Infantry Brigade Research Articles

PYRAMIDS AND POPPIES; The 1st SA Infantry Brigade in Libya, France and Flanders 1915-1919

Pyramids and Poppies by Peter Digby is a book entirely devoted to the fortunes, and misfortunes, of the 1st South African Brigade during World War One. The Brigade was the first South African force ever to experience combat in Europe or North Africa. As this grants the contingent a distinctive standing in local military history, Pyramids and Poppies is a book which will be of interest, not only to World War One enthusiasts, but to most of warfare's other ardent fans as well.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JÓZEF OLSZYNA-WILCZYŃSKI IN LATVIAN CAMPAIGN (DECEMBER 1919 – FEBRUARY 1920)

The article introduces Lieutenant Colonel Józef Olszyna-Wilczyński in the Polish and Latvian campaign conducted in winter 1920. Then, this officer commanded 3 Infantry Brigade Legions and at the same time as was Acting Commander of 1 Infantry Brigade Legions and Infantry Division, which belonged to Edward Rydz-Śmigły.During this campaign Lt. Col. Olszyna-Wilczyński commanded Grupa Przełomowa (the Breakthrough Group), which mainly carried out attacks. On 3 January he conquered Daugavpils. In the first ten days of January Gen. Rydz-Śmigły gave J. Puriņša`s Latvian Group under Lt. Col. Olszyna-Wilczyński’s command.For the Polish and Latvian campaign, conducted under very harsh conditions, he was held in high regard by the division commander Gen. Rydz-Smigly and the commander of the Lithuanian and Belarusian Front Gen. Stanislaw Sheptytsky. For conquering Daugavpils, at Stefan Dąb-Biernacki’s request, he was decorated second time with the Cross of Valour. At the beginning of February 1926, the President of the Republic of Poland permitted him to accept and wear the Latvian Cross Lacplesis (Bear Slayer) Class III.

The Construction of Ethnic Identity in the Military—From the Bottom Up

This article examines how ethnicity is created, maintained, and perpetuated in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Research studies on ethnicity in the Israeli army have examined ethnicity while focusing on the macro, emphasizing the way the structure and the policy of the army, alongside its reciprocal relations with the greater society and the state, maintain and reproduce ethnicity. It focuses on the micro point of view, hitherto neglected, which emphasizes the soldiers' experience and interpretation. Using a case study of two Israeli infantry brigades, the article demonstrates how ethnicity is produced, maintained, and reproduced by individuals through practices, behavior, perceptions, and observations.

Effectiveness of battlefield-ethics training during combat deployment: a programme assessment

Breakdowns in the ethical conduct of soldiers towards non-combatants on the battlefield are of grave concern in war. Evidence-based training approaches to prevent unethical conduct are scarce. We assessed the effectiveness of battlefield-ethics training and factors associated with unethical battlefield conduct. The training package, based on movie vignettes and leader-led discussions, was administered 7 to 8 months into a 15-month high-intensity combat deployment in Iraq, between Dec 11, 2007, and Jan 30, 2008. Soldiers from an infantry brigade combat team (total population about 3500) were randomly selected, on the basis of company and the last four digits of each soldier's social security number, and invited to complete an anonymous survey 3 months after completion of the training. Reports of unethical behaviour and attitudes in this sample were compared with a randomly selected pre-training sample from the same brigade. The response patterns for ethical behaviour and reporting of ethical violations were analysed with chi-square analyses. We developed two logistic regression models using self-reported unethical behaviours as dependent variables. Factors associated with unethical conduct, including combat experiences and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), were assessed with validated scales. Of 500 randomly selected soldiers 421 agreed to participate in the anonymous post-training survey. A total of 397 soldiers of the same brigade completed the pre-training survey. Training was associated with significantly lower rates of unethical conduct of soldiers and greater willingness to report and address misconduct than in those before training. For example, reports of unnecessary damage or destruction of private property decreased from 13·6% (54 of 397; 95% CI 10·2-17·0) before training to 5·0% (21 of 421; 2·9-7·1) after training (percent difference -63·2%; p<0·0001), and willingness to report a unit member for mistreatment of a non-combatant increased from 36·0% (143 of 397; 31·3-40·7) to 58·9% (248 of 421; 54·2-63·6; percent difference 63·6; p<0·0001). Nearly all participants (410 [97%]) reported that training made it clear how to respond towards non-combatants. Combat frequency and intensity was the strongest predictor of unethical behaviour; PTSD was not a significant predictor of unethical behaviour after controlling for combat experiences. Leader-led battlefield ethics training positively influenced soldiers' understanding of how to interact with and treat non-combatants, and reduced reports of ethical misconduct. Unethical battlefield conduct was associated with high-intensity combat but not with PTSD. None.

