Active Inference Research Articles

Active Inference for Learning and Development in Embodied Neuromorphic Agents.

Taking inspiration from humans can help catalyse embodied AI solutions for important real-world applications. Current human-inspired tools include neuromorphic systems and the developmental approach to learning. However, this developmental neurorobotics approach is currently lacking important frameworks for human-like computation and learning. We propose that human-like computation is inherently embodied, with its interface to the world being neuromorphic, and its learning processes operating across different timescales. These constraints necessitate a unified framework: active inference, underpinned by the free energy principle (FEP). Herein, we describe theoretical and empirical support for leveraging this framework in embodied neuromorphic agents with autonomous mental development. We additionally outline current implementation approaches (including toolboxes) and challenges, and we provide suggestions for next steps to catalyse this important field.

Measure for Measure: Operationalising Cognitive Realism

This paper develops a measure of realism from within the framework of cognitive structural realism (CSR). It argues that in the context of CSR, realism can be operationalised in terms of balance between accuracy and generality. More specifically, the paper draws on the free energy principle to characterise the measure of realism in terms of the balance between accuracy and generality.

Brain asymmetry as minimization of free energy: a theoretical model.

The asymmetry between the left and right sides seems to be a general principle of organization of the nervous systems in Bilateria, providing the foundations for a plethora of leftward and rightward biases in behaviour as documented in species ranging from Caenorhabditis elegans nematodes to humans. Several theories have been put forward to account for the existence and maintenance in the evolution of the asymmetric organization of the brain at both individual and population levels. However, what is missing in theorizing about the evolution of brain asymmetry is an overarching general hypothesis that may subsume all different aspects of current models. Here, we tried to provide an overarching general framework based on the energy and free-energy minimization principle, which proved so valuable in other areas of neuroscience. We found that at the individual level the antisymmetric singlet configuration realizes the lowest energy state of the system, whereas at the group level, the spontaneous emergence of directional asymmetry arises as a consequence of the minimization of the free energy of the system, which guarantees its stability and equilibrium. We thus argue that the various phenomenological aspects of brain asymmetry that have been captured in biology-e.g. sparing of neural tissue, control of unitary motor responses and, at the population level, evolutionarily stable strategies described by mathematical games theory-may be thought of as the manifestation of a more general principle of energy minimization generating, among others, asymmetry of the brains.

Modeling Autonomous Vehicle Responses to Novel Observations Using Hierarchical Cognitive Representations Inspired Active Inference

Equipping autonomous agents for dynamic interaction and navigation is a significant challenge in intelligent transportation systems. This study aims to address this by implementing a brain-inspired model for decision making in autonomous vehicles. We employ active inference, a Bayesian approach that models decision-making processes similar to the human brain, focusing on the agent’s preferences and the principle of free energy. This approach is combined with imitation learning to enhance the vehicle’s ability to adapt to new observations and make human-like decisions. The research involved developing a multi-modal self-awareness architecture for autonomous driving systems and testing this model in driving scenarios, including abnormal observations. The results demonstrated the model’s effectiveness in enabling the vehicle to make safe decisions, particularly in unobserved or dynamic environments. The study concludes that the integration of active inference with imitation learning significantly improves the performance of autonomous vehicles, offering a promising direction for future developments in intelligent transportation systems.

Episodic Visual Hallucinations, Inference and Free Energy.

Understandings of how visual hallucinations appear have been highly influenced by generative approaches, in particular Friston's Active Inference conceptualization. Their core proposition is that these phenomena occur when hallucinatory expectations outweigh actual sensory data. This imbalance occurs as the brain seeks to minimize informational free energy, a measure of the distance between predicted and actual sensory data in a stationary open system. We review this approach in the light of old and new information on the role of environmental factors in episodic hallucinations. In particular, we highlight the possible relationship of specific visual triggers to the onset and offset of some episodes. We use an analogy from phase transitions in physics to explore factors which might account for intermittent shifts between veridical and hallucinatory vision. In these triggered forms of hallucinations, we suggest that there is a transient disturbance in the normal one-to-one correspondence between a real object and the counterpart perception such that this correspondence becomes between the real object and a hallucination. Generative models propose that a lack of information transfer from the environment to the brain is one of the key features of hallucinations. In contrast, we submit that specific information transfer is required at onset and offset in these cases. We propose that this transient one-to-one correspondence between environment and hallucination is mediated more by aberrant discriminative than by generative inference. Discriminative inference can be conceptualized as a process for maximizing shared information between the environment and perception within a self-organizing nonstationary system. We suggest that generative inference plays the greater role in established hallucinations and in the persistence of individual hallucinatory episodes. We further explore whether thermodynamic free energy may be an additional factor in why hallucinations are temporary. Future empirical research could productively concentrate on three areas. Firstly, subjective perceptual changes and parallel variations in brain function during specific transitions between veridical and hallucinatory vision to inform models of how episodes occur. Secondly, systematic investigation of the links between environment and hallucination episodes to probe the role of information transfer in triggering transitions between veridical and hallucinatory vision. Finally, changes in hallucinatory episodes over time to elucidate the role of learning on phenomenology. These empirical data will allow the potential roles of different forms of inference in the stages of hallucinatory episodes to be elucidated.

