Influence Of Institutional Investors Research Articles

ESG Reporting: Empirical Analysis of the Influence of Board Heterogeneity from an Emerging Market

Firms are facing pressure to convincingly communicate to stakeholders their environment, society, and corporate governance (ESG) disclosure. In developing countries, where frictions among controlling and non-controlling shareholders are pervasive, the possible dissensus inside boards regarding ESG disclosure remains understudied. We investigate the ways in which boards’ heterogeneity between the interests of controlling groups and the interests of institutional investors influences ESG disclosure of firms in the Latin American context. Using social networks and logit panel data models, we analyze for 2015-17 the probability of ESG disclosure by 124 Chilean listed firms. Our evidence suggests that the influence of controlling shareholders through directorate interlocking has a negative relation with ESG disclosure. Additionally, we observe that the influence of institutional investors on ESG disclosure is not yet critical. Moreover, we find partial evidence of the presence of tension within the boards regarding ESG reporting between the directors that represent controlling shareholders and institutional investors. Considering the importance of institutional investors and the ubiquity directorate interlocking among Latin American’ firms, our results are relevant for regulators involved in advancing the rules of ESG disclosure practices, institutional investors focused on enhancing their ESG investment strategies, and firms engaged in improving the ESG decision-making within their boards.

Institutional Investor, Economic Policy Uncertainty, and Innovation Investment: Evidence from China

As a participator in corporate investment decision-making, the institutional investor is directly related to the corporate innovation investment. However, the economic policy uncertainty is aggravated by problems, such as economic slump and trade friction. Thus, institutional investors are not optimistic about the prospects of innovation investment. To explore the influence of institutional investors on corporate innovation investment from the perspective of economic policy uncertainty, using the 2010–2018 panel data in China and the fixed effect model, the influences of institutional investors on innovation investment and the moderating effects of the economic policy uncertainty were analyzed. Results show that institutional investors facilitate corporate innovation investment. Moreover, the increasing economic policy uncertainties repress the promoting effect of institutional investors on innovation investment. Furthermore, the institutional investors boost the corporate innovation investment by improving the internal control and relieving the financing constraints. For private companies, new and high-tech companies, the promoting effect of institutional investors on the corporate innovation investment is inhibited by the economic policy uncertainty to a small extent. For the listed companies located in areas with a high level of investor protection and intellectual property protection, the economic policy uncertainty has a minimal influence on the institutional investors and corporate innovation investment. The conclusions obtained from this study provide empirical evidence for giving full play to the role played by institutional investors in corporate innovative development. The conclusions also reveal, from the macroscopic level, that the consistency and stability of governmental economic policies have important effects on corporate development.

Antecedents of IFRS Compliance: The Moderating Effect of Audit Quality

Despite the significant non-compliance with IFRS, most audit reports provide unqualified opinion which brings into question the audit quality in enforcing IFRS compliance. Therefore, the purpose of the study was to examine the antecedents of compliance with IFRS by focusing on the moderating effect of audit quality on the association of firm characteristics and IFRS compliance. The collection of data was done through quantitative content analysis of annual reports of 20 Zambian listed companies and Zambia Institute of chartered Accountants covering the years 2012 to 2018. Being a longitudinal study requiring panel data analysis, a Hausman test was done to choose the model to employ. The Hausman test showed that the random effect model was suitable. Results indicate that audit quality moderates the association of firm characteristics and IFRS compliance. Also, there was a positive association between firm size and compliance with IFRS. There was a negative association between firm profitability and compliance with IFRS. However, there was a statistically insignificant positive association between foreign investors, institutional investors, audit quality and IFRS compliance. The study suggests that large companies are expected to comply more with IFRSs and profitable firms withhold financial information. Audit quality was not impaired probably due to the size of the audit firms and international affiliation. Meanwhile, the influence of institutional investors and foreign investors on IFRS compliance was insignificant probably because both institutional and foreign investors in Zambian listed companies are transient investors without significant incentives to demand financial disclosures and they may have other means to access financial information. The financial reporting regulators should focus on enhancing audit quality for listed companies in Zambia and even in other African countries. Future research can focus on the relevance of IFRS disclosures to the domestic investors in Africa considering the cultural differences both at firm and national-level.

Common Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Product Market Competition

The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on revenue-based pay as a plausible channel through which institutional investors might influence competition. Our model implies a negative effect of common ownership on firms' use of revenue-based pay. Using both associative analyses and an event study difference-in-differences design based on plausibly exogenous institutional mergers, we find that common ownership has zero (or a marginally positive) effect on the use of revenue-based pay. Results involving relative performance incentives are similar. Collectively, our results provide no support for the notion that cross-owning block-holders influence compensation contracts in order to soften executives' incentives to compete aggressively.

