Independent Sovereign States Research Articles

Overcoming the Challenge of Legacy Learning Methods

Recognizing the role of the leader points to the importance of how leaders are trained and developed so that they are capable of helping their institutions maintain the values of their organizations. This was found to be a concern of the defense and security leaders of the newly developed independent sovereign states of the USSR. As many of them installed democratic forms of government, the challenge was not just to declare education for reform on paper, but how to transform their educational institutions to develop leaders for the directions that had been set by their newly formed governments.This concern for sustaining institutions is in keeping with much research in the field of leadership. Leadership's role in sustaining institutional and societal culture and in driving institutional change is clearly pointed out by experts such as Burt Nanus, who focused on visionary leadership; the late Peter Drucker, who emphasized the growth of future leaders; and Warren Bennis, who underlined the importance of developing leaders to become leaders of leaders.1 Additional recognition of the leader's significance in both sustaining and changing culture is found in Brady's work,2 where he cited 2001 research conducted by the public relations firm Burson-Marsteller examining the top thirty CEOs of publicly traded companies in Germany. The results showed that approximately twothirds of the public reputation of a company was determined by the leader of the organization. In keeping with this, a later Burson-Marsteller study done in the United States examined 1155 key stakeholders, and determined that the CEO's reputation contributed significantly to how companies are perceived. Brady pointed to leaders such as Lord Browne at BP, Chad Holliday at DuPont, Michael W. Crooke at Patagonia, and Ben Cohen at Ben and Jerry's, who have understood that their legacies as leaders established the tone and sustainability of their organizations and made this an organizational priority.To be successful in leadership development at defense and security educational institutions requires that the educational processes themselves be examined. Following NATO's Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building (PAP -DIB) and Education for Defense Reform initiatives (2004-05), the Partnership for Peace Consortium's (PfPC) Educators Development Working Group (ED WG) created a sub-group of the same name to tackle the challenge of how to transform the legacy teaching methods of authoritarian institutions into democratic learning processes that promoted education for defense reform within these countries so that they could train the leaders that would be required for the twenty-first century. More specifically, the challenge was how to help transform an authoritarian, top-down, teacher-centered approach to education that was based most often in the lecture method into a shared, collaborative learning process that exhibited democratic values, not just as curriculum content or an end state but as a democratic process and means of learning resulting in transformative leadership education.Educators Development Working Group ResponseThe response of the Educators Development Working Group was to approach learning from a three-fold perspective, and to develop active working teams around each prong:1 . What to teach, which included curricula for defense institution building and professional military education2. Defense education enhancement programs tailored for each participating nation3. How to teach, which included annual multinational educators' workshops and local national educator programs.The goal of the latter, and the focus of this article, was to share and instill Western learning and teaching methods with Partner defense educators. This included an emphasis on learner-centered education, with its collaborative knowledge building capacity, assessment, and community building. The approach was embedded in democratic values central to education for defense reform. …

African Economic Blocs and Trade: Case Study of COMESA and Sudan

African Economic Blocs and Trade: Case Study of COMESA and Sudan

Иракская драма идет к концу?

The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq marks the beginning of a new stage in the history of that country. Iraq once again becomes a sovereign independent state. From now on, the huge task of ensuring security and putting an end to the terrible internal strife must be entrusted to the local authority. It is crucial to find a compromise solution to the Sunni-Shiite conflict. To achieve this end, the central power has to be really inclusive, giving the Sunnis their legitimate place in governing the country. The worst scenario would be the establishment of a Shiite-dominated regime that is prone to neglect the grievances of the Sunni population. The rights of the Kurdish minority, too, have to be safeguarded unless the state falls apart. Judging by their past behavior, however, it is hard to believe in the goodwill and adequate judgment of Iraqi politicians. The author concludes that the situation may well get worse before it starts to better off.