The Bravest of the Brave: The Correspondence of Stephen Dodson Ramseur (review)

Reviewed by: The Bravest of the Brave: The Correspondence of Stephen Dodson Ramseur Keith Bohanon (bio) The Bravest of the Brave: The Correspondence of Stephen Dodson Ramseur. Edited by George G. Kundahl. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010. Pp. xv, 324. $45.00 cloth) This volume includes the edited correspondence, over 180 letters, of Confederate army general Stephen D. Ramseur. The great majority of this correspondence is addressed to David Schenk, Ramseur's closest friend and brother-in-law, and Ellen Richmond, Ramseur's cousin and wife. Ramseur was on intimate terms with both of these people, but the overall tone and subject matter of his correspondence with each of them is very different. The insightful letters to Schenk deal in large part with political, military, and business affairs. Those to Ellen, or "Nellie," reflect Ramseur's intense love for her and his Christian convictions. Stephen D. Ramseur hailed from a mercantile family in the North Carolina Piedmont town of Lincolnton, and his values and religious beliefs reflect those of a typical small, slaveholding family of the antebellum South. Following two years of study at Davidson College, Ramseur attended West Point, graduating in the class of 1860. He then served as an artillery officer in the U.S. Army before resigning his commission in the first week of April 1861. Ramseur's subsequent outstanding service in the Confederate army on the battlefield and in camp led to a rapid series of promotions. A severe wound in the arm sustained at Malvern Hill while leading his regiment, the Forty-ninth North Carolina, kept Ramseur away from the army for much of the remainder of 1862. When he rejoined Lee's army, he was a brigadier general in command of an infantry brigade. Ramseur subsequently directed his regiments with skill and courage at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and Spotsylvania Court House. At the end of May 1864, Ramseur received a promotion to major general shortly after his twenty-seventh birthday. As a division commander, Ramseur amassed a mixed record, his penchant for attacking resulting in costly defeats at Bethesda Church in early June 1864 and at Stephenson's Depot the following month. The later battle particularly upset Ramseur, as it elicited harsh criticism of him [End Page 102] in the southern press. Ramseur repeatedly defended his actions at Stephenson's Depot in letters that contain no admission of misjudgments that could have contributed to the rout of his command. Ramseur's letters are valuable not only for statements about military and political matters, but also for what they reveal about the cultural, religious, and social values of mid-nineteenth-century white Southerners. The missives reveal a deep hatred for the foe, particularly those written in the summer and fall of 1864 when Ramseur witnessed the devastation of the Shenandoah Valley. Ramseur was a fervent and unwavering believer in southern independence, even in the midst of battlefield defeats and the anguish that military duty entailed because of separation from his beloved Nellie. George Kundahl did a fine job editing these literate letters, thoroughly identifying the people, places, and events mentioned in them and providing satisfying background commentary. This reader did question the inclusion in their entirety of a few mundane official Confederate army documents, such as requests for commissions and blank bonds for a quartermaster in Ramseur's original regiment. Such documents could probably have been summarized in footnotes or omitted entirely from the volume. The final letters in the book, written in the fall of 1864, are particularly poignant as they express Ramseur's deep concern for his wife as she approached the birth of their first child. Ramseur's death at the battle of Cedar Creek in October 1864 occurred immediately after the birth of the baby; the general never knew the sex or name of his child. Keith Bohanon Keith Bohanon teaches in the department of history at the University of West Georgia, in Carrollton, Georgia. Copyright © 2011 Kentucky Historical Society

