Mental State Inferences Research Articles

How causal structure, causal strength, and foreseeability affect moral judgments

Causal analysis lies at the heart of moral judgment. For instance, a general assumption of most ethical theories is that people are only morally responsible for an outcome when their action causally contributed to it. Considering the causal relations between our acts and potential good and bad outcomes is also of crucial importance when we plan our future actions. Here, we investigate which aspects of causal relations are particularly influential when the moral permissibility of actions and the moral responsibility of agents for accidental harms are assessed. Causal strength and causal structure are two independent properties of causal models that may affect moral judgments. We investigated whether the length of a causal chain between acts and accidental harms, a structural feature of causal relations, affects people's moral evaluation of action and agent. In three studies (N = 2285), using a combination of vignettes and causal learning paradigms, we found that longer chains lead to more lenient moral evaluations of actions and agents. Moreover, we show that the reason for this finding is that harms are perceived to be less likely, and therefore less foreseeable for agents, when the relation is indirect rather than direct. When harms are considered equally likely and equally foreseeable, causal structure largely ceases to affect moral judgments. The findings demonstrate a tight coupling between causal representations, mental state inferences, and moral judgments, and show that reasoners process and integrate these components in a largely rational manner.

Neural substrates of shared visual experiences: a hyperscanning fMRI study.

Sharing experience is a fundamental human social cognition. Since visual experience is a mental state directed toward the world, we hypothesized that sharing visual experience is mediated by joint attention (JA) for sharing directedness and mentalizing for mental state inferences. We conducted a hyperscanning functional magnetic resonance imaging with 44 healthy adult volunteers to test this hypothesis. We employed spoken-language-cued spatial and feature-based JA tasks. The initiator attracts the partner’s attention by a verbal command to a spatial location or an object feature to which the responder directs their attention. Pair-specific inter-individual neural synchronization of task-specific activities was found in the right anterior insular cortex (AIC)–inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) complex, the core node of JA and salience network, and the right posterior superior temporal sulcus, which represents the shared categories of the target. The right AIC-IFG also showed inter-individual synchronization of the residual time-series data, along with the right temporoparietal junction and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex—the core components for mentalization and the default mode network (DMN). This background synchronization represents sharing the belief of sharing the situation. Thus, shared visual experiences are represented by coherent coordination between the DMN and salience network linked through the right AIC-IFG.

An Electrocortical Measure Associated with Metarepresentation Mediates the Relationship between Autism Symptoms and Theory of Mind.

Impairments in theory of mind (ToM) - long considered common among individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) - are in fact highly heterogeneous across this population. While such heterogeneity should be reflected in differential recruitment of neural mechanisms during ToM reasoning, no research has yet uncovered a mechanism that explains these individual differences. In this study, 78 (48 ASD) adolescents viewed ToM vignettes and made mental state inferences about characters' behavior while participant electrophysiology was concurrently recorded. Two candidate event-related potentials (ERPs) - the Late Positive Complex (LPC) and the Late Slow Wave (LSW) - were successfully elicited. LPC scores correlated positively with ToM accuracy and negatively with ASD symptom severity. Notably, the LPC partially mediated the relationship between ASD symptoms and ToM accuracy, suggesting this ERP component, thought to represent cognitive metarepresentation, may help explain differences in ToM performance in some individuals with ASD.

In a bilingual state of mind: Investigating the continuous relationship between bilingual language experience and mentalizing

AbstractMentalizing, a dynamic form of social cognition, is strengthened by language experience. Past research has found that bilingual children and adults outperform monolinguals on mentalizing tasks. However, bilingual experiences are multidimensional and diverse, and it is unclear how continuous individual differences in bilingual language experience relate to mentalizing. Here, we examine whether individual differences in bilingual language diversity, measured through language entropy, continuously pattern with mentalizing judgments among bilingual adults, and whether this relationship is constrained by first vs. second language reading. We tested sixty-one bilingual adults on a reading and inference task that compared mental state and logical inferences. We found that greater language diversity patterned with higher mentalizing judgments of mental state inferences across all readers, and that L2 readers attributed more mentalizing to logical inferences compared to L1 readers. Together, we found evidence of a positive relationship between continuous individual differences in bilingual language diversity and mentalizing.

