Initial Willingness Research Articles

Research on the evolution of express packaging recycling strategy considering virtual incentives and heterogeneous subsidies

With the growth of e-commerce business volume, a large amount of express packaging waste is generated, causing certain damage to the environment. In response to this problem, the China Post Bureau pointed out the plan to strengthen express packaging recycling, and large e-commerce platforms such as JD.com have taken actions. Starting from this background, this paper uses a tripartite evolutionary game model to study the strategies evolution of consumers, e-commerce companies and e-commerce platforms. At the same time, the model considers the influence of platform virtual incentives and heterogeneous subsidies on equilibrium evolution. The study found that with the increase of virtual incentives from the platform to consumers, consumers converge to the strategy of "participating" in express packaging recycling faster and faster. When the assumption of participation constraints for cosumers is relaxed, the virtual incentives of the platform are still effective, but it will be affected by the initial willingness of consumers; when the e-commerce platform uses a single method to subsidize, it can effectively encourage e-commerce companies to use green packaging items. Compared with direct subsidize, the policy flexibility of the discount coefficient is stronger, in addition, moderate double subsidies can also achieve the same effect, and the e-commerce platform can make decisions based on the actual situation. The cyclical fluctuations in the strategies of consumers and e-commerce companies in the case of high additional profit coefficients of e-commerce companies may be the reason why the current express packaging recycling program is not effective. In addition, this article also discusses the influence of other parameters on the equilibrium evolution, and gives targeted countermeasures.

Evolutionary game study on multi-agent value co-creation of service-oriented digital transformation in the construction industry.

The service-oriented digital transformation of the construction industry is a development trend of cross-border industrial integration and transformation and upgrading in the digital economy environment, and collaborative value creation among stakeholders is seen as a strategic imperative to promote this process. This study aims to achieve efficient collaborative value co-creation and accelerate the digital transformation process of the construction industry by exploring the collaborative strategies and evolution laws of value co-creators in the digital service ecosystem of the construction industry. Based on evolutionary game theory and methods, this paper analyzes the evolutionary stability strategies and conditions of each participant in the service-oriented value chain at different stages of the digital transformation of the construction industry. It is found that with the improvement of the level of digitalization, the degree of cooperation among game players continues to increase until a stable state of full cooperation is achieved. The initial willingness of the game players to cooperate accelerates the speed of the system's evolution to the stable state of full cooperation in the middle stage of digital transformation. Additionally, the improvement of the construction process digitalization level can subvert the evolution result of full non-coordination caused by a low initial willingness to cooperate. The research conclusions and corresponding countermeasures and suggestions can provide a strategic reference for the service-oriented digital transformation of the construction industry.

Building up scrap steel bases for perfecting scrap steel industry chain in China: An evolutionary game perspective

China has stated that it will strive to reach the carbon peak by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 Carbon emissions. Steel industry as the largest manufacturing industry could reduce carbon emissions by using more environmentally friendly ways to make steel. Short process steelmaking is an environmentally friendly method. Scrap steel as the main raw material of short process steelmaking should be popularized. However, several issues happening in the scrap steel industry chain may hamper the formation of scrap steel bases. Therefore, we establish a tripartite evolutionary game model between Steel enterprises, Scrap steel enterprises and the government. After solving the equilibrium points and the evolutionary stable strategy of each stakeholder by the replicator dynamics equation, we carry out simulation to get the behavior strategy of Steel enterprises, Scrap steel enterprises and the government. The results show that: (i) there are three evolutionary stability strategies for the formation of scrap steel bases, among which the participate of steel enterprises and scrap steel enterprises, less intervention of the government is a more appropriate choice. (ii) there is a threshold effect on relevant parameters, which may change the evolutionary stability strategy of stakeholders. (iii) the initial willingness of steel enterprises, scrap steel enterprises and government affect the convergence speed of the evolutionary stable strategy. These conclusions provide unique insights and theoretical support for promoting the development of scrap and steel industry in China and helping to realize the strategy of carbon peak carbon neutrality.

Perceived coercion, perceived pressures and procedural justice arising from global lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic: A scoping review.

