Indiana Supreme Court Research Articles

Family Law. Medical Consent. Indiana Supreme Court Holds That Family May Terminate Treatment for Nevercompetent Patient in Persistent Vegetative State. In re Lawrance, 579 N. E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991)

Family Law. Medical Consent. Indiana Supreme Court Holds That Family May Terminate Treatment for Nevercompetent Patient in Persistent Vegetative State. In re Lawrance, 579 N. E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991)

An Examination of the Indiana Supreme Court Docket, Dispositions, and Voting in 1991

An Examination of the Indiana Supreme Court Docket, Dispositions, and Voting in 1991

Athletic Scholarships as Contracts of Employment: the Rensing Decisions and the Future of College Sports

In 1982 and 1983, the Indiana Court of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court, respective ly, reached opposite answers to the question: Is an athletic scholarship an employment contract which entitles an injured athlete to workers' compensation? Both decisions, in Rensing v. Indiana State University, highlight the inability of narrowly drawn judicial rulings to recognize and remedy the most egregious manifestations of professionalism in college athletics. The following article draws two lessons from the limitations of the Rensing decisions. First, judicial involvement is necessary when due process or procedural fairness are implicated, but when the athlete's "conditions of participation" (based upon the scholarship agreement) are at issue, judges must permit educators to make necessary policy choices. Second, the existing system of college athletics is beset by a host of problems which derive from the "employment- like" conditions under which the scholarship athlete lives. Several means of diminishing the resemblance between athletic participation and employment are suggested.

The government and selective nontreatment of handicapped infants.

ON April 9, 1982, a baby known only as "Infant Doe" was born in Bloomington, Indiana. He had Down's syndrome, plus esophageal atresia with associated tracheoesophageal fistula. Over the course of six days, he became the focal point of an intensive medical, legal, and ethical debate. When the parents chose to withhold surgery and intravenous feeding, the hospital administrators sought legal advice on the case. The ensuing legal battle involved several lower-court hearings, an informal hearing by the Indiana Supreme Court, and a trip to Washington, D.C., by Bloomington prosecutors to secure an emergency stay of the Indiana court orders, . . .

Gender Discrimination in Pension Plans Revisited: The Results of Court Ordered Implementation

After five years of debate in learned journals, in court, and before professional associations, the question of sex discrimination in pension plans refuses to disappear. The core of the argument, however, is shifting. The original topic of debate was whether discrimination existed, and that has now been settled in the courts. The current debate is on-how to implement a nondiscriminatory plan. This note presents four subjects: first, what has been settled in the courts; second, how two employers implemented nondiscriminatory plans; third, implications to insurers; fourth, what is still to come. In 1974, several independent cases began their slow movement through various courts and, from time to time, the progress of those cases has been reported in this Journal [2, 6, 7, 8]. The primary issue has been whether group pension plans are discriminatory by sex. By 1978, two of the cases had reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Now final decisions have been made. The first to be acted on was the case involving the public school teachers of Indiana and the Indiana State Teachers Retirement Fund (hereafter the Robertson case) [11]. In Robertson, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling that periodic pension benefits must be equal for both sexes. The defendant board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was denied. By this denial the U.S. Supreme Court permitted the Indiana Supreme Court decision to stand. The second case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court was that brought by the female employees of the California Power and Light Company (hereafter the Manhart case). The Court heard this case and ruled that periodic contributions made by employees to the pension fund must be equal for both sexes [5]. The Robertson and Manhart decisions, when viewed together, indicate that all employees shall receive equal periodic benefits and make equal periodic contributions. This, of course, refers to similarly situated persons in terms of years of service, pay levels, age, etc. The decisions do not appear to be directly applicable to noncontributory defined benefit plans.

Rufus Allen Lockwood (Continued)

At some time in his career while in Lafayette, he became a Mason: Among famous names that have been enrolled upon Center Lodge's list of memberships... are those of... Hon. Rufus A. Lockwood_62 His name appears as attorney-of-record in two cases before Indiana supreme court in 1845 (May term); in 1846 he had only one case before that court?and lost it.63 During next two years (1847, 1848), and up to time of his departure for California in 1849, his name appears as attorney-of-record in nine cases before court.64 His fifth and last child, a daughter, was born on September 21,1848, at Lafayette. She was named Harriet, after her mother.65 Lockwood's last trial, a jury trial, before Indiana courts so em bittered him that it may well have been a determining factor in his decision to leave his family again, quit his profession, and head for California. The case involved an unsuccessful attempt on his part to contest a death-bed will in which its maker had left his entire property to his wife's wealthy relative, to exclusion of his own poor, blood relations, who were Lockwood's clients. Notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, a three-day closing argument to jury, verdict went against Lockwood. Senator Booth quotes him as being of opinion that his plea to jury was the ablest effort of his life.66 Upon hear ing adverse verdict, Lockwood arose, struck table with his clenched fist, and swore he would never try another case in that court.67 Although this episode marked end of his career as a lawyer in Indiana, his name continued to appear as attorney-of-record in two cases decided by supreme court during November term 1849, and in three during May term 1850.68 Of these cases, most impor tant was on behalf of his friend Elias L. Beard, who had been awarded a judgment of some $13,000, representing difference between then-depreciated value of scrip received by Beard, as payment for con 239

Indiana Supreme Court. City of North Vernon v. Voegler

Indiana Supreme Court. City of North Vernon v. Voegler