South Africa's first century

For better or for worse, the date 31 May will remain embedded in the annals of South African history. On this date in 1902 the second Anglo-Boer War officially ended, and in 1910 the four British colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State united to form a single country under British dominion. Bar this event, these colonies would have traversed separate historical trajectories eventually leading to four independent sovereign states. Ironically, the name South Africa (and the ZA international country code) harks back to Paul Kruger's Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek, itself an amalgamation of several tiny Afrikaner republics in the territory that came to be known as the Transvaal. Finally, on 31 May 1961, South Africa was declared a republic, with Hendrik Verwoerd exulting 'God regeer!' (God reigns!).

The Digital Divide in Asia

1.0 IntroductionWidening of the gap between so called haves and have-nots is a problem for people even in western countries. In Asia this gap is even bigger and more worrying making any research that looks into it a significant contribution to the dialogue about the topic. This article presents an unusual approach to the digital divide for several reasons. Research done on the digital divide in Asia is often conducted by scholars who come from western nations; this article reports on research done by researchers who come from Asia. In addition, quite often researchers focus on only one country when they study the digital divide; this article focuses on four Asian countries to give the reader the opportunity to compare situations in more than one country. Within these four countries the article looks at four different groups of people to allow the reader the opportunity to see the results relating to the digital divide from different perspectives. The groups studied come from interesting backgrounds, yet typically paid attention to in the literature. The groups that will be discussed here are Women in political online forums in Yemen, Rural Students in Bangladesh, Cyber Activists and Virtual Protesters in Pakistan, and Farmers in China. Finally, this research will show that the reasons these groups of people are standing on the not side is just because of, as often thought, economics, but also cultural, technological or political reasons, providing fuel for further research on the digital divide. Toward the end, this article also offers a very brief philosophical analysis to shed light on the moral significance of the digital divide in these countries.2.0 Country ProfilesYemen (officially the Republic of Yemen), which is composed of former North Yemen and South Yemen, is located on the Arabian Peninsula, bordering Saudi to the north, the Arab Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the south, the Sultanate of Oman to the east and the Red Sea to the west. Yemen is one of the oldest civilizations in the world dating back to the ninth century b.c. and known then as Happy Arabia due to its rich and fertile soil. Yemen is also one of the fastest growing democracies in the Arab world holding elections that have always been judged by international observers as being free and fair. Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Arab world, where 45.2 per- cent of the total population (23,013,376 people, July 2008 est.) is below the poverty line. Although the population, which is predominately Muslim (Sunnis and Shiaa), is relatively young (46.2 percent between 0 and 14 years and 51.2 percent between 15 and 64 years), the unemployment rate is still as high as 35 percent (CIA World Fact Book 2009).Bangladesh is an extremely poor and densely populated third world country situated in South East Asia (USAID 2007 and Atlapedia 2008). It has more than 150 million people and only 133,910 sq km of land area resulting in a high population density, which is 1,150 people per sq km, whereas the population density of China and India are 142 and 386 people per sq km, respectively. To make things even worse, about one third of the country floods every year causing serious damage to the already poor economy. GDP per capita (PPP) is only $1,300 whereas, in Australia it is $36,300. Almost half (45 percent) of the total population live below the poverty line (CIA World Fact Book 2008). Most of the people (around 85 percent of the total population) live in rural areas. Around 20 percent of the rural population live in extreme poverty. They do have any cultivable land or assets, and often suffer from serious illness and persistent food insecurity. Another 29 percent of the people are moderately poor meaning that they suffer from lack of protein and other nutritional elements in their diets (Rural Poverty Portal 2007).Islamic Republic of Pakistan emerged on the map of the world as an independent sovereign state on August 14, 1947. …

From Hindu Monarchy to Secular Republic

States are the principal subjects of International Law. The Himalayan State of Nepal fulfils all the essential conditions of statehood. It is an independent sovereign State. It is a member of the United Nations Organisations. On 1 June 2001, King Birendra, Queen Ashwarya and other close relatives were killed in a shooting spree by drunken Crown Prince Dipendra, who then shot himself to death. Later on, Gyanendra was crowned as the King of Nepal on 4 June 2001. He was a man of high ambition. He misused the provisions of the Constitution of 1990. He tried to justify his unconstitutional and arbitrary acts under Article 127 and certain other provisions of the Constitution. The General Elections for the new Constituent Assembly and Interim Parliament were held on 10 April 2008. On 28 May 2008, the new Constituent Assembly declared Nepal a ‘SECULAR, FEDERAL, DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLIC’ Nation. On 1 July 2008, the Constituent Assembly elected Nepali Congress leader Dr. Ram Baran Yadav as President of Nepal. At present, Nepal has its elected President, Vice President and Prime Minister. The Constituent Assembly has the responsibility to frame a new Constitution for the country. It is submitted that the new Constituent Assembly shall try to adopt the basic principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights.