Socio-cognitive processing in people with eating disorders: Computerized tests of mentalizing, empathy and imitation skills.

ObjectiveEating disorders are psychiatric illnesses characterized by extreme eating behaviors, such as sustained food restriction or loss of control over eating. Symptoms are thought to be maintained by a variety of mechanisms, one of which may be the socio‐cognitive impairments associated with eating disorders. While some previous work has addressed socio‐cognitive impairments in eating disorders, this work has relied mostly on self‐report data.MethodHere we employed computerized tests of (a) mentalizing (ability to infer the mental states of others); (b) empathy (the degree to which the emotional states of others can be identified and the degree to which the states of others impact one's own emotional state); and (c) imitation (the degree to which observation of another's actions prompts the performance of those actions); in a group of 78 women with an eating disorder and a matched control group of 66 healthy women.ResultsPeople with eating disorders showed both hyper‐ and hypo‐mentalizing and reduced accuracy of emotional and cognitive mental state inference. They displayed less imitation of observed actions, but no differences in empathy compared to healthy controls. Although anxiety and depressive symptoms had significant effects on mentalizing, most of the observed inter‐group differences persisted.DiscussionWomen with eating disorders have difficulties mentalizing and imitating observed actions despite intact non‐social automatic imitation, compared to healthy controls. These findings provide an indication that intervention modules to strengthen specific areas of social cognition might be helpful to improve patients' social skills.

Linking young children’s teaching to their reasoning of mental states: Evidence from Singapore

To fully participate in the human information-sharing ecosystem that allows for efficient knowledge dissemination and creation, children need to be able to teach others effectively. The current research is the first to investigate links between children’s teaching abilities and their developing theory of mind abilities in a non-Western sample. In a sample of 4- to 6-year-old Singaporean children (N = 49), we examined relations between specific components of theory of mind abilities and teaching ability on a social cognitive task. We found that both false belief understanding and the ability to make mental state inferences in a teaching context were associated with effective teaching even after controlling for age and language ability. These findings provide a nuanced picture of the links between mental state reasoning and teaching ability. More broadly, they provide evidence that these links extend beyond Western cultures and generalize to social-cognitive teaching contexts.

Cue competition in mental state inference: Blocking effects in learning to interpret the behaviors of others

In the literature on learning, one of the most robust cue competition effects is blocking: the previous learning of a cue-outcome association prevents learning that other cues predict the same outcome if those cues are presented together with the first cue. In this research, we investigated blocking effects in mental state inference. Participants learned to diagnose the internal states of a target person based on the behaviors he displayed. Blocking effects were observed across several studies, such that, when participants had previously learned that a certain behavior predicted a certain internal state, they later failed to learn about the predictive value of other behaviors that were paired with the original behavioral cue. Implications are discussed for cognitive models of learning and cue competition, as well as for the social psychology of mental state inference.

The Relationship Between Different Aspects of Theory of Mind and Symptom Clusters in Psychotic Disorders: Deconstructing Theory of Mind Into Cognitive, Affective, and Hyper Theory of Mind.