Diagnoses and Mechanisms of Musculoskeletal Injuries in an Infantry Brigade Combat Team Deployed to Afghanistan Evaluated by the Brigade Physical Therapist

Musculoskeletal injuries are the most common cause for disability in deployed environments. Current research is limited to body region affected by the injury. To determine the prevalence of musculoskeletal diagnoses and mechanisms of injury (MOI) as well as associations to specific Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) in a deployed Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Data collected on 3,066 patient encounters by the Brigade Combat Team physical therapist over 15 months were analyzed using descriptive statistics and X2 tests. Mechanical low back pain was the most common diagnosis (19%), whereas overuse was the most prevalent MOI (22%). The Infantry MOS was significantly associated with meniscal tears and pre-existing injuries, the Maintenance MOS with contusions, Signal and Transportation MOSs with weight lifting injuries, and the Administrative MOS with running injuries. Different MOSs are preferentially susceptible to different diagnoses and MOIs. Therefore, different injury prevention strategies may be needed across occupations.

Low Back Pain Prevalence and Mechanisms of Injury in an Infantry Brigade Serving in Afghanistan

Low Back Pain Prevalence and Mechanisms of Injury in an Infantry Brigade Serving in Afghanistan

A Physical Therapist Experience, Observation, and Practice With an Infantry Brigade Combat Team in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom

In 2005 the first physical therapists were employed in direct support of infantry brigade combat teams (BCTs) during a combat deployment. The initiative sought to bring soldiers direct access to specialized musculoskeletal care at the places they work and live. The goal was to prevent deferment of care for injuries that may become chronic and to decrease medical evacuations for orthopedic nonbattle injuries by locally providing acute and definitive management. To describe the experience of a newly authorized physical therapy role in direct support of an infantry BCT in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The practice patterns, observation, and utilization of the physical therapy team are reported, to include demographics, injury prevalence, and outcomes. Physical therapists should be part of the risk management team and advise unit commanders on injury-prevention strategies in a combat setting.

Knee bioelectric impedance assessment in healthy/with osteoarthritis subjects

The present study analyzes parameters estimated by bioelectric impedance spectroscopy (BIS) in subjects with healthy and with osteoarthritis (OA) knees. Thirty-two male volunteers, members of the Parachute Military Infantry Brigade of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, participated in the study (62 knee joints). Clinical specialists used the Dejour scale for OA classification and divided the subjects into a control (without OA) and a pathological group (with different degrees of OA). BIS data were obtained in a standing position using a BIS technique based on the current response to a step voltage excitation. Differences between groups were measured by means of a Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test. Results indicate that raw bioimpedance parameters seem to be sensitive to the physiological changes associated with OA. Thus, data indicate that extra-cellular resistance (Re) and reactance of the equivalent capacitance (Xcx) increase according to the disease intensity (p < 0.001). In conclusion, the BIS technique seems to be able to provide the objective and non-invasive basis for helping the diagnosis of knee OA.

Kurt Meyer on Trial: A Documentary Record (review)

