Inferential Role Research Articles

Logical expressivism, logical theory and the critique of inferences

The basic idea of logical expressivism in the Brandomian tradition is that logic makes inferential relations explicit and thereby accessible to critical discussion. But expressivists have not given a convincing explanation of what the point of logical theories is. Peregrin provides a starting point by observing a distinction between making explicit and explication in Carnap’s sense of replacing something unclear and vague by something clear and exact. Whereas logical locutions make inferential relations explicit within a language, logical theories use formal languages to explicate inferential roles and meanings of ordinary-language expressions. But Peregrin also holds that the whole point of logical theories is to provide perspicuous models of inferential structures in ordinary language practice. This turns explication into a mere continuation of making explicit by other means, and it leads to a one-sided conception of logic which has no room for evaluating inferential practice in light of logical theories. As a more convincing alternative, I suggest that expressivists rely on the method of reflective equilibrium. This approach is closely related to Carnapian explication, but it has the potential of correcting informal inferential practice without dubious ambitions to replace ordinary languages by logical formalisms.

Relevance, ad hoc concepts and analogy

In Relevance Theory (RT) concepts are “enduring elementary mental structure[s] capable of playing different discriminatory or inferential roles on different occasions in an individual’s mental life.” (Sperber & Wilson, 2012, p. 35). They may be lexicalized atomic concepts, ad hoc atomic concepts not encoded in our linguistic system and some innate concepts (Carston, 2010, p. 14). Concepts may be shared between interlocutors, idiosyncratic but grounded in common experience or fully idiosyncratic and non-communicable. They are “arrived at through the mutual pragmatic adjustment of explicature and contextual implicatures.” (Carston, 2010, p. 10). Ad-hoc concepts are “pragmatically derived, generally ineffable, non-lexicalized […] rough indication to aid readers in understanding what we have in mind in particular cases.” (Carston 2010, p. 13). Concepts encoded will only occasionally be the same as the ones communicated because words are used to convey indefinitely many other ad hoc concepts constructed in a given context (Sperber & Wilson, 2012, p. 43). Apparently, RT restricts the construction of ad hoc concepts by the search for relevance (definitions of (optimal) relevance, principles of relevance and relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure) and the potential connection (narrowing or broadening) between the denotations of the encoded and constructed concepts. The mechanisms underlying category narrowing/broadening seem not to be explicitly described and explained. What provides a very general but, at the same time, precise account of concept-relatedness is Hofstadter & Sander’s (2013) understanding of analogy. The question posed here is whether this understanding may help explain concept-relatedness in Relevance Theory.

From Natural to Formal Language: A Case for Logical Pluralism

I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of the logical vocabulary. In particular, I argue that the apparent rivalry between classical and relevant logic can be resolved, given that both logics capture and formalize normative and legitimate senses of logical consequence: classical logic encodes “follows from” as truth preservation and captures the truth conditions of the logical constants, while relevant logic encodes a notion of “follows from” which, apart from preserving truth, avoids the violation of certain Gricean maxims and captures a different inferential role for the same logical constants, enriching their meaning pragmatically.

Identifying the influence of quality management of ISO 9001 on product innovation and financial turn over interfering the lack of peripheral confidence

This paper aims at identifying the influence of Quality Management of ISO 9001 on product innovation and financial turn over interfering the lack of peripheral confidence. The population includes 90 employees of industrial factories around Ahvaz and in Ahvaz-Shooshtar road who were selected through random sampling. Stability and the validity of the mentioned questionnaire were also evaluated in this research. Data analysis was performed via descriptive and inferential analysis and also SPSS18 and Lisrel 8.5 and approved by confirmatory factor and goodness of fit for four variables. The results coming from the hypothesis test confirm the both the hypothesis and the influence of ISO 9001 Quality Management on financial turn over and the innovation. Also the turn over itself is effective in product innovation but the inferential role of lack of peripheral confidence on ISO 9001 Quality Management on financial turnover and the product innovation was not approved.

Interpersonal Sameness of Meaning for Inferential Role Semantics

Inferential Role Semantics is often criticized for being incompatible with the platitude that words of different speakers can mean the same thing. While many assume that this platitude can be accommodated by understanding sameness of meaning in terms of similarity of meaning, no worked out proposal has ever been produced for Inferential Role Semantics. I rectify this important omission by giving a detailed structural account of meaning similarity in terms of graph theory. I go on to argue that this account has a number of attractive features, prominent among them that it makes sameness of meaning probabilistically determine co-reference.

An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics

Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features of the application process. In this way, a better account of mathematical applications is, in principle, available.