Background: Several meta-analyses highlight pronounced problems in general Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other persons' mental states, in patients with psychosis in comparison to non-clinical controls. In addition, first studies suggest associations between Hyper-ToM, an exaggerated inference of mental states to others, and delusions. Research on different ToM subtypes (Cognitive ToM, Affective ToM, and Hyper-ToM) and symptom clusters of psychosis (positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms) have gathered conflicting findings. Thus, the present study examined group differences between patients with psychosis and non-clinical controls concerning Cognitive ToM/Affective ToM and Hyper-ToM. Further, the association between ToM subtypes and symptom clusters (positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms) were examined.Methods: Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 64, 1/3 with present delusions indicated by a minimum score of four in the PANSS P1 item) and non-clinical controls (n = 21) were examined with assessments of Cognitive ToM and Affective ToM abilities and Hyper-ToM errors using the Frith-Happé animations. Psychopathology was assessed using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale.Results: Patients with psychosis presented more pronounced problems in Cognitive and Affective ToM in comparison to non-clinical controls, whereas there were no group differences with regard to Hyper-ToM errors. Furthermore, deficits in Cognitive ToM were associated with general delusions, whereas problems in Affective ToM were associated with negative and disorganized symptoms. In addition, there was no association between Hyper-ToM errors and any symptoms when controlling for years of education.Conclusions: Our findings suggest that deficits in ToM subtypes might not be directly related to delusions and positive symptoms and are in line with more recently developed cognitive models of delusions. In addition, our results support the well-established finding of associations between ToM alterations and negative or disorganized symptoms. Our results shed light on the role of different dimensions of ToM in specific symptoms of psychosis.

Integrating empathic and mentalizing abilities with interpersonal sensitivity in people with eating disorders: A network analysis approach

IntroductionLiterature highlights that interpersonal sensitivity represents an important development and maintaining factor for Eating Disorder (ED). Mentalizing and empathy are two psychological constructs that play a crucial role in social functioning. However, the role of mentalizing and empathy in the socio-emotional processing deficits of ED patients has been under investigated.ObjectivesWe aimed to assess the complex interactions between the sub-components of mentalizing and empathy and ED symptoms through a network analysis approach.MethodsSeventy-seven women with EDs were included in our study. Eating disorder and affective symptomatology were investigated with self-report questionnaires. All patients underwent two computerized tasks: Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC), assessing emotional and non-emotional mental state inferences; Empathic Accuracy Task-Revised (EAT-R), measuring accuracy in identifying and sharing others’ emotions. A partial correlation network and bridge function analyses were computed.ResultsIn the partial correlation network inference of cognitive mental states and shape concern were the nodes with the highest strength centrality. Inference of emotional mental states was the node with the highest bridge strength in the cluster of social cognition functions. Empathic and mentalizing abilities were directly connected with each other and with ED symptoms.ConclusionsThis is the first network analysis study which integrates self-reported symptoms and objective socio-cognitive performance in people with Eds. Our results provide evidence of the complex interactions between mentalizing, empathy and psychopathological symptoms in people with EDs. Therefore, confirm that the ability to infer others’ mental state may represent a useful target for clinical intervention in EDs.

Understanding the Links between Inferring Mental States, Empathy, and Burnout in Medical Contexts.

It is generally accepted that empathy should be the basis of patient care. However, this ideal may be unrealistic if healthcare professionals suffer adverse effects when engaging in empathy. The aim of this study is to explore the effect of inferring mental states and different components of empathy (perspective-taking; empathic concern; personal distress) in burnout dimensions (emotional exhaustion; depersonalization; personal accomplishment). A total of 184 healthcare professionals participated in the study (23% male, Mage = 44.60; SD = 10.46). We measured participants’ empathy, the inference of mental states of patients, and burnout. Correlation analyses showed that inferring mental states was positively associated with perspective-taking and with empathic concern, but uncorrelated with personal distress. Furthermore, emotional exhaustion was related to greater levels of personal distress and greater levels of inferences of mental states. Depersonalization was associated with greater levels of personal distress and lower levels of empathic concern. Personal accomplishment was associated with the inference of mental states in patients, lower levels of personal distress, and perspective-taking. These results provide a better understanding of how different components of empathy and mental state inferences may preserve or promote healthcare professionals’ burnout.

