Implicit Theory Of Mind Research Articles

How robust are egocentric and altercentric interference effects in social cognition? a test with explicit and implicit versions of a continuous false belief task.

It has been long assumed that meta-representational theory of mind (ToM) -our ability to ascribe mental states to ourselves and other people- emerges around age four as indicated in performance on explicit verbal false belief tasks. In contrast, newer studies assessing false belief understanding with implicit, non-verbal measures suggest that some form of ToM may be present even in infancy. But these studies now face replication issues, and it remains unclear whether they can provide robust evidence for implicit ToM. One line of research on implicit ToM, however, may remain promising: Studies that tap so-called altercentric biases. Such biases occur when agents in their judgments about the world are influenced (perform slower, more error-prone) in light of another agent's deviating perspective even if that perspective is completely irrelevant to the task; they thus can be seen as indicators of spontaneous and implicit ToM. Altercentric biases are the mirror images of egocentric biases (agents are influenced by their own perspective when evaluating another agent's deviating perspective). In three studies with adults, we aimed to tap both egocentric and altercentric interference effects within the same task format. We used the so-called Sandbox task, a false belief task with continuous locations. In Study 1, we tested an online adaptation of the Sandbox task, which we also used to explore potential cross-cultural differences in these biases. Studies 2 and 3 combined the Sandbox task with mouse-tracking measures. These studies revealed neither egocentric nor altercentric biases. These null results are discussed with regard to the question whether absence of evidence here may present evidence of absence of such spontaneous perspective-taking biases or merely false negatives.

The effect of reading literary fiction on the theory of mind skills among persons with schizophrenia and normal controls.

Recent research data suggest that theory of mind (ToM) skills may improve after reading literary fiction. However, beside this short term favorable effect, regular long-term reading of literary fiction may also support ToM development or may improve ToM performance. The presence of impaired ToM abilities is well-documented in schizophrenia; however, the role of reading in these deficits is unknown. In the present study our aim was to assess the effect of prior reading experiences on theory of mind performance in patients with schizophrenia, and in healthy controls. ToM assessment was done with the Short Story Task, which is based on the interpretation of a Hemingway short story. After reading the short story, questions were asked in an interview format regarding comprehension, explicit and implicit ToM skills, then comparative analysis of schizophrenia patients was performed (n = 47) and matched to a normal control (n = 48) group concerning deficits of ToM abilities. Participants were also stratified according to their prior reading experiences. Previous reading experience was associated with better comprehension and explicit ToM performance both in patients with schizophrenia, and in healthy controls. However, the explicit ToM performance of patients with prior reading was still weaker compared to healthy controls with reading experiences. Path model analysis revealed that reading had a direct positive effect on ToM, and an indirect effect through improving comprehension. Prior reading experience is associated with better ToM performance not just in healthy controls but also in patients living with schizophrenia. Previous reading experience also improves comprehension, which in turn has a favorable impact on ToM. Our results support the idea that literary fiction reading may have a therapeutic potential in the rehabilitation of schizophrenia.

A systematic review and meta-analysis of implicit Theory of Mind in schizophrenia

IntroductionEveryday social interactions are based on Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing, whose complex processes are involved in understanding, representing one’s own and other people’s mental states. ToM is supposed to have two systems. The implicit ToM seems to be a fast, automatic, non-verbal processing. The explicit ToM is characterized by a slower, but more flexible processing, which is mostly verbal, interpretative. Several studies have described explicit ToM deficit in schizophrenic patients. Less research has investigated implicit ToM in patients, however recently, there has been a growing number of articles examining implicit ToM of patients with schizophrenia.ObjectivesThe aim of our systematic review and meta-analysis is to summarize the results of the implicit ToM in schizophrenia.MethodsA systematic search was performed in four major databases. We included 11 publications. 7 studies; and 5 studies were included the quantitative synthesis and the qualitative synthesis, respectively.ResultsWe found significant differences in accuracy, reaction time and brain activation patterns during implicit ToM between schizophrenic patients and controls. The systematic review revealed further alterations in visual scanning, cue fixation, face looking time, and difficulties in perspective taking.ConclusionsBased on our results implicit ToM is affected in schizophrenia in addition to explicit ToM deficit. However, based on these results we cannot exclude the possibility, that implicit ToM or at least some elements of it might be relatively unaffected (e.g. detection of intentionality), however its effectiveness is limited by non-mentalizing deficits (e.g. certain neurocognitive impairments). Our results may have important implications for the remediation of mentalizing skills.DisclosureThe research is supported by the Hungarian National Excellence Centrum Grant (FIKP II) and Hungarian Brain Research Program (KTIA-13-NAP-A-II/12).

