Increased Audit Risk Research Articles

Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil

We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increased audit risk deters rent extraction in three areas of local government activity in Brazil: procurement, health service delivery and cash transfer targeting. Our estimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the share of audited resources involved in corruption in procurement by about 10 percentage points and the proportion of procurement processes with evidence of corruption by about 15 percentage points. In contrast, we find no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly provided preventive and primary health care services - measured through user satisfaction surveys - or compliance with eligibility requirements for the conditional cash transfer program - measured through household inspections. The observed impact heterogeneity across activities is consistent with differences in potential sanctions and in the probability that a sanction is applied, conditional on detection.

Anti-corruption reform and audit pricing

This paper examines how Chinese anti-corruption reform affects audit pricing. We show that auditors react to the increased audit risk resulting from anti-corruption reform and charge higher audit fees to the politically connected firms. We find that the treatment effect is stronger for firms with poor financial statement quality, with higher operating uncertainty, located in provinces experiencing larger effect of anti-corruption reform, and audited by audit firms with greater bargaining powers. Finally, the results suggest that earnings management and the probability of issuing an unqualified opinion of politically connected firms are reduced after the anti-corruption reform. Our findings provide further insight into the effect of anti-corruption reform on auditors in audit pricing decisions.

Pengaruh Tekanan Waktu, Tindakan Supervisi dan Locus of Control Terhadap Penghentian Prematur Atas Prosedur Audit

Premature sign off of audit procedure is one of those behaviors that can reduce audit quality. The present study was intended to examine whether time pressure, supervision, and locus of control affect the premature sign off of the audit procedure. The population used in this study is all auditors working at Public Accounting Firms in Surabaya. The data used is the primary data in the form of questionnaires distributed to the respondents. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling. The sample of research is 50 auditors from 17 Public Accounting Firms in Surabaya. Data analysis techniques used is multiple regressions. The results of this research showed that time pressure, supervision and locus of control affected the premature sign off of the audit procedures. The implication of this research result for the auditor is the higher the premature discontinuation of the audit procedure performed by the auditor will result in decreased audit quality and increased audit risk.

Related party transactions and audit fees: the role of the internal audit function

Related party transactions (RPTs) are viewed as genuine transactions that rationally fulfil other economic demands of a company. However, RPTs can also be used to transfer wealth from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders. The existence of such transactions may deteriorate financial reporting quality, increase audit risk, and as a result increase audit fees. This study examines the relationship between RPTs and audit fees in Malaysia, where ownership is often concentrated within a controlling family and corporate governance mechanisms are poor. It also investigates the moderating effect of the internal audit function (IAF) on this relationship. We find that external auditors base their fees on the types of RPTs undertaken. Specifically, our results show that audit fees are higher for firms that undertake RPTs involving the sale and purchase of assets, goods, and services. We also document that external auditors rely on the IAF, and thus their fees are lower for firms that undertake RPTs and that have made a large investment in an IAF. Our study is the first to provide evidence that RPTs in Malaysian firms may be abused as a channel to facilitate tunnelling and that the IAF plays a vital role in controlling such transactions.

How do Auditors Respond to CEO Narcissism? Evidence from External Audit Fees

Prior research on CEO narcissism has primarily focused on outcomes related to the CEO’s firm. We add to this literature by examining how an important counterparty — the firm’s external auditor — responds to a client having a relatively more narcissistic CEO. Compared to other firms, firms with narcissistic CEOs are more likely to engage in risky business practices and to be perceived as greater fraud risks, both of which increase audit risk. Consistent with this notion, we find that CEO narcissism has an economically and statistically significant positive effect on external audit fees, indicating that auditors perform more work and/or charge a risk premium when auditing a client with a relatively more narcissistic CEO. This is the first study to provide real-world evidence on how auditors respond to CEO narcissism and demonstrates the significant effect that executive personality characteristics can have in an audit setting.

The relationship between audit report delay and investment opportunities

Higher investment opportunities can increase audit risk. Therefore, external auditors need to extend the scope of their substantive tests and their audit work, and in turn, this leads to longer audit report delay. This study aims at investigating the relationship between audit report delay and the extent of investment opportunities among firms listed on Tehran stock exchange (TSE). We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 133 firms listed on TSE during the period 2006–2014, using multivariate regression analysis on panel data. Our results revealed that the audit report delay is longer for firms with higher investment opportunities. The research results also show that small companies, lost companies and companies that have major weakness in internal controls, are likely to have a longer delay in the audit report. The delay in the audit report of companies that had an independent auditor change is greater during the current period. The paper provides useful information for firms’ management and external auditors.

