Indian Federalism Research Articles

Building a Robust Federalism in India: Constitutional Provisions, Practical Challenges, and Pathways to Overcome

This study explores the intricacies of India's federalism, examining both the actual challenges encountered in implementing the system and the legal structure that establishes and governs it. The Indian Constitution aims to establish a balance of authority and responsibility between the central and state governments. It combines unique characteristics of unitary government with federal government. This study looks at the key constitutional provisions and amendments that specify the organizational structure of the federal government, including the division of legislative power, budgetary relationships, and administrative processes. Federalism cannot actually be implemented in India due to significant barriers, despite a constitution designed to maintain a careful balance. Administrative inefficiencies, political tensions, and economic disparities sometimes lead to strained relations between centers and states. This essay looks at these problems, highlighting instances of conflict and cooperation between different levels of government. This study aims to understand the evolution of Indian federalism by a critical analysis of case laws, policy decisions, and intergovernmental discussions. The paper also covers the effects of regionalism, coalition politics, and economic liberalization on the federal framework. The study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the practical aspects of constitutional federalism and the necessary modifications to enhance its efficacy by means of an examination of these characteristics. The findings underscore the necessity of continuous deliberation and adaptation to ensure that India's federalism is resilient and responsive to the aspirations of its diverse citizenry.

Goods and services tax and its implications for fiscal federalism in India

Goods and services tax and its implications for fiscal federalism in India

UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF TRIBAL POLITY IN INDIA: THE STUDY OF LADAKH AND RAJASTHAN

The term ‘Federalism’ refers to and deals with multiple aspects; it relates to administrative setup in the constitutional distribution of power in various layers of government. At the same time, it also works as a system to accommodate multiple identities in a plural administrative setup; it is fiscal and administrative, it can accommodate aspirations, and at the same time, it can adopt exclusivity. Comparative and cooperative can also be the dimension of federalism. As the word Federation is derived from the Latin word ‘foedus’, which means agreement or treaty, ironically, in modern plural democracies, it acts as the consensus builder and the reason for conflict, protest and movements.The paper will explore the various dimensions of federalism in India, particularly tribal polity. The tribes in India are not homogenous groups, and their heterogeneities can be seen in terms of their regional, culturally specific demands within the scope of federal arrangements in India. Politically and administratively, the Post-Independent India struggled to address the tribal aspirations. Even though administrative arrangements have been made to the constitution in the form of the Vth and VIth schedules, the tribal aspirations in the federal polity of India demand further accommodation and representation.

Changing Dynamics of Indian Federalism

One of the main tenets of the Indian government, federalism, has changed significantly since it was first implemented. In order to better understand the changing dynamics of Indian federalism, this research study will look at the historical background, constitutional provisions, and current issues (Dasgupta, 2018). It explores the interactions between the federal government and the states, examining elements that affect federal relations, including social, political, and economic shifts. Additionally, the influence of globalization, regional ambitions, and decentralization initiatives are discussed in the article (Sridharan, 2012). It aims to deepen knowledge of Indian federalism and influence the policy dialogue for efficient government by bringing attention to possibilities and concerns.

Fiscal Federalism in India: Learning from best practices in Canada

This research paper aims to provide a comparative study on the fiscal federalism of India and Canada. Both India and Canada have a federal form of government, but their fiscal federalism systems differ in many aspects. This paper analyzes the historical development, constitutional provisions, tax systems, revenue-sharing mechanisms, and challenges of fiscal federalism in India and Canada. The paper concludes that while both countries face challenges in fiscal federalism, Canada has a more established and effective system due to its focus on revenue sharing and cooperative federalism. This paper will examine the key features of Canada's fiscal federalism model and explore the lessons that can be drawn for India.