Is the Bandwagon Bias Effect Theory Driving Institutional Investors Impact on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Practices?

This paper employs the bandwagon bias effect theory to explain the influence of institutional investors on CSR Practices. This study focuses on Nigeria and uses the bandwagon bias theory to explore how institutional investors are being influenced by peer and society pressure to go along with the crowd to conform to CSR industrial standards. Using the balanced panel data of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009, the study investigates the institutional investors influence on CSR. The findings indicate a significant manifestation of relationship between them, which implies that the bandwagon effect on firm’s CSR engagement exists.

Does institutional ownership affect the value relevance of accounting information?

PurposeDrawing upon agency theory, this study aims to assess the value relevance (VR) of accounting information released by non-financial firms listed on the Kuwait stock exchange for the period of 2015-2018. Also, the influence of institutional ownership level and other explanatory variables, namely, book value per share, earnings per share, growth in assets and changes in financial leverage on share prices is examined.Design/methodology/approachTo test the hypotheses, the Ohlson (1995) model is extended. This study uses panel data analysis and applies appropriate statistical techniques to measure empirical relationships.FindingsThe results show that the VR of accounting information released by the Kuwaiti non-financial listed firms varies over the period of 2015-2018. Book value and earnings have significant and positive effects on share prices. In recent years, the VR of book value information has been growing, while that of earnings information has been declining. Institutional ownership level has a significant and positive influence on the VR of accounting information released by the Kuwaiti non-financial listed firms. The findings confirm a positive power, signalling growth in assets regarding the share prices. However, no significant relationship between changes in financial leverage and share prices is found.Practical implicationsThe findings of the study provide evidence of the linkage between VR and institutional ownership level, which promotes the understanding of the influence of institutional investors on a firm’s market value. Empirical evidence from Kuwait will have international implications and can serve as a guide for accounting researchers studying other emerging markets. Capital market regulators can provide guidelines in the form of information characteristics and elements of financial statements that need improvement. Finally, the findings assist non-financial listed firms to enhance the quality of accounting information by identifying the strengths and weaknesses in their financial reports.Originality/valueThis study extends the previous literature by investigating a relatively new set of data in more depth than that has been examined by prior research, which focusses on the relationship between accounting information and the firm’s market value.

The Conundrum of Common Ownership

The common ownership debate has become one of the most contentious issues in corporate law today. This debate is a by-product of major changes to capital market ownership structure, which have triggered concerns about the rise of institutional investors, the growth of index investing, and the rapid concentration of ownership in major international financial markets. Common ownership theory focuses on concerns about the incentives of large financial institutions holding widely diversified portfolios of shares in competing companies within a particular economic sector. Proponents of the common ownership theory argue that, even where institutional investors have relatively small ownership stakes, their collective holdings in competing companies produce anticompetitive effects. Other scholars, however, have challenged both common ownership theory and its regulatory prescriptions. Although common ownership theory began in the United States, it is now being discussed around the world. This article examines three conflicting narratives that emerge in this literature concerning institutional investors and common ownership theory. The article seeks to position these narratives within the context of the rising influence of institutional investors since the early 1990s and its relation to major international corporate governance developments. It analyzes aspects of common ownership theory in light of these contemporary corporate governance developments, and argues that drawing regulatory and policy conclusions from the current body of conflicting empirical findings on the effects of common ownership is premature.

Institutional Investor Influence on Executive-to-Worker Pay Dispersion after the Financial Crisis

In this study, we revisit the influence of institutional investors on executive-to-worker pay dispersion by replicating and extending Connelly, Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, and Devers (2016). Using a ...

Can Institutional Investors’ Participation Improve Accounting Conservatism in China?

Recently many scholars are greatly concerned about the influence of institutional investors on companies’ earnings information quality. Institutional investors have strong and professional team. With big fund stake on listed companies, institutional investors are theoretically thought of playing active role in supervising companies to ensure their investment safety and return. Much evidence has showed that institutional investors are becoming active institutional participation from past passive shareholders. The characteristics of institutional show great advantages on exerting their effect on corporate governance. Correspondingly positive behavior of institutional investors will influence the degree of the accounting information quality. Based on this concept, institutional investors can discover in a timely and effective manner problems existing in the accounting information disclosure. As a result, this article examines whether institutional investors as active shareholders can participate in corporate governance in order to improve companies’ accounting information quality.