The Association Between Corporate Tax Avoidance And Audit Efforts: Evidence From Korea

The purpose of this paper is to verify external auditors’ behavior toward corporate tax avoidance (hereafter ‘CTA’) via audit efforts. In particular, this study examines the effect of CTA on actual audit hours and abnormal audit hours (i.e., auditor perception of corporate tax avoidance as a risk factor). For the successful CTA, the managers have incentives to render corporate information environments more complex and opaque, and as a result exacerbate information asymmetries. And some real-world cases of CTA suggest that it is closely related to the principal-agent regime. These negative aspects of CTA may increase inherent and control risk of audit risks. Considering the monitoring role of external auditing, the auditors may respond to increased inherent and control risks which are consequent to CTA. And the auditor responses are expected to reflect directly in audit hours. For this empirical question, this paper used 2,588 firm-year observations from Korea stock exchange market in the period 2001-2010. We found that in response to increased audit risk from CTA, auditors increased the number of actual audit hours or devoted more audit hours than normal to achieve a given level of audit risk. This study contributes to the literature and auditing practices by extending the auditing and tax literature on the examination of auditor behavior toward CTA and by implying the firms’ CTA behavior is one of the audit risk factors that affect audit planning, respectively.

The effect of CEO turnover on audit report lag and management discretionary report lag: evidence from Korea

This study empirically investigates the effect of a CEO turnover on audit report lag (ARL), discretionary report lag (DRL) and total report lag (TRL). The object of this study is to provide empirical evidence for the responses of both the CEO and the external auditor on audit risk increases and information asymmetry that occur as a result of a CEO turnover. According to the previous study on CEO turnovers, the CEO turnover would increase audit risk and information asymmetry (Sohn et al., 2014). In this situation, the CEO has an incentive to provide timely information to decrease the monitoring costs and cost of debt (Lee et al., 2008). It is expected that an external auditor spends a large amount of time on audit procedures to lower the audit risk when the CEO changes. Therefore, the CEO turnover would have a conflicting effect on the ARL and DRL. The results of the analysis are as follows. First, the ARL increases and DRL decreases when the CEO changes, which suggests that an external auditor spends a great amount of time on audit procedures to lower the audit risk because the audit risk increases when the CEO changes. A new CEO provides information faster to reduce monitoring costs and cost of debt that occur due to information asymmetry. Second, the ARL increases and DRL decreases as the frequency of CEO turnover increases. An external auditor would estimate the audit risk as being high if the CEO changes more frequently. To lower the audit risk to an acceptable level, many audit hours are spent on audit procedures by an external auditor, which increases the ARL. A new CEO has an incentive to provide timely information when the CEO changes more frequently. Thus, the DRL decreases as the frequency of CEO turnover increases

Managerial overconfidence and audit fees

We investigate the association between managerial overconfidence and audit fees, as well as the effect of a strong audit committee on this relation. Overconfident managers tend to overestimate their ability and the future payouts of projects but underestimate the likelihood and impact of adverse events. If auditors perceive managerial overconfidence as increasing audit risk, they will charge additional fees to compensate for the increased audit effort. Conversely, audit fees for companies with an overconfident manager will be lower if managers demand less audit services due to either hubris in their companies' financial reporting or a desire to reduce auditor scrutiny over aggressive accounting practices. We find evidence of a negative relation between managerial overconfidence and audit fees for companies lacking a strong audit committee. Additionally, we find that overconfident managers are less likely to use an industry specialist auditor.

Related Party Transactions and Audit Fees: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the effect of related-party transactions (RPTs) on audit fees in China. RPTs may violate the arm’s-length assumption of regular market-based transactions, impairing the representational faithfulness and verifiability of accounting data and, as a consequence, increase clients’ auditor-assessed business risk. The presence and magnitude of such transactions are therefore likely to increase audit fees. On the other hand, audit fees could be lower for firms with RPTs because auditors face less difficulty in verifying them, as opposed to third-party transactions. We first consider the effect of RPTs on audit fees, and document relatively high audit fees associated with RPTs. This lends support to the conjecture that RPTs are seen as increasing audit risk. We then extend this baseline case by considering the effects on audit fees of different classes of RPTs, of the different parties involved in RPTs and, finally, of the interaction between product-market competition and RPTs. We first document a negative (positive) association between RPTs involving sales and purchase of goods and services (RPTs related to intercorporate loans). We also find that audit fees are relatively high for RPTs involving loans and capital transfers when listed parents transact with their subsidiaries. Finally, we find that audit fees are relatively low for RPTs within competitive industries.

