Individual Defendants Research Articles

Language and Implicit Attributions in the Nuremberg Trials Analyzing Prosecutors'and Defense Attorneys'Closing Speeches

The attributional implications of prosecutors’and defense attorneys’language strategies were investigated, using the protocols of the historical Nuremberg trials. Statements from both perspectives about four German Nazi generals were coded at the sentence level with regard to three aspects: the reference of the sentence subject to the defendant (specific vs. diffuse), the linguistic category of the sentence predicate (action verbs, state verbs, adjectives), and the evaluative tone of the utterance (negative, neutral, positive). Distinct language patterns were demonstrated for the opposing parties, reflecting theoretical predictions about the attributional implications of specific linguistic tools. Apart from the fact that the same defendant's behavior was described in more positive terms by defense attorneys than prosecutors, the two sides used a number of less obtrusive, more subtle strategies. In particular, defense attorneys tended to raise positive defendant attributes to a higher level of linguistic abstractness, avoided direct person references for negative statements, and projected unavoidable negative statements onto the prosecution. In contrast, prosecutors produced the highest rate of action verbs, which implicitly suggest internal attributions of responsibility. In addition to direct negative references to the individual defendant, they also used global references to the defendant's Nazi in-group to convey the inherently negative meaning of the defendant's behavior. In general, these findings mirror previous results on the role of language in interpersonal and intergroup settings.

Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the “Deep-Pockets” Hypothesis

Evidence that juries treat corporate defendants less favorably than individual defendants is often cited in support of the widely held view that juries are biased against wealthy “deep-pocket” defendants. Such evidence confounds defendant wealth and defendant identity. In two juror simulation experiments involving citizens on jury duty, these factors were separated by manipulating whether the defendant was described as a poor individual, a wealthy individual, or a corporation; the defendant's assets were described identically in the latter two conditions. In Experiment 1, liability was significantly more likely, and awards were significantly greater, for corporate defendants than for wealthy individual defendants, but verdicts against poor versus wealthy individuals did not differ. In Experiment 2, awards were larger against wealthy individuals who engaged in commercial rather than personal activities, and awards in the personal activity condition were larger against corporations than wealthy individuals. There was little evidence for a defendant wealth effect on juror judgments. While juries do appear to treat corporations differently, the explanation may have more to do with citizens' views about the special risks and responsibilities of commercial activity.

The Ninth Circuit: Deference to a Point

Research Article| March 01 1995 The Ninth Circuit: Deference to a Point Olivia W. Karlin, Olivia W. Karlin Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Marilyn Bednardski, Marilyn Bednardski Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Marilyn Bednarski Marilyn Bednarski Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Federal Sentencing Reporter (1995) 7 (5): 255–257. https://doi.org/10.2307/20639806 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Olivia W. Karlin, Marilyn Bednardski, Marilyn Bednarski; The Ninth Circuit: Deference to a Point. Federal Sentencing Reporter 1 March 1995; 7 (5): 255–257. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/20639806 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentFederal Sentencing Reporter Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1995 Vera Institute of Justice, Inc. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

