Indirect Reciprocity Research Articles

Balanced-imbalanced transitions in indirect reciprocity dynamics on networks.

Here we investigate the dynamics of indirect reciprocity on networks, a type of social dynamics in which the attitude of individuals, either cooperative or antagonistic, toward other individuals changes over time based upon their actions and mutual monitoring. We observe an absorbing state phase transition as we change the network's link or edge density. When the edge density is either small or large enough, opinions quickly reach an absorbing state, from which opinions never change anymore once reached. In contrast, if the edge density is in the middle range, the absorbing state is not reached and the state keeps changing, thus being active. The result shows an effect of social networks on spontaneous group formation.

Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity

Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we investigate stability of cooperation in the donation game by regarding each player’s reputation and behaviour as continuous variables. Through perturbative calculation, we derive a condition that a social norm should satisfy to give penalties to its close variants, provided that everyone initially cooperates with a good reputation, and this result is supported by numerical simulation. A crucial factor of the condition is whether a well-reputed player’s donation to an ill-reputed co-player is appreciated by other members of the society, and the condition can be reduced to a threshold for the benefit-cost ratio of cooperation which depends on the reputational sensitivity to a donor’s behaviour as well as on the behavioural sensitivity to a recipient’s reputation. Our continuum formulation suggests how indirect reciprocity can work beyond the dichotomy between good and bad even in the presence of inhomogeneity, noise, and incomplete information.

Do Social Relationships With Those Who Witness Moral Transgression Affect the Sense of Guilt?

Moral emotion is thought to have evolved to guide our behavior and control our impulse to achieve immediate rewards, thus serving to enforce pro-social behavior. Guilt, one of the moral emotions, is a social, other-oriented emotion that is experienced primarily in interpersonal situations, although it may also be experienced in non-interpersonal situations. We predicted that the intensity of the sense of guilt would differ depending on the relationship between a witness and the person who performed the antisocial behavior because building a good reputation plays an important role in the evolution of reciprocal altruism through indirect reciprocity. Participants were asked to imagine that they had been observed by a third party while committing five kinds of moral transgression based on moral foundation theory, and to describe the intensity of their sense of guilt when witnessed by parents, a cordial friend, a neighbor, or a stranger. The intensity of guilt was significantly lower when the act was witnessed by a stranger regardless of the moral foundation involved. The effects of the kind of witness, however, differed for each moral foundation. The results support the hypothesis that guilt functions to guide our behavior, to achieve cooperation.

The Roots of Cooperation

Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintaining public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

Adherence to public institutions that foster cooperation

Humans typically consider altruism a moral good and condition their social behavior on the moral reputations of others. Indirect reciprocity explains how social norms and reputations support cooperation: individuals cooperate with others who are considered good. Indirect reciprocity works when an institution monitors and publicly broadcasts moral reputations. Here we develop a theory of adherence to public monitoring in societies where individuals are, at first, independently responsible for evaluating the reputations of their peers. Using a mathematical model, we show that adherence to an institution of moral assessment can evolve and promote cooperation under four different social norms, including norms that previous studies found to perform poorly. We determine how an institution’s size and its degree of tolerance towards anti-social behavior affect the rate of cooperation. Public monitoring serves to eliminate disagreements about reputations, which increases cooperation and payoffs, so that adherence evolves by social contagion and remains robust against displacement.

Genetic and Environmental Structure of Altruism Characterized by Recipients in Relation to Personality.

Background and Objectives: Altruism is a form of prosocial behavior with the goal of increasing the fitness of another individual as a recipient while reducing the fitness of the actor. Although there are many studies on its heterogeneity, only a few behavioral genetic studies have been conducted to examine different recipient types: family members favored by kin selection, the dynamic network of friends and acquaintances as direct reciprocity, and strangers as indirect reciprocity. Materials and Methods: This study investigated the genetic and environmental structure of altruism with reference to recipient types measured by the self-report altruism scale distinguished by the recipient (the SRAS-DR) and examine the relationship to personality dimensions measured by the NEO-FFI with a sample of 461 adult Japanese twin pairs. Results: The present study shows that there is a single common factor of altruism: additive genetic effects explain 51% of altruism without a shared environmental contribution. The genetic contribution of this single common factor is explained by the genetic factors of neuroticism (N), extraversion (E), openness to experience (O), and conscientiousness (C), as well as a common genetic factor specific to altruism. Only altruism toward strangers is affected by shared environmental factors. Conclusions: Different types of altruistic personality are constructed by specific combinational profiles of general personality traits such as the Big Five as well as a genetic factor specific to altruism in each specific way.