The Changing Trends of Coalition Politics of Kerala from its Origin to 2016 in India

The Constitution of India provide for a federal system of government though the term ‘federalism’ which is nowhere been used in the constitution. But the article 1 of the constitution describes that India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States. K.C. where describes Indian federalism as “Quasi-federal”. Granville Austin called it ‘co-operative federalism.’ And Ivor Jennings describes it as ‘federation with strong centralizing tendency’. This nature of Indian federalism has leads India towards coalition. The coalition politics at the central level has been relatively a recent phenomenon but at the state level it has been in operation right after the first general election (1952). The growth of regional parties and dominant leadership at state level has federalized the polity and the state government has stretched their arms. The first coalition at state level formed in Kerala in 1954. The coalition politics is a time-tested thing in contemporary democracy. The concept of coalition politics occurred when the states used to ally with each other in order to defect of a common enemy. In 1954 the Congress created a coalition government in Kerala. Since this time Kerala has been living with coalition rule after regular intervals. The politics in Kerala is dominated by two coalition fronts: the communist party of India (Marxist)- led left Democratic front (LDF) and the Indian National Congress – led United Democratic Front (UDF) since late 1970s. Kerala was the first Indian state where the communists were chosen to power. Since the early 1980s these two coalitions have alternate in government. They are unable to gain re- election for a second term. These two-alliance coalition have occurred periodically and ruled continued to 2016 election. In May 2016, the LDF win election and now in power. This LDF coalition occurred with CPI (M)-58, CPI-19, TDS-3, NCP-2, KCB-1, CPM(L)-1, CS-1 and Independents-5.

Repugnancy Laws and Its Effect on Indian Federalism

The Doctrine of Repugnancy is a pivotal concept within the Indian constitutional framework, aimed at resolving conflicts between central and state laws in a federal system. This review explores the historical evolution, judicial interpretations, and contemporary relevance of the Doctrine of Repugnancy within the context of Indian federalism. The Indian Constitution is often described as "quasi-federal" due to its combination of federal and unitary features. The Doctrine of Repugnancy, enshrined in Article 254, plays a critical role in maintaining the balance between these elements. It delineates a hierarchy in which central laws prevail over state laws in cases of inconsistency, reflecting a unitary characteristic. This hierarchy, while essential for legislative coherence and uniformity, can potentially centralize power and hinder state autonomy. The judicial interpretation of the Doctrine of Repugnancy is central to its application. Courts distinguish between direct and implied repugnancy, ensuring that state laws do not undermine the purpose of central laws. They also determine the field of legislation, deciding whether specific subjects fall under the purview of the center, states, or the concurrent list. Precedents established by the Supreme Court guide the consistent application of this doctrine. Furthermore, the Doctrine of Repugnancy is indispensable for resolving conflicts between central and state laws in the Concurrent List. When central and state laws clash on the same subject, the central law prevails. If a state law receives the President's assent, it coexists with the central law, emphasizing the delicate balance within Indian federalism. This research has discussed the effect of repugnant laws through judicial decisions and how impactful has been towards federalism in India.

Cooperative federalism in India: Expectations and challenges

Cooperative federalism in India: Expectations and challenges

A Critical Analysis of Changing Trend of Federalism in India

A Critical Analysis of Changing Trend of Federalism in India

Concept of federalism in India and the USA

Concept of federalism in India and the USA

The Fiscal and Monetary Federalism in India During Covid-19

The Fiscal and Monetary Federalism in India During Covid-19

Externalization of Indian federalism: Understanding the role of West Bengal and Tripura on India’s policy toward Bangladesh

ABSTRACT In a federal political system like India, the role of the federal units bordering the neighboring countries becomes crucial in foreign policy-making toward neighboring countries. It is expected that when similar political parties or coalition partners remain in power in both the center and the states, federal politics does not hinder policy-making toward neighboring countries. Moreover, foreign policy being a central subject, federal units any way reflect passive tendencies, especially in the case of governments with the same party affiliations. Both these simplifications are contested in this paper by citing instances of the role of West Bengal and Tripura, India’s two federal units bordering the neighboring country of Bangladesh, at different historical junctures, in which similar political parties in the center and the state resulted in more friction than when different political parties were in office in matters of India’s foreign policy-making toward Bangladesh. The paper argues that instead of federalization of foreign policy, where federal units have an influential role, this particular experience suggests an externalization of federalism, where an external variable (Bangladesh) influences internal federal dynamics to the extent that domestic electoral politics force the political parties of the two federal units to give importance to the neighboring country in taking positions on foreign policy-making. The immediate context of fifty years of the India-Bangladesh relationship and question about over-centralization during the latest phase of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) regime in India push the authors to take up Bangladesh as a case to contest the given of Indian federalism in foreign policy making.

