Indian Intelligence Research Articles

The Sino-Indian war and the evolution of wireless monitoring capabilities in the Indian Intelligence Bureau (1959–1968)

ABSTRACT This article is the first academic work exploring the evolution of wireless monitoring capabilities (COMINT) in India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) between 1959 and 1968. Until 1968, the IB was India’s foreign intelligence agency and experienced its biggest failure in providing estimates for the 1962 Sino-Indian war. B.N. Mullik, the then IB chief, argued that the availability of foreign exchange was directly responsible for determining the COMINT capabilities prior to, and after the war. Consulting recently declassified governmental documents, this article contests this claim and highlights that bureaucratic politics played an impactful role. It reveals that pre-war weaknesses were a result of bureaucratic lethargy among some individuals and factionalism within the IB. In the post-war period, even though foreign exchange became available, bureaucratic battles continued and compelled the IB to explore domestic and in-house alternatives to imports. Therefore, the article offers fresh insights into the history of India’s intelligence by exploring a hitherto unexplored domain.

Proximity or Sycophancy? The Relationship between Intelligence and Policy in the Nehruvian Era, 1947–64

Scholars of Intelligence Studies have extensively debated the contours of an ideal relationship between intelligence services and policy making, in which agencies can maintain analytical objectivity while having a policy impact. However, this debate has not meaningfully embraced a geographic expanse covering the Global South. This article, firstly, addresses this by offering a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence–policy relationship in India during the Nehruvian era. Secondly, it draws on the existing scholarly examinations of the global intelligence–policy relationships and argues that ‘proximity’ produces varying results in different decision-making cultures. Thirdly, the article contributes to the literature on contemporary Indian security by examining the impact on Indian intelligence of the relationship between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and B.N. Mullik, former chief of Indian intelligence and an understudied personality. It challenges the popular perception surrounding Mullik’s ‘sycophancy’ and argues that the decision-making culture that existed during the Nehruvian years demanded greater proximity, subservience and, in the worst case, sycophancy. A cost-benefit analysis presented in the article reveals that there were both pros and cons to the ‘proximity’ factor, with the former being more significant.

Espionage, Intrigue, and Politics: Kalimpong Chung Hwa School as International Playhouse

Abstract This article examines the ways in which Kalimpong, living up to its moniker as a “nest of spies,” was a site where local and international intrigues played out, especially at the local Chinese Chung Hwa School. It examines the period between the 1940s and early 1960s, when Kalimpong, on account of its strategic location, was home to “foreign Kautilyas” of different intelligence services. The Chung Hwa School came to play a part in this game as it provided cover/camouflage for Chinese secret agents. The secret services run by the British colonial state—and later the Indian state—suspected it to be a platform for intelligence gathering. A close reading of the archives uncovers the circuit of suspicion and misgiving surrounding the school. This article analyses these narratives and the ways in which, through the enmeshment of espionage, the Indian Intelligence Bureau, the local Chinese, and “China” were constituted in Kalimpong’s (under)world. The school also emerges as tangled in transnational and international machinations epitomizing People’s Republic of China–Republic of India relations and Guomindang–Chinese Communist Party rivalry.

Colonial Sinews of Postcolonial Espionage - India and the Making of Ghana’s External Intelligence Agency, 1958-61

Based on untapped Indian archives, this article details how Delhi built Accra’s security service in 1958-61. Keen to reduce its dependency on the outgoing British colonial administration, Ghana sought India’s support when both the Cold War rivalry and the Afro-Asian Solidarity were at a peak. In doing so, Ghana inherited a similar set of problems affecting Indian intelligence, which in itself was supported by the British i.e. resorting to colonial policing methods, lack of legislative oversight, and a recruitment system based on partisan loyalties instead of professionalism. The Foreign Service Research Bureau (external intelligence) and the Special Branch (domestic intelligence) effectively secured Ghana’s first prime minister and then president Kwame Nkrumah from real and perceived adversaries. But their methods of functioning fed his authoritarian appetite –ultimately leading to an unceremonious ouster– during a highly turbulent phase in Ghanaian history. The first and only time India helped create, and unofficially lead, another country’s intelligence service, this history sheds light on India and Ghana’s approach towards intelligence in the aftermath of independence.

Indian Intelligence and the Mystery of Muhammad’s Hair

Several times a year, crowds gather at the Hazratbal Shrine near Srinagar to see the imam display a thermometer-like container that purportedly holds Prophet Muhammad’s hair.1 Located close to the ...