Disentangling the splicing factor programs underlying complex molecular phenotypes.

The regulation of exon inclusion through alternative splicing tunes the cell's behavior by increasing the functional diversity of the transcriptome and the proteome. Splicing factors work in concert to generate gene isoform pools that contribute to cell phenotypes yet their activity is controlled by multiple regulatory and signaling layers. This hinders identification of functional, phenotype-specific splicing factors using traditional single-omic measurements, such as their mutational state or expression. To address this challenge, we propose repurposing the virtual inference of protein activity by enriched regulon analysis (VIPER) to measure splicing factor activity solely from their downstream exon transcriptomic inclusion signatures. This approach is effective in assessing the effect of co-occurring splicing factor perturbations, as well as their post-translational regulation. As proof of concept, we dissect recurrent splicing factor programs underlying tumorigenesis including aberrantly activated factors acting as oncogenes and inactivated ones acting as tumor suppressors, which are undetectable by more conventional methodologies. Activation and inactivation of these cancer splicing programs effectively stratifies overall survival, as well as cancer hallmarks such as proliferation and immune evasion. Altogether, repurposing network-based inference of protein activity for splicing factor networks distills common, functionally relevant splicing programs in otherwise heterogeneous molecular contexts.

Artificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle

Does the assumption of a weak form of computational functionalism, according to which the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness, entail that a digital computational simulation of such neural computations is conscious? Or must this computational simulation be implemented in the right way, in order to replicate consciousness?From the perspective of Karl Friston’s free energy principle, self-organising systems (such as living organisms) share a set of properties that could be realised in artificial systems, but are not instantiated by computers with a classical (von Neumann) architecture. I argue that at least one of these properties, viz. a certain kind of causal flow, can be used to draw a distinction between systems that merely simulate, and those that actually replicate consciousness.

EXPLORING CONCUSSION RECOVERY THROUGH THE LENS OF THE FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE AND MARKOV BLANKET THEORY

This paper delves into the application of the Free Energy Principle (FEP) and the concept of the Markov blanket in understanding the neurocognitive implications of concussion. The FEP, a unifying theory in neuroscience, posits that the brain functions to minimize free energy, equating to a reduction in surprise or uncertainty regarding sensory inputs. The Markov blanket, defining the boundary between a system and its environment, is integral to this framework, particularly in understanding how the brain processes and responds to sensory information. We explore how a concussion might disrupt the brain's predictive processing and its ability to minimize free energy, leading to increased prediction errors and cognitive deficits. This disruption is hypothesized to manifest as an inability to accurately predict sensory inputs, resulting in impaired cognitive functions post-concussion. The paper also discusses the potential of neuroplasticity in concussion recovery, framed within the FEP as the brain's effort to re-establish minimized free energy under new constraints. We propose a methodological approach combining neuroimaging and computational modeling to empirically test these hypotheses. This theoretical exploration offers novel insights into the mechanisms underlying concussion-induced cognitive impairments and suggests new avenues for therapeutic intervention and rehabilitation strategies.

Meaningfulness and attachment: what dreams, psychosis and psychedelic states tell us about our need for connection.

The human need to find meaning in life and the human need for connection may be two sides of the same coin, a coin forged in the developmental crucible of attachment. Our need for meaningfulness can be traced to our developmental need for connection in the attachment relationship. The free energy principle dictates that in order to resist a natural tendency towards disorder self-organizing systems must generate models that predict the hidden causes of phenomenal experience. In other words, they must make sense of things. In both an evolutionary and ontogenetic sense, the narrative self develops as a model that makes sense of experience. However, the self-model skews the interpretation of experience towards that which is predictable, or already "known." One may say it causes us to "take things personally." Meaning is felt more acutely when defenses are compromised, when the narrative self is offline. This enables meaning-making that is less egocentrically motivated. Dreams, psychosis, and psychedelic states offer glimpses of how we make sense of things absent a coherent narrative self. This has implications for the way we understand such states, and lays bare the powerful reach of attachment in shaping what we experience as meaningful.