The evolution of strongly-held group identities through agent-based cooperation

Identity fusion represents a strongly-held personal identity that significantly overlaps with that of a group, and is the current best explanation as to why individuals become empowered to act with extreme self-sacrifice for a group of non-kin. This is widely seen and documented, yet how identity fusion is promoted by evolution is not well-understood, being seemingly counter to the selfish pursuit of survival. In this paper we extend agent-based modelling to explore how and why identity fusion can establish itself in an unrelated population with no previous shared experiences. Using indirect reciprocity to provide a framework for agent interaction, we enable agents to express their identity fusion towards a group, and observe the effects of potential behaviours that are incentivised by a heightened fusion level. These build on the social psychology literature and involve heightened sensitivity of fused individuals to perceived hypocritical group support from others. We find that simple self-referential judgement and ignorance of perceived hypocrites is sufficient to promote identity fusion and this is easily triggered by a sub-group of the population. Interestingly the self-referential judgement that we impose is an individual-level behaviour with no direct collective benefit shared by the population. The study provides clues, beyond qualitative and observational studies, as to how hypocrisy may have established itself to reinforce the collective benefit of a fused group identity. It also provides an alternative perspective on the controversial proposition of group selection - showing how fluidity between an individual’s reputation and that of a group may function and influence selection as a consequence of identity fusion.

Dynamic modulation of social influence by indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity is a pervasive social norm that promotes human cooperation. Helping someone establishes a good reputation, increasing the probability of receiving help from others. Here we hypothesize that indirect reciprocity regulates not only cooperative behavior but also the exchange of opinions within a social group. In a novel interactive perceptual task (Experiment 1), we show that participants relied more on the judgments of an alleged human partner when a second alleged peer had been endorsing participants’ opinions. By doing so, participants did not take into account the reliability of their partners’ judgments and did not maximize behavioral accuracy and monetary reward. This effect declined when participants did not expect future interactions with their partners, suggesting the emergence of downstream mechanisms of reciprocity linked to the management of reputation. Importantly, all these effects disappeared when participants knew that the partners’ responses were computer-generated (Experiment 2). Our results suggest that, within a social group, individuals may weight others’ opinions through indirect reciprocity, highlighting the emergence of normative distortions in the process of information transmission among humans.

When it pays to be kind: The allocation of indirect reciprocity within power hierarchies

Indirect reciprocity – the notion that third-party observers offer rewards to prosocial actors – is known to increase levels of cooperative behavior. Yet we know relatively little about how people decide to grant indirect reciprocity. This process is complex because it relies on assessing moral character, which is unobservable. In the current research, we identify a salient cue in the social environment that observers use to calibrate their indirect reciprocity: power differences. Across three experiments, observers were less likely to offer indirect reciprocity to employees who targeted their generosity toward higher- rather than lower-power co-workers. Indirect reciprocity was measured through the allocation of participants’ own financial resources (Experiments 1 and 2), as well as behavioral intentions (Experiment 3). Experiment 3 also showed that this effect is driven by observers’ perceptions of actors’ motives, which inform assessments of moral character.

A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity.

Direct and indirect reciprocity are key mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Direct reciprocity means that individuals use their own experience to decide whether to cooperate with another person. Indirect reciprocity means that they also consider the experiences of others. Although these two mechanisms are intertwined, they are typically studied in isolation. Here, we introduce a mathematical framework that allows us to explore both kinds of reciprocity simultaneously. We show that the well-known 'generous tit-for-tat' strategy of direct reciprocity has a natural analogue in indirect reciprocity, which we call 'generous scoring'. Using an equilibrium analysis, we characterize under which conditions either of the two strategies can maintain cooperation. With simulations, we additionally explore which kind of reciprocity evolves when members of a population engage in social learning to adapt to their environment. Our results draw unexpected connections between direct and indirect reciprocity while highlighting important differences regarding their evolvability.

Chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) internal arousal remains elevated if they cannot themselves help a conspecific.