A Study on the Case of Kalbushan Jadev from the View of International Law

Kulbushan Yadhav Case is a unique case in which an Indian spy was caught during the operation of security forces in Pakistan in 2016. He was allegedly involved in sponsoring terrorism in the provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh in Pakistan. He confessed all the offenses committed by him which was telecasted on TV channels across the world. Kulbushan Yadhav was serving Commander of Indian Navy that confessed that he funded BLA and BRA named illegal terrorist organizations in the Province of Baluchistan while working for Indian Intelligence Agency RAW. He further confessed that he visited Karachi twice and gathered intelligence pertaining to Pakistan’s Navy. He also admitted that there are many other RAW agents like him working in He was sentenced to death in Pakistan. India denied the confession of Kulbushan Yadhav again and again. India approached International Court of Justice in 2017 which initially stayed the execution of death sentence against Kulbushan Yadhav. In the final verdict of the case the International court of Justice (ICJ) granted consular access to India and ordered review of death sentence of Kulbushan Yadhav in July 2019. India’s plea for the release of Kulbushan Yadhav was rejected. This case was contested by India Legal team headed by Mr. Harish Salve and Pakistan’s Legal Team headed by Mr. Khawar Qureshi. India’s stance was that Pakistan is denying consular access to India which is right of accused under the provisions of Vienna Convention. The proceedings of the case initiated in May 2017 and finally the case got decided in 2019. In this article we have used different spellings of the name of Kulbushan Yadhav (Jadhev) as this name is written both ways in India and Globally. Pakistan and India are neighboring countries located in sub-continent. Both got independence from Great Britain by virtue of Partition Act 1947. India never accepted Pakistan’s independence because of which it made things worse for Pakistan since the independence times. Both countries fought fierce wars against each other in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Pakistan also lost half of the country which was East Pakistan and later it becomes Bangladesh in 1971 because of the interference of India in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Pakistan came into being on the doctrine of Two Nation Theory which was given by Dr. Allama Muhammad Iqbal at his historic speech at Allahabad India in 1931. He was a renowned poet also known as poet of the east. According to the two nation theory there are two nations living in Indo-Pak Subcontinent which are different in their cultures, religions, morals, language and lifestyles. They cannot live together because of which there is a dire need of separate homeland for Muslims living in India. This two nation theory becomes the basis of division of India and creation of Pakistan in 1947. When Pakistan lost East Pakistan province, the then Primemininster of India Mrs. Indira Gandhi said “Two Nation Theory has been drowned in Bay of Bengal”. India has the same approach of destroying rest of Pakistan because of which it keeps sending its agents in Pakistan to destabilizing it. Kulbushan Yadhav is one of such agents which got arrested after considerable time. He was involved in sponsoring terrorism activities in Pakistan especially in the provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh. Pakistan and India are both Nuclear Armed Nations. Both the countries are well equipped with the state of the art machinery, fighter jets, strong armed forces and capability to destroy each other. There are border disputes also between both countries especially because of disputed territory of Jammu & Kashmir. If agents like Kulbushan Yadhav are not restrained from interfering in the matters of Pakistan, someday this world may become an unsafe place to live. Keywords: - Kulbushan Yadhav Case, Indian Spy Case, Consular Access Latest Judgment, Indian Terrorist Spy Case, Cross Border Terrorism by India, Indian Sponsored Terrorism DOI: 10.7176/JLPG/97-03 Publication date: May 31 st 2020

Indian spies inside Pakistan: South Asian human intelligence across borders

ABSTRACT This article examines India’s historical efforts to spy inside Pakistan from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s. It draws from memoirs of notable Indian spies who were jailed for espionage in Pakistan and spy ‘fiction’ written by former Indian intelligence and military officers who allege their writing is based on actual cases. The article highlights commonalities among Indian spies using the words of Indian officers to better understand human intelligence efforts inside Pakistan. It finds that Indian spies in these books have initially been Hindus or from multi-religious families, from the Indian-Pakistan border and have been poorly treated by the Indian government and its intelligence services.

Indian Interference in Balochistan: Analysing the Evidence and Implications for Pakistan

An Indian serving naval officer, Kulbhushan Yadav got arrested by the law enforcement agencies of Pakistan in March 2016, when he was trying to enter Pakistan from the Saravan region, located in Balochistan, Pakistan. India’s involvement has created serious implications for the national security and economic progress of Pakistan. Furthermore, this may eventually lead to permanent instability in the region. The United Nations (UN) was also provided with the dossiers of the Indian patronage to the insurgent groups in Balochistan by the Government of Pakistan (GoP) regarding terrorist activities being funded and monitored by the Research Analysis Wing (RAW) ─ the Indian intelligence agency. The paper argues that the Indian interference in the neighbouring countries, particularly in Pakistan, is causing instability. It will try to examine the Indian interference in its neighbouhood in the light of The Arthashastra, a book written by Kautilya during the Chandragupta Maurya’s reign. What choices does a resilient Pakistan have in order to counter the consequences of a hegemonic India in the light of Kautilya’s theory? Suppression of an immediate neighbour (Pakistan) and friendship with the distant neighbours (Afghanistan and Iran) is what the theory suggests.