This aim of this scoping review is to map what is known about perceived coercion, perceived pressures and procedural justice within the context of the general population's experience of 'lockdowns' imposed by governments worldwide in response to the increased transmission of COVID-19. Arksey & O'Malley's (2005) framework for conducting scoping reviews was chosen. A sensitive search strategy was devised and conducted using PubMed, Scopus, and Web of Science using the following search terms: (adherence OR acceptance OR agreement OR trust OR distrust OR compliance OR willing*) OR (perceived coerc* OR percept* coerc* OR pressure OR force OR influence OR control OR threat OR justice) AND (lockdown) AND (COVID OR SARS-CoV-2 OR COVID-19). The database search initially produced 41,628 articles to screen. A total of 40 articles were included in this review and the following five themes were identified from the studies: perceived acceptability and willingness to adhere to lockdown; perceived control during lockdown; perceived pressures arising from lockdown; perceived threat of sanction from others and the procedural (in)justice of lockdown. Our synthesis suggests that i) individuals experienced an initial willingness and tolerance of lockdown that lessened over time as perceptions of personal control decreased; ii) that social influences may pressure individuals to follow or break lockdown rules; and iii) that justifiability and proportionality together with individuals' perceptions of harm from COVID-19 may impact the extent to which individuals adhere to lockdown. Furthermore, the review found an absence of information regarding specific individual characteristics and circumstances that increase the likelihood of experiencing perceived coercion and its related constructs and highlights a need for a better understanding of the cultural and socioeconomic factors affecting perceptions of, and adherence to, lockdown.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Resilient Community Construction Driven by Government Regulation and Market

As the basic unit of residents’ activities and social management, communities are the disaster bearers of various public security emergencies. To improve the ability and level of community governance, as well as to strengthen the construction of resilient communities, a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, developers, and home buyers is built, and numerical simulation is carried out using Matlab to analyze the impact mechanism of main parameters on the evolutionary stability strategy. The results show that: (1) The three parties’ different initial intentions will lead to different evolutionary stability strategies of the system, and the system’s final evolution result will reach the ideal state only when the initial willingness of developers and buyers is high. (2) The greater the government’s subsidy coefficient and the greater the regulatory intensity, the more likely it is that developers will choose to build resilient communities. (3) Public awareness of disaster prevention and mitigation is an important determinant of the purchase of resilient community housing strategies. To achieve rapid development of resilient communities, the intensity of regulation must be continuously improved, the public’s awareness of disaster prevention and mitigation must be strengthened, and the government’s regulatory costs must be reduced.

Sustainable Technology Diffusion Manufacturing Outwards FDI Firms: Evidence from China Using Numerical Simulation Methods

Technology diffusion plays an important role in the improvement of technological innovation capabilities and can provide strong support for sustainable economic development. This paper aims to analyze the influence mechanism of technology diffusion on sustainable development, such as the initial investment willingness, technology spillover effects and absorptive capacity, technology transfer prices and intellectual property protection, government subsidy support and penalties. However, there is a lack of systemic game mechanism and numerical simulation methods for heterogeneous enterprises. Based on the government, OFDI companies, and domestic companies that are not involved in FDI, we have proposed the evolutionary game model for technology diffusion on sustainable development. The results show that: (1) The government, OFDI firms, and domestic firms are influenced by each other’s initial willingness to a different extent; (2) Different combinations of technology spillover and absorptive capacity lead to different sustainable evolution results of technology diffusion; (3) Reasonable technology transfer pricing and enhancing the protection of property rights can improve the efficiency of the technology diffusion sustainable development system; (4) Both financial support and penalties encourage technology diffusion sustainable development, but excessive financial support reduces the government’s willingness to participate ultimately. Therefore, this paper proposes that the government should increase its willingness to participate and increase punishment for unreasonable pricing behaviors. The stronger the stimulus effect of OFDI firm technology spillover and domestic firm absorptive capacity, the stronger the stimulus effect; however, there is a certain threshold effect, at the same time increasing the property rights protection of OFDI firms and the penalties for opportunistic behaviors of domestic firms, and establishing a diversified financial support policy, will increase the efficiency of the technology diffusion sustainable development system.