De-territorializing and Re-territorializingLotus: Sovereignty and Systematicity as Dialectical Nation-Building in Early Republican Turkey

AbstractThe chief aim of this article is to unearth, explicate, and contextualize the various techniques on which Mahmut Esat, Turkey's agent before the Permanent Court of International Justice in theLotuscase, drew in order to narrate a fresh understanding of Turkish ‘nationhood’ during a period of intense vulnerability for the newly established Republic. The argument advanced by Turkey in this case – that it need not demonstrate the existence of a specific jurisdictional exception in international law in order to proceed with its prosecution of the French captain of theLotus, a French vessel – has often been dismissed as an example of cynical apologetics. Nevertheless, a close reading of Turkey's pleadings reveals that it was inclined to oscillate between a variety of universalistic and particularistic approaches, Esat litigating theLotuswith an eye to exploiting the schism that lies at the heart of the concept of ‘civilization’ so as to submit Turkey to the normative authority of the international legal system while bolstering its positive power as an independent sovereign state. More specifically, it was by merging two modes of reasoning – the one prizing systematicity, the other prioritizing sovereignty – that Esat sought to construct a new, robustly reconciliatory identity for the ‘Turkish nation’, one that would enable it to embrace its commitment to international order by securing its place in ‘la civilisation contemporaine’ while amplifying the ambit of its autonomy as ‘un état civilisé’.

Latecomers to the ILO and the Authorship and Ownership of the International Labour Code

The article examines the extent to which latecomers to the International Labour Organization (ILO) that comprise more than one half of the organization could be said to have contributed to the establishment of the International Labour Code, about two-thirds of which had already been established by the time that they began to join the ILO as politically sovereign independent states. The article focuses on the recent work of the ILO Working Party on Policy Regarding the Revision of Standards (1994-2002). It evaluates both the significance of outcomes of the Working Party's achievements and the role of the latecomers in that enterprise. It shows that the latecomers have appropriated the ILO dynamic and utilized the ILO's working party and committee structures both to project matters of foremost concern to themselves onto the agenda of the ILO and to update the International Labour Code by evaluating, categorizing, and suspending some of the conventions and recommendations that they had deemed to be irrelevant. It concludes that after the conclusion of the work of the Working Party on Policy Regarding the Revision of Standards, latecomers to the ILO have become equal coauthors [End Page 706] and co-owners of the International Labour Code together with all the other member states parties of the ILO.

NATO and the anticipatory use of force

Only since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since September 2001, have questions of anticipatory action arisen in alliance deliberations concerning the use of force. In initiating their Balkan operations, it should be recalled, the allies did not face direct threats, but intervened toterminate conflicts and human rights abuses and to shape their security environment. It has been difficult for the alliance to get to grips with the new security challenges presented by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction because of its history, its intrinsic character, and the nature of the new security challenges. Its history includes a strictly reactive posture during the Cold War and its interventions from a position of overwhelming superiority in the Balkan conflicts. The new security challenges place under stress the alliance's intrinsic character as a permanent coalition of sovereign independent states committed to collective defence because these challenges may endanger specific allies to differing degrees (in contrast with the overarching Soviet threat during the Cold War) and revealdiff erences in interests, capabilities and strategic cultures among the allies. The allies have not yet resolved questions concerning the legality and legitimacy of the antici patory use of force, nor have they fully explored the implications of concepts such as ‘constructive abstention’ and ‘NATO in support’ with regard to preemptive or preventive operations undertaken by a group of allies.