Reviewed by: Kurt Meyer on Trial: A Documentary Record Michael F. Noone Kurt Meyer on Trial: A Documentary Record. Edited by P. Whitney LackenbauerChris M.V. Madsen. Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-662-46169-2. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Index. Pp. xi, 697. Kurt Meyer was a model SS officer. Trained as a policeman, he joined the SS in 1931 as a twenty-one-year-old officer candidate. In 1939 he commanded companies during the invasions of Poland, France, and the Low Countries. He then commanded the SS Division reconnaissance detachment and distinguished himself and his unit as they spearheaded the invasions of Greece and then Russia. By early 1943 he was a battalion commander, leading a series of bold and successful counterattacks in the Kharkov region. One of the selected officers and NCOs withdrawn from Russia to form the 12th SS, “Hitler Jugend,” 8000 Hitler Youth recruited from the class of 1926, boys who had known only the Third Reich, he was responsible for division training which emphasized live fire and movement [End Page 975] exercises and physical fitness, and didn’t utilize standard training manuals. As the unit was deployed to Normandy in Spring 1944, higher headquarters noted: “The quality of the conscripts was high, but that of subordinate officers and NCO’s was poor.” The report didn’t note that Meyer, the training officer, had spent the prior year in Russia where neither side followed the laws of war. The unit was certified combat ready on June 1st. On June 7th 1944, advance elements of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade moving inland from Juno Beach stumbled on the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, commanded by Meyer. Outmanned and outgunned for two hours the Canadians were bested in a series of brief intense clashes. Shortly afterwards, there were reports that prisoners were being killed in battle and afterwards. In Authie village two Canadians’ bodies were placed in a street and repeatedly run over by a tank. The bodies of prisoners had been surreptitiously buried at the Abbaye d’ Ardenne, from whose church tower Meyer had initiated the attack. Meyer, subsequently captured by partisans after he and 500 survivors of the 12th SS kept open the Falaise Gap, was charged with war crimes both for ordering murders and, as a commander, for permitting them. The book under review, after a forty-nine page Introduction, documents the Meyer case with sections devoted to Legal and Pre Trial Documents (38 pp.), The Trial transcript, (435 pp.), The Decision to Commute Meyer’s Sentence (10 pp.), Transfer to Canada (22 pp.), Appeals and Meyer’s Transfer to Germany (69 pp.), the Decision to Release Meyer (41 pp.); Responses to Meyer’s Release (52 pp.) To what end? Meyer’s was Canada’s first war crimes trial and, as such, is worthy of being memorialized. The legal run-up to the trial is comprehensively described in Patrick Brode’s Criminal Slaughters and Accidental Judgements: Canadian War Crimes Prosecutions 1944–1948, listed in the bibliography. Post trial documentation regarding Meyer’s case might interest students of recent Canadian history. Ultimately the book’s value to a larger readership depends on the trial transcript. Those entertained by reading play scripts or transcripts will enjoy the trial proceedings. Are there other virtues as well? Each part, read aloud by a class member, would illustrate how difficult it is to prove a case of command responsibility. Commentary could raise issues which weren’t explicitly raised in Court. [General Vokes, the convening authority, had led his division at the bloody battle of Ortona in December 1943 and claimed in his autobiography, My Story, “there isn’t a general or colonel I know of on the allied side who hasn’t said ‘Well, this time we don’t want any prisoners’”(p. 206). There was evidence that the 12th SS had heard that the Canadians took no prisoners. Of what value, if any, is a tu quoque defense in a war crimes trial? Shils and Janowitz first wrote of Wermacht unit cohesion three years after Meyer’s trial. What can social science tell us about the behavior of the 12th SS and should social science...

Kearny's Own: The History of the First New Jersey Brigade in the Civil War, and: Banners South: A Northern Community at War (review)

