Implicit Incentives Research Articles

The Effect of Horizontal Monitoring on Individual Performance in the Presence of Task Interdependencies

This study examines the implicit incentive effects of horizontal monitoring and team member dependence for individuals working in teams but facing explicit incentives based solely on measures of individual performance. We combine proprietary performance data with survey data for 133 internal auditors. We show that the social influences of relatively high levels of both horizontal monitoring and team member dependence provide implicit incentives that motivate individual performance, making the provision of team rewards unnecessary to ensure individual and team productivity. We conclude that horizontal monitoring and team member dependence are complementary control mechanisms whose effectiveness helps explain the observed practice of organizing work into teams without explicit team-based rewards.

The Learning Effects of Monitoring

ABSTRACT This study investigates the relationship between monitoring, decision making, and learning among lower-level employees. We exploit a field-research setting in which business units vary in the “tightness” with which they monitor employee decisions. We find that tighter monitoring gives rise to implicit incentives in the form of sharp increases in employee termination linked to “excessive” use of decision-rights. Consistent with these implicit incentives, we find that employees in tightly monitored business units are less likely than their loosely monitored counterparts to: (1) use decision-rights; and (2) adjust for hard information, in the form of historical performance data, in their decisions. These decision-making patterns are associated with large and systematic differences in learning rates across business units. Learning is concentrated in business units with “loose monitoring” and entirely absent in those with “tight monitoring.” The results are consistent with an experimentation hypothesis in which tight monitoring of decisions leads to more control but less learning. Data Availability: The data used in this study cannot be made publicly available due to confidentiality agreements with the participating organization.

Paying for observable luck

This article examines why CEOs are rewarded for luck, namely for observable shocks beyond their control. I propose a simple hidden action model where the agent has implicit incentives to avoid bankruptcy. After signing the contract, but before acting, the agent observes a signal on future luck. Implicit incentives are weaker after good news, and call for higher pay‐for‐performance sensitivity in good times. As a result, managerial pay is tied to luck. The model is also consistent with recent evidence of asymmetric pay for luck, that is, a larger exposure of managerial pay to good luck than to bad.

Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts.

Optimal Job Design in the Presence of Implicit Contracts

We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms rely on implicit incentive contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual accountability, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and assumes full responsibility for its outcome; and (ii) team accountability, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. The key trade-o¤ is that team accountability mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cut-off rule: firms with high reputation concerns opt for team accountability, whereas firms with low reputation concerns opt for individual accountability. Team accountability is more likely the more acute the multitasking problem is. However, the cut-o¤ rule need not hold if the firm combines implicit incentives with explicit pay-per-performance contracts.

The Roles of Incentives and Voluntary Cooperation for Contractual Compliance

Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit incentives affect cooperation. We first show that there is substantial cooperation under non-incentive compatible contracts. Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any voluntary cooperation. Further experiments show that this result is robust to two important variables: experiencing Trust contracts without any incentives and implicit incentives coming from repeated interaction. Implicit incentives have a strong positive effect on effort only under non-incentive compatible contracts.

Incentive Compensation and Promotion-Based Incentives of Mid-Level Managers: Evidence from a Multinational Corporation

ABSTRACT: This study re-examines the hypothesis that explicit, compensation-based incentives of mid-level managers are adjusted to the level of implicit incentives provided by the possibility of moving to higher-level positions. Using compensation data from a large multinational corporation, I find that, after controlling for the position’s scope and level of accountability, bonus-based incentives are stronger for managers who (1) have fewer organizational levels left to climb, (2) face weaker implicit incentives from getting promoted to the next level, and (3) face weaker implicit incentives from getting promoted to the top of the organization. The findings are consistent with the notion that implicit incentives are taken into consideration in the design of explicit incentive contracts. In particular, the results support the prediction that explicit incentives are optimally stronger in situations with weaker implicit incentives.

Une analyse néo-institutionnelle de la dynamique du guanxi en Chine

AbstractHow to explain the economic development of China since the country does not have the institutional matrix of market economies yet? The neo-institutional approach of North that emphasizes the role of informal rules in a society can mobilize the guanxi as part of the answer. This particular form of relational governance, peculiar to the Chinese confucian society, found a second wind with the development of business affairs to compensate for the inadequacies of the formal institutional architecture under construction. As form of capital social, guanxi produces trust and develops implicit incentives necessary to economic dynamism. By reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, it could be a substitute for formal rules during the ripening time of the latter.