Pakistan's India Fixation on the Issue of Balochistan

In recent times, with the rise of people's grievances and frustration against the federal government in Balochistan, the Pakistani leadership, to avoid being blamed, is blaming the Indian intelligence agencies for all the troubles taking place in the province. The manner in which the problems are being avoided, Pakistan's fixation with India and the real issues have been dealt with in this paper.

The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks: (re-)constructing Indian (counter-)terrorism

This paper deploys a discursive approach to the ‘scripting’ of the November 2008 Mumbai ‘terror attacks’ and their aftermath, including ensuing debates about counter-terrorism in India. It explores the perspectives of a range of actors who participated in very different ways in the social construction of the attacks, including media consumers and producers, key participants in public debates, and even the masterminds of the attacks. Important insights into the planning and implementation of the attacks are drawn from phone conversations intercepted by Indian intelligence, between the gunmen and their ‘controllers’. The Mumbai attacks were scripted and staged in a conscious effort to obtain maximum media coverage, which also made the masterminds dependent on the media. The war story created by the media featured violence simply as a means of ‘fighting a battle’, obscuring the significant role of violence as a display of force by both security forces and ‘terrorists’.

Colin Davidson's British Indian Intelligence Operations in Japan 1915–23 and the Demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Colin Davidson was the British consular official in Japan during and after World War I delegated to run intelligence operations in the country on behalf of the British Indian security authorities. Davidson's original target, Indian revolutionaries based in Japan, soon expanded to include their clandestine links to powerful Japanese political patrons, violating the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–23). Davidson's expertise on Japan, combined with intelligence on Japanese ultranationalist support of Indian independence, proved crucial for confirming suspicions about secret Japanese intent against the British Empire, contributing to the decision not to renew the Alliance.

The Failure of Indian Intelligence in the Sino-Indian Conflict

The Failure of Indian Intelligence in the Sino-Indian Conflict

The "Fry-Bread" Test (American Indian Intelligence Quotient Test)

4. Modern America grew out of colonial America. Without the colonial mold, today's culture would be quite different. In that epoch, Indians helped in the exploration, development, settlement and cultivation of the continent. Essentially, who were the pupils in the Indian schools during this period? a. Cajuns b. European pioneers c. Apollonians d. Plastic Medicine Men e. Peyote Road Men f. Sasquatch (Big Foot)

More on the Zinoviev Letter

Many Comintern policy decisions and missives to foreign Communist parties were, as Dr Carr observes, made public at the time.' But many were not. Aino Kuusinen, wife and assistant of Comintern's Finnish secretary-general, later described the 'three days and nights of feverish activity' which were necessary to remove 'secret instructions to the British Party' and other 'compromising documents' from the Comintern archives in preparation for the visit of a T.U.C. delegation anxious to discover the truth about the Zinoviev letter. 'After the delegation had left', she recalled, 'there was general relief and everyone had a good laugh over the fact that they had been able to pull the wool so easily over the Englishmen's eyes.' It was less easy to pull the wool over the eyes of foreign intelligence services. In the pre-Stalinist era Comintern security appears to have been woefully defective. As Aino Kuusinen later acknowledged, 'many of its secrets were penetrated by agents of foreign governments'. Documents were not the only things to go astray. On several occasions Comintern's secret subsidies to foreign Communists were embezzled en route.2 The contents of the Zinoviev letter of I5 September 1924 were, as Dr Carr says, 'no novelty'. Internal evidence alone is insufficient to prove or to disprove the charge of forgery. Advocates of the forgery hypothesis (like Mr Chester and his colleagues)3 have, however, invariably neglected a substantial part of the external evidence. They have notably failed to place the Zinoviev letter within the broader context of British communications intelligence. Yet GC & CS, SIS, MI 5, the special branch, and the Indian intelligence bureaux were all involved with varying regularity and varying success in intercepting Soviet and Comintern communications at source, in transit, or at destination. The authenticity of the largest category of Soviet intercepts the coded telegrams and wireless messages intermittently decrypted by GC & CS until 1927 (and invariably left out of account by the forgery theorists) is in scarcely greater doubt than that of the German intercepts during the Second World War. Those intercepts must have been of at least some assistance in checking the credibility of the other Soviet and Comintern documents less frequently obtained by other