An analysis of litigation claiming joint and several liability

The purpose of the research is to aid the tort reform decision-making process by generating and analyzing a broad scope of state and federal court cases involving the use of joint and several liability from 1963 through 1988. Results indicate that the overall number of joint and several liability cases is quite small (just .41 percent in 1988). Further, as a percentage of all cases contained in LEXIS, joint and several cases showed an exponential increase from 1963 to 1988 at the federal level but not at the state level. Patterns observed in a sample of joint and several liability cases include dominance of contract cases, relatively large representations of corporate plaintiffs and individual defendants, minimal involvement of municipalities as defendants, larger damage values for corporate plaintiffs than for individual plaintiffs, and an increase in size of claimed damages over time. An Analysis of Litigation Claiming Joint and Several Liability Of 58 legislative and regulatory risk management issues recently considered by risk managers in an Alexander and Alexander (1989) survey, modification of the joint and several liability doctrine was rated as second in importance only to caps on non-economic and/or punitive damages. This finding is consistent with claims by insurers and commercial insureds throughout the 1980s that joint and several liability modification is one of the, if not the, most needed tort reform(s). Yet despite such strong opinions about the doctrine, little evidence beyond anecdotes has been collected and analyzed regarding the extent and manner in which joint and several liability is employed in litigation. Joan T. Schmit is Associate Professor of Risk Management and Insurance; Dan R. Anderson is the Leslie P. Schultz Professor of Risk Management and Insurance and Chair of the Actuarial Science, Risk Management and Insurance Department. Both are with the University of WisconsinMadison. Timothy K. Oleszczuk is an Associate with Godfrey and Kahn, S.C. The authors are grateful for helpful comments from Marc Galanter and for the assistance of Kay Millonzi, as well as for the input of two anonymous referees, an associate editor, and the editor. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.69 on Sun, 06 Nov 2016 04:37:46 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 398 The Journal of Risk and Insurance The purpose of the research reported here is to initiate the assimilation and analysis of data on the use of joint and several liability in an effort to aid evaluation of the effects and desirability of proposals to reform its implementation. Two areas of analysis are conducted in this study. The first examines the growth over a 26 year period in number of cases reported by LEXIS in which joint and several liability is mentioned. The second area analyzes a sample of cases claiming joint and several liability. The article will be presented in five sections. Following this introduction, a brief history and description of key issues regarding joint and several liability is given. Data collection and research methodology are discussed next. The results of the data analysis, including an interpretation of those results, are presented. A summary and conclusions complete the article. Evolution of Joint and Several Liability

Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction

INTRODUCTIONAmerican lawyers know all about the limits the Constitution places on jurisdiction in civil cases, like Pennoyer v. Neff1 or International Shoe.2 But constitutional limits on criminal jurisdiction have been much more obscure. This is because, for most of the nation's history, criminal prosecutions have been purely local affairs. When New York prosecutes a New York resident for a crime she committed in New York, questions of jurisdiction can be taken for granted; they do not warrant attention. But no longer. Over and over during the past few decades, the federal government has launched ambitious international prosecutions in the service of U.S. national security goals- prosecutions of terror leaders operating in Pakistan or Libya, of notorious global arms dealers working in Russia or Spain, and of violent drug lords based in Afghanistan or Colombia. These extraterritorial prosecutions seek to hold defendants accountable for their actions abroad, wholly outside the sovereign territory of the United States. And they force us to ask and answer a fundamental question that has long been latent in the law: Namely, what are the outer boundaries that the Constitution places on criminal jurisdiction?To answer this question, the lower federal courts have spent decades crafting a sprawling new due process jurisprudence, which allows a federal criminal law to reach extraterritorial conduct only if that conduct has a connection or to the United States. And at first glance, this new jurisprudence seems sensible. In an analogous context, the Supreme Court has long required what amounts to a nexus.3 In particular, before state civil law is permitted to reach extraterritorial conduct-before, say, the tort law of Minnesota is allowed to reach a car accident in Wisconsin-due process requires a connection between the source of the law (Minnesota) and the event in question (the accident).4 And leading scholars have argued that there is no reason not to subject federal criminal law to these same due process limits.5I argue, however, that the new due process jurisprudence that has been developed in the criminal context is fundamentally wrong. It is only in extremely rare cases that due process, properly understood, requires a nexus to the United States as a predicate to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. As things stand, though, due process is generally-if not exclusively-being brought to bear in precisely that class of cases to which it should not be applied. The real world costs of this are severe. Forcing the United States to forego major extraterritorial prosecutions harms global public safety. And in the name of protecting defendants' presumed interests, the new due process jurisprudence may end up badly undermining them, by incentivizing a turn to harsher, alternative national security measures-drone strikes, for example, and military detention in Guantanamo Bay. This Article argues that none of this is necessary. A coherent due process jurisprudence protects both the liberty of criminal defendants and U.S. national security.Due process generally limits the law's extraterritorial reach for two reasons. The first is a concern for intergovernmental structure, for keeping sovereigns from interfering with each other. The second is a concern for protecting individual defendants from unfairness.As I argue, the first concern, for intergovernmental relations, cannot be used to justify due process limits on the extraterritorial application of federal criminal law. Structural concerns about what will or will not lead to a rupture between national governments have long been understood as ultimately the province of the popular branches, not the courts. These structural concerns should not be implicitly constitutionalized-by transposing them into a due process jurisprudence whose purpose is to limit the popular branches and, if necessary, to override their decisions. Moreover, the Constitution already fixes the boundaries of federal law's reach-in Article I. …

Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants

Research Article| November 01 1990 Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants William W. Wilkins,, Jr. William W. Wilkins,, Jr. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Federal Sentencing Reporter (1990) 3 (3): 118–120. https://doi.org/10.2307/20639305 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation William W. Wilkins,; Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants. Federal Sentencing Reporter 1 November 1990; 3 (3): 118–120. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/20639305 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentFederal Sentencing Reporter Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1990 Vera Institute of Justice, Inc. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Courtroom Hearing as a Middle Ground: Speech Accommodation by Lawyers and Defendants

A criminal court trial may be characterised in terms of interactional asymmetry and by largely conflicting goals and interests on the part of the principal actors. It is also an arena where different linguistic varieties and modes of interaction meet. In this paper, we analyse Swedish court hearings as a middle ground where actors, defendants as well as legal professionals, attenuate a number of differences in their respective discourse styles, e.g. as regards vocabulary and information density. Despite what defendants claim in interviews, they themselves attenuate their colloquial jargons when they speak to judges and lawyers in courts. At the other side, legal professionals routinely change their language considerably as they move from the monological phases of the trials to the rather informal dialogical phases (hearings), in which they directly interact with defendants. Furthermore, professionals are also shown to accommodate to the linguistic styles of individual defendants (as regards level of information density). Results are interpreted in terms of speech accommodation theory and provide support for the validity of the theory for authentic interaction in real social life.

ADVERSARIAL AND NONADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: A COMPARISON OF GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIALS*

Despite the frequency of guilty pleas, researchers disagree about the ability of plea bargaining to provide justice. Critics argue that plea bargaining deprives defendants of due process rights and procedural safeguards Proponents argue that guilty pleas save resources for cases that require trial and allow officials flexibility to tailor justice to individual defendants. This article explores these issues by examining the effect of defendant and case characteristics on sentence severity for 3,269 male robbery and burglary defendants who either pled guilty or were tried in six U.S. jurisdictions, three of which had recently attempted to eliminate or greatly reduce plea bargaining and three with few restrictions on plea bargaining. The results confirm some criticisms of plea bargaining, but refute others. More criminally experienced defendants and defendants who pled guilty at the earliest opportunity did not receive sentencing leniency. Moreover, to a large extent, the same variables predict sentence severity for guilty pleas and trials. In contrast, the results show that defendants convicted at trial received more severe sanctions than defendants who pled guilty, controlling for case severity, evidence, and offender characteristics The results also suggest that the jurisdictions which attempted to control plea bargaining through more centralized control of assistance succeeded in tightening the fit between case characteristics and sentences for both cases adjudicated by guilty plea and trial.

Competence to Proceed: A Functional and Context-Determinative Decision

Legally, the defendant's competence at any stage of criminal proceedings is defined in terms of the test set forth in Dusky v. United States, a test establishing minimum rationality as the basis for determining mental competence. A number of investigators have attempted to devise testing instruments to assist clinicians in applying this test to individual defendants being examined for competence. Competence, however, is both context-determinative and functional in nature. The evaluator must insist on being given specific information relating to the functions that the defendant is expected to perform. The evaluator must then assess the defendant's measurable skills in the light of those specified functions and articulate his findings to the court in terms of the skills and functions rather than in terms of conclusory legal labels. Competence is then best determined by the court as a legal, not a mental, health decision under the somewhat nebulous but nonetheless appropriate criterion of "fundamental fairness" in the light of the defendant's mental state.