Discretion in Bonus Plans

ABSTRACT: This study examines discretionary bonus payments by firms to senior-level executives. Interpreting discretionary bonuses as the result of implicit incentive contracts, I analyze an analytical model that includes a contractible and a non-contractible performance measure. The model yields the primary hypothesis that discretionary bonuses occur when the outcome of the contractible measure is either low or high, but not when the contractible outcome falls in the medium range. Based on a sample collected from public sources, I find empirical support for the notion that discretionary bonuses are paid based on non-contractible performance measures that are related to future financial performance. Moreover, discretionary bonus payments occur significantly more often when the contractible performance measure falls in the tails of the distribution. In contrast, I do not find support for the predictions that discretionary bonus payments are related to the manipulability of the contractible performance measures or that discretionary bonus payments are related to the power of the executives in the companies.

Accountability and Incentives

I study a model of electoral competition where both economic policy and politicians' effort affect voters' payoff. If voters cannot distinguish the effect of policy and effort, politicians acquire an implicit incentive to exert effort. This incentive can last through every period in an infinitely repeated game, provided there is uncertainty in every period regarding the policy's effectiveness. As uncertainty decreases, set of effort-exerting equilibria shrinks. Though the electorate manages to hold the incumbent politician accountable on effort dimension, it may not eliminate inefficient persistence in policy choice even when cost of changing policy is negligible.

Organizational Enablers for NPD Portfolio Selection

Despite substantial research that advocates the 'right' portfolio of NPD initiatives for the firm, one important aspect has been overlooked: creating a portfolio of NPD initiatives is not equivalent to ‘choosing from a menu' of initiatives. NPD initiatives are defined by and within the organization. Thus, portfolio selection rests upon two challenges: the cross-functional nature of tasks, which require collaboration; and the subtle dependence of innovative outcomes on explicit and implicit incentives. In this paper, we explore how the interplay between these challenges determines the initiatives that are ultimately supported by the NPD organization. We abstract the NPD organization as two functional managers, who report to a common vice president (VP), and analyze the strategic interactions of all three stakeholders. The VP decides whether to empower the managers to define the initiative and how to reward them contingent on the outcome. We evaluate how: (i) asymmetry of information regarding each function's capability, and (ii) the explicit rewards and implicit penalties managers receive based on the outcomes, affect their upfront resource commitments. We find a profound effect of the information asymmetry: the set of initiatives the organization deems profitable is reduced, thus impeding its potential to innovate. To counter such a shortcoming, the VP may optimally misalign the payoffs of the stakeholders, either by changing the incentive plans or by empowering the organization.

Transient Institutional Ownership and CEO Contracting

ABSTRACT: Prior research documents that CEOs respond to transient ownership preferences by choosing actions to meet short-term earnings targets. This study examines whether contract designers anticipate these actions and respond by adjusting explicit CEO compensation contracts. We find that, in determining CEO cash bonuses, firms with high levels of transient investors, on average, place a relatively low weight on earnings and a relatively high weight on annual returns. Additionally, both the likelihood of granting equity and the magnitude of annual equity grants to CEOs are higher with a higher level of transient investors, after controlling for previously studied determinants of equity grants. The results suggest transient-owner trading behavior creates implicit incentives for CEOs to take actions that increase current earnings, and firms take these implicit incentives into account in the design of explicit CEO compensation contracts.

Explicit and Implicit Incentives in Delegated Portfolio Management

Investors can incentivize a fund manager by assigning a compensation contract to provide explicit incentives, or by adjusting fund flows to provide implicit incentives, or both. In this paper based on a tractable dynamic model we show that the interplay between the explicit and implicit incentives is important in accounting for a puzzling phenomenon in the mutual fund industry, namely, the convex flow-performance relationship whereby disproportionate amounts of new money flow into funds with superior recent performance while less money escapes from funds with poor performance. Furthermore, this paper sheds new light on asset pricing implications of portfolio delegation; in particular, we show that introducing delegated portfolio management increases stock return volatility and reduces unconditional stock risk premium.