A study on the competitive dissemination of disinformation and knowledge on social media

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to explore the evolutionary path and stable strategy for the competitive dissemination between disinformation and knowledge on social media to provide effective solutions to curb the dissemination of disinformation and promote the spread of knowledge.Design/methodology/approachBased on the social capital (SC) theory, the benefit matrix is constructed and an evolutional game model is established in this paper. Through model solving and Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB) simulation, the factors that influence disinformation-believing users (DUs) and knowledge-believing users (KUs) to choose different strategies are analyzed.FindingsThe initial dissemination willingness, the disinformation infection probability, the knowledge infection probability and the knowledge penetration probability are proved to be crucial factors influencing the game equilibrium in the competitive dissemination process of disinformation and knowledge. Moreover, some countermeasures and recommendations for the governance of disinformation are proposed.Originality/valueCurrently most research interest lies in the disinformation dissemination model but ignores the interaction between disinformation and knowledge in the diffusion process. This study reveals the dynamic mechanism of social media users disseminating disinformation and knowledge and is expected to promote the formation of cleaner cyberspace.

Research on the Carbon Credit Exchange Strategy for Scrap Vehicles Based on Evolutionary Game Theory.

In this article, we construct a game model that uses government regulators and scrap vehicle owners as the main parties to investigate the carbon credit exchange strategy of scrap vehicles using evolutionary game theory. The results were validated using Matlab simulation analysis to reveal the dynamic evolution process of the strategy of both sides of the game. A sensitivity analysis of the key parameters was conducted to explore the influence of each parameter on the evolution process and the stabilization trends. The study shows that (1) The time for the game system to reach a steady state is inversely related to the size of the initial willingness of the parties to cooperate. (2) In the mixed steady-state scenario, when the overall return differential between the positive and negative regulatory verification by government departments is positive, the steady state is participation and positive scrapping. (3) When the probability of the government verifying and being successful in verifying the punishment of the owner's negative scrapping behavior increases, both parties of the game will eventually choose the strategy of participation and positive scrapping. When the cost of the government participation strategy and the cost of the government verification strategy increase, both sides of the game will eventually choose the strategy combination of no participation and positive scrapping. (4) When the owner's reward for cooperating with the strategy, the owner's cost of scrapping the vehicle, and the benefits of the owner's negative cooperation strategy change, they will not change the strategy stability results but will affect the time it takes for the game system to reach a stable state. This study has theoretical implications for government policies in the scrapping industry and how to guide vehicle owners to actively scrap their vehicles.

Factors associated with refusal of preventive therapy after initial willingness to accept treatment among college students with latent tuberculosis infection in Shandong, China

BackgroundPreventive therapy of latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) is an important component of tuberculosis (TB) control. Research on acceptance of TB preventive therapy (TPT) is an important topic. Current studies focus on acceptability and compliance. However, it is unclear whether LTBI patients will start TPT after accepting treatment. The study assessed the factors associated with TPT refusal after initial willingness to accept treatment.MethodsData were derived from a baseline survey of prospective study of LTBI treatment among college students in Shandong Province, China. A total of 723 students initially willing to accept TPT were included in the analysis. Stepwise logistic regression was used to explore the individual- and family-level characteristic variables that factors associated with TPT refusal after initial willingness to accept treatment.ResultsOf the 723 LTBI college students who initially had acceptance willingness, 436 (60.3%) finally refused TPT. At the individual level, non-medical students were more likely to refuse TPT [odds ratio (OR) = 4.87, 95% confidence interval (CI): 3.10–7.67)], as were students with moderate physical activity (OR = 1.45, 95% CI: 1.04–2.04). Students with boarding experience (OR = 0.49, 95% CI: 0.31–0.78) and a high level of knowledge about TB (OR = 0.97, 95% CI: 0.95–0.99) were less likely to refuse TPT. At the family level, those with high father’s educational level (OR = 1.50, 95% CI: 1.07–2.10) or high household income (OR = 1.80, 95% CI: 1.20–2.71) were more likely to refuse TPT after initially accepting treatment.ConclusionsFactors associated with TPT refusal after initial willingness to accept treatment, such as personal (type of students, physical activity, boarding experiences, knowledge of TB) and family characteristics (father’s education level, household income) among college student with LTBI, might help identify persons for whom tailored interventions could improve the start of LTBI treatment.

Government participation in low-carbon technology transfer: An evolutionary game study

Low-carbon technology transfer is the primary means of promoting the industrialization of low-carbon scientific and technological achievements, as well as an important component in accelerating the realization of carbon peak and carbon neutrality. This study uses the evolutionary game model to construct a three-party game relationship consisting of a low-carbon technology sender and receiver along with government participation. Additionally, based on the Green Technology Bank case, we demonstrate the impact of various factors on the three parties' choice of low-carbon technology transfer strategy in the game. The results reveal that the final participation behavior of the government is less influenced by the initial willingness of the sender and receiver to participate. However, the initial participation willingness of the government and low-carbon technology sender has a significant impact on the receiver's participation. Furthermore, the sender's participation is substantially influenced by the government's willingness to participate. Optimizing the cost and benefit distribution mechanism can encourage low-carbon technology transfer subjects to participate. Increasing government incentive and default punishment is more conducive to realizing the three parties' win-win situation in the game. While government incentive has a significant impact on the sender, the increase in default punishment has a considerable effect on the receiver.

