Impossible Worlds Research Articles

Problem wszechwiedzy logicznej. Krytyka światów nienormalnych i propozycja nowego rozwiązania

In this paper, we bring up the problem of logical omniscience in epistemic logic. One way of avoiding the problem is through Rantala models, where non-normal worlds are introduced. Such models are vulnerable to criticism, as we show. One of many issues that occur is the Bjerring result, which states that incorporating non-normal worlds makes the agent logically incompetent. For this reason, we propose a different solution based on positional logics.

Unnatural Narrative: Impossible Worlds in Fiction and Drama

Unnatural Narrative: Impossible Worlds in Fiction and Drama

Counterpossibles for modal normativists

Counterpossibles are counterfactuals that involve some metaphysical impossibility. Modal normativism is a non-descriptivist account of metaphysical necessity and possibility according to which modal claims, e.g. ‘necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’, do not function as descriptive claims about the modal nature of reality but function as normative illustrations of constitutive rules and permissions that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary, e.g. ‘bachelor’. In this paper, I assume modal normativism and develop a novel account of counterpossibles and claims about metaphysical similarity between possible and impossible worlds. I argue that considerations of metaphysical similarity between various impossible worlds and the actual world only require us to tacitly consider how the actual constitutive rules that govern the use of our terms change in order to accommodate the description of some hypothetical impossible scenario. I then argue for my account by raising worries for alternative epistemic and realist accounts of counterpossibles and showing how my account avoids those worries.

Non-human Actors in Their “Strongly Possible Worlds”. Constructions of Alternative Universes in Bio Art Projects

The article is an introduction that examines certain perspectives of new-materialist research on the ontological status of alternative universes in bio art projects with reference to the narratological concepts of possible worlds and the storyworld. In this context, it introduces the concept of “strongly possible worlds”, which is a complementary concept to the Jan Alber’s theory of impossible worlds. This methodological proposal is also presented in the article in reference to the latest study by Francesca Ferrando, in which the idea of “posthuman multiverse” was presented. The author also considers the role of non-human actors in the process of constructing such “in the world stories” (Bruno Latour). As non-human actors bacteria and living cells are understood, which have their own intentionality (goal-oriented behavior) and which are responsible for causal changes to the project; moreover, non-human actors are considered to be a force that affects the physical shape of storyworlds—with reference to Timothy Morton’s category of hyperobjects. The article presents two types of experiments involving the process of creation of possible worlds in bio art. The first one is conducted by the artists working with living materials, mostly tissues and cells, as the duo Tissue Culture and Art Project, Alicia King and Guy Ben-Ary and Kirsten Hudson; the other one is so called bacterial art with Sonja Baumel’s “Expanded body”, Pinar Yoldas “Speculative biologies” and “Ecosystem of Excess”, as well as Anna Dumitriu’s artistic vision “The Romantic Disease: An Artistic Investigation of Tuberculosis” and “ArchaeaBot: A Post Climate Change, Post Singularity Life-form” as special case studies.

A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience

The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, violate the laws of logic. In this paper, we argue that existing impossible-worlds models of belief fail to describe agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent. To model such agents, we argue, we need to ‘dynamize’ the impossible-worlds framework in a way that allows us to capture not only what agents believe, but also what they are able to infer from what they believe. In light of this diagnosis, we go on to develop the formal details of a dynamic impossible-worlds framework, and show that it successfully models agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent.

Logically Impossible Worlds


 
 
 What does it mean for the laws of logic to fail? My task in this paper is to answer this question. I use the resources that Routley/Sylvan developed with his collaborators for the semantics of relevant logics to explain a world where the laws of logic fail. I claim that the non-normal worlds that Routley/Sylvan (with his collaborators) introduced are exactly such worlds. To disambiguate different kinds of impossible worlds, I call such worlds logically impossible worlds. At a logically impossible world, the laws of logic fail. In this paper, I provide a definition of logically impossible worlds. I then show that there is nothing strange about admitting such worlds. 
 
 

The best possible option of impossible worlds: Hybrid Modal Realism


 In this paper I reconstruct the merits and drawbacks of the concretist and abstractionist theories of possible worlds and face them with the challenge of impossible worlds. I show how these two types of theories deal with the problem of impossibilities, and argue that the best option is two advance the so-called hybrid modal realism, namely concret possible worlds and abstract impossible worlds. Finally, as a conclusion, I highlight some of the disadvantages of this view as well and note the possibility of a Carnap-like solution.

Theory of impossible worlds: Toward a physics of information.

In this paper, we introduce an innovative approach to the fusion between datasets in terms of attributes and observations, even when they are not related at all. With our technique, starting from datasets representing independent worlds, it is possible to analyze a single global dataset, and transferring each dataset onto the others is always possible. This procedure allows a deeper perspective in the study of a problem, by offering the chance of looking into it from other, independent points of view. Even unrelated datasets create a metaphoric representation of the problem, useful in terms of speed of convergence and predictive results, preserving the fundamental relationships in the data. In order to extract such knowledge, we propose a new learning rule named double backpropagation, by which an auto-encoder concurrently codifies all the different worlds. We test our methodology on different datasets and different issues, to underline the power and flexibility of the Theory of Impossible Worlds.

Truth in Fiction, Impossible Worlds, and Belief Revision

ABSTRACTWe present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.

Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision

I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.

Wierenga on theism and counterpossibles

Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails.