Nature Connectedness, Nonattachment, and Engagement with Nature's Beauty Predict Pro-Nature Conservation Behavior

Although research has examined factors that account for pro-environmental behaviors relating to climate warming through carbon and resource use, very few studies have investigated factors that account for behavior that directly supports conservation of habitats and biodiversity. In particular, there remain questions as to whether nature connectedness relates to an individual's aesthetic or spiritual relationship with the objective world, or their philosophy of consciousness and selfhood. Consequently, the purposes of this study were to examine (a) the relationship between nature connectedness, engagement with nature's beauty, nonattachment and implicit theory of mind, and (b) how each of these variables predict pro-nature conservation behavior. A cross-sectional cohort study utilizing a correlational design recruited 203 male and female English-speaking adults. Participants completed a battery of online psychometric tests that assessed each of the aforementioned variables. The data were examined using bivariate correlations and multiple regression analysis. Significant correlations were found between all pairs of variables. Furthermore, nonattachment and nature connectedness were found to be significant predictors of pro-nature conservation behavior, whereas engagement with nature's beauty was of borderline significance and implicit theory of mind was nonsignificant. Findings provide insight into the mechanisms underlying specific psychological and philosophical outlooks that may facilitate or impair a person's inclination to actively participate in pro-nature conservation behaviors. In particular, findings suggest that practices or interventions that foster nonattachment in addition to nature connectedness may have a role in the development of effective programs to aid nature's recovery.

Developmental continuity in coordination of perspectives as an alternative to the implicit and explicit theory of mind controversy.

The dichotomy between explicit and implicit theory of mind remains controversial. This study proposed a developmental and social-constructionist perspective that challenges this notion through a model showing that coordination of perspectives (CoP) is a continuously developing ability in children. Our tested model comprises eight distinct abilities that emerge sequentially. We tested our model using 25 different tasks in a longitudinal six-wave study with 300 native Polish children aged from 1 year (MT1 = 1 year 0 months; SDT1 = 1.73 weeks; 44% girls) to 3.5 years (MT6 = 3 years 6 months; SDT6 = 1.81 weeks; 45% girls). All children were Caucasian; both parents of 54% children had university degree. Structural equation modeling with factor scores for each of the eight abilities was used to verify the fit of obtained data. We provide preliminary support for distinguishing six abilities: (a) immediate social perspective-tracking and taking at age of 1 year, (b) deferred social perspective-tracking and visual perspective-taking as an intermediate step at age of 2 years, and (c) epistemic perspective-tracking and taking at 3.5 years. Using our new nomenclature-emphasizing the function of coordination of own and another person perspective in social situations-we found that development of mindreading begins when infants coordinate their bodily-expressed orientations with those of others, and by the age of 4 is manifested by coordinating own and others mental states. Thus, we support the idea of heterotypic continuity of mindreading development. Development of CoP and difference between perspective-tracking and taking should be further elucidated. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Explicit and implicit theory of mind and social competence: A social information processing framework

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to children's understanding that mental states, such as beliefs desires, or intentions, rather than reality, drive actions implicitly or explicitly. The research community considers proficiency with prototypical tasks as marking the transition from earlier appearing implicit ToM, observed from the first year of life, to a more advanced explicit ToM, consolidated between the ages of four and six. Despite unsettled questions concerning continuity or discontinuity of underlying cognitive mechanisms, researchers rely on explicit measures of ToM beyond early childhood, neglecting implicit measures. Breaking new ground, we align explicit (standard) and implicit (picture-elicited storytelling) ToM tasks with their respective requirements for social information processing and revisit relations between ToM and social competence with kindergarteners using both types of tasks. Findings challenge the prevailing emphasis on explicit ToM and encourage consideration of the information processing requirements of measures to discern mental states.

