Reviewed by: Language and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of language by Michael Devitt, Kim Sterelny Luis Alonso-Ovalle Language and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of language. By Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny. 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. xiii, 342. Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny’s introduction to the philosophy of language was first published more than a decade ago. On that occasion, the preface presented the work as intended, ‘primarily, but not solely’, to be a textbook. The very same aim prevails in this second edition, which, despite numerous profitable changes, maintains the general axes of content and form of the first. As in the first edition, the authors organize the material without any pretense of neutrality: their realist and naturalist perspective still pervades the whole book. D & S are realists in that they claim that the world exists objectively. They are naturalists both in that they reject the idea that philosophical knowledge [End Page 188] is a priori and in that they claim that physical objects and processes are all that exist. The book surveys the relationships between language and reality, on the one hand, and language and thought on the other, and includes some further discussion on the place and role of the philosophy of language within the philosophical building. After a brief introduction on the nature of the phenomena to be explored, Part 2 begins wondering about the relation between language and reality by focusing on the problem of meaning and reference. There is an emphasis on the truth-referential theory of meaning, by which the truth conditions of a sentence depend on the referential properties of its elements together with the way they are combined (Frege’s insight). Part 3 focuses on the relation between language and thought, suggesting that it should be considered somewhat ‘symbiotic’: The authors argue for both the hypothesis that thought is language-like and for the relative independence of language with respect to thought. Within Part 3, Ch. 8 will be of special interest for linguists since it is devoted to the notion of linguistic competence. Interestingly enough, D & S remain dubious of the idea that grammatical rules play an important role in language processing and look critically at the alleged innate character of certain linguistic principles. Part 4 explores the relation between theories of language and the metaphysical doctrine of realism, according to which the objects of our environment exist independently of us and our thoughts. The main point of the authors here is that, since a realist metaphysics has a more secure epistemic foundation than any theory of language, it has to take precedence over whatever metaphysics of any other kind a theory of language assumes. Metaphysics should override linguistic assumptions. Despite maintaining the general flavor of the first edition, there are important changes in this second one. The material on causal theories of reference and their competitors has changed substantially and so have issues dealing with a speaker’s linguistic and conceptual competence. Linguists will be delighted to see that the views on the role of a Chomskyan theory of grammar within a theory of mind and meaning have been completely reworked. The authors argue that developing a theory of sentence structure is a different task from that of explaining the speaker’s ability to understand and produce those sentences. Therefore, a good theory of sentence structure is not necessarily a good theory of linguistic competence. The book is a most welcome updated introduction to the philosophy of language, useful for anyone interested in dealing with the basics and beyond and of special value for readers coming from such related disciplines as formal semantics or artificial intelligence. The book is also pedagogically outstanding. The use of asterisks to mark off more difficult sections is retained from the first edition as are the suggested reading sections that accompany each chapter. Both will help those who decide to tackle the subtleties of the philosophical argumentation on the domain of language. Luis Alonso-Ovalle University of Massachusetts, Amherst Copyright © 2001 Linguistic Society of America