How to carry out technological innovation in the rare earth industry?

As an important strategic industry in China, the rare earth industry needs to extend its industrial chain to the high-end by carrying out technological innovation. This paper discusses the dynamics of technological innovation in rare earth enterprises and how local governments regulate the behaviors of these enterprises. First, we establish an evolutionary game model between local governments and rare earth enterprises, considering direct and indirect factors of policy regulations regarding the rare earth industry. Second, we analyze the mechanism and evolution process of governance strategy selection and explain the efficiency and evolution path of the local governance system under different policy orientations by finding the stable point of the replication dynamic process. Finally, we use numerical simulation to analyze the impacts of initial willingness and direct and indirect factors on the dynamic evolution process. The results demonstrate that (1) the regulation cost of local governments and subsidies have negative impact on local government decisions and rewards generated by enterprises' technological innovation have positive impact on local government decisions; (2) benefits, direct subsidies from local governments, and indirect performance rewards from the central government have positive impact on enterprises' technological innovation decisions. Based on the empirical results, we recommend that to promote enterprises' participation in technological innovation, central and local governments should create policy for rules and regulations for rare earth enterprises by comprehensively considering the technological risks and spillover effects rather than increasing subsidies. Moreover, based on their characteristics, rare earth enterprises should create an environment for technological innovation and integrate into regional technological innovation platforms.

The impact of regulatory mechanisms on vulnerability disclosure behavior during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing.

There are various regulatory mechanisms to coordinate vulnerability disclosure behaviors during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing. However, in the case of unclear regulatory effectiveness, enterprises cannot obtain sufficient vulnerability information, third-party crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing platforms fail to provide trusted services, and the government lacks strong credibility. We have constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionary process of the equilibrium of {legal disclosure, active operation, strict regulation}, and the paper reveals the impact of three regulatory mechanisms. We find that these participants' positive behaviors are in a stable state. Higher initial willingness accelerates the speed of reaching the evolutionary stability of the system, and this equilibrium is satisfied only if the governmental regulatory benefits are sufficiently high. Regarding the punishment mechanism, increased punishment for enterprises causes them to adopt positive behaviors faster, while the opposite occurs for platforms; increased punishment for platforms drives both participants to adopt positive behaviors faster. Concerning the subsidy mechanism, increased subsidy to enterprises causes them to adopt legal disclosure behaviors faster, while platforms remain unresponsive; increased subsidy to platforms motivates both players to choose their own positive behaviors. In terms of the collaborative disclosure mechanism, excessive collaborative costs reduce the platforms' willingness to operate actively, which decreases the enterprises' incentives to disclose vulnerability legally. These findings guide the government to establish suitable mechanisms to regulate the participants' behavior and promote the healthy development of the cybersecurity crowdsourcing industry.

Study on Evolutionary Game of Rural E-Commerce Entrepreneurship Ecosystem with Governmental Participation

Rural e-commerce has become an effective measure for rural economic development under the background of digital transformation. Governmental participation is an important driving force to encourage the formation of rural e-commerce entrepreneurial ecosystems. From the perspective of bounded rationality, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model of a rural e-commerce entrepreneurial ecosystem among e-commerce platform, entrepreneurs and government, and systematically analyzes the evolutionary stability of each participant’s strategic choice. The initial intention of the three parties and the coefficient of governmental reward and punishment are introduced into the model design. Through numerical simulation, the influence of different parameters on the strategic selection of the three parties and the evolution path are analyzed, further implying the complexity of the strategic selection process in the reality. The results show that subsidies for e-commerce platforms are more conducive to the evolution of entrepreneurs and e-commerce platforms in a positive direction than direct subsidies for entrepreneurs by the government. In the early stage of development of the rural e-commerce entrepreneurial ecosystem, the government behavior strategy evolved to be one of active participation. After the system matured, the government behavior turned toward the negative direction. Compared with governmental reward and punishment, the initial willingness of each subject has more significant influence on the evolution of the tripartite behavior strategy. Finally, this paper proposes some countermeasures and suggestions to optimize the game relationship among the main bodies in the rural e-commerce entrepreneurial ecosystem from the perspective of a government subsidy mode, effective government intervention and the promotion of the initial willingness of the three parties. The research ideas and conclusions of this paper are enlightening to the academic research and corporate practice related to rural e-commerce.