The brand origin meaning transfer model (BOMT): an integrative theoretical model

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore how brand origin (BO) cues affect the consumer’s association of a new brand with BO learning and the subsequent effects on brand image (BO semiotics). An integrative theoretical framework is proposed that includes both processes. Design/methodology/approach – The proposed model is based on analogical learning theory and triadic semiotic theory. Findings – Two types of BO knowledge form BO meanings in consumer minds: country-related categories and exemplar brands, which have a classification and/or inferential role. The brand cues (indexes or icons) used by consumers to identify BO generate one or the other type of BO knowledge. Indexes trigger the classification function of country-related categories while icons trigger the inferential role of country-related categories and exemplar brands. BO knowledge informs the meaning transfer when consumers interpret the meaning of a new brand, leading to either a transfer of relations or a transfer of attributes to the new brand. Practical implications – Marketers should monitor BO exemplar brands that consumers use as meaning sources and carefully select the signs used in their communications to evoke BO. Originality/value – The proposed framework contrasts with dominant categorisation perspectives, re-establishing the dual role of categories and emphasising the relevance of brand cues in BO identification and BO exemplar brands in the BO meaning transfer process. A meaning-centred perspective is adopted to integrate BO identification and the related transfer mechanisms.

A proof-theoretic universal property of determiners

The paper highlights a difference between Model-Theoretic Semantics (MTS) and Proof-Theoretic Semantics (PTS) regarding the meanings of NL-realisable determiners. While MTS uses conservativity as a major filter on GQs as serving NL-realisable determiners' meanings, conservativity fails in serving as such a filter. According to the PTS rendering of conservativity, all determiners are conservative. Instead of conservativity, PTS methodology focuses on other criteria, originating from the inferential role of determiners as captured by the introduction and elimination rules of a meaning-conferring ND-system. The criteria considered in the paper are harmony, stability and purity of rules. The paper presents two examples of conservative “determiners” that can be excluded by the suggested criteria.

The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding

One sometimesbelievesa proposition withoutgraspingit. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory is more plausible than the inferential theory.

The eco-cognitive model of abduction: Ἀπαγωγή now: Naturalizing the logic of abduction

Abduction (ἀπαγωγή, in ancient Greek, often translated as “leading away” or “reduction”) is a procedure in which something that lacks classical explanatory epistemic virtue can be accepted because it has virtue of another kind: Gabbay and Woods [15] contend (GW-schema) that abduction presents an ignorance-preserving or (ignorance-mitigating) character. From this perspective abductive reasoning is a response to an ignorance-problem; through abduction the basic ignorance – that does not have to be considered a total “ignorance” – is neither solved nor left intact. Abductive reasoning is an ignorance-preserving accommodation of the problem at hand. Is abduction really ignorance-preserving? To better answer this question I will introduce (and take advantage of) an eco-cognitive model (EC-Model) of abduction. It will be illustrated that through abduction, knowledge can be enhanced, even when abduction is not considered an inference to the best explanation in the classical sense of the expression, that is an inference necessarily characterized by an empirical evaluation phase, or an inductive phase, as Peirce called it. To further deepen the eco-cognitive character of abduction a simple genealogy of logic is provided: Aristotle clearly states that in syllogistic theory local/environmental cognitive factors – external to that peculiar inferential process, for example regarding users/reasoners, are given up. Indeed, to define syllogism Aristotle first of all insists that all syllogisms are valid and contends that the necessity of this kind of reasoning is related to the circumstance that “no further term from outside (ἔξωθɛν) is needed”, in sum syllogism is the fruit of a kind of eco-cognitive immunization. At the same time Aristotle presents a seminal perspective on abduction: the second part of the article considers the famous passage in Chapter B25 of Prior Analytics concerning ἀπαγωγή (“leading away”), also studied by Peirce. I contend that some of the current well-known distinctive characters of abductive cognition are already expressed, which are in tune with the EC-Model. By providing an illustration of the role of the method of analysis and of the middle terms in Plato's dialectic argumentation, considered as related to the diorismic/poristic process in ancient geometry – also, later on, emphasized by Proclus – I maintain that it is just this intellectual heritage which informs Aristotle' Chapter B25 on ἀπαγωγή. Even if, in general, Aristotle seems to sterilize, thanks to the invention of syllogistic theory, every “dialectic” background of reasoning, nevertheless in Chapter B25 he is still pointing to the fundamental inferential role in reasoning of those externalities that substantiate the process of “leading away” (ἀπαγωγή). Hence, we can gain a new positive perspective about the “constitutive” eco-cognitive character of abduction, just thanks to Aristotle himself. Finally, the paper presents an excursus on Aristotle's enthymemes from signs, disregarded by Peirce, but extremely important to stress the Aristotelian treatment of what I have called selective abduction. A forthcoming companion paper [35] will further deepen the EC-Model of abduction stressing stricter logical aspects: the first result will be that, contrarily to the classical logical view, relevance and plausibility in abductive reasoning have to be relativized and so the epistemologically embarrassing concepts of irrelevance and implausibility exculpated: they are not always offensive to reason.