Protection of Diffuse, Fragmented and Collective Interests in Civil Litigation: English Law

If a pebble is dropped into a pool of water, ripples will spread on the surface of the water; how far the ripples will spread and with what strength depends on a variety of factors, but there will always be a ripple of some kind. The same is true of a decision of a court of law. Notwithstanding what Professor Chayes has accurately described as the “bipolar” character of traditional civil litigation, it is almost inconceivable that the outcome of a civil action will affect no one but the parties to it: unless an exception can be found to John Donne's famous axiom that "No man is an Island, entire of itself”—and such a man, if he exists, is unlikely to bring an action in the first place—the ripple effect even of, say, a simple decision that an individual defendant must pay a sum of money by way of damages to an individual plaintiff will extend to their respective families and beyond. It is not wholly absurd to say of such a case that, for example, the retail traders, the banks, and so on with whom the parties have dealt or may deal in the future have an “interest” which an action by an injured individual may “protect” and, if they do, that interest is certainly "diffuse" and "fragmented" even if it is not “collective.”

Breath tests for determining alcohol in the blood.

The "drunk driver" represents one social problem that medicine and the exact sciences have been asked to help solve. Once the decision to employ the criminal justice system for that purpose was made, they were asked to provide both a more precise measure of intoxication, in order that criminal sanctions might be brought into play, and means of determining that measure in individual defendants. The use of breath tests in the courtroom to determine alcohol in the blood, along with evidence of related scientific issues, thus serves well to illustrate the mechanisms by which these scientific contributions may enter into the social scheme.

The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens

Sitting in the lounge of his plane on a nonstop flight over New York, a citizen of California is handed a summons. For many years come, his great expense and greater annoyance, he will have defend a law suit in a New York court three thousand miles away from his home, even though the plaintiff may be a spiteful competitor alleging a fanciful claim dating back many years a trip abroad. For transitory actions may be brought in any court that has jurisdiction of the defendant, and anyone personally present in a state is subject its jurisdiction, whether he is permanently or only temporarily there.1 The dogma that will herein be called the transient has it that in per? sonam jurisdiction of an individual defendant can be acquired by mere physical service of process, even in a forum where neither plaintiff nor defendant resides and which has no connection with the cause of action.2 The inadequacy of this rule, and its contrast with the law prevailing elsewhere in the world,3 have often been stressed. A rule compelling the traveler to run the

Federal Courts. Diversity of Citizenship: Corporations. Corporation in Derivative Suit Must Be Realigned as Plaintiff When Not Dominated by Individual Defendants

Federal Courts. Diversity of Citizenship: Corporations. Corporation in Derivative Suit Must Be Realigned as Plaintiff When Not Dominated by Individual Defendants

Du Pont Replies to Government Charges

AN antitrust suit generally, regarded as the most important filed in recent years has been brought against E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., General Motors Corp., and U. S. Rubber Co., along with more than 100 individual members of the Du Pont family. I am writing to the stockholders of the Du Pont company in regard to this suit not only because of its great significance to Du Pont but because of what it implies for business in general and for the welfare of the country. The central theme of the charges brought by the Department of Justice is that the individual defendants, through their stock ownerships in the various defendant corporations, have required these corporations to purchase goods from each other, thereby serving to restrain trade. For the Du Pont company, we deny emphatically that our business transactions with these companies have been illegal or improper in any sense. While not ...

