Immigration Reform And Control Act Research Articles

The Findings and Policy Implications of the GAO Report and the Urban Institute Hiring Audit

In March, 1990 die General Accounting Office of the United States submitted its third and final mandated report on the impact and implementation of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Its conclusion was diat the law had given rise to widespread discrimination against foreignsounding and foreign-looking job applicants. This result had been antic? ipated during the two-decade debate over IRCA by opponents of the law's principal policy innovation: employer sanctions. Sanctions were intended to right an asymmetry in American law that made it illegal for undocumented aliens to enter and work in the United States but imposed no penalties on employers who hired them. Righting this asymmetry involved the largest expansion of labor-related regulation since 1970, as well as the broadest regulatory expansion to take place during the fiercely antiregulatory Reagan Administration. By deputizing employers as junior immigration officers (Roberts and Loehr, 1987), sanctions for the first time brought the hitherto obscure and little-encountered world of immigration law and immigration law enforcement to the nation's workplace and indeed, because sanctions govern all hiring transactions, in theory, to the homes of die nation's citizens. The battle for sanctions was a long and arduous one that forced its proponents to consent to a series of major political trades. Among other things, it led to the enactment of the two largest legalization programs in recent history (one for aliens who had been in the U.S. since 1982, the other

The initial effects of immigration reform on farm labor in California

Agriculture was the major industry singled out for preferential treatment in the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. Farmers argued that their traditional reliance on unauthorized workers and the seasonal nature of work in perishable commodities required extra time for them to adjust to immigration reforms. A February 1989 survey of California farm employers indicates that these employers had not yet adjusted to IRCA. Instead of revising their personnel policies to retain newly legalized farmworkers, farmers expected to hire more workers through labor contractors if the seasonal workforce contracts in the years ahead.

The U.S. 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and undocumented migration to the United States

One of the major goals of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) is to reduce the number of undocumented immigrants coming to and residing in the United States. This goal is pursued by allocating increased resources to Border Patrol enforcement, imposing penalties on employers for hiring undocumented workers, and offering to legalize the undocumented population that has resided in the country for a substantial period of time. This paper evaluates the impact of IRCA on the flow of undocumented migrants across the U.S.-Mexican border by analyzing a monthly time series of Border Patrol apprehensions from January 1977 to September 1988 within the context of a multivariate statistical model. The model provides a good fit to the data (R2 = 0.94), and our results indicate that INS resources, Mexican population growth, comparative economic conditions on both sides of the border, and seasonal factors related to the agricultural planting and harvesting cycle are all determinants of border apprehensions and, by implication, of the flow of undocumented migrants to the United States. IRCA's impacts on the number of ‘apprehensions averted’ operate mainly through changes in INS effort, the SAWs agricultural legalization program, and other IRCA-related factors. Our analysis concludes that the effects of IRCA, though perhaps smaller than sometimes alleged, were associated with a cumulative net reduction in linewatch apprehensions of nearly 700,000 in the 23-month period following enactment of the law. The associated reduction over the same period in the number of illegal border crossings may be as high as 2 million.

The Education Requirement of the U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986

RESUMEN El requisite de educatión en el Acto sobre Reforma y Limitatión de Inmigraciôn a losEstados Unidos (1986): Estudio de un ejemplo de una planificatión lingüística ineficaz El 6 de noviembre de 1986, el presidente Ronald Reagan firmó como ley el Acto sobre Reforma y Limitaciôn de Inmigraciôn (1986). El objetivo de la ley es detener la corriente de inmigrantes ilegales a través de la frontera mejicano-estadounidense y aplicar sanciones a patronos estadounidenses que hacen uso de trabajadores ilegales. La sección 2 del Acto especifica un programo legislativo en dos partes, por medio del cual extranjeros que habitan en Estados Unidos desde el 1 de enero de 1982, tienen derecho a solicitar residencia legal, temporal en primera instancia, y permanente posteriormente. Este programo de legalización está con-siderado como menos costoso que la deportaciôn de millones de extranjeros ilegales. Un requisito para la adquisición de esta residencia legal es que los extranjeros a los que se ha acordado este privilegio, sean capaces de probar un conocimiento bâsico del inglés, historia estadounidense y conocimientos sociales, o intenten conseguir ese conocimiento asistiendo a una instrucción de al menos cuarenta horas en un programa reconocido por el INS (Servicio de Naturalización e Inmigración). El requisito de educación se encuentra en la ley para lógicamente apoyar la concesión de residencia permanente a extranjeros ilegales, principalmente de origen hispánico, antes que a otros extranjeros que solicitan residencia dentro de otros programas de inmigración. El cono-cimiento del inglés esta considerado como un signo de integration en la sociedad. El inglés es un importante sfmbolo cultural para esa sociedad, y los legisladores piensan que se ve amena-zado por una creciente minorfa hispanohablante. Puesto que el objetivo del requisito de education no es capacitar a los participantes para alcanzar una competencia funcional en inglés, el resultado es una polftica lingufstica costosa e ineficaz. RESUMO La klereca devigo en la Usona Akto pri Enmigra Reformo kaj Limigo (1986): Studo de ekzemplo de neefika lingvoplanado La 6-an de novembro 1986, Prezidento Ronald Reagan jure subskribis la Usonan Akton pri Enmigra Reformo kaj Limigo (1986). La celo de la leĝo estas haltigi la fluon de neleĝaj enmigrantoj trans la usonmeksikan limon kaj apliki sankciojn kontraŭ usonaj dungantoj, kiuj uzas neleĝajn laborfortojn. Sekcio 2 de la Akto specifigas dustadian leĝigan programon, per kiu fremduloj, kiuj loĝas ene de Usono jam de la 1-a de januaro 1982, rajtas peti unue dumtempan kaj poste konstantan laŭleĝan lograjton. Oni konsideras tiun programon de leĝigo pli mal-multekosta ol deportado de milionoj da neleĝaj fremduloj. Unu devigo por tia laŭlega lo|rajto estas tio, ke fremduloj, kiuj ricevas tiun privilegion, povu montri scion de baza angla lingvo, usona historio kaj sociaj scioj, aŭ klopodu atingi tian scion per ĉeesto de minimume kvardek horoj da instruado en programo rekonata de INS (la Servo pri Naturalizo kaj Enmigrado). La klereca devigo troviĝas en la lego por logike subteni la transdonon de konstanta loĝrajto al neleĝaj fremduloj, cefe hispandevenaj, antaû tiuj alilandanoj, kiuj petas leĝan loĝrajton laŭ aliaj enmigraj programoj. Scipovo de la angla estas konsiderata kiel signo de integriĝo en la ĝeneralan socion. La angla lingvo estas grava kultura simbolo por tiu socio, kaj leĝfarantoj kredas, ke ĝi estas minacata de kreskanta hispanparolanta minoritato. Pro tio, ke la celo de la klereca devigo ne estas ebligi al la partoprenantoj atingi funkcian kompetentecon en la angla, la rezulto estas multekosta kaj neefika lingva pohtiko.