The fear-avoidance model as an embodied prediction of threat.

The fear-avoidance model is a well-established framework in the understanding of persistent pain. It proposes a dichotomous path: either the context is interpreted as safe; there is no fear reaction and, therefore, the individual engages in active (positive) coping; or the context is interpreted as threatening, leading to a self-reinforcing vicious circle of fear and (negative) avoidance. We propose an embodied interpretation of this phenomenon employing the joint framework of predictive coding and active inference. The key idea is that multisensory integration of exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive sensory inputs can lead to dysfunctional experiences of threat in nonthreatening situations. Threat inference can promote fear responses, maladaptive strategies (i.e., avoidance) and self-provides evidence for threat in associated or future contexts, or both. Under this treatment, the prediction of nonrealized threat becomes self-evidencing and context-invariant, and hence self-perpetuating. Safety cues are unable to attenuate the interpretation of the negative context as the dominant inference of the context is threatful and gains more precision and becomes resistant over time. Our model provides an explanation for the emergence of a dysfunctional fear response in the clinical setting despite apparent safety based on modern concepts from theoretical (computational) neuroscience.

The Universal Optimism of the Self-Evidencing Mind.

Karl Friston's free-energy principle casts agents as self-evidencing through active inference. This implies that decision-making, planning and information-seeking are, in a generic sense, 'wishful'. We take an interdisciplinary perspective on this perplexing aspect of the free-energy principle and unpack the epistemological implications of wishful thinking under the free-energy principle. We use this epistemic framing to discuss the emergence of biases for self-evidencing agents. In particular, we argue that this elucidates an optimism bias as a foundational tenet of self-evidencing. We allude to a historical precursor to some of these themes, interestingly found in Machiavelli's oeuvre, to contextualise the universal optimism of the free-energy principle.

Narrative as active inference: an integrative account of cognitive and social functions in adaptation.

While the ubiquity and importance of narratives for human adaptation is widely recognized, there is no integrative framework for understanding the roles of narrative in human adaptation. Research has identified several cognitive and social functions of narratives that are conducive to well-being and adaptation as well as to coordinated social practices and enculturation. In this paper, we characterize the cognitive and social functions of narratives in terms of active inference, to support the claim that one of the main adaptive functions of narrative is to generate more useful (i.e., accurate, parsimonious) predictions for the individual, as well as to coordinate group action (over multiple timescales) through shared predictions about collective behavior. Active inference is a theory that depicts the fundamental tendency of living organisms to adapt by proactively inferring the causes of their sensations (including their own actions). We review narrative research on identity, event segmentation, episodic memory, future projections, storytelling practices, enculturation, and master narratives. We show how this research dovetails with the active inference framework and propose an account of the cognitive and social functions of narrative that emphasizes that narratives are for the future-even when they are focused on recollecting or recounting the past. Understanding narratives as cognitive and cultural tools for mutual prediction in social contexts can guide research on narrative in adaptive behavior and psychopathology, based on a parsimonious mechanistic model of some of the basic adaptive functions of narrative.

Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them.

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.

On Predictive Planning and Counterfactual Learning in Active Inference.

Given the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence, understanding the foundations of intelligent behaviour is increasingly important. Active inference, regarded as a general theory of behaviour, offers a principled approach to probing the basis of sophistication in planning and decision-making. This paper examines two decision-making schemes in active inference based on "planning" and "learning from experience". Furthermore, we also introduce a mixed model that navigates the data complexity trade-off between these strategies, leveraging the strengths of both to facilitate balanced decision-making. We evaluate our proposed model in a challenging grid-world scenario that requires adaptability from the agent. Additionally, our model provides the opportunity to analyse the evolution of various parameters, offering valuable insights and contributing to an explainable framework for intelligent decision-making.

