The recent Supreme Court decision in Loper v Raimondo overturned the long-standing Court ruling establishing novel legal precedents referred to as “Chevron deference,” which compels the Court to allow for broad authority to U.S. administrative agencies deference in the interpretation of statutes and regulations. Members of the Court, critical of the prior rule, state that this deference held by agencies grants them a power not authorized by the Administrative Procedures Act or the Constitution, that being the power to interpret the law by defining their meaning where the document’s drafting was unclear. Thus reducing authority by an independent judiciary. Critics of the current decision argue that it diminishes the use of technological expertise held by the agencies in interpreting laws. Opponents counter that the decision restores the courts expertise in engaging in the various methods necessary to perform the statutory review, up to and including agency science and interpretation as part of their decision process, without exclusively relying on the agency interpretation as the only permissible one, which is argued to be a more balanced approach. It is hoped that the Loper decision will reduce the potential to abuse deference as they may push interpretations beyond the legislature’s goals or fail to interpret vague legislative language appropriately. Furthermore, legislatures may be encouraged to develop statutes that guide agencies that align with the electorate’s views and provide the predictability to support business development.
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