When my wrongs are worse than yours: Behavioral and neural asymmetries in first-person and third-person perspectives of accidental harms

Research on third-party moral judgments highlights two mechanisms as central to moral judgments of accidental harms: the inference of intent and the perception of harm. However, little is known about how these mechanisms are recruited when people evaluate themselves for harm that they have accidentally caused. Here we explore how a person's perspective — as either actor or observer — influences their moral judgments of accidental harm. We use fMRI to investigate how brain regions involved in the inference of intent and the perception of harm differentially respond when participants either cause (first-person) or observe (third-person) accidental harm. First, we find that people judge their own accidental harms more harshly than they judge others' accidents, and hold themselves more responsible for the unintended harmful outcomes of their choices. Second, we find that regions responding to the first-hand experience of pain are also more sensitive to first-person harms relative to third-person harms, and brain-behavior relationships in a subset of these regions suggest that the tendency to judge oneself more harshly may be supported by a greater sensitivity to the victim's experience of harm. Third, though we find that first-person harms recruit regions for mental state inference to a lesser extent than third-person harms, this difference does not appear to account for the behavioral differences in moral judgment between first-person and third-person harms. The results of this experiment suggest that accidental harms are an important context for broadening our understanding of the relationship between agency, empathy, and moral judgments about the self.

Validation de la mini-SEA dans une population française variée : données de référence pour la pratique clinique

Social cognition, referring to humans’ abilities to process social information in order to efficiently interact with each other, is impaired in a wide range of clinical groups. Among them, patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal lobar degeneration (bvFTD) have been found to present deficits in emotion recognition and mental state inference. Based on these components of social cognition, the mini-SEA battery was developed a dozen years ago and is widely used today with patients suffering from a variety of conditions. However, national normative studies are still lacking. The aim of the present study is to provide such normative reference data for French participants and to evaluate the psychometric qualities of the mini-SEA. 150 healthy participants were assessed with the mini-SEA. We found that performance decreased with the age of participants, and we observed a general, though small, advantage for women participants. Sensitivity analyses revealed that both sub-tests are relatively easy for healthy participants. However, emotion recognition performance appeared to depend on the type of emotions displayed. Internal consistency and reliability both appeared to be satisfactory, although these dimensions should be investigated in greater depth in future studies. Finally, the mini-SEA showed good clinical validity, as reflected by excellent specificity and sensitivity values.

God's mind on morality.

Most research on cognition behind religious belief assumes that understanding of other minds is culturally uniform and follows the Western model of mind, which posits that (a) others' thoughts can be known and (b) action is best explained by mental state inference. This is potentially problematic if, as a growing body of evidence suggests, other populations view minds differently. We recruit Indigenous iTaukei Fijians who hold (a) a model of mind that discourages mental state inference and (b) co-existing Christian (Western) and traditional supernatural agent beliefs. Study 1 (N = 108), uses free-listing to examine how Western and local models of mind relate to beliefs. The Christian God cares about internal states and traits (aligning with the Western model of mind). Study 2 tests whether evoking God triggers intent focus in moral reasoning. Instead, God appears to enforce cultural models of mind in iTaukei (N = 151) and North Americans (N = 561). Expected divine judgement mirrors human judgement; iTaukei (N = 90) expect God to emphasise outcome, while Indo-Fijians (N = 219) and North Americans (N = 412) expect God to emphasise intent. When reminded to think about thoughts, iTaukei (N = 72) expect God to judge outcomes less harshly. Results suggest cultural/cognitive co-evolution: introduced cultural forms can spread new cognitive approaches, while Indigenous beliefs can persist as a reflection of local institutions.

Attention in naïve psychology

In everyday life, mentalizing is nested in a rich context of cognitive faculties and background information that potentially contribute to its success. Yet, we know little about these modulating effects. Here we propose that humans develop a naïve psychological model of attention (featured as a goal-dependent, intentional relation to the environment) and use this to fine-tune their mentalizing attempts, presuming that the way people represent their environment is influenced by the cognitive priorities (attention) their current intentions create. The attention model provides an opportunity to tailor mental state inferences to the temporary features of the agent whose mind is in the focus of mentalizing. The ability to trace attention is an exceptionally powerful aid for mindreading. Knowledge about the partner's attention provides background information, however being grounded in his current intentions, attention has direct relevance to the ongoing interaction. Furthermore, due to its causal connection to intentions, the output of the attention model remains valid for a prolonged but predictable amount of time: till the evoking intention is in place. The naïve attention model theory is offered as a novel theory on social attention that both incorporates existing evidence and identifies new directions in research.