Collaborative strategy within China's emission trading scheme: Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model

Emission trading scheme (ETS) is considered as a tool to reduce emissions at a low cost, which can effectively promote the carbon peak and carbon neutrality. As the main participants in the carbon emission trading (CET) market, the behavior and strategies for governments and different types of enterprises affect the final emission reduction performance. Taking the national carbon market as an example, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including governments and power generation enterprises with different emission reduction capacity to analyze the possible game situations in the development process of the CET market. The results show that with the development of the CET market, the governments and power generation enterprises will have different game results. In order to achieve the optimal stable equilibrium and maximize carbon emission reduction, governments should improve regulatory efficiency and formulate appropriate incentive strategies for excess emission reduction and punishment strategies for insufficient emission reduction. In addition, the initial willingness will not affect the final strategy choice of the three parties. Reasonable free carbon quota ratio, lower technology emission reduction cost and higher carbon price can stimulate the enthusiasm of governments and enterprises to reduce emissions. The above results provide a reference for coordinating the relationships between governments and power generation enterprises with different emission reduction capacity in the construction of the CET market in the future.

Developing hydrogen refueling stations: An evolutionary game approach and the case of China

Diffusion of hydrogen refueling stations (HRS) is key for promotion of hydrogen vehicles. We explore the nexus between critical stakeholders in the HRS industry from a game perspective. We model the three main actors in the policy for the development of HRS in Chinese hydrogen pilot cities, i.e. the public sector, the private investor, and the consumer. The tripartite evolutionary game analyzes the interaction of subsidy provision, HRS investment, and fuel consumption. We examine the evolutionary stable strategy of the system and propose a policy mechanism for setting the values of key parameters to promote active cooperation in the HRS diffusion. The simulation validates the equilibrium solution of the game, performs sensitivity analyses of initial probabilities and key parameters, and obtains the threshold values of subsidy and hydrogen price triggering a cooperative behavior. Furthermore, we find that, while there are several ways to stimulate cooperation such as subsidy provision and cost reduction, boosting the initial probabilities of actors to choose cooperative strategies is most effective for leading the game system to the ideal outcome. Accordingly, we offer recommendations on how to improve the actors' initial willingness to cooperate by enhancing the formulation and enforcement of regulations.

The dynamic analysis on low-carbon building adoption under emission trading scheme

Low-carbon building (LCB) is generally considered an effective solution for reducing energy consumption and carbon emissions in the construction industry. However, LCBs have not been widely adopted by developers due to uncertainties of high R&D investments, immaturity of markets, and inefficiency of policy mechanisms. To promote the widespread application of LCBs, this paper firstly expounds the interactions among developers regarding the LCB adoption under emission trading scheme (ETS). Then, an evolutionary game model on LCB adoption is developed to analyze the systematic evolutionary stability and discuss the dynamic evolutionary process. The results show that the initial willingness of developers affects the evolutionary trajectories and developers with a high low-carbon level play a leading role in the promotion of LCBs. Key factors in relation with LCB adoption are further investigated through the simulation analysis method. The results reveal that the low-carbon market demand, the low-carbon synergetic benefit and the carbon price have positive impacts on LCB adoption, and higher attention should be assigned to the low-carbon synergetic benefit. This study also provides a significant reference for developers on maintaining market competitiveness and insights for the government on improving the performance of the ETS system.