The Implicit Theory of Mind in the Dependence on Psychoactive Substances and under Standard Conditions

The aim of the article is to compare the features of Theory of Mind between people dependent on psychoactive substances, at different stages of recovery and the group of conditional norm. 98 individuals participated in the research. In the study, the following groups were compared by different parameters: 1) persons dependent on psychoactive substances. This group includes patients of the rehabilitation center, i. e. people in the early stages of recovery who are dependent on alcohol and / or other psychoactive substances; 2) persons dependent on alcohol which are part of the previous group; 3) persons addicted to alcohol, at later stages of recovery. This group includes members of the Alcoholics Anonymous community; 4) persons belonging to the group of conditional norm. Methods. There were used such instruments as Theory of Mind assessment scale (Th.o.m.a.s, Bosco, Gabbatore, Tirassa & Testa, 2016); Toronto Alexithymia Scale TAS26, adapted by Bekhterev Psychoneurological Research Institute (Eresko, Isurina, Koidanovskaia, Karvasarskyi, Karpova, Korepanova & Shifrin, 2005); 5PFQ personality questionnaire, adapted by Hromov (Hromov, 2000). For further analysis, descriptive statistics as well as several non-parametric criteria (U-Mann-Whitney test; Kolmogorov-Smirnov criterion) has been used. The results. A number of statistically significant differences were found between the 4 groups. In particular, differences were found in ToM structure, in the severity of alexithymia, as well as in the strength of the manifestation of various factors and subfactors by the personal questionnaire 5PFQ. The complexity of the allocative perspective has been established in both groups of dependent persons, in patients of the rehabilitation center and within the group of Alcoholic Anonymous. It was found that these two groups are not statistically different in the Toronto alexithymic scale, although in both groups there are high median indicators, which are moderately higher the upper limit of normal scores, and there is a statistically significant difference between these groups and the conditional norm group. Conclusions. ToM of persons dependent on psychoactive substances is characterized by a reduced understanding of their own emotions, if usage of psychoactive substances continues or has stopped recently, but it is resumed over the term of sobriety; while a high rate of alexithymia is remained. Also, persons dependent on psychoactive substances have a complication of the allocative perspective of ToM, even during the long-term sobriety.

Does a Computerized Social Cognitive Intervention Improve Implicit or Explicit Theory of Mind in Individuals With Psychosis?

Theory of mind (ToM) is a component of social interaction used to understand the behavior of others and one’s own, it can be measured explicitly or implicitly. Computerized targeted social cognitive training (TSCT) interventions have produced improvements in social cognition but changes in explicit versus implicit ToM have not been assessed directly. This study measured changes in implicit and explicit ToM in individuals with schizophrenia to evaluate the effect of TSCT on ToM as well as the relationship in social functioning.

Implicit Theory of Mind under realistic social circumstances measured with mobile eye-tracking

Recently, there has been a debate whether implicit Theory of Mind can be reliably measured using anticipatory looking tasks. Previous anticipatory looking paradigms used video stimuli to measure implicit Theory of Mind; however, numerous replications of these paradigms were unsuccessful. This lack of replications may be due to video stimuli not being sufficiently engaging. As Theory of Mind is an inherently social phenomenon, robust evidence might only be observed in a real social situation. Therefore, the current preregistered study aimed to test anticipatory looking with real-life social stimuli. A mobile eye-tracker was used to measure gaze patterns indicative of Theory of Mind while participants observed a real-life interaction of an experimenter and a confederate. The realistic scenario did not provide clear evidence for implicit Theory of Mind. Furthermore, anticipatory looking behavior did not reliably occur during familiarization trials, in line with previous research. However, looking patterns were slightly more in line with belief tracking than in some more controlled studies using video stimuli. In general, implicit Theory of Mind was not reliably reflected in anticipatory looking patterns even if they were measured in realistic social situations. This questions the suitability of anticipatory looking measures for implicit Theory of Mind.