Torts. Federal Tort Claims Act. District Courts Split on Permissibility of Joining Individual Defendants in Suit against the United States

Torts. Federal Tort Claims Act. District Courts Split on Permissibility of Joining Individual Defendants in Suit against the United States

The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants

The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants

The Trial of German Major War Criminals By the International Military Tribunal Sitting At Nuremberg, Germany, the Trial of German Major War Criminals By the International Military Tribunal Sitting At Nuremberg, Germany and the Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting At Nuremberg, Germany

The Trial of German Major War Criminals By the International Military Tribunal Sitting At Nuremberg, Germany, the Trial of German Major War Criminals By the International Military Tribunal Sitting At Nuremberg, Germany and the Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting At Nuremberg, Germany Get access The Trial of German Major War Criminals By the International Military Tribunal Sitting At Nuremberg, Germany. (Commencing 20th November, 1945.) Speeches of the Chief Prosecutors for the United States of America; the French Republic; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the Close of the Case against the Individual Defendants. 1946. (London: published under the authoritv of H.M. Attorney-General by His Majesty's Stationery Office. 9½″× 6″. 200 pp. 3s.)The Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting At Nuremberg, Germany. Part I. 20th November, 1945 to 1st December, 1945. Taken from the Official Transcript. 1946. (London: published under the authority of H.M. Attorney-General by His Majesty's Stationery Office. 9½″× 6″. xi + 327 pp. 5s.)The Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting At Nuremberg, Germany. Part I. 20th November, 1945 to 1st December, 1945. Taken from the Official Transcript. 1946. (London: published under the authority of H.M. Attorney-General by His Majesty's Stationery Office. 9½″× 6″. xi + 327 pp. 5s.) Alan Bullock Alan Bullock Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 23, Issue 2, April 1947, Pages 257–258, https://doi.org/10.2307/3018925 Published: 01 April 1947

The United States of America, Appellants, vs. The American Medical Association, A Corporation; The Medical Society of the District of Columbia, A Corporation; The Harris County Medical Society, An Association, et al., Appellees

This volume, bound in a durable green cover, contains a complete chronological review of the several steps in the criminal action instituted by the United States against the American Medical Association, the Medical Society of the District of Columbia, the Washington Academy of Surgery, the Harris County, Texas, Medical Society and twenty-one individual defendants, an action in which the defendants were charged with conspiring to violate the Sherman Antitrust Act in that they allegedly conspired unlawfully to interfere with Group Health Association, Inc., of the District of Columbia. The material contained in the book, all of which was previously published inThe Journal, is presented in three groupings. In the first grouping, dealing with events occurring before the trial, will be found a verbatim copy of the statement released by Thurman Arnold, Assistant United States Attorney General, on Sunday, July 31, 1938, in which a grand jury investigation of the

Set-Off and Counterclaim. Shareholders' Derivative Suit. Corporate Defendant but Not Individual Defendant Allowed to Counterclaim against Plaintiff-Stockholder

Set-Off and Counterclaim. Shareholders' Derivative Suit. Corporate Defendant but Not Individual Defendant Allowed to Counterclaim against Plaintiff-Stockholder

ALGORITHMIC JUDICIAL ETHICS

Judges have a brand-new bag—an algorithmic accessory in criminal adjudication. It scores criminal defendants, aiming to inform judges which defendants are likely reoffenders or flight risks and which ones are not. The downsides, however, include that the algorithms score defendants primarily on the basis of other defendants’ (mis)conduct and that certain races effectively score lower than other races. This article explores these algorithmic developments in criminal courts across the country and makes four contributions: (1) a survey and preliminary application of judicial ethics to this development; (2) a preliminary moral argument, informed by related judicial ethics and legal standards, suggesting that judges should use these algorithmic tools only to help, not hurt, individual defendants; (3) an approach to judicial decision-making in the shadow of structural injustice that promises to deal less algorithmic damage to defendants and their family members; and (4) a technical constraint on algorithmic design that ensures equal (indeed, better than equal) protection on the basis of race.