Moral inferentialism and the Frege-Geach problem

Despite its many advantages as a metaethical theory, moral expressivism faces difficulties as a semantic theory of the meaning of moral claims, an issue underscored by the notorious Frege-Geach problem. I consider a distinct metaethical view, inferentialism, which like expressivism rejects a representational account of meaning, but unlike expressivism explains meaning in terms of inferential role instead of expressive function. Drawing on Michael Williams’ recent work on inferential theories of meaning, I argue that an appropriate understanding of the pragmatic role of moral discourse—the facilitation of coordinated social behavior—suggests the kind of inferences we should expect terms with this function to license. I offer a sketch of the inferential roles the moral ‘ought’ plays, and argue that if we accept that the relevant inferential roles are meaning-constitutive, we will be in a position to solve the Frege-Geach problem. Such an inferentialist solution has advantages over those forwarded by expressivists such as Blackburn and Gibbard. First, it offers a more straightforward explanation of the meaning of moral terms. It also gives simple answers to at least two semantic worries that have vexed contemporary expressivists—the “problem of permissions” and the commitment to “mentalism”, both of which I argue are problems that don’t get traction with an inferentialist approach. I conclude by considering ways in which this approach can be expanded into a more robust semantic account.

Putting Brandom on His Feet: A Realist Interpretation of Inferentialism

1. Inference and RepresentationThe view that the meaning of a word or sentence is identical its in language, and that language is primarily a social practice, is mainly associated with the name of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958, §§ 30 and 43). It is opposed theories that construe meanings as abstract entities (for example, propositions) or as somehow determined by mental entities (for example, intentions). As is well known, however, Wittgenstein left it develop a systematic use of meaning. One of these others is Robert Brandom, whose thoughts about meaning, language, and social practices in general, have attracted much attention in the past two decades, more precisely, since the publication of his book Making It Explicit in 1994.Brandom's theory, which he also calls semantic pragmatism and pragmatic semantics, sticks out among other approaches of this sort because of its sheer size and richness of details. It is part of a comprehensive system that also deals with normativity, truth, and intentionality, mention just three important themes.1 The core of Brandom's semantics is the assumption that the meaning (or propositional content) of an assertion depends on its inferential role, that is, on its function as a premise or conclusion in inferences.2 One understands an assertion if one is able draw the relevant inferences. Brandom emphasizes that drawing inferences is a kind of knowing-how, a practical activity or capacity, rather than some kind of theoretical knowledge.Furthermore, Brandom also leaves no doubt that the main opponent of inferentialism is representationalism, which is his term for approaches that start with the concept of representation and this for defining the concept of inference. A representationalist theory would typically describe how words and sentences refer things and facts in the world, how the truth value of a sentence depends on the of the words appearing in the sentence, and finally, how true conclusions can be inferred from true premises.Brandom turns this explanatory strategy upside down. For him, the basic notion is that of inference.3 Inferences between sentences determine the meanings of these sentences and of the words contained in them. There are inferences and bad ones. Roughly speaking, neglecting a lot of details, we may say that the good inferences are those which are endorsed by the community. Truth is introduced into the theory only at a later stage, being defined as that which is preserved in the transition from premises conclusions in good inferences.As reference, this is not a relation between language and the world, such as between the word dog and a class of hairy animals. It is rather a relation between the word and another part of discourse. Imagine, for example, a dialogue about someone's pet. At some point in this dialogue, the would perhaps be specified as a dog, which would establish a relation between the word dog and previous occurrences of the word pet in the same dialogue. Brandom calls this an anaphoric account of refers. Anaphoric is intralinguistic and is not be confused with extralinguistic reference, which does not exist in Brandom's system. The purpose is to show how an analysis in terms of anaphoric mechanisms can provide the resources for a purely intralinguistic account of the of the English sentences by means of which philosophers make assertions about extralinguistic referential relations. (Brandom 1994, 306)In order better understand this anti-representationalist treatment of representational concepts, it may be useful distinguish three kinds of representationalism: In a first sense, a theory can be said be representationalist if it uses representational concepts such as reference at all, whether these figure as basic or as derived concepts and however they may be defined within the theory. …

Fictions, Conditionals, and Stellar Astrophysics

This article argues in favour of an inferential role for fictions in scientific modelling. The argument proceeds by means of a detailed case study, namely models of the internal structure of stars in stellar astrophysics. The main assumptions in such models are described, and it is argued that they are best understood as useful fictions. The role that conditionals play in these models is explained, and it is argued that fictional assumptions play an important role as either background or antecedent conditions. I then expand on the argument for the compatibility of fictions and scientific realism. I argue that realism and antirealism plausibly offer correspondingly different accounts of the semantics of these fictional conditionals.