Managerial Overconfidence and Audit Fees

We investigate the association between managerial overconfidence and audit fees, as well as the effect of a strong audit committee on this relation. Overconfident managers tend to overestimate their ability and the future payouts of projects but underestimate the likelihood and impact of adverse events. Auditors may therefore charge a fee premium to compensate for the additional audit effort due to the increased audit risk. Conversely, overconfident managers may demand less audit services due to either hubris in their companies’ financial reporting or a desire to reduce auditor scrutiny over aggressive accounting. A strong audit committee can alleviate the audit risks associated with managerial overconfidence or prevent overconfident managers from reducing audit services thus mitigating the relation between audit fees and managerial overconfidence. We find robust evidence of a negative relation between managerial overconfidence and audit fees for companies lacking a strong audit committee. However, in the presence of a strong audit committee the negative relation is mitigated. In additional analysis, we also find that companies with overconfident managers have a lower likelihood of using a city-industry specialist auditor.

Related-Party Transactions and Audit Fees: Evidence from China

ABSTRACTThis paper investigates the effect of related-party transactions (RPTs) on audit fees in China. RPTs may violate the arm's-length assumption of regular market-based transactions, impairing the representational faithfulness and verifiability of accounting data and, as a consequence, increase clients' auditor-assessed business risk. The presence and magnitude of such transactions are therefore likely to increase audit fees. On the other hand, audit fees could be lower for firms with RPTs because auditors face less difficulty in verifying them, as opposed to third-party transactions. We first consider the effect of RPTs on audit fees, and document relatively high audit fees associated with RPTs. This lends support to the conjecture that RPTs are seen as increasing audit risk. We then extend this baseline case by considering the effects on audit fees of different classes of RPTs, of the different parties involved in RPTs and, finally, of the interaction between product-market competition and RPTs. We first document a negative (positive) association between RPTs involving sales and purchase of goods and services (RPTs related to intercorporate loans). We also find that audit fees are relatively high for RPTs involving loans and capital transfers when listed parents transact with their subsidiaries. Finally, we find that audit fees are relatively low for RPTs within competitive industries.

Investment Opportunities and Audit Report Lags: Initial Evidence

We examine the association between audit report lag (ARL) and the level of investment opportunity. High investment opportunities have been perceived to increase audit risk. External auditors, therefore, have to increase the required scope of audit work, which is expected to lead to longer audit report delays. The paper is motivated from (1) the effect of audit report lag on the timeliness of financial reporting and thus the market reactions to late earnings releases; and (2) the limited research on investment opportunities. We find that firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to have longer audit report lags. Our results extend the contemporary research on ARL and investment opportunities. The paper also provides useful information for firms’ management and external auditors.

The Association between Client‐specific Investment Opportunities and Audit Fees of Industry Specialists and Non‐Specialists

Audit clients' investment opportunity sets (IOS) include firm‐specific opportunities that are unique to the client, as well as opportunities generalizable to the client's industry and opportunities even more generically available to all firms. Prior research does not examine the variation in audit fees related to firm‐specific IOS nor how firm‐specific IOS affects the premiums charged by industry specialist auditors. We find that firm‐specific IOS plays a distinct role in the pricing of audit services, leading to higher fees as the auditor demands compensation for increased audit risk. Further, we find that the ability of an industry specialist auditor to charge fee premiums is reduced in the case of clients that are highly differentiated based on firm‐specific IOS, as the knowledge gleaned in auditing other clients within the industry is often not applicable to clients in more unique IOS environments. We contribute to the literature by showing that industry specialist premiums are not constant for firms in the same industry; rather, they reflect a trade‐off between firm‐ and industry‐specific knowledge.