Author's Response

[ 137 ] book review roundtable • untying the knot Author’s Response Richard C. Bush Iam deeply grateful to the six reviewers for their thoughtful commentaries. Having different perspectives on one’s work is useful. I share many of the commentators’ observations, and wish here to briefly address some of the issues that they have raised. One of the complaints I heard soon after the release of Untying the Knot was that the front cover of the book portrayed the island of Taiwan in the same color as the Chinese mainland. As Dan Blumenthal indicates, there is concern that the book carries a pro-unification bias. To clarify, my purpose in writing the book was to explain why the Taiwan Strait issue is so difficult to resolve. Given that point of departure, and given the apparent reality (at least to me) that Beijing is not going to permit de jure independence for Taiwan, any “resolution” would seem to mean some sort of unification. Since the people of Taiwan have expressed no enthusiasm whatsoever for China’s “one country, two systems” formula, the question now concerns whether there are other approaches to political union that might be mutually acceptable. Other approaches can certainly be conceptualized (e.g., confederation). Since these options have not been offered in any objective way, however, whether any or all of these alternatives would be acceptable to the people of Taiwan is an open question. Perhaps there is no “one China” approach that would be acceptable. By the same token, however, it is not for outsiders nor for Taiwan’s political leaders to assume that a one-China solution is impossible. Moreover, as I think I demonstrated in Untying the Knot, the only way for Beijing to have some hope of achieving unification is to creatively offer one of these alternatives. A similar creativity and openness is necessary when it comes to the cross-cutting question of identity. I am in fundamental agreement with Allen Carlson’s conclusion that “any resolution of the current standoff will hinge upon the degree to which those on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (at the elite and popular levels) can successfully cultivate a new set of more inclusive and mutually compatible constructs in regard to the question of what it means to be Chinese—and, perhaps, Taiwanese.” As he understands much better than I, these constructs are vigorously contested on Taiwan. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian may indeed represent the past more than they do the future. Richard C. Bush is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and director of its Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. From 1997 to 2002 he served as chairman and managing director at the American Institute in Taiwan. He can be reached at . [ 138 ] asia policy In his discussion of Beijing’s reading of Lee and Chen, Steve Goldstein argues that Beijing and Taipei were stuck in a sovereignty-unification dilemma analogous to their security dilemma: “[For Beijing] to accept, or perhaps even to explore, the implications of Lee and Chen’s position on sovereignty and their vision of the future composition of China would be essentially to grant Taiwan independence against the promise of an uncertain outcome yet to be negotiated…Lee and Chen would face a similarly unfavorable outcome if they surrendered claims to sovereignty before negotiation had even begun.” Though a fair capsule statement, the above articulation misses a couple of important points. The first is that this dilemma is probably truer of Chen Shui-bian than of Lee Teng-hui. Lee’s position throughout his entire presidency was that there was one divided China. The point of contention centered around the status of the Republic of China (ROC) and how to end the state of division. From a legal point of view, therefore, for Beijing to have accepted Lee’s view that the ROC was an independent sovereign state would have amounted to less of a sacrifice than to have accepted the similar principle on the part of Chen’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) because the DPP did not start from the premise of one divided China. Even with Chen there was an openness to...

Future of North Cyprus: An economic-strategic appraisal

Based on qualitative methods of study of the future, including experts interviews and the deliberations of a symposium, this paper analyses the shape of things to come for North Cyprus in the light of its historical backlog and the present scenarios. It argues that the impact of globalisation is becoming very decisive in this part of the world: there are important players including the US, Russia, Turkey, Greece, European Union, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in this strategic region with their vested interests and plans which will be deterministic for the fate of the Island. One of the most crucial of these plans is the Greater Middle East Initiative developed by the US. Given the vectors of forces now active in the political horizon, the future of North Cyprus to be an independent sovereign state looks within reach if Muslim countries continue recognising it.

