The impact of Information Communications Technology (ICT), especially the Internet, on the poor is of increasing concern within the development community. Previous empirical studies suggest the impact of Internet is Janus faced — in some cases it creates new opportunities for the poor, while in others it seems to exacerbate the challenges the poor face (Kenny 2006; Huerta, Esperanza, and Sandoval-Almazan 2007; Hanson 2008). However, growing literature on the digital divide purports debilitating effects caused by a lack of access to the Internet, leading to social, political and economic exclusion for many marginalized groups. Recently, the framework of human rights has been increasingly employed in arguments for Internet access to be formally recognized as a human right. Yet whether or not there is a “Right to Internet access” has been strenuously debated since an influential UN Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (2011), argued for Internet access to be considered a human right. Critics of the claims made by the Special Rapporteur remained skeptical including a leading founding member of the Internet, Vint Cerf (2012), and also scholar Brian Skepys (2012). This emerging debate is almost exclusively in the domain of political rights, usually focused on the right to information in the UDHR. However, published academic work contains little theoretical connection to broader human rights theory. The lack of theoretical development in this emerging debate allows this paper to contribute by exploring possible theories of human rights and applying them the “Right to Internet access.” I posit that access to the Internet is best conceptualized as an instrumental human right. The Internet is now instrumental to both: (I) economic rights (especially the right to work); and (II) civil and political rights. The argument proceeds by positing that the philosophical grounding for a “Right to Internet access”, at least in terms of implementation, should be conceptualized as a prioritarian theory of instrumental rights. Finally, turning towards case law, I empirically display that a “Right to Internet access” is already being implemented through legal arguments grounded in human rights. Thus, the empirical section exposes that a “Right to Internet access” is beginning to be litigated in pockets of case law around the world. Therefore, I argue that in the modern world the “Right to Internet access” cannot be simply characterized as “nonsense on stilts”.