P.214 The investigation of implicit theory of mind in healthy participants – a functional MRI study

P.214 The investigation of implicit theory of mind in healthy participants – a functional MRI study

Actions do not speak louder than words in an interactive false belief task.

Traditionally, it had been assumed that meta-representational Theory of Mind (ToM) emerges around the age of 4 when children come to master standard false belief (FB) tasks. More recent research with various implicit measures, though, has documented much earlier competence and thus challenged the traditional picture. In interactive FB tasks, for instance, infants have been shown to track an interlocutor's false or true belief when interpreting her ambiguous communicative acts (Southgate et al. 2010 Dev. Sci. 13, 907–912. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00946.x)). However, several replication attempts so far have produced mixed findings (e.g. Dörrenberg et al. 2018 Cogn. Dev. 46, 12–30. (doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.01.001); Grosse Wiesmann et al. 2017 Dev. Sci. 20, e12445. (doi:10.1111/desc.12445); Király et al. 2018 Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 115, 11 477–11 482. (doi:10.1073/pnas.1803505115)). Therefore, we conducted a systematic replication study, across two laboratories, of an influential interactive FB task (the so-called ‘Sefo’ tasks by Southgate et al. 2010 Dev. Sci. 13, 907–912. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00946.x)). First, we implemented close direct replications with the original age group (17-month-olds) and compared their performance to those of 3-year-olds. Second, we designed conceptual replications with modifications and improvements regarding pragmatic ambiguities for 2-year-olds. Third, we validated the task with explicit verbal test versions in older children and adults. Results revealed the following: the original results could not be replicated, and there was no evidence for FB understanding measured by the Sefo task in any age group except for adults. Comparisons to explicit FB tasks suggest that the Sefo task may not be a sensitive measure of FB understanding in children and even underestimate their ToM abilities. The findings add to the growing replication crisis in implicit ToM research and highlight the challenge of developing sensitive, reliable and valid measures of early implicit social cognition.

Pragmatic markers: the missing link between language and Theory of Mind

Language and Theory of Mind come together in communication, but their relationship has been intensely contested. I hypothesize that pragmatic markers connect language and Theory of Mind and enable their co-development and co-evolution through a positive feedback loop, whereby the development of one skill boosts the development of the other. I propose to test this hypothesis by investigating two types of pragmatic markers: demonstratives (e.g., ‘this’ vs. ‘that’ in English) and articles (e.g., ‘a’ vs. ‘the’). Pragmatic markers are closed-class words that encode non-representational information that is unavailable to consciousness, but accessed automatically in processing. These markers have been associated with implicit Theory of Mind because they are used to establish joint attention (e.g., ‘I prefer that one’) and mark shared knowledge (e.g., ‘We bought the house’ vs. ‘We bought a house’). Here I develop a theoretical account of how joint attention (as driven by the use of demonstratives) is the basis for children’s later tracking of common ground (as marked by definite articles). The developmental path from joint attention to common ground parallels language change, with demonstrative forms giving rise to definite articles. This parallel opens the possibility of modelling the emergence of Theory of Mind in human development in tandem with its routinization across language communities and generations of speakers. I therefore propose that, in order to understand the relationship between language and Theory of Mind, we should study pragmatics at three parallel timescales: during language acquisition, language use, and language change.

Depression, trauma and mentalizing: No influence of depressive symptoms on spontaneous theory of mind in a subclinical sample.

Depressive symptoms are associated with impaired social functioning, arguably because of reduced mentalizing abilities. However, findings in persons with depressive symptoms and/or major depressive disorder (MDD) are presently mixed, finding evidence both for and against the hypothesis of reduced mentalizing abilities. This study investigated spontaneous cognitive mentalizing in 36 age-, sex- and education-matched students with depressive symptoms and 45 comparisons with minimal depressive symptoms. To assess spontaneous mentalizing, we used the implicit theory of mind (ToM) task, which looks specifically at spontaneous computation of false belief. Bayesian analysis did not support the hypothesis of impaired mentalizing; in fact, it suggested that the results were 3.90 times more likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis. Results remained stable when comparing depressed and non-depressed individuals without maltreatment exposure but were inconclusive in the maltreatment-exposed groups. The findings suggest no effect of spontaneous mentalizing in a high-functioning depressed sample. Moreover, the findings also emphasize the need to control for childhood maltreatment experiences in future ToM and social functioning research, as these may constitute subgroups within depressed samples. Tailored therapy for maltreated depression individuals may be beneficial.