The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding

Although empirical studies show that common shareholding affects corporate conduct and that common horizontal shareholding lessens competition, critics have argued that the law should not take any action until we have clearer proof on the causal mechanisms. I show that we in fact have ample proof on causal mechanisms, and that anyway antitrust enforcement should focus on anticompetitive market structures, rather than on causal mechanisms. I rebut claims that every type of causal mechanism that might produce anticompetitive effects is either empirically untested or implausible. I also show that critics are mistaken in claiming that common shareholders lack incentives to influence corporations to increase portfolio value by lessening competition. Finally, I show that preventing anticompetitive horizontal shareholding need not restrict diversification and would encourage, not discourage, desirable institutional investor influence on the efficiency of corporate conduct.

Institutional investors’ response to improved corporate governance: Evidence from the brazilian capital market

<p>This study examines whether normative pressures from stock market regulators to improve the governance quality of Brazilian listed firms influence the participation and activism of institutional investors. More specifically, we investigate the association between institutional investor’s ownership and firm’s voluntary adhesion to the São Paulo Stock Exchange (B3) differentiated levels of corporate governance quality. Empirical testing is performed on a ten-year (2002–2011) panel data set from a sample of 439 firms listed on the B3. Our findings suggest that firms in differentiated corporate governance levels, that is, with better level of transparency and commitment to monitoring, are more attractive to institutional investors. We interpret this result as evidence supporting the shareholder activism movement, attributed by several scholars to institutional shareholders. Our study contributes to the governance literature on the firm’s response to normative pressures and the ability of internal governance mechanisms to signal lower agency cost to capital market. Our evidence also contributes to the ongoing discussion about the role and influence of institutional investors in the functioning of capital markets, and more specific in emerging market like Brazil.</p>

Does Institutional Ownership Improve Firm Investment Efficiency?

ABSTRACT Our study examines the influence of institutional investors on firm investment efficiency based on nonfinancial firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges over the period 2009–2014. Our results show that institutional ownership generally improves firm investment efficiency. However, after considering the independence of institutional ownership, we find that only pressure-resistant institutional ownership increases firm investment efficiency by alleviating both overinvestment and underinvestment. We also find that the pressure-resistant institutional investors’ horizon matters. In particular, pressure-resistant institution investors who have higher shareholdings are more stable—that is, they tend to hold shares longer and thus have a more intensive effect on firm investment efficiency. Our results also show that relaxing external financing constraints, reducing agency costs, and increasing executive incentives significantly improve firm investment efficiency. The results are robust to controlling for endogeneity. Documenting the positive influence that pressure-resistant institutional investors have on firm investment efficiency and the channels through which they improve firm investment efficiency should be of interest to investors, regulators, and academics.

Institutional Investors Holding, Market-Maker System, and Stock Liquidity: An Empirical Study Based on the NEEQ Market

This paper demonstrates the influence of institutional investors shareholding on stock liquidity by means of samples from the NEEQ market from 2014 to 2016. The results of this study suggest that, first, institutional investors shareholding will reduce the liquidity of stocks under agreement trading, and the higher the proportion of shareholding, the worse will become the liquidity. Second, shareholding by institutional investors significantly increases the liquidity of stocks under market-making trade. Third, owing to the function of class market making, the influence of private ownership on liquidity is more positive than that of other kinds of institutional shareholding.

Weather, Institutional Investors, and Earnings News

We examine how pre-announcement weather conditions near a firm’s major institutional investors affect stock market reactions to firms’ earnings announcements. We find that unpleasant weather experienced by institutional investors leads to more delayed market responses to subsequent earnings news. Moreover, unpleasant weather of institutional investors is associated with higher earnings announcement premia. The influence of institutional investors’ weather is robust after controlling for New York City weather, extreme weather conditions, and firm local weather. Additional cross-sectional evidence suggests that the strength of this weather effect is related to institutional investors’ trading behavior.

Influence of institutional investors on firms' corporate social performance in an emerging market

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the link between institutional investor ownership (IIO) and corporate social performance (CSP) among firms in Malaysia. CSP Asset4 sustainability indices have been investigated in order to determine whether institutional owners reward or penalise companies for undertaking CSR activities. For this study, it is assumed that CSP Asset4 sustainability indices are suitable indicators for the performance of corporate sustainability. The results provide empirical support to the argument that institutional owners act as a promoter of CSP. This is important because the institutional investors tend to invest in emerging markets based on their perception of the firms' ability to exhibit market neutral strategies, i.e., long-term sustainable focus, communication and transparency, and size of the firm. This study contributes to the concerns of corporate management and policy-makers regarding responsible CSP related investment that may be directed towards a firm's growth and to establish competitive advantage.