Socio-cultural Challenges on Federal Structure Nepal

Socio cultural change is a dynamic concept and change on different time periods. These variables are change and main determinants of political and economic change. The cultural, ethnic and economic diversity across the country is very hard to have homogeneity within such heterogeneous characteristics. Therefore, new minorities are likely to be created within the subunits. Such units and subunits among various socio-cultural and ethnic groups may create instability. The disagreement on the geographical division of the states has already created instability in the Terai region. Why is socially and culturally diverse Asia still overwhelmingly unfederal ? The issue seeks to answer the question by identifying the factors responsible for the adoption of federalism in some countries as well as its rejection in others, with particular reference to existing research and the practices of federalism in India, Pakistan and Malaysia.1 The central argument is that the federal discourse in Asia is to be conjoined to democracy discourse in order to assess the democratic effect of federalism, which is an important key to federal success. On the basis of a conceptual distinction between diversity- claims and equality-claims, it is emphasized that federalism in Asia needs to strike a balance between its concern for management of diversity and for the production of some equity in the social-cultural and economic realms.

How the Pennies Drop


 The introduction of a Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India in 2017 not only impacted the economy, but also altered the contours of fiscal federalism in India. Amongst other indicators, the steady growth of GST revenue has been a robust barometer of the success of the reform. This paper delves into the trends of GST collections to evaluate the efficacy of the reform to generate revenue. Subsequently, an attempt is made to answer the questions – what drives revenue growth, and are the collections, collection efficiencies, and buoyancy of collections better under GST as compared to the pre-GST period? This is done by examining GST collections while controlling for extraneous factors, such as inflation. Further, a novel mechanism for computing the collection rate of GST, using only publicly-available data is proposed. This has potential applications in revenue modelling, in analysis of trends across time and geographies, and for policy formulation. Rationalization of tax rates, structural efficiencies, widening of the tax base, and enhanced compliance are seen to contribute to the positive outcomes observed. In order to address the paucity of disaggregated data on enforcement in the public domain, the paper uses judicial data from District Level Courts to analyse spatial dimensions of GST enforcement. Overall, it is seen that GST has delivered on multiple fronts, including revenue growth, formalization of the economy, reduced rates of taxation, and creation of a more unified market. We also observe that post-GST tax buoyancy and collection efficiencies have shown significant improvement.

Intergovernmental relations and the territorial management of ethnic diversity in India

ABSTRACT This article examines how and to what extent ethnic diversity underpinned intergovernmental relations (IGR) in deeply divided societies like India. Central to this is the vertical and intermediating roles of political actors, structures and processes of Indian federalism in defining the ways in which ethnic diversity is territorially managed. Unlike Canada or Belgium which have more formal and robust structures of IGR, the inconsequential roles of formal structures of IGR in India unduly leverage centralizing actors, structures and processes in the territorial management of ethnic diversity. Given that these centralizing actors, structures and processes are contingent on political expediency, the dynamic ideas, interests and strategies of centralizing and regionalist actors are particularly salient in defining not only the contours and outcomes of IGRs but also the ways in which “unity in diversity” are negotiated and balanced within the overarching framework of “self-rule and shared rule.”

Book review: Mahendra Prasad Singh, Federalism in India

Mahendra Prasad Singh, Federalism in India, New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2022, pp., xxi + 294, ₹1,295.00.