On efficient computation in active inference

Biological agents demonstrate a remarkable proficiency in calibrating appropriate scales of planning and evaluation when interacting with their environments. It follows logically that any decision-making algorithm aspiring to neurobiological plausibility must mirror these attributes, particularly regarding computational expenditure and the intricacy of evaluative processes. However, active inference encounters notable challenges in simulating apt behaviours within complex environments. These stem chiefly from its substantial computational demands and the intricate task of defining the agent’s behaviour preference. We address these through a two-fold approach. First, we introduce a planning algorithm by using the Bellman-optimality principle to minimise the planning cost function (i.e., expected free energy). Briefly, we recursively compute the expected free energy of actions in reverse temporal sequence to significantly reduce the computational complexity. Secondly, inspired by the Z-learning algorithm, we propose a novel method to learn time-constrained agent preferences. We face-validate the efficacy of these through grid-world simulations and demonstrate precise model learning and planning, even under uncertainty. These algorithmic advances create new opportunities for various applications—in neuroscience and machine learning.

Equilibrium in the Computing Continuum through Active Inference

Computing Continuum (CC) systems are challenged to ensure the intricate requirements of each computational tier. Given the system’s scale, the Service Level Objectives (SLOs), which are expressed as these requirements, must be disaggregated into smaller parts that can be decentralized. We present our framework for collaborative edge intelligence, enabling individual edge devices to (1) develop a causal understanding of how to enforce their SLOs and (2) transfer knowledge to speed up the onboarding of heterogeneous devices. Through collaboration, they (3) increase the scope of SLO fulfillment. We implemented the framework and evaluated a use case in which a CC system is responsible for ensuring Quality of Service (QoS) and Quality of Experience (QoE) during video streaming. Our results showed that edge devices required only ten training rounds to ensure four SLOs; furthermore, the underlying causal structures were also rationally explainable. The addition of new types of devices can be done a posteriori; the framework allowed them to reuse existing models, even though the device type had been unknown. Finally, rebalancing the load within a device cluster allowed individual edge devices to recover their SLO compliance after a network failure from 22% to 89%.

Kinetic Energy and the Free Energy Principle in the Birth of Human Life

Kinetic Energy and the Free Energy Principle in the Birth of Human Life

Form, function, mind: What doesn't compute (and what might)

The applicability of computational and dynamical systems models to organisms is scrutinized, using examples from developmental biology and cognition. Developmental morphogenesis is dependent on the inherent material properties of developing animal (metazoan) tissues, a non-computational modality, but cell differentiation, which utilizes chromatin-based revisable memory banks and program-like function-calling, via the developmental gene co-expression system unique to the metazoans, has a quasi-computational basis. Multi-attractor dynamical models are argued to be misapplied to global properties of development, and it is suggested that along with computationalism, classic forms of dynamicism are similarly unsuitable to accounting for cognitive phenomena. Proposals are made for treating brains and other nervous tissues as novel forms of excitable matter with inherent properties which enable the intensification of cell-based basal cognition capabilities present throughout the tree of life. Finally, some connections are drawn between the viewpoint described here and active inference models of cognition, such as the Free Energy Principle.

The free energy principle induces intracellular compartmentalization

Living systems at all scales are compartmentalized into interacting subsystems. This paper reviews a mechanism that drives compartmentalization in generic systems at any scale. It first discusses three symmetries of generic physical interactions in a quantum-theoretic description. It then shows that if one of these, a permutation symmetry on the inter-system boundary, is spontaneously broken, the symmetry breaking is amplified by the Free Energy Principle (FEP). It thus shows how compartmentalization generically results from permutation symmetry breaking under the FEP. It finally notes that the FEP asymptotically restores the broken symmetry, showing that the FEP can be regarded as a theory of fluctuations away from a permutation-symmetric boundary, and hence from an entangled joint state of the interacting systems.

Framing the predictive mind: why we should think again about Dreyfus

AbstractIn this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus’ old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus’ arguments about the “frame problem” for artificial cognitive systems, and his contrasting account of embodied human skills and expertise. The frame problem presents as a prima facie problem for practical work in AI and robotics, but also for computational views of the mind in general, including for PP. Indeed, some of the issues it presents seem more acute for PP, insofar as it seeks to unify all cognition and intelligence, and aims to do so without admitting any cognitive processes or mechanisms outside of the scope of the theory. I contend, however, that there is an unresolved problem for PP concerning whether it can both explain all cognition and intelligent behavior as minimizing prediction error with just the core formal elements of the PP toolbox, and also adequately comprehend (or explain away) some of the apparent cognitive differences between biological and prediction-based artificial intelligence, notably in regard to establishing relevance and flexible context-switching, precisely the features of interest to Dreyfus’ work on embodied indexicality, habits/skills, and abductive inference. I address several influential philosophical versions of PP, including the work of Jakob Hohwy and Andy Clark, as well as more enactive-oriented interpretations of active inference coming from a broadly Fristonian perspective.