Thinking about Others\u2019 Minds: Mental State Inference in Boys with Conduct Problems and Callous-Unemotional Traits

Children with conduct problems (CP) and high levels of callous-unemotional traits (CP/HCU) have been found to have an intact ability to represent other minds, however, they behave in ways that indicate a reduced propensity to consider other people’s thoughts and feelings. Here we report findings from three tasks assessing different aspects of mentalising in 81 boys aged 11–16 [Typically developing (TD) n = 27; CP/HCU n = 28; CP and low levels of callous-unemotional traits (CP/LCU) n = 26]. Participants completed the Movie Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC), a task assessing ability/propensity to incorporate judgements concerning an individual’s mind into mental state inference; provided a written description of a good friend to assess mind-mindedness; and completed the Social Judgement Task (SJT), a new measure assessing mentalising about antisocial actions. Boys with CP/HCU had more difficulty in accurately inferring others’ mental states in the MASC than TD and CP/LCU boys. There were no group differences in the number of mind-related comments as assessed by the mind-mindedness protocol or in responses to the SJT task. These findings suggest that although the ability to represent mental states is intact, CP/HCU boys are less likely to update mental state inferences as a function of different minds.

The Interaction Between Mentalizing, Empathy and Symptoms in People with Eating Disorders: A Network Analysis Integrating Experimentally Induced and Self-report Measures

BackgroundThe role of mentalizing and empathy in the socio-emotional processing deficits of Eating Disorder (ED) patients has been under investigated. We aimed to assess these psychological processes and their interplay with ED symptoms by means of the network analysis approach.MethodsSeventy-seven women with EDs completed self-report questionnaires assessing ED, anxious and depressive symptoms, and underwent two computerized tasks; the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC), assessing emotional and non-emotional mental state inferences, and the Empathic Accuracy Task-Revised (EAT-R), measuring accuracy in identifying others’ emotions and the extent to which those emotions are shared. A partial correlation network and bridge function analyses were computed.ResultsIn the partial correlation network inference of cognitive mental states and shape concern were the nodes with the highest strength centrality. Inference of emotional mental states was the node with the highest bridge strength in the cluster of social cognition functions. Empathic and mentalizing abilities were directly connected with each other and with ED symptoms.ConclusionsThis is the first network analysis study which integrates self-reported symptoms and objective socio-cognitive performance in people with EDs. Results highlight the importance of mentalizing abilities in that they contribute to maintenance of ED psychopathology and to empathic ability.

Understanding how minds vary relates to skill in inferring mental states, personality, and intelligence.

Using a "theory of mind" allows us to explain and predict others' behavior in terms of their mental states, yet individual differences in the accuracy of mental state inferences are not well understood. We hypothesized that the accuracy of mental state inferences can be explained by the ability to characterize the mind giving rise to the mental state. Under this proposal, individuals differentiate between minds by representing them in "Mind-space"-a multidimensional space where dimensions reflect any characteristic of minds that allows them to be individuated. Individual differences in the representation of minds and the accuracy of mental state inferences are explained by one's model of how minds can vary (Mind-space) and ability to locate an individual mind within this space. We measured the accuracy of participants' model of the covariance between dimensions in Mind-space that represent personality traits, and we found this was associated with the accuracy of mental state inference (Experiment 1). Mind-space accuracy also predicted the ability to locate others within Mind-space on dimensions of personality and intelligence (Experiment 2). Direct evidence for the representation of minds in mental state inference was obtained by showing that the location of others in Mind-space affects the probability of particular mental states being ascribed to them (Experiment 3). This latter effect extended to mental states dependent upon representation of trait covariation (Experiment 4). Results support the claim that mental state inference varies according to location in Mind-space, and therefore that adopting the Mind-space framework can explain some of the individual differences in theory of mind. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Persons With Schizophrenia Misread Hemingway: A New Approach to Study Theory of Mind in Schizophrenia.

