The Sino-Indian war and the evolution of wireless monitoring capabilities in the Indian Intelligence Bureau (1959–1968)

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article is the first academic work exploring the evolution of wireless monitoring capabilities (COMINT) in India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) between 1959 and 1968. Until 1968, the IB was India’s foreign intelligence agency and experienced its biggest failure in providing estimates for the 1962 Sino-Indian war. B.N. Mullik, the then IB chief, argued that the availability of foreign exchange was directly responsible for determining the COMINT capabilities prior to, and after the war. Consulting recently declassified governmental documents, this article contests this claim and highlights that bureaucratic politics played an impactful role. It reveals that pre-war weaknesses were a result of bureaucratic lethargy among some individuals and factionalism within the IB. In the post-war period, even though foreign exchange became available, bureaucratic battles continued and compelled the IB to explore domestic and in-house alternatives to imports. Therefore, the article offers fresh insights into the history of India’s intelligence by exploring a hitherto unexplored domain.