Reviewed by: Kearny’s Own: The History of the First New Jersey Brigade in the Civil War, and: Banners South: A Northern Community at War Allan Peskin Kearny’s Own: The History of the First New Jersey Brigade in the Civil War. By Bradley M. Gottfried. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005. Pp. 301. Cloth, $36.95.) Banners South: A Northern Community at War. By Edmund J. Raus Jr. (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2005. Pp. 333. Cloth, $39.00.) At a time when narrative history is under attack as old fashioned and even condemned as "imperialistic," traditional storytelling continues to find a refuge in Civil War studies. And why not? Civil War historians have such good stories that it would be a shame not to tell them. Unfortunately, these stories have been told so often that they are in danger of losing their power. What is left to say about such a twice-told tale? One solution is to tell the Civil War story from the bottom up—from the perspective of the small units that constituted a tiny part of the grand mosaic. The problem with this approach is how to deal with the microcosm without lapsing into trivia. These two books confront that problem, but with mixed success. Both deal with units that served in the Army of the Potomac: the New Jersey [End Page 314] brigade for the duration of the war; the New York regiment for two years, Both endured the confusion of mobilization, the rigors of training, and the ineptness of early commanders. They even participated in many of the same military campaigns. Yet despite these overlaps, the two books are sufficiently different to prompt some useful comparisons. The 1st New Jersey Brigade was initially led by Philip Kearny, though he soon moved on to higher command. Unlike most brigades that were fluid aggregations of various regiments, often assembled for a specific purpose and then disbanded, this brigade was more permanent. According to the dust jacket of Kearny's Own (but not the author), it was the only federal infantry brigade to have "experienced the entire Civil War as a cohesive unit"—a claim that could be disputed by the Vermont Brigade of the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Whether unique or merely unusual, the brigade's distinctive tenacity raises interesting questions as to its cause and its impact on the men who were so tightly bonded together. These questions, as well as all matters that fall outside the limitations of the book's strict chronological organization, are not addressed. This narrative strategy leaves little room for digressions or even explanations. The brigade does something one day and something else the next as disjointed paragraphs follow each other often without connection or transition. In the process, the larger picture gets lost in the mass of minutiae. It is not merely that the reader cannot see the forest for the trees, but often he or she cannot even see the trees for the leaves. To compound matters, the book is written in a clunky prose that cries out in vain for the hand of an editor familiar with the fine points of English grammar and usage. And yet, despite all these shortcomings, such is the power of the Civil War story that readers may be drawn, almost against their will, into this narrative and feel at the end as if they have lived it along with these New Jersey boys. Art is not everything. But it helps. Banners South demonstrates how even a great story can be improved through skillful telling. Rather than plunging immediately into the military activities of the 23d New York Volunteers, Edmund J. Raus sets the stage by describing the Cortland, New York, region from which this two-year infantry regiment was drawn. Raus also gives us capsule sketches of the leading characters in his story and even a collective portrait of the regiment itself—"the typical county volunteer was twenty-two years old, five feet seven inches tall and single" (12). Unlike the New Jersey study, Raus sometimes interrupts his narrative to set it within a broader context, both military and [End Page 315...

Falklands Logistics

Twenty‐five years ago, my Regiment, the Commando Logistics Regiment Royal Marines, was responsible for the Logistics of the land battle in support of both 3 Commando Brigade and 5 Infantry Brigade....

The Falls Road Curfew Revisited

At 4 p.m. on Friday 3 June 1970, the duty officer of the 39th Infantry Brigade, the British army formation responsible for the Belfast area, recorded the following message from the 1st Battalion Ro...

Society Strength as a Base for Military Power: The State of Israel during the Early 1950s