Spontaneous theory of mind in adults with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder

Spontaneous theory of mind (ToM) is an unconscious and automatic understanding of others’ mental states. Recently, individuals with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) have been shown to have social and communication difficulties, and ToM in ADHD has come under scrutiny. Although some studies have employed explicit ToM tasks to this end with contradictory results, none, to our knowledge, has investigated spontaneous ToM in individuals with ADHD. Therefore, we performed this study to examine implicit mentalizing in adults with ADHD using the anticipatory-looking paradigm designed by Senju et al. (2009) with a sample of 24 adults with ADHD and 18 neurotypical adults. The total fixation times to three areas of interest, i.e., the actor and the false-belief congruent and incongruent sides of the scene were measured. We found that neither group showed looking bias toward either the false-belief congruent or incongruent side. We interpret that this similar gaze pattern and the absence of looking bias to the false-belief incongruent side in both groups is indicative of intact implicit ToM in adults with ADHD. Adults with ADHD looked significantly less at the actor than did neurotypical individuals, possibly due to inattention and further experimental modifications should be considered.

Мозговые механизмы нарушения модели психического при расстройствах аутистического спектра и шизофрении: обзор данных фМРТ

Theory of mind is a cognitive ability, which enables to understand intentions, emotions and beliefs of another person. Because of theory of mind, people are able to interpret behavior of others and adapt to it. Numerous psychiatric impairments are associated with damaged theory of mind and communication with others. The present review analyses the impairments of theory of mind as laying on a continuum from hypermentalization (over-attribution of intentions to others) to hypomentalization (under-attribution of intentions to others) in autism spectrum disorders and schizophrenia. FMRI paradigm of different subprocesses of theory of mind is described (perceptual mind-reading, cognitive theory of mind, “hot” theory of mind and implicit theory of mind). Neural mechanisms of these subprocesses and their impairments in autism spectrum disorder and schizophrenia analyzed.

Do patients with high-functioning autism have similar social cognitive deficits as patients with a chronic cause of schizophrenia?

Objective: There is substantial evidence that both patients with schizophrenia and patients with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have impaired social cognition including theory of mind (ToM) deficits. However, it remains unclear if both verbal (explicit) and non-verbal (implicit) ToM as well as social perception are similarly affected in both disorders.Methods: Twenty-one patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and 11 patients diagnosed with ASD were matched one-to-one to healthy controls based on gender, age, and educational level. Social functioning was measured by Personal and Social Performance (PSP) scale. Neurocognition was measured using Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS-DK), and four subtests from Wechsler Adult Intelligence (WAIS-IV) scale were applied to estimate IQ. The Animated Triangles Task was used to measure implicit ToM, while explicit ToM and social perception were measured by The Awareness and Social Inference Test (TASIT).Results: Patients with schizophrenia had deficits in implicit ToM and complex social perception compared to their matched controls, but no problems with explicit ToM. Surprisingly, patients with ASD solely had deficits with regard to complex social perception compared to their matched controls. The two patient groups were similar regarding estimated IQ, social functioning and years of education, but differed in age and neurocognition. When adjusting the p-values for age and neurocognitive deficits, both patients groups had similar social cognitive deficits.Conclusions: Results imply that we compared schizophrenia patients with substantial neurocognitive deficits to a group of high-functioning patients with ASD. However, these two subgroups may have the same level of social cognitive deficits.

Reduced tendency to attribute mental states to abstract shapes in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia links with cerebellar structural integrity.

