Indo-Pacific Concept Research Articles

Three Faces of the Indo-Pacific: Understanding the “Indo-Pacific” from an IR Theory Perspective

This paper examines the three faces of the Indo-Pacific from an IR theory perspective. It suggests that the realist face of the Indo-Pacific is a “balancing strategy” against China. The liberal face of the Indo-Pacific aims to form a new “institutional setting” that facilitates cooperation among states across the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. According to constructivism, the Indo-Pacific offers an “ideational construct” for promoting value-oriented and norm-based diplomacy in the region. This paper argues that these three faces of the Indo-Pacific concept are theoretically problematic and practically flawed. There are two ways of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific, though. One is exclusive institutionalization with China as an outside target, which follows the realist logic of making China a common threat in the region. The success of this approach mainly depends on how China behaves in the future. The other is the inclusive approach of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific by embracing China and other states into a new Indo-Pacific institution. It will not be easy, but the endeavor of the inclusive institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific will produce positive externalities of peace and stability to the region.

Implications of maritime trade-dependence of India, China and Japan

ABSTRACTIndia, China and Japan, the economic big three in Asia, is heavily dependent on maritime trade in terms of importation of energy and other natural resources in addition to import/export of manufactured products. Major economic, political and security impact has been resulted from such a dependence, as the sea-lines of communication for maritime trade across the Indian Ocean and West Pacific is vulnerable to heavy conventional/unconventional threat. Policy measures have been taken in order to mitigate the vulnerabilities. Accelerated development of maritime powers, bilateralism/multilateralism, enhanced engagement with regional players and diversification policies are among such effort. The unconventional challenges are on the decline, partly thanks to effective counter-measures, while the conventional challenges is on the rise, also partly due to the mis-match of policies from major stakeholders. The Rise of Indo-Pacific Concept and the Emerging Maritime Regionalism can be a double-edge sword. Clarification of strategic intention and effective policy dialogue is needed for a more harmonious maritime engagement among the three. Strategic vision and smart policies are needed to ensure a cooperation for the benefit of all stakeholder inclusive of the three countries in particular.

印度对印太外交的考虑及其局限: India’s Indo-Pacific Diplomacy and its Limitations

India’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy is born out of its ‘Look East’ policy, initially aimed at extending its influence into the Asia-Pacific region. Modi’s June 2018 address at the Shangri La Dialogue marked New Delhi’s full embracing of the Indo-Pacific concept. Thereafter, Indo-Pacific diplomacy, or such a vision, has become a new pillar of Indian foreign policy, and a new angle through which it is observed. India’s Indo- Pacific diplomacy will continue to put emphasis on its relationship with ASEAN and respect for ASEAN’s centrality in regional security cooperation. Meanwhile, India is expected to strengthen multilevel exchanges and cooperation in different areas with like-minded countries such as the US, Japan, and Australia, and continue to engage in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – but probably keep a relatively low profile. Though it may share common interests with the US in dealing with a rising China, India so far seems to prefer hedging its bets on both China and the US, and is reluctant tochoose a side too early. Consequently, India’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy will maintain a relatively clear-cut strategic independence. Limitations of India’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy include: the kind of competition and confusion that seems to exist between its two ambitions, i.e. the Indian Ocean region as India’s paramount strategic focus, and the Asia-Pacific as the hub of its Indo-Pacific diplomacy; ASEAN’s centrality may be diminished by the Indo-Pacific; and India’s simultaneous engagement with Quad and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization may leave the awkward impression of straddling two boats.

The rise of the Indo-Pacific: understanding ideational change and continuity in India's foreign policy

In 2011, the concept of the Indo-Pacific began to appear in India's foreign policy discourse. This article argues that rather than signalling a dramatic shift in India's foreign policy, however, the way in which the Indo-Pacific has been interpreted by the Indian leadership suggests significant continuity as well as change, which is contrary to the goals of the concept's most fervent proponents in India. The article seeks to develop a framework for understanding ideational change and continuity in foreign policy by theorising the interplay between ideas, political and economic flux, and social expectations related to effective and legitimate state-building. It is argued that the Indo-Pacific concept has instigated a new emphasis on regional architecture-building to manage the ongoing regionalisation in the area between the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a result of heightened trade flows and production and investment linkages. Yet, the Indo-Pacific concept, like the new policy ideas on regional engagement that preceded it—the Look East policy and the ‘extended neighbourhood’—has been articulated in ways that are also compatible with long-standing ideas—such as non-alignment—about what constitutes appropriate international behaviour. This reflects the nature of the broader state project that has emerged since 1990, which, while encompassing a new focus on economic growth and competitiveness as being essential to effective state-building, continues to prioritise older ideas about what constitutes effective and legitimate state-building.

‘Securing’ the Indian Ocean? Competing regional security constructions

Dictated and driven to a significant extent by the changing dynamics of the knowledge–power equation, regional constructions are devised and propagated for a range of purposes – describing economic success, structuring a set of relationships, reproducing a particular vision of (in)security or organising a specific function, such as to maximise economic cooperation, to minimise insecurity or to fashion a particular form of security architecture. It is argued that there are three competing regional constructions for security (currently in circulation) in the Indian Ocean Region, emanating largely from Australia, the United States and India – an Indian Ocean-wide concept, an East Indian Ocean construct and an Indo-Pacific concept. It is suggested that there exists an overriding narrative in favour of an ‘Indo-Pacific’ construction at the expense of Indian Ocean concepts. As a result, it is concluded that the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) will remain relatively weak for the foreseeable future and that, unless there is a concerted attempt to involve China in a new maritime security regime, the discourse and practices of regional security might become the preserve of an Indo-Pacific alliance comprising Australia, India, the United States and other East Asian states, including Japan.