Bank regulators and academics have long conjectured the beneficial effects of counter-cyclical loan loss provisioning (i.e., making higher provisions during good times so as to avoid doing so during bad times) for bank lending and stability. In contrast, accounting regulators express concerns about its potential adverse impact on reporting transparency due to the ensuing income smoothing. Testing these opposing predictions of the dark versus bright sides of counter-cyclical provisioning requires a shock to capital supply that is not confounded by borrower demand for credit. Using the emerging market crisis of the late 1990s to identify an adverse supply-shock to bank capital, we show that the ensuing contractions in bank lending are weaker for banks that were provisioning counter-cyclically. These lending differences translate into positive real effects for the counter-cyclical banks’ small borrowers that have limited access to alternative funding sources. Our inferences are robust to addressing the endogeneity of counter-cyclical provisioning and to corroborating the emerging market crisis results with large-sample evidence based on Federal Reserve data on bank supply and borrower demand. Overall, our results highlight the tradeoff between bank stability and transparency inherent in counter-cyclical loan loss provisioning – while proactive recognition of unrealized loan losses reduces bank transparency, it increases bank stability during periods (if and) when these losses materialize.