One-party Dominance of BJP: Emerging Dynamics of Conflict and Co-operation in Indian Federalism

Federalism in India is a unique framework of governance that aims to meet the necessities of a heterogeneous and variegated society. In the Indian design, the destiny of States rests with the Union government, which can alter, dissolve or redefine issues with consultation, but without their consent. The rationale for adopting such an arrangement was to discourage centrifugal forces that had led to communal carnage and the partition of the Indian sub-continent at the time of Independence in 1947. Post-Independence, multiple constitutional, political and societal factors shaped the nature and course of Indian federalism as it evolved from one-party dominance of the Congress party to a phase of multiparty coalitions led by a national and/or regional parties in the 1990s and thereafter under a bi-nodal coalitional system. Subsequently, since 2014 the advent of BJP as a dominant party has strengthened federal centralisation that has unleashed several challenges that have a number of ramifications for federalism. Therefore, this paper examines the working of Indian federalism with a focus on contemporary trends of centralisation, conflict and co-operation.

State capacity & the soft budget constraint: Fiscal federalism, Indian style

In this paper, we explore the effects of India's federal structure on state-level fiscal responsibility. Drawing from a 1991–2018 dataset, we argue that higher levels of transfer and borrowing dependence (soft budget constraints) from the central government facilitate lower levels of fiscal responsibility by subnational governments. Our hypothesis is tested using panel regressions on fiscal responsibility outcomes across Indian states. We also evaluate the effects of the world's largest employment program, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), on subnational fiscal responsibility. We find that rural public employment measures are conducive to lower levels of fiscal responsibility. Soft budget constraints constitute a key structural feature of Indian federalism.

Locating Contemporary Indian Federalism: Contextualising the Trends of Centralisation with Changing Dynamics

Indian federalism is a peculiar model designed to accomplish the necessities of a heterogeneous and multifaceted society. The constitutional framework of federalism spells out that the fate of the states rests with the centre, as the centre can alter it with consultation but without taking consent from the concerned states. The justification offered for such a design during the Constituent Assembly deliberations was to thwart the centrifugal forces that had caused the partition of the subcontinent. The post-independence issues emerged due to several circumstances that influenced federalism in a political milieu where one party, the Congress, held dominance for the first two decades. This phase of Indian federalism was less contentious than the subsequent phase because of consensual politics but opposition and confrontation later appeared with the rise of oppositional politics and regional autonomy demands. In the 1990s, Indian federalism experienced a shift where regionalisation and federalisation of political parties reshaped the federal context along with other factors. Also, this was a volatile phase followed by a bi-nodal alliance system that brought political stability at the national level. The BJP scripted landmark victories in the 2014 and 2019 Lok Sabha elections that unleashed new challenges and strengthened the trends of centralisation. Besides centralisation, federal cooperation found space through several initiatives of the centre. Thus, the article investigates how Indian federalism functions in a variegated system by emphasising the contemporary trends of centralisation with changing dynamics.

Centrally-sponsored Schemes and Cooperative Federalism in India: A Case Study of Integrated Child Development Scheme

This article attempts to explore the dynamics of cooperative federalism in India through a case study of the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS), a Centrally Sponsored Scheme initiated by the Government of India in 1975 for the health and nutrition of pregnant and lactating women and children of below six years of age. The study of ICDS provides an interesting case to study vertical and horizontal federalism and its interlinkages and the spirit and working of cooperative federalism in India. The article analyses the performance of ICDS in different states by emphasizing factors, such as party congruence, the commitment of the Chief Minister, awareness of the community, functioning of the NGOs and so on. The study has involved fieldwork in some districts of Gujarat and Punjab and relied on government reports and some secondary literature to understand the functioning of ICDS in other states, such as Odisha, Tamil Nadu, and Jammu and Kashmir. Our fieldwork brought to light the fact that there were variations not only in the success rate but also in the number of actors involved in the implementation of the scheme in different states and the adoption of some innovations by particular states. There were pilot initiatives introduced in some districts, such as the toy bank initiative, School Enrolment Drive, Mobile Anganwadi vans, Insurance scheme for Anganwadi workers and felicitation of Anganwadi workers (Mata Yashoda Awards). The study of multi-level federal structure in India is crucial for a holistic understanding of the implementation of the centrally-sponsored schemes in India including ICDS.