Influence of institutional investors on firms' corporate social performance in an emerging market

Influence of institutional investors on firms' corporate social performance in an emerging market

Heterogeneous Beliefs, Institutional Investors and Stock Returns – Evidence from China

Using the turnover decomposition model, I extract unexpected trading volume from the institutional investors’ trading activity to measure the institutional investors’ heterogeneous beliefs and explore the explanatory power of that on stock returns. Portfolios built according to the magnitude of institutional investors’ heterogeneous beliefs are significantly profitable. The expected returns of portfolios with higher heterogeneous beliefs are significantly higher than other portfolios, particularly for small companies, and the influence of institutional investors’ heterogeneous beliefs on stock returns during the current month is significantly positive, but it is significantly negative for the next month. When considering beta, bm, size and short-sales constraints, the conclusion is still valid.

The governance role of institutional investors in information disclosure

PurposeAs an important participant in capital market, institutional investors play a principal role in improving corporate governance. Most existing studies have focused on institutional ownership and its economic consequences. Nevertheless, they have not provided sufficient insight on the governance behavior of institutional investors as well as the underlying incentive mechanism. This paper aims to analyze the governance role of institutional investors in information disclosure and provide related evidence.Design/methodology/approachThe authors propose a novel theory to analyze the institutional investors’ behavior of active governance and shows that such behavior significantly improves the quality of corporate information disclosure. The authors then conduct an empirical test by using the hand-collected data of institutional investors’ corporate visits during 2009-2014 in ChiNext.FindingsThis paper finds that the firms visited by institutional investors are more likely to have a greater tendency of disclosing more information than the firms that have never been visited. In particular, a higher frequency of visits or a larger number of participating institutional investors leads to a higher degree of disclosure. Consistent with the notion that on-site visits endow institutional investors with more frequent and active interaction with the firms, the authors find that the results are stronger for firms which are visited on-site, when compared with other information acquisition activities such as online meetings, conference calls and investor meetings. In addition, the effect of a site visit is greater when the site visit is conducted by securities companies or funds rather than insurance companies or QFIIs. Finally, the test of the direction of causality suggests that visits conducted by institutional investors leads to more information disclosure, rather than the reverse. Collectively, these results show that institutional investors’ participation enhances corporate information disclosure.Originality/valueThis paper explores the internal mechanism that institutional investors affect corporate governance by improving information disclosure through their corporate visits. This is the first study to investigate the influence of institutional investors’ corporate visits and their economic consequences.

Institutional investors, monitoring and corporate finance policies

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of institutional investors’ investment horizons (IIIH) on a wide variety of key corporate policies.Design/methodology/approachThe authors perform regression analysis to a panel data set of quarterly financial statement data for US firms over the 1981-2014 using several measures of IIIH.FindingsThe authors argue that an increase in the presence of long-term investors contributes to more effective monitoring and information quality. This results in a reduction in agency costs and informational asymmetry problems for firms that are more heavily influenced by long-term investors, which in turn influences the corporate policies they pursue. Consistent with these arguments, the evidence suggests that firms with a greater long-term institutional investor base maintain lower investment outlays, higher dividend payments, lower levels of cash and higher levels of leverage. All results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity issues.Originality/valueThe authors show that a greater presence of long-term institutional investors leads to higher dividends, lower investment outlays, lower cash holdings and higher leverage. The comprehensive nature of the predictions with respect to overall corporate finance policies and the supporting evidence provided represents an important contribution, as previous studies have tended to focus on one specific area of corporate behavior (i.e. such as cash holdings).

CEO Overconfidence, Leadership Ethics, and Institutional Investors

This paper explores the influence of institutional investors’ external monitoring on CEOs’ overconfidence. We particularly examine institutional monitoring’s influence on overinvestments by overconfident CEOs and the likelihood of appointing these overconfident CEOs to firms. The results indicate that firms with overconfident CEOs have more overinvestment, as the CEOs tend to be overly optimistic about investment opportunities and are more likely to act on them. The findings, more importantly, show that institutional monitoring mechanisms attenuate overconfident CEOs’ overinvestment. However, we find that institutional monitoring is only significant when long-term and/or large institutional investors hold the firms’ shares. We also discover that investors’ institutional monitoring not only actively reduces a CEO’s overinvestments, but also negatively influences the appointment of overconfident CEOs. Overall, our study provides insights into institutional monitoring’s role in corporate governance as an effective means of preventing value-destroying behaviors by an overconfident leader and cultivating an ethical business philosophy.