Chimpanzees help conspecifics achieve their goals in instrumental situations, but neither their immediate motivation nor the evolutionary basis of their motivation is clear. In the current study, we gave chimpanzees the opportunity to instrumentally help a conspecific to obtain food. Following recent studies with human children, we measured their pupil diameter at various points in the process. Like young children, chimpanzees' pupil diameter decreased soon after they had helped. However, unlike children, chimpanzees' pupils remained more dilated upon watching a third party provide the needed help instead of them. Our interpretation is that chimpanzees are motivated to help others, and the evolutionary basis is direct or indirect reciprocity, as providing help oneself sets the conditions for a payback. This is in contrast to young children whose goal is to see others being helped-by whomever-presumably because their helping is not based on reciprocity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma

Cooperation is ubiquitous, but our innate selfishness greatly challenge our motivation to cooperate since natural selection favors the fittest individuals in all the ecosystems. In addition, cooperation is costly, implementing it weighs down the individual wealth and the prosperity of human society. Therefore, how to deal with social dilemma has attracted numerous scholars’ attentions. Among previous researches, indirect reciprocity acts a crucial role in the promotion of cooperation. However, scholars focus more on the consistency and constancy of all the players’ reputation fluctuation, and ignore its potential features, the heterogeneity and dynamic of the reputation increment. In real world, such a scenario can reflect it, for example, a famous person and a notorious person have a totally distinct reputation variation even if they have coincident actions. Inspired by aforesaid particularity of reputation variation, a new mechanism, heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence is introduced, in which players who have more payoffs than the average of their neighbors’ would be more influential, and their actions would lead to a bigger scale of reputation fluctuation due to more attentions from others. Simulation results show that cooperation is facilitated effectively by our new mechanism, compared with traditional model with constant reputation variation.

Diminishing returns drive altruists to help extended family.

Altruism between close relatives can be easily explained. However, paradoxes arise when organisms divert altruism towards more-distantly-related recipients. In some social insects, workers ‘drift’ extensively between colonies and help raise less-related foreign brood, seemingly reducing inclusive fitness. Since being highlighted by W. D. Hamilton, three hypotheses (bet-hedging, indirect reciprocity, and diminishing returns to cooperation) have been proposed for this surprising behaviour. Here we show using inclusive fitness theory that bet-hedging and indirect reciprocity could only drive cooperative drifting under improbable conditions. However, diminishing returns to cooperation create a simple context in which sharing workers is adaptive. Using a longitudinal dataset comprising over a quarter of a million nest-cell observations, we quantify cooperative payoffs in the Neotropical wasp Polistes canadensis, where drifting occurs at high levels. As the worker-to-brood ratio rises in a worker’s home colony, the predicted marginal benefit of a worker for expected colony productivity diminishes. Helping on related colonies can allow effort to be focused on related brood that are more in need of care. Finally, we use simulations to show that cooperative drifting evolves under diminishing returns when dispersal is local, allowing altruists to focus their efforts on related recipients. Our results indicate the power of nonlinear fitness effects to shape social organisation, and suggest that models of eusocial evolution should be extended to include neglected social interactions within colony networks.

Emotion expressions shape human social norms and reputations

SummaryThe emergence of pro-social behaviors remains a key open challenge across disciplines. In this context, there is growing evidence that expressing emotions may foster human cooperation. However, it remains unclear how emotions shape individual choices and interact with other cooperation mechanisms. Here, we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis of the interplay of emotion expressions with two important mechanisms: direct and indirect reciprocity. We show that cooperation in an iterated prisoner's dilemma emerges from the combination of the opponent's initial reputation, past behaviors, and emotion expressions. Moreover, all factors influenced the social norm adopted when assessing the action of others — i.e., how their counterparts' reputations are updated – thus, reflecting longer-term consequences. We expose a new class of emotion-based social norms, where emotions are used to forgive those that defect but also punish those that cooperate. These findings emphasize the importance of emotion expressions in fostering, directly and indirectly, cooperation in society.

Community Membership and Reciprocity in Lending: Evidence from Informal Markets

We study how wholesalers assess borrower credit risk and extend trade credit to retailers in economies where formal market institutions, such as financial reporting systems, auditing, and courts, are nonexistent or function poorly. Using the setting of a large market in India, we find that community membership plays a strong role in the access to credit. Wholesalers are more likely to provide trade credit and to offer less restrictive credit terms to within-community retailers, are more lenient when these retailers default, and are less likely to experience defaults from them. Our analyses suggest that this cooperation between same-community wholesalers and retailers is achieved through an indirect reciprocity mechanism, which is sustained by within-community information flows and provides insurance against income shocks.