Belief ascriptions and social externalism

I outline Brandom’s theory of de re and de dicto belief ascriptions, which plays a central role in Brandom’s overall theory of linguistic communication, and show that this theory offers a surprising, new response to Burge’s (Midwest Stud 6:73–121, 1979) argument for social externalism. However, while this response is in principle available from the perspective of Brandom’s theory of belief ascription in abstraction from his wider theoretical enterprise, it ceases to be available from this perspective in the wider context of his inferential role semantics and his doctrines of scorekeeping and of the expressive role of belief ascriptions in discourse. In this wider context, Brandom’s theory of belief ascriptions implies that Burge’s argument trivially fails to have the disquieting implications for psychological explanations that it is widely taken to have. Yet since this is not trivially so, Brandom’s theory apparently provides a false picture of our practice of interpreting belief ascriptions. I then argue that Brandom might as well accept the alternative picture of interpreting belief ascriptions that Burge’s argument presupposes: even in the context of his overall project, Brandom’s take on our practice of interpreting them does not afford belief ascriptions with the discursive significance Brandom claims they have.

The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge

The central Fodorian objections to Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) can be taken to include an 'Analyt- icity Challenge' and a 'Circularity Challenge', which are ultimately challenges to IRS explanations of concept possession. In this paper I present inferential role theories, critically examine those two challenges and point out two misunderstandings to which the challenges are exposed. I then state in detail a rationalist ver- sion of IRS and argue that this version meets the Fodorian challenges head on. If sound, this line of argu- ment shows that there is no problem of principle in the consideration of IRS as a good candidate for a the- ory of concepts.

Reconceiving Eliminative Inference

Eliminative reasoning seems to play an important role in the sciences, but should it be part of our best theory of science? Statistical evidence, prevalent across the sciences, causes problems for eliminative inference, supporting the view that probabilistic theories of confirmation provide a better framework for reasoning about evidence. Here I argue that deductive elimination has an important inferential role to play in science, one that is compatible with probabilistic approaches to evidence. Eliminative inferences help frame testing problems, an essential step that determines the context for evaluating statistical evidence. I illustrate this process with examples from molecular evolutionary biology.

The Conjectural Approximation

It is not possible to investigate the methodological scope of the legal conjecture without reference to Xenophanes. This is not the dutiful tribute to the ancient but the recognition that derives from archeology of a concept. We need to focus on two elements of Xenophanes conjecture theory : the procedural nature of the conjecture and the inferential role of typoi. According to Xenophanes the man does not pursue the truth, which belongs to gods, but the likelihood which is discovered only gradually. He believes that it is impossible to have absolute certainty of knowing. Even if we find in the reality something that approximates to the truth, we are not absolutely certain of that. So his thoughts only consider something plausible. But this reluctance of the philosopher must not be confused with the expression of a skeptical theory, since the uncertainty of knowledge is due to its speculative way that makes it physiologically approximate. The domain of the conjecture is therefore not properly the domain of error or illusion, but that of “different” knowledge able to identify its subject matter. It does not have the security of knowledge, it is not certain, however, it involves a prominent part of probability, a positive probability. In short, the conjecture is a judgment criterion according to Xenophanes in and, if there always remains the possibility of error, it is reasonable to accept what is abductively probable.

There is no such Thing as Predication

SummaryIt is often taken for granted that predication is something that happens on a mental, nonlinguistic level, that the grammatical operation of predication is merely a shadowy epiphenomenon of our mental gluing together of the entities stood for by the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate. I argue that there is nothing - or at least nothing clearly graspable - that could be reasonably called predication save the grammatical operation. Predication, I argue, is what happens when we use a linguistic ‘tool’ having built it of two specific parts, where the parts, already furnished with certain inferential roles, conspire to produce a sentence with a specific inferential potential, which then can be used within a plentitude of our language games.

On the Ramsey Test without Triviality

We present a way of classifying the logically possible ways out of Gardenfors' inconsistency or triviality result on belief revision with conditionals. For one of these ways—conditionals which are not descriptive but which only have an inferential role as being given by the Ramsey test—we determine which of the assumptions in three different versions of Gardenfors' theorem turn out to be false. This is done by constructing ranked models in which such Ramsey-test conditionals are evaluated and which are subject to natural postulates on belief revision and acceptability sets for conditionals. Along the way we show that in contrast with what Gardenfors himself proposed, there is no dichotomy of the form: either the Ramsey test has to be given up or the Preservation condition. Instead, both of them follow from our postulates.

To Prove the Evident: On the Inferential Role of Euclidean Diagrams

To Prove the Evident: On the Inferential Role of Euclidean Diagrams