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Avner Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel, Haifa, 1994; Israel Tal, National Security: The Few Against the Many, Tel Aviv, 1996. 2. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, From Settlement to State, Tel Aviv, 1977, p. 293. 3. M. Sicron, Immigration to Israel, 1948–1953, Jerusalem. See also M. Sicron, Mass Immigration: Its Dimensions, Characteristics, and Influence on the Israeli Population Structure in Immigrants and Transit Camps, Jerusalem, pp. 31–52. For statistics, see Jewish Agency, Department of Immigrant Absorption, 1959. 4. Sicron, Mass Immigration, p. 43. 5. Tal, National Security, p. 17. 6. David Tal, Israel's Day-to-Day Security Conception: Its Origin and Development, 1949–1956, Beersheva, 1998. 7. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, Tel Aviv, 1986. 8. Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Harsina, Operations Branch of the General Staff entitled ‘Security Guidelines for Planning Agricultural Settlements and their Location’, February 1953. 9. State Archives 22/2393, 10 February 1955. Report from General Headquarters/Intelligence Branch on ‘Fortification of Frontier Settlements’, Central Zionist Archives (hereafter, CZA) S-15/9786. 10. Tal, Israel's Day-to-Day Security Conception, pp. 52–56. 11. Tal, Israel's Day-to-Day Security Conception, pp. 52–56 12. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947–1948. 13. Morris, Israel's Border Wars 1949–1956, p. 126. 14. Letter of David Shaltiel to the Minister of Defence, September 1949, CZA 150/86. 15. See ‘Session of the State Committee’, 28 December 1955, Labour Party Archives 26/55. 16. See meeting of the Mapai Secretariat with its Knesset faction, 18 June 1950, Labour Party Archives 1/11/3. 17. Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, Tel Aviv, 1979, p. 84. 18. See AZ file 104/51/56, 6 June 1949 and file 169/56/580, June 1949. 19. Education and Morale in the IDF, GHQ Discussion, 6 April 1950. 20. Education and Morale in the IDF, GHQ Discussion, 6 April 1950 21. Education and Morale in the IDF, GHQ Discussion, 6 April 1950 22. AZ. file 55/65 312, Composition of Inductees into Compulsory Service, 11 March 1951. 23. AZ. file 702/60 115, Research on the Problem of Military and Social Absorption of Oriental Immigrants, Adjutant General Office/GHQ, 6 March 1952. 24. Moshe Dayan, Milestones: Autobiography, Jerusalem, 1976, p. 121. 25. AZ 63/55, file 35, Report on a Visit to Infantry Units, Colonel Yehuda Wallach, 17 April 1953. 26. AZ 63/55, file 35, Report on a Visit to Infantry Units, Colonel Yehuda Wallach, 17 April 1953 27. AZ 63/55, file 35, Report on a Visit to Infantry Units, Colonel Yehuda Wallach, 17 April 1953 28. AZ, Report of Colonel Wallach, Moral Survey and Operational Capability of Infantry Brigades in the IDF, 1954. 29. AZ, 204/21, file 6031, meeting with company commanders who carried out the Operation at Nitzana, Jerusalem, 11 July 1955. Additional informationNotes on contributorsZe'ev DroryZe'ev Drory is a lecturer at the Department of History at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Injury Reductions Seen in an Infantry Brigade using the Australian Defence Injury Prevention Program (DIPP)

Injury Reductions Seen in an Infantry Brigade using the Australian Defence Injury Prevention Program (DIPP)

Five Days in October: The Lost Battalion of World War I (review)

Reviewed by: Five Days in October: The Lost Battalion of World War I Daniel R. Beaver Five Days in October: The Lost Battalion of World War I. By Robert H. Ferrell. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2005. ISBN 0-8262-1594-7. Maps. Photographs. Appendix. Notes. Essay on sources. Index. Pp. xvii, 130. $19.95. They were never lost and they were never a battalion. Between 2 October and 7 October 1918, trapped in a pocket on the left bank of the Meuse River, they held out against everything the Germans could throw at them. Much of the mythology of the "Lost Battalion" was made up by newsmen anxious for a headline. It was good copy then and it is good copy now. However, distinguished historian Robert H. Ferrell successfully penetrates the romantic mist to reconsider the events of those five tumultuous days. Tapping under-utilized materials from the National Archives and the World War I collection at the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, he challenges the conventional wisdom, expands the perspective, and places the ordeal of Major Charles W. Whittlesey and his men within the context of the maturation of the American army in France during the Great War. There were no Louisiana maneuvers for General John J. Pershing and his soldiers. They got their training in combined arms from the Germans at the Meuse-Argonne and it was a bloody experience. The leaders of the American Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.) were pushers. During the battle Pershing pushed Major General Robert Alexander, commander of the 77th Division, who pushed Brigadier General Evan Johnson, commander of the 154th Infantry Brigade, who pushed Whittlesey and his men. On 2 October the American 28th Division on the left failed to advance. The French on the right also failed and scapegoated the African American 92d Division. The officers and men of the "Lost Battalion," who were ahead of their comrades, were caught in a vise. For almost a week they repulsed over two German attacks a day. Whittlesey refused to withdraw and leave his casualties behind and by 6 October food was gone and ammunition was almost exhausted. Alexander and the 77th Division did not save Whittlesey. Major General Hunter Liggett, who then commanded the Ist Corps, did that on the morning of 7 October by turning a brigade of the 82d Division east and threatening the Germans with encirclement. When elements of the 77th Division moved forward, the Germans were already withdrawing and out of roughly 500 Americans who had been caught in the treacherous brush and barbed wire filled ravines, 146 walked out. In the wake of the relief, the blame game began. Reputations had to be protected; scores had to be settled; medals had to be awarded. Liggett, as was his habit, remained silent. Whittlesey later committed suicide. However, the story never lost its momentum. The officers and men of the 307th and 308th Regiments of the 154th Brigade of the 77th "Liberty" Division of the A.E.F., the "Lost Battalion," like "The Battling Bastards of Bastogne," became part of the American military Pantheon. Daniel R. Beaver Emeritus, University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio Copyright © 2006 Society for Military History