An extended reciprocity cycle of gratitude: How gratitude strengthens existing and initiates new customer relationships

AbstractCustomers who feel gratitude toward a firm are motivated to engage in direct reciprocity. However, does gratitude's effect extend beyond the original dyadic interaction to affect relationships with other potential customers? Drawing from indirect reciprocity theory, we propose an extended reciprocity cycle of customer gratitude in which existing customer relationships are strengthened through direct reciprocity and new customer relationships are initiated through indirect reciprocity. Through an experiment, Study 1 demonstrates that employee‐centric reviews are written by grateful customers because they desire to help the firm. Utilizing another experiment, Study 2 reveals that gratitude‐driven employee‐centric reviews significantly increase other consumers' attitudes toward helpful service firms (i.e., positioned as having a sincere brand personality). Study 3 extends the prior findings using field data from Yelp, revealing that employee‐centric reviews are perceived as more useful when shown for sincere rather than sophisticated brands. Collectively, results indicate that customer gratitude fosters not only direct reciprocity, but also indirect reciprocity by encouraging other consumers to reward firms that help customers, signaling to practitioners the importance of managing customers' emotional experiences and strategically placing gratitude‐driven content.

Emergence of cooperation with reputation-updating timescale in spatial public goods game

The evaluation and updating of individual reputation plays a significant role in the evolution of game cooperation under the framework of reputation-based indirect reciprocity. However, the reputation-updating timescale is not necessarily consistent with the strategy-selection timescale. In this letter, we explore the effect of reputation-updating timescale on the cooperation behavior of second-order reputation-based public goods game, and it is assumed that the reputation-updating timescale is slower than the strategy-selection timescale. We observe that the low-frequency of reputation updating will result in some delay, and further hamper the emergency of cooperation behavior. Thus, we propose a novel adaptive reputation-update rule by combining the number of cooperative strategy in the historical memory. Through extensive numerical simulations, we find that under the appropriate reputation-updating timescale (not too fast or too slow), the emergence of cooperation behavior will be improved greatly, even the cooperation level is better than that under the conventional second-order reputation-based PGG. Taking together, the current results will be conducive to understanding the emergency of cooperation in theory and design a reasonable reputation-updating rule in practice.

The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity

We theoretically and experimentally study the evolution of strategies reflecting different moral judgments under indirect reciprocity. We fully characterize the asymptotically stable sets of rest points. In all cooperative rest points multiple strategies coexist. This offers an explanation for the heterogeneity in moral judgments among humans. The behavior prescribed by the predicted strategies can rationalize the design of real-life reputation systems, which are set up to resolve problems of moral hazard. In our laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of participants play strategies that belong to the predicted set of strategies.

Discourse Ethics and the Intergenerational Chain of Concern

This paper addresses the question of what discourse ethics might have to contribute to increasingly urgent issues in intergenerational justice. Discourse ethics and deliberative democracy are often accused of neglecting the issue, or, even worse, of an inherently presentist bias that disregards future generations. The few forays into the topic mostly seek to extend to future people the “all affected principle” according to which only those norms are just to which all affected can rationally consent. However, this strategy conflicts with core commitments of discursive ethics, as it renders agreement hypothetical and discursive participation virtual. I will attempt a supplementary route toward a connection between discourse ethics and intergenerational justice. Discourse ethics must be concerned, in what Habermas calls the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld, with the emergence of rational minds capable of assessing reasons for proposed norms and policies, and such emergence is an intrinsically intergenerational affair. Symbolic reproduction links overlapping and non-overlapping generations in what has been elaborated as a chain-of-concern model, which I show to be linked to forms of indirect reciprocity among more than two parties. I conclude by discussing some consequences of this model for the all affected principle when viewed as specifically applied to future generations.

Evolution of cooperative study

Associate Professor Isamu Okada is based at the Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University in Japan, as well as a visiting professor of Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics and Business in Austria. Okada has dedicated his career to understanding more about the evolution of cooperation which is a strand of thought that falls under evolutionary biology. Academics around the world have long considered the issues relating to the evolution of cooperation. In these studies, cooperation is taken to mean providing benefits to others by paying some kind of cost, whether that be money, time, effort, etc. One of the most fascinating aspects of the theory is that rational thought holds a person has no incentive to cooperate. Indeed, despite decades of research and huge numbers of studies, a rational reason for cooperating has still not been cultivated properly. One of the mechanisms that lie behind cooperation are known as reciprocity and there are many different types. Three specific types have been studied in great detail; direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and network reciprocity. Okada's team has conducted investigations that shine new light on indirect reciprocity which could open up new directions for the field of evolutionary biology.