Tigres azules de J. L. Borges. Lógica, verdad y mundos imposibles

El propósito de este artículo es mostrar el modo en que Borges, en su relato Tigres azules, desarrolla varias ideas interesantes en torno a la lógica, el lenguaje y las matemáticas. El punto de partida es el escepticismo borgeano sobre la capacidad de la lógica clásica para abordar el problema de la verdad y los mundos imposibles. Se defiende que objetos inconsistentes e, incluso, autocontradictorios no necesariamente dan lugar a mundos física o lógicamente imposibles. Se sugiere que las paradojas que Borges construye en el cuento no son paradojas de autorreferencia, sino variantes de la paradoja de Moore y de las paradojas de implicación material, por lo que para superarlas se requiere un enfoque no-clásico que neutralice ECQ, esto es, un sistema de lógica paraconsistente.

Semantics for Counterpossibles

The object of this paper is to examine two approaches to giving non-vacuous truth conditions for counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. I first develop modifications of a Lewis-style sphere semantics with impossible worlds. I argue that this approach sanctions intuitively invalid inferences and is supported by philosophically problematic foundations. I then develop modifications of certain ceteris paribus conditional logics with impossible worlds. Tableaux are given for each of these in an appendix and soundness and completeness results are proved. While certain of the latter systems are shown to have similar problems to logics from the first approach, at least one relatively weak system appears to offer an adequate uniform semantics for counterpossibles and counterfactuals.

Impossible worlds and partial belief

One response to the problem of logical omniscience in standard possible worlds models of belief is to extend the space of worlds so as to include impossible worlds. It is natural to think that essentially the same strategy can be applied to probabilistic models of partial belief, for which parallel problems also arise. In this paper, I note a difficulty with the inclusion of impossible worlds into probabilistic models. Under weak assumptions about the space of worlds, most of the propositions which can be constructed from possible and impossible worlds are in an important sense inexpressible; leaving the probabilistic model committed to saying that agents in general have at least as many attitudes towards inexpressible propositions as they do towards expressible propositions. If it is reasonable to think that our attitudes are generally expressible, then a model with such commitments looks problematic.

Education for cultural and linguistic diversity in the United States in hard times

In this article, we share our perspectives on the education for cultural and linguistic diversity in the United States in an era of intolerance, violence, hatred, fear, and injustice. We begin with a snapshot of the increasingly multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual, and multiracial world landscape and an overview of the landscape of education for cultural and linguistic diversity in the United States. We particularly focus on discussing the challenges and possibilities for education for cultural and linguistic diversity in the United States in Hard Times. We call for educational researchers to work with other researchers, educators, teachers, administrators, parents, students, community workers, policy makers, and other educational workers to “hope radically, imagine creatively, and act inspirationally” (Ball et al. 2017, p.2) to invent a landscape of education for cultural and linguistic diversity where “creative, harmonious, associative, joyful, and worthwhile” (He 2016, p. 36; also Goulah & He 2015; Schubert 2009) learning, teaching, and living are possible for all in a highly contested and impossible world.

Content, the Possible and the Impossible

What are contents? The answer provided by the possible worlds approach is that contents are sets of possible worlds. This approach incurs serious problems and to solve them Jago suggests, in The Impossible, to get rid of the ‘possible’ bit and allowing some impossible worlds to be part of the game. In this note, I briefly consider the metaphysics behind Jago’s account and then focus on whether Jago is right in thinking that his worlds and his worlds only can do the explanatory work he posits them for.

Impossible Worlds and the Logic of Imagination

I want to model a finite, fallible cognitive agent who imagines that p in the sense of mentally representing a scenario—a configuration of objects and properties—correctly described by p. I propose to capture imagination, so understood, via variably strict world quantifiers, in a modal framework including both possible and so-called impossible worlds. The latter secure lack of classical logical closure for the relevant mental states, while the variability of strictness captures how the agent imports information from actuality in the imagined non-actual scenarios. Imagination turns out to be highly hyperintensional, but not logically anarchic. Section 1 sets the stage and impossible worlds are quickly introduced in Sect. 2. Section 3 proposes to model imagination via variably strict world quantifiers. Section 4 introduces the formal semantics. Section 5 argues that imagination has a minimal mereological structure validating some logical inferences. Section 6 deals with how imagination under-determines the represented contents. Section 7 proposes additional constraints on the semantics, validating further inferences. Section 8 describes some welcome invalidities. Section 9 examines the effects of importing false beliefs into the imagined scenarios. Finally, Sect. 10 hints at possible developments of the theory in the direction of two-dimensional semantics.

An impossible proof of God

A new version of the ontological argument for the existence of God is outlined and examined. After giving a brief account of some traditional ontological arguments for the existence of God, where their defects are identified, it is explained how this new argument is built upon their foundations and surmounts their defects. In particular, this version uses the resources of impossible worlds to plug the common escape route from standard modal versions of the ontological argument. After outlining the nature of impossible worlds, and motivating the need for positing them, the new argument is delineated and its premises justified. It is taken for granted that the argument cannot be sound, since it would prove too much. However, its premises are all plausible, and their denial promises to have significant ramifications. Several intuitive lines of objections are then explored in order to illuminate their shortcomings. The puzzle that the argument poses is therefore not whether the argument is sound, for it clearly cannot be. Rather, it is to place pressure on its plausible premises, so some plausible account of how the argument fails can be identified, and that the devising of such an account promises to be insightful. In the process, we should gain an improved understanding of how such ontological arguments work.

Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’sModality and Explanatory Reasoning

Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s<i>Modality and Explanatory Reasoning</i>

Impossibilia

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81The paper defends the so-called extended modal realism, a theory according to which there are concrete impossible worlds. Firstly, modal realism is presented. Next, the way of how its ontology enriched by impossible worlds should look like in order to save its main theoretical virtues is pursued. Finally, I argue for a claim that metaphysical impossibility equals to dissimilarity between worlds instantiating distinct metaphysical structures.