ABSTRACT This article engages the question how police departments internally delegitimize the use of private sector technology vis-à-vis democratic considerations. Specifically, it retraces argumentation around the discontinuation of commercial predictive policing software and the alternative development of in-house tools. Conceptually, the analysis builds on the notion of digital sovereignty that has more recently become a popular analytical trope vis-à-vis public-private partnerships/public sector procurement and the question which technologies and services state agencies should keep under their own control in order to avoid dependencies on external suppliers and ensure functionality even in times of crisis and/or breakdown. Importantly, digital sovereignty allows us to study the complex and multi-faceted power relations between the police, private sector technology suppliers, and the public. The analysis identifies three key facets of digital sovereignty around which police concerns regarding the use of private sector technology revolve: (1) the control over data; (2) skepticism towards black boxes; and (3) accountability requirements towards the general public.