The Association between Client-Specific Investment Opportunities and Audit Fees of Industry Specialists

Audit clients’ investment opportunity sets (IOS) include firm-specific opportunities that are unique to the client, as well as opportunities generalizable to the client’s industry and opportunities even more generically available to all firms. Prior research does not examine the variation in audit fees related to firm-specific IOS nor how firm-specific IOS affects the premiums charged by industry specialist auditors. We find that firm-specific IOS plays a distinct role in the pricing of audit services, leading to higher fees as the auditor demands compensation for the investment in firm-specific knowledge necessary to conduct the audit or for increased audit risk. Further, we find that the ability of an industry specialist auditor to charge fee premiums is reduced in the case of clients that are highly differentiated based on firm-specific IOS. We contribute to the literature by showing that industry specialist premiums are not constant for firms in the same industry; rather, they reflect a trade-off between firm- and industry-specific knowledge.

The Effects of Earnings Management on Enforcement Releases and Their Recognition in Audit Fees

In 2004 German legislation established the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel. In 147 cases since then, the panel has ordered the announcement of errors in previously disclosed and audited financial statements of German firms. We use this unique dataset to evaluate the consequences of increasing earnings management over time on enforcement releases and their recognition in audit fees. Ettredge et al. (2010) provide evidence on a phenomenon called ‘balance sheet bloat’ that is due to income increasing earnings management and later influences the disclosure of misstated financial statements. Thus, the evidence of earnings management recognition in audit fees (Abbott et al. 2006) and the hypothesis of future information content in fees by Stanley (2011) leads us to hypothesize that auditors recognize increasing audit risk in audit fees before the enforcement process starts. We extend related earnings management and audit fee literature by modeling the development of earnings management within the misstatement firms and systematically link it to auditor reactions. We find significant predictive power of different commonly used accrual measures for enforcement releases in the period prior and up to the misstatement period. In this period of time, we also observe an audit fee increase, e.g. the recognition of increased audit risk. We investigate an audit fee effect after the misstatement period but find no significant relation.

Interdependencies between Auditing and Corporate Governance — Evidence from Germany

We study the empirical relation between audit fees and governance mechanisms in Germany. Using data from German listed companies, we examine the German governance setting with its two-tier board system. Various model specifications control for potential endogeneity of the governance variables. We identify two major findings. First, we find that performance-based management remuneration has a significant positive impact on audit fees. This effect suggests that increased audit risk due to enhanced incentives for earnings management is reflected in higher audit fees. Second, we find a complementary relation between audit fees and the formation of an audit committee. The results regarding further board characteristics are ambiguous.

Changing audit risk characteristics in the public client market

Financial audit services have changed in the US over the last half century, resulting in distinct cyclical patterns of relative audit risk. The purpose of this project is to describe changing patterns in the economic and institutional risk environment over time and investigate differences using empirical surrogates as measures of relative audit risk. Economic, competitive, and regulatory differences are analyzed over the period of study. Particularly important events included the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (likely reducing audit risk), the elimination of rules against advertising and direct solicitation in 1979 (increasing audit risk), the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (increasing risk), and the collapse of Arthur Andersen and Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2001–2002, reducing risk). Empirical models are used to evaluate financial risk (Altman’s Z-score), earnings manipulation risk (Sloan’s measure of accruals), and litigation risk (litigation index). Averages by year suggest cyclical patterns of relative audit risk that parallel regulatory, economic and institutional changes over the period.

Dual-Class Shares and Audit Pricing: Evidence from the Canadian Markets

SUMMARY: This paper investigates whether audit fees vary with the wedge between cash flow rights and control rights arising from the presence of dual-class share structures. Dual-class shares exist in firms having two or more classes of shares with disproportionate voting rights. They affect audit fees through their effect on the supply for audit services. External auditors conduct wider (narrower) scope audits depending on whether dual-class shares increase (decrease) audit risk and/or auditor business risk. Wider (narrower) scope audits are more (less) costly for the auditors and for their clients. This paper documents a positive association between audit fees and the wedge between cash flow rights and control rights in a sample of Canadian firms during 2004. It extends current research by investigating whether dominant shareholdings affect audit pricing, and by examining audit pricing in Canada over a time period that witnessed significant changes in corporate governance.

Are auditors sensitive enough to fraud?

This study investigates how auditors alter their audit program decisions in response to an increased likelihood of fraud risk. A total of 48 auditors from one Big 5 CPA firm were surveyed regarding the type of audit procedures they would use in response to an increased likelihood of material misstatements caused by fraud. The auditors were provided with a scenario that reflected changes in economic and industry factors that increase audit risk and typically require a reevaluation of the audit program. They were asked to make choices as to which tests of balances and details and analytical procedures to perform. The results of the study are summarized and tabulated and then explained in terms of the tradeoff between effectiveness and efficiency and corporate governance.