Atrocity, Authenticity and American Exceptionalism: (Ir)rationalising the Massacre at My Lai

On the morning of 16 March 1968, the men of Charlie Company, 11th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, US Army, entered the village of Son My, on the coast of Central Vietnam. The company was led by Captain Ernest Medina. In charge of the company's 1st Platoon was Lieutenant William Calley. The company encountered no enemy forces, no opposing fire of any kind. Its only casualty was self-inflicted. Nevertheless, by early afternoon, over 400 villagers lay dead. Those killed were – almost exclusively – either women, old men or small children. For many of the women, rape had preceded death. Other victims had been tortured and mutilated, then killed. Much of the killing, though not all, had occurred in the collection of hamlets known by the Americans as My Lai 4 and had been conducted by 1st Platoon.

Through the Valley: Vietnam, 1967-1968

A chronicle of the combat in South Vietnam during 1967-1968, between the proud units of the American Division and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and a stubborn enemy. Colonel Humphries draws both on his own experience and on the eye-witness reports of 50 former veterans.

Press Censorship and the Terrace Mutiny: A Case Study in Second World War Information Management

During the Second World War the Canadian government employed a system of voluntary press censorship to prevent the publication of information harmful to military security. In November 1944, an anti-conscription mutiny broke out in the 15th Infantry Brigade based in Terrace, British Columbia. Terrified that the mutiny would spread, the military and government pressured the censors to increase the stringency of their application of the Defence of Canada Regulations to down-play news of the out-break. The censors resisted this pressure, arguing that the existing system adequately protected military security. Greatly disturbed by these demands, the censors felt that increased censorship was harm-ful to freedom of the press. Following the end of the mutiny the censors determined that the voluntary press censorship system did prevent the publication of inflammatory information; if anything, the press had been far too quick to censor the news, and individual freedom would have been better served by the media disputing more of their decisions. Second World War press censorship was a successful system which effectively prevented the publication of harmful material. Torn between their duties and their ethical concerns, censors also demonstrated the moral ambiguities of war in arguing against censorship.

Orthopedic Casualties in an Activated National Guard Mechanized Infantry Brigade during Operation Desert Shield

From November 1990 to April 1991, the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), an Army National Guard unit, was activated under Operation Desert Shield and deployed to the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, for training in desert warfare. All casualties requiring care beyond the battalion aid stations were evacuated to the medical company organic to the 48th Brigade. Each of 727 orthopedic patient visits were grouped into one of eight etiologies: trauma, degenerative, overuse, infectious, neoplastic, congenital/pediatric, miscellaneous, and psychiatric. Each case was also classified according to anatomic region, severity, and disposition as well as need for a minor procedure, operation, or referral. Orthopedic casualties in a reserve mechanized infantry brigade undergoing intensive field training primarily arose from four common etiologic/regional presentations: wrist/hand trauma, knee/leg trauma, spine/pelvis degenerative, and ankle/foot overuse. Many of these injuries are predictable consequences of a particular soldier's military occupational specialty and unit mission.