Change and Continuity in Soviet Policy Towards Soviet Jewry and Israel, May-December 1948

Change and Continuity in Soviet Policy Towards Soviet Jewry and Israel, May–December 1948 Binyamin Pinkus (bio) Introduction This article focuses on the Jewish national awakening among Soviet and East European Jewry and the first signs of official Soviet policy on the Jewish Question. Although May-December 1948 is a relatively brief period in Israeli-Soviet relations, it is one of utmost importance because it reflects the dilemmas and inconsistencies of Soviet policy toward Israel and Jewish issues. The Soviet regime under Stalin's leadership would solve these issues in typical totalitarian style: a war to the death using all means available to the state. Israel requested that the Government of the USSR grant official recognition to the Provisional Government of the State of Israel. On May 18, 1948 Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov notified Israel of the USSR's decision to grant full de jure recognition. He asserted that the "Soviet Government hopes that the establishment of the sovereign independent state by the Jewish People will serve to strengthen peace and security in Palestine and the Near East, and it expresses its faith in the development of friendly relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the State of Israel."1 The Soviet Union was the first superpower to extend de jure. Although Washington preceded Moscow in endorsing the Jewish State, it had only accorded de facto recognition. The other two Western powers, France and Britain, after exhaustive efforts granted de facto recognition to Israel in January 1949. De jure recognition was delayed until May 1949 and April 1950 respectively. The situation in eastern Europe was different. The new socialist states competed with one another to be the first to recognize Israel after the Soviet Union. On May 18, Zygmunt Modzelewski, the Polish Foreign Minister, informed Moshe Sharett, the Israeli Foreign Minister: [End Page 96] In the name of the Polish Government, I would like to express [Poland's] satisfaction with the Provisional Government as the provisional Jewish regime in Israel . . . The Polish Government's position on matters related to the Jewish People and Jewish Government in Israel is common knowledge in international forums and especially in the UN. The Polish Government has consistently maintained a position of great sympathy for the Jewish People who have fought for their freedom and their own state.2 One of the members of the Polish delegation at the UN, Julius Katz-Sukhy, lauded the establishment of the Jewish state and expressed hope that "the Arabs of Palestine would also establish their own state."3 In mid-June, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Rumania extended de facto recognition to Israel, and Bulgaria followed in turn.4 The "right" person had to be selected to serve as Israel's representative to the Soviet Union. Eliahu Elath, a senior official of the Jewish Agency who was involved in Zionist diplomatic affairs, could have been chosen, or a top figure in the ruling political party, Mapai. The heads of the left-wing parties in Israel had been unconditionally excluded from the mission to Moscow and were allowed a place only on the mission to Warsaw. According to Eli Tzur, "The most sensitive ministry under Mapai's control was the Foreign Ministry headed by Moshe Sharett. Mapam's (left-wing Zionist- Socialist party) involvement in this ministry was perceived as a major political issue because of the party's pro-Moscow orientation." Mapai's Central Committee debated whether to admit Mapam representatives into the Diplomatic Corps, especially to posts in eastern Europe, according to a proportional party key.5 Mapai could offer many qualified candidates of Russian origin who were fully acquainted with the country's history and culture. One of top contenders was Mordechai Namir, a leader of the Histadrut and key Mapai figure, who asked Ben-Gurion "for an assignment in Moscow or another Slavic country."6 He had already carried out a number of important diplomatic missions in February and July 1948 in East European countries and negotiated with Czechoslovakia and Rumania on arms, oil, and immigration. Namir recalled that they had received him there "with a standing ovation."7 Sharett considered Golda Meir the most suitable candidate for the Soviet mission. He approached...

Constraints and Adjustments in Portugal's Policy toward Israel

Throughout most of its existence the State of Israel had only a handful of friends and allies. However, even during the era of pan-Arabism, when Arab nationalism held sway over the Middle East, eng...