Performance Measure Properties and Incentive System Design

We analyze effects of performance measure properties (controllable and uncontrollable risk, distortion, and manipulation) on incentive plan design, using data from auto dealership manager incentive systems. Dealerships put the most weight on measures that are “better” with respect to these properties. Additional measures are more likely to be used for a second or third bonus if they can mitigate distortion or manipulation in the first performance measure. Implicit incentives are used to provide ex post evaluation, to motivate the employee to use controllable risk on behalf of the firm, and to deter manipulation of performance measures. Overall, our results indicate that firms use incentive systems of multiple performance measures, incentive instruments, and implicit evaluation and rewards as a response to weaknesses in available performance measures.

The Breakdown of Morale

textabstractThis paper studies how morale in teams can break down. It interprets high morale as team members working together productively, either because of a sense of fairness or because of implicit incentives from repeated interactions. Team members learn that lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date, which will eventually cause morale to break down. The paper shows that the breakdown of morale can vary in size and the equilibrium outcomes can be Pareto ranked. A firm's measures to encourage cooperation may actually hurt morale, by convincing opportunistic team members to imitate and later take advantage of cooperative colleagues.

SHOULD YOU ALLOW YOUR EMPLOYEE TO BECOME YOUR COMPETITOR? ON NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS*

We discuss a principal–agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a noncompete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal, as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the value created is sufficiently small relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent, she will never prefer a strict noncompete agreement.

Implicit and Explicit Incentives, and Management Earnings Forecasts

Implicit and Explicit Incentives, and Management Earnings Forecasts

Offsetting the Incentives: Risk Shifting and Benefits of Benchmarking in Money Management

Money managers are rewarded for increasing the value of assets under management, and predominantly so in the mutual fund industry. This gives the manager an implicit incentive to exploit the well-documented positive fund-flows to relative-performance relationship by manipulating her risk exposure. In a dynamic portfolio choice framework, we show that as the year-end approaches, the ensuing convexities in the manager's objective induce her to closely mimic the index, relative to which her performance is evaluated, when the fund's year-to-date return is sufficiently high. As her relative performance falls behind, she chooses to deviate from the index by either increasing or decreasing the volatility of her portfolio. The maximum deviation is achieved at a critical level of underperformance. It may be optimal for the manager to reach such deviation via selling the risky asset despite its positive risk premium. Under multiple sources of risk, with both systematic and idiosyncratic risks present, we show that optimal managerial risk shifting may not necessarily involve taking on any idiosyncratic risk. Costs of misaligned incentives to investors resulting from the manager's policy are economically significant. We then demonstrate how a simple risk management practice that accounts for benchmarking can ameliorate the adverse effects of managerial incentives.

Corporate Governance Spillovers

Failures of corporate governance at one firm spill over into short-termism and incentives for managers at other firms to manipulate earnings fraudulently due to career concerns and relative performance evaluation. The model predicts that (i) peer governance matters and that the average rate of earnings fraud should be higher when peer governance is weaker; (ii) managers should react more aggressively to changes in relative performance when peer governance is weaker; and (iii) earnings fraud should be most sensitive to peer governance when career concerns are strong. Using data on event-periods associated with fraudulent restatements, I find evidence corroborating all three predictions and the implication that a few bad apples can lead to increased misbehavior at other firms. By studying a specific managerial action, the paper highlights the importance of the role of career concerns and implicit incentives as well as the governance environment in influencing managerial behavior.

Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure

Firms often augment career concerns incentives with implicit incentive contracts. I formalize the interaction between these two incentives, and highlight its implications on a firm's decision to disclose its workers' productivity information. Disclosure enhances career concerns but inhibits implicit contracts. I show two main results. First, implicit contracts weaken (i.e., substitute) career concerns if the prior belief about the worker's ability is low, and vice versa. Second, when these incentives are substitutes, the optimal disclosure policy follows a cutoff rule: patient firms are opaque, and transparent firms never offer implicit contracts. These results need not hold if the incentives are complements.