W E saw (sees. 2 and 3) that, for Bohr and Rosenfeld, the observed system and the instrument of observation form a whole, a ' sealed unit' defining the phenomenon. ' Any atomic scale phenomenon must thus be conceived as a whole ; any attempt to apply to it the same kind of analysis as in classical physics would simply make it vanish. The word ' atomic ' here resumes its etymological sense with a more subtle connotation.' x That is to say, the atomic scale phenomenon is regarded as a whole in the sense of holistic philosophies—a totality that cannot be rationalised and hence represents a limit, a non plus ultra, to human knowledge. For instance, every energy change in an atom has to be regarded as elementary or atomic, because the forever indivisible quantum is involved in i t ; * and, as Bridgman once said, ' it is meaningless to penetrate much deeper than the electron ', for there is really nothing within it. This modern version of atomism is as mechanistic as ancient atomism and as irrationalistic as any obscurantist world outlook. The irrationalist feature lies in the claim that wholes are unanalysable, that their analysis and understanding is forever beyond all human possibility. This irrationalist aspect of the official philosophy of quantum mechanics was recognised by Bohr himself, when he wrote that the ' quantum postulate', according to which every atomic process exhibits a character of ' individuality ' or wholeness, is an ' irrational element '. Elsewhere, after describing an electron diffraction phenomenon, Bohr stresses the universality of such an irrational totality (which he calls individuality) : The impossibility of a closer analysis of the reactions between the particle and the measuring instrument is indeed no peculiarity of the experimental procedure described, but is rather an essential property
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