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute mental states to others. Behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is a neurodegenerative disorder characterized by profound deficits in social cognition, including ToM. We investigate whether bvFTD affects intention attribution tendency while viewing abstract animations and whether this might represent a primary deficit. A sample of 15 bvFTD patients and 19 matched controls were assessed on cognition and performed an implicit ToM task. They were instructed to describe what they observed in movement patterns displayed by geometrical shapes (triangles). These movement patterns either represented animacy, goal-directed actions or manipulation of mental state (ToM). The responses were scored for both accuracy and intentionality attribution. Using Voxel-Based Morphometry, we investigated the structural neuroanatomy associated with intention attribution tendency. The behavioral results revealed deficits in the bvFTD group on intentionality attribution that were specific for the ToM condition after controlling for global cognitive functioning (MMSE-score), visual attention (TMT B-score), fluid intelligence (RCPMT-score) and confrontation naming (BNT-score). In the bvFTD sample, the intention attribution tendency on the ToM-condition was associated with grey matter volume of a cluster in the cerebellum, spanning the right Crus I, Crus II, VIIIb, IX, left VIIb, IX and vermal IX and X. The results reveal a specific, primary, implicit domain-general ToM deficit in bvFTD that cannot be explained by cognitive dysfunction. Furthermore, the findings point to a contribution of the cerebellum in the social-cognitive phenotype of bvFTD.

How (not) to measure infant Theory of Mind: Testing the replicability and validity of four non-verbal measures

A growing body of infant studies with various implicit, non-verbal measures has suggested that Theory of Mind (ToM) may emerge much earlier than previously assumed. While explicit verbal ToM findings are highly replicable and show convergent validity, systematic replication studies of infant ToM, as well as convergent validations of these measures, are still missing. Here, we report a systematic study of the replicability and convergent validity of implicit ToM tasks using four different measures with 24-month-olds (N = 66): Anticipatory looking, looking times and pupil dilation in violation-of-expectation paradigms, and spontaneous communicative interaction. Results of anticipatory looking and interaction-based tasks did not replicate previous findings, suggesting that these tasks do not reliably measure ToM. Looking time and new pupil dilation measures revealed sensitivity to belief-incongruent outcomes which interacted with the presentation order of outcomes, indicating limited evidence for implicit ToM processes under certain conditions. There were no systematic correlations of false belief processing between the tasks, thus failing to provide convergent validity. The present results suggest that the robustness and validity of existing implicit ToM tasks needs to be treated with more caution than previously practiced, and that not all non-verbal tasks and measures are equally suited to tap into implicit ToM processing.

Social motivation and implicit theory of mind in children with autism spectrum disorder.

The goal of the present study was to examine the link between poor attention to social information and mindreading abilities in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Results demonstrated that children with ASD tended to perform worse than neurotypical children on both social orienting and theory of mind tasks. Preference for human faces and motion tended to be related but only for the neurotypical children. These findings provide partial support for the social motivation theory.

Assessing theory of mind in schizophrenia during a collaborative game

Introduction While Theory of mind (ToM) impairments have been well established in schizophrenia (SZ), very few studies have investigated these impairments during social interactions. However, in daily life the attribution of mental states to others (ToM) is most often implicit and spontaneous whereas classical ToM tasks rely on explicit, deliberate and cognitively-demanding reasoning. Objective The aim of the present study was to fully characterize ToM ability in schizophrenia by investigating this ability during a collaborative game. Methods Ten individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) and ten healthy control (HC) participants were recruited. Patients' severity of symptoms was measured using the PANSS. All participants were asked to play a collaborative game with an experimenter. During this game, the aim of the participant was to transfer a given route from his/her map to his/her interlocutor. The prosodic focus marking was used as a linguistic marker of ToM. Participants were also submitted to a classical ToM task requiring explicit attribution of mental states and to a neuropsychological evaluation. Results The results showed that, by contrast to HC participants, SZ patients did not produce prosodic focus marking revealing difficulties to attribute knowledge to their interlocutor during the collaborative game. SZ patients were impaired on both explicit and implicit ToM assessment. No correlation was found between the ToM abilities and the symptoms or the neuropsychological evaluation. Conclusions Thus, the interactive task we used appears to be an original option for studying ToM ability in schizophrenia since it is close to what happens in real-life interactions.