Research on the evolution of incentive mechanisms for urban deep decarbonization under the vision of carbon neutrality: A perspective of multi-agent embedded participation

Carbon Peak & Carbon Neutral (30–60) target is a major strategic decision for China's sustainable development in the new era, and the short-term deep decarbonization transition (DDT) of cities under this target vision is imperative. This study constructed a tripartite game model of urban DDT under the vision of carbon neutrality from the perspective of embedded participation of multiple subjects, analyzed the behavior strategy choice of relevant subjects and its evolution process by using the evolutionary game approach, and further simulated the influence of four types of driving policies on the system evolution by using Matlab software. The main findings are as follows. (1) The stable equilibrium point of stakeholders' behavioral strategies (e.g., active participation or limited participation) in the urban DDT process was influenced not only by their strategic tendencies, but also by the behavioral strategies of other relevant groups (2) Changes in stakeholders' initial willingness (i.e., the probability of choosing a particular strategy at the beginning). significantly affected the evolutionary trajectory of stakeholders' behavioral strategies in the urban DDT process. The evolutionary trajectory of the government's stabilization strategy under the low initial willingness scenario showed a tendency to evolve first toward an active guidance strategy and then gradually toward a limited guidance strategy. (3) Both subsidy and penalty policies had significant positive effects on enterprises' evolutionary trajectories, but their effects differed. The increase of policy subsidies could continuously push enterprises to converge to a stable strategy, while the increase of regulatory fines could push enterprises to converge to a stable strategy in the early stage of system evolution, and then the push effect gradually decreases. (4) Participation incentive policies and emission compensation policies affect the evolutionary trajectory of the behavioral strategies of the government and the public. When participation incentives increase, the government and the public would converge to the stabilization strategy quickly. Finally, targeted policy recommendations were made in order to provide reference for the government to formulate effective DDT policies.

Three-Party Evolutionary Game of Shared Manufacturing under the Leadership of Core Manufacturing Company

Shared manufacturing provides a new development direction for the transformation and upgrading of the manufacturing industry. This paper took a manufacturing company that masters core technology and has strong knowledge creation and spillover capabilities as the core manufacturing company. The core manufacturing company led two resource-complementary manufacturing companies in participating in shared manufacturing, and the additional benefits of each company participating in shared manufacturing were realized. Due to the bounded rational behavior of the participating companies and the difficulty in maximizing each’s own interests, this paper used the evolutionary game method and MATLAB to analyze the influencing factors of shared manufacturing among manufacturing companies. The goal of this study is to understand the decision-making behavior of manufacturing companies in a shared manufacturing context. The research results show that: The initial willingness to share, default losses, and excess income realized by the core manufacturing company as a result of delivering high service levels all contributed to the companies’ willingness to engage in shared production. The companies’ ability to participate in shared manufacturing was negatively impacted by cost-to-income ratio and speculative income. The allocation of additional income had a significant influence on the non-core enterprises’ decision-making: when the distribution ratio of additional income from non-core companies was low, non-core companies would be less willing to share. Although the additional income distribution ratio of core companies were high at the time, the service level of core companies would also decrease due to the reduction of non-core companies’ willingness to share.

Addressing research-validated community needs through data-driven community philanthropy: A case study

ABSTRACT While many community foundations use data to focus philanthropic resources to address identified needs, creating and using a compiled data set as the basis for establishing a shared community agenda is unique. Driven, in part, by cuts in government spending in 2012, the Lincoln Community Foundation in Lincoln, Nebraska acted as the convener of leaders from across the community in creating and interpreting data, and in engaging the community in conversations that led to a shared agenda. The defined path to community betterment created with data as the basis assured confidence and buy-in from donors as well as from private and public resources. The initial results and willingness on the part of all entities to continue to engage in this long-term initiative demonstrate the power of building a shared agenda and grassroots support by using data at the ground level of development.

An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of construction workers' unsafe behavior: Considering incentive and risk loss.

The behavior of construction workers has a significant impact on the overall safety climate of a project. The purpose of this paper is to figure out the evolutionary pattern of workers' unsafe behavior and to minimize its occurrence. We constructed a two-sided evolutionary game model consisting of workers and managers to explore the focal point of interest, strategy equilibrium conditions, and behavior evolution process. The experimental results of stability analysis and system dynamics show that there are two stable states in all four cases, (Safe behavior, Negative management) as well as (Unsafe behavior, Negative management). The lower the initial willingness of workers to behave unsafely, the faster they reach a safe steady state. By contrast, managers' strategy choices have a certain lag. Workers are discouraged from choosing unsafe behavior under both the positive incentive of raising bonuses and the negative incentive of raising fines. And the sensitivity of the two incentives is similar. For indirect effect risk loss, when it is effectively controlled during safe construction, workers quickly gravitate toward safe behavior. These findings provide a reference for construction safety management. Several practical suggestions were proposed from three perspectives: the worker, the manager, and the site safety climate, focus on the theme of reducing unsafe behavior and achieving a virtuous cycle of safety climate.