The cultural construction of Italy in Albania and vice versa: migration dynamics, strategies of resistance and politics of mutual self-definition across colonialism and post-colonialism

SummaryThis article analyses the shifting ways in which Italy has been strategically represented in Albania during the different key passages of the latter's relatively recent history as a sovereign independent state. As a parallel narrative, the article also examines the way Albania has been equally strategically represented in Italy before and during the two periods in which Italy has been militarily involved in Albania, and the way this has been consistent with an attempt to elaborate and sustain a politically strategic definition of Italian identity and culture. The history of the asymmetrical relationship between Albania and Italy is deeply embedded in the social, cultural and political environments that are on the two shores of the Adriatic Sea. The cultural construction of Albania in Italy and vice versa of Italy in Albania should be linked to seemingly independent instances of domestic reforms. The dynamics of projective identification or dis-identification stemming from these instances should be seen as intertwined within two parallel processes of mutual definition encompassing both the colonial and the postcolonial relations between and within the two countries.

Mixed Jurisdictions and Convergence: Scotland

There is an independent Scottish legal system today because, until the Union of the English and Scottish Crowns in 1603 and the Union of the Parliaments of the two countries in 1707, Scotland was an independent sovereign state. When King James VI of Scotland became James I of England and Great Britain in 1603, there was considerable interest in the possibility of establishing a single legal system for the newly united kingdoms, while during the Cromwellian interlude of the 1650s the possibility moved some way towards actuality. But the 1707 Act of Union showed a recognition that the establishment of a single legal system and body of law for the whole of the United Kingdom was not really a practical proposition, in articles which remain the formal basis for the continuing existence and independence of the Scottish law and legal system. Article XVIII provided for the continuation of Scots law after the Union, excepting only the ‘Laws concerning Regulation of Trade, Customs and … Excises', which were to ‘be the same in Scotland, from and after the Union, as in England.’ Change to Scots law was allowed under the Article, but in matters of ‘private right’ such change had to be for the ‘evident utility’ of the Scottish people. Only in matters of ‘public right’ might the aim be simply to make the law the same throughout the United Kingdom. Article XIX laid down that the principal Scottish courts, the Court of Session and the High Court of Justiciary, should ‘remain in all time coming’ as they were then constituted, and further provided that Scottish cases were not to be dealt with by the English courts ‘in Westminster-hall’ (which likewise continued to exist post-Union).

Stability, Asymmetry, and Discontinuity: The Launch of European Monetary Union

ALTHOUGH STILL LESS than one year old as this volume goes to press, European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is already under trial, charged with at least three offenses. The first is false advertising: Europeans, it is claimed, did not get the strong, stable currency they were promised, for within seven months of its birth the euro had lost 13.5 percent of its value against the dollar. The second is obfuscation: markets are finding the signals from the new monetary institutions confusing and inconsistent, and a scarcity of relevant information--from delays in releasing reliable euro area--wide statistics to lack of access to the deliberations of the Governing Council--makes it difficult to forecast economic developments and to understand the policy conduct of the new European Central Bank (ECB). The third is lack of impartiality: the ECB's new policies are claimed to be exacerbating asymmetries between fast-growing and slow-growing countries and validating the presumption that the costs and benefits of monetary cohabitation are unfairly distributed among small and large member states. This paper espouses a rather different thesis. In terms of its impact on financial market integration and the ability of its institutions to cope with cyclical contingencies, EMU is performing well above expectations. And it is doing so even though persistent asymmetries across countries represent a threat to the ability of the new policy framework to guarantee economic stability and promote further integration in Europe. It is clearly premature to attempt even a first assessment of the new European monetary architecture--it will take quite a few years before the track record of the ECB becomes sufficiently long and rich for such an evaluation. This paper is instead devoted to the more modest task of casting light on early developments in the euro area and their potential implications for the future of EMU, surveying the main points in the current debate, noting contrasting positions, and evaluating those positions in light of the available evidence. Our synthetic but comprehensive overview of the first few months in the life of the euro is thus aimed at disentangling those facts, empirical evidence, and institutional details that we consider useful toward a balanced interpretation of the current monetary and financial evolution in Europe. The paper is organized as follows. We begin by placing our analysis of the swift launch of the euro in the context of the macroeconomic convergence and integration that took place in Europe following the 1992-93 crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS). We then discuss the monetary strategies of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), reviewing the official positions taken and the main criticisms leveled in the recent debate. Next we focus on the instruments of monetary policy in the euro area and on liquidity management and money market integration. We then present an update of developments in the bond and equity markets and a preliminary assessment of public debt management strategies by the eleven independent sovereign states coexisting in the euro area. We go on to deal with some open issues in the euro area banking sector, comment on the behavior of the euro in the currency markets, and analyze asymmetries across European regions and their implications for centralized monetary policy. Finally, we review the process of fiscal consolidation and the debate on the code of budgetary discipline in Europe.(1) The Launch of the Euro in Historical Perspective From a technical standpoint, the euro was born on December 31, 1998. That was the date when the fixed conversion rates among euro area currencies were determined, and thus when the national currencies were demoted to nondecimal denominations of the new currency.(2) It was also the start of the changeover weekend, during which clearing and settlement systems were retooled and trading positions and accounts redenominated from the old currencies into euros. …

