuminate and possibly resolve some of the confusions and impasses in psychology's contemporary struggles. To set the stage for our presentation, we first offer three different, traditional doctrines of realism and consider a variety of brief examples of how these might play out with respect to various levels of physical and human phenomena. We then distinguish realism from related, but different, philosophical doctrines of naturalism, essentialism, foundationTh is d oc um en t i s c op yr ig ht ed b y th e A m er ic an P sy ch ol og ic al A ss oc ia tio n or o ne o f i ts a lli ed p ub lis he rs . Th is a rti cl e is in te nd ed so le ly fo r t he p er so na l u se o f t he in di vi du al u se r a nd is n ot to b e di ss em in at ed b ro ad ly . 178 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 19, No. 2, 1999 alism, and reductionism. We start this way because, on our reading of their works, many modernists, postmodernists, and others frequently conflate one or more of these doctrines or positions with realism or its opposite, and in so doing, contribute significantly to our woes. However, proceeding in this way also makes it apparent that traditional philosophical doctrines of realism may be inadequate with respect to ascertaining the ontological status of psychological phenomena per se. We therefore make one final preliminary move prior to presenting our of reality position and argument. This move consists of introducing a line of thought with respect to questions concerning that effectively rejects the entire debate between metaphysical realists and anti-realists as arising from a failure to understand human life and existence properly in the first place. This type of thinking takes human existence in the world as a basic, unitary that is not amenable to traditional metaphysical conjecture. It is available most originally in the work of Martin Heidegger (1962, 1982), especially as developed and extended by Charles Taylor (1985, 1995) and Charles Guignon (1991, Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). Of particular relevance for our of reality position is the Heideggerian claim that meanings are as much a part of the world as are gravitation and mass. With these preliminaries in place, we turn directly to an explication of our of reality position and argument and conclude by considering some of its possible implications with respect to psychological inquiry. The point of all of this is to argue that psychological is neither as reducible as some modernists claim, nor as problematic as some postmodernists assert. Rather, psychological is irreducibly nested within physical, biological, and sociocultural levels of reality, all of which both enable and constrain it. Further, while psychological is not fixed, nor knowledge of it certain, it also is not so ephemeral and subjective as to escape psychologists' attempts to study it, so long as the conclusions from such studies are regarded as contingent, fallible, and subject to revision.