IntroductionTheory of Mind (ToM) is a key component of social cognition. Recently the Short Story Task (SST) was developed as a new measurement of ToM. SST uses a short story of Ernest Hemingway to assess ToM skills. SST proved to be a suitable tool, and sensitive to individual differences among healthy subjects. Our aim was to test SST to evaluate the ToM skills of persons with schizophrenia.Materials and MethodsSST was used to assess ToM skills. After reading the short story “The End of Something” a structured interview was done with 14 questions. Spontaneous mental state reasoning, explicit mental state inference and comprehension of nonmental aspects of the story were evaluated. 47 persons with schizophrenia in remission and 48 healthy controls were assessed and compared.ResultsPersons with schizophrenia performed significantly more poorly in the explicit mental state inference questions. Ceiling effect was not detectable in explicit ToM scores. Patients made less spontaneous mental state references as well, although the occurrence of spontaneous mental state terms was infrequent in both groups. Patients were also less accurate in answering comprehension questions, but the difference was not significant after Bonferroni correction.DiscussionOur results lined up with the original findings and we found SST to be a sensitive tool to explore the individual differences in ToM performance, not only among healthy subjects, but also among persons with schizophrenia especially in explicit mental state inferences without observing the ceiling effect. We found, however, SST to be less sensitive to measure spontaneous mental state reasoning and also the lack of the use of another ToM test to assess convergent validity of SST for indicating ToM deficits in schizophrenia stands as a limitation of current study.

Theory of mind network activity is associated with metaethical judgment: An item analysis

The theory of mind network (ToMN) is a set of brain regions activated by a variety of social tasks. Recent work has proposed that these associations with ToMN activity may relate to a common underlying computation: processing prediction error in social contexts. The present work presents evidence consistent with this hypothesis, using a fine-grained item analysis to examine the relationship between ToMN activity and variance in stimulus features. We used an existing dataset (consisting of statements about morals, facts, and preferences) to examine the variability in ToMN activity elicited by moral statements, using metaethical judgments (i.e. judgments of how objective/subjective morals are) as a proxy for their predictability/support by social consensus. Study 1 validated expected patterns of behavioral judgments in our stimuli set, and Study 2 associated by-stimulus estimates of metaethical judgment with ToMN activity, showing that ToMN activity was negatively associated with objective morals and positively associated with subjective morals. Whole brain analyses indicated that these associations were strongest in bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ). We also observed additional by-stimulus associations with ToMN, including positive associations with the presence of a person (across morals, facts, and preferences), a negative association with agreement (among morals only), and a positive association with mental state inference (in preferences only, across 3 independent measures and behavioral samples). We discuss these findings in the context of recent predictive processing models, and highlight how predictive models may facilitate new perspectives on both metaethics and the nature of distinctions between social domains (e.g. morals vs. preferences).

Theory of minds: managing mental state inferences in working memory is associated with the dorsomedial subsystem of the default network and social integration.

We often interact with multiple people at a time and consider their various points of view to facilitate smooth social interaction. Yet, how our brains track multiple mental states at once, and whether skill in this domain links to social integration, remains underspecified. To fill this gap, we developed a novel social working memory paradigm in which participants manage two- or four-people’s mental states in working memory, as well as control trials in which they alphabetize two- or four-people’s names in working memory. In Study 1, we found that the dorsomedial subsystem of the default network shows relative increases in activity with more mental states managed in working memory. In contrast, this subsystem shows relative decreases in activity with more non-mental state information (the number of names alphabetized) managed in working memory. In Study 2, only individual differences in managing mental states in working memory, specifically on trials that posed the greatest mental state load to working memory, correlated with social integration. Collectively, these findings add further support to the hypothesis that social working memory relies on partially distinct brain systems and may be a key ingredient to success in a social world.