Europe united?: the European Union and the retreat from federalism

Preface - Foreword by Sir Leon Brittan - The 'Ever Closer Union' - The European Commission: Government by Bureaucrat - The Council of Ministers: 'Willing Co-operation between Independent Sovereign States' - The European Parliament: the Democratic Deficit - The European Court of Justice: Legislation by Judges? - The Road to Maastricht: Turning Point or Turning Back? - The Competencies of the Union: Centralism or Subsidiarity? - Political Co-operation: The Mouse that Roared - Defence and Security: A New World Order? - Economic and Monetary Union: The Uncertain Dynamic - After Maastricht: An Uncertain Future - Index

Rescue or Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe, 1945–93

‘My first guideline is this: willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community. To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging. … Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity.’ Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister, speech to College of Europe in Bruges, 20 September 1988. ‘The nation state was the twin of the industrial society, and like industrial society it is becoming outworn. … The evolution of Europe in the next decades will be shaped by the phasing in of the information society to replace the industrial culture and industrial technology which have served us so well for almost two hundred years. Poul Schluter, Danish Prime Minister, speech to the America–European Community Association, London, 20 September 1988. ‘Nations are not everlasting. They have a beginning, they will have an end. Probably a European confederation will replace them.’ Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Lecture to Sorbonne, Paris, 11 March 1882. ‘Both the nation state and integration appear as fortunate accidents of the time, fundamentally contradictory tendencies, which nevertheless in promoting economic growth fortuitously complemented each other.’ Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (London, Routledge, 1992), p. 24.

CIS Radionavigation System Evolution and International Cooperation in Radionavigation Support

In the former USSR, the Radionavigation Service was based on national radio systems without any real employment of foreign navigation aids. Separation of the independent sovereign States from the USSR caused problems in operating separate radionavigation systems (RNS) and resulted in failure to support the economic activity of the States with radionavigation data. Solving the problem for each new State individually seems unrealistic. Its solution can, however, be found through cooperation amongst the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Internavigation Committee therefore suggested an initiative to coordinate these efforts via a new Radionavigation Intergovernmental Advisory Council. This suggestion was approved by the Independent States and the Council has been formed. Also, since operating the RNS in limited national interests seems inefficient, the Internavigation Committee is broadening international cooperation for the integration and joint exploitation of radionavigation systems in the interests of the world radionavigation community.

A preliminary evaluation of the new RIDP and its impact on regional development in South Africa

The debate on regional political autonomy makes regional economic development a subject of central importance. Current policy is embodied in the Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP), as revised in May 1991. Regional industrial policy in South Africa originated in 1956 with the Border Industry Programme, whose objective was to create economically independent sovereign states, Subsequent shifts of emphasis from socio‐political objectives towards a predominantly economic orientation in the 1991 RIDP were expected to concentrate the allocation of resources to industry at locations with greater natural potential for industrial development. An evaluation of the preliminary results of the 1991 RIDP confirms these expectations in that, as far as capital investment is concerned, a certain degree of concentration is already discernible especially in metropolitan areas and secondary cities. However, it seems there are a number of factors present in the market‐place that are still inhibiting the full real...