Impacts of the 1986 US Immigration Law on Emigration from Rural Mexican Sending Communities

From the perspective of traditional labor-exporting communities in rural Mexico this article examines how the 1986 US Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) has affected perceptions of the US labor market the propensity to migrate settlement patterns in the US and the economies of migrant families and their home communities. The analysis draws upon sample survey interviews conducted in 1988-1989 in 3 communities located in the states of Jalisco Michoacan and Zacatecas. The data reveal that most residents--including prospective 1st-time undocumented migrants to the US--continue to view US labor markets as relatively accessible with or without legal entry documents even though employer sanctions have increased the perceived difficulty of finding work in the US. IRCA-mandated legalization programs have augmented the total flow of US-bound migrants from traditional sending communities while sharply reducing the relative size of the undocumented component. Through its amnesty programs the 1986 law is also increasing the representation of women and children in the migrant flow and accelerating the shift from temporary or shuttle migration to permanent settlement in the US. (authors)

The role of Church amnesty assistance programs in the implementation of the 1986 immigration reform and control act

On November 6, 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The legislation provides comprehensive changes in the country's immigration policies, primarily addressing the problems of illegal immigration. The act sets forth various employer sanctions associated with the hiring of undocumented immigrants, an amnesty program for the legalization of aliens and provisions for an active role for voluntary agencies in the implementation of the law. Under the law these agencies are defined as Qualified Designated Entities (QDEs). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) entered into cooperative agreements with several hundred voluntary agencies representing, for example, local and community organizations, farm and labor associations, and churches. The responsibility of the QDEs included providing accurate information and assistance to undocumented immigrants seeking adjustment of their immigration status during Phase I of the implementation of IRCA. Phase I of IRCA allowed for certain undocumented immigrants to apply for temporary resident status and later for permanent resident status. This phase ended in May, 1988. Phase II allows for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence when an applicant demonstrates an understanding of English and a knowledge of the history and government of the United States. An applicant who has resided in the United States for a period of eighteen months after the granting of temporary resident status may apply for permanent resident status. This essay examines the role of the church-sponsored QDEs in deep east Texas involved in Phase I of the IRCA amnesty program. Specifically, the reasons for the inclusion of voluntary agencies in the amnesty program and their roles are described. In addition, problems encountered by the QDEs are explored and suggestions for their future role in the development and implementation of immigration programs are made. Church-sponsored agencies were selected because of their central importance in providing counseling to immigrants in the deep east Texas area. Apart from immigration attorneys, few other resources exist that can provide detailed information about IRCA.

The U.S. legalization program: a preliminary final report.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 made 4 types of aliens eligible to receive legalization benefits: 1) those who resided "continuously" in the US since January 1, 1982; 2) those who had worked in the US perishable-crop agriculture for 90 "man-days" in specified time periods (Special Agricultural Workers [SAWS]); 3) those who were in the US since before January 1, 1972; and 4) those classified as Cuban/Haitian entrants and who had been in the US since January 1, 1982. Estimates of the number of aliens eligible for legalization, not including SAWS, ranges from 1.834 million to 2.56 million. Estimates of undercounts of undocumented aliens are 10% for those who entered before 1975 and 37.5% for those who arrived after 1975. Other refinements in the estimates of undocumented aliens include adjustments for 1) ethnic group and location, 2) the growth of the undocumented population between the census date and the legalization eligibility date under IRCA, and 3) emigration and deportation rates. Out of the 1,581,800 applicants entered into the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) computers (from a total of 2.15 million applicants) as of May 20, 1988, 73.7% were Mexican nationals. Only 5 other countries contributed more than 1%: El Salvador (6.5%), Haiti (2.3%), Guatemala (2.2%), the Philippines (1%), and Colombia (1%). The Mexican percentage was unexpectedly high, perhaps because the legalization had been much more successful in the Southwest than anywhere else in the country. Reasons that Mexicans have a higher legalization participation rate than other nationalities include 1) the distant eligibility date; 2) ethnic differences among non-Mexican nationalities; 3) particularly in the northeast, fears of exposing one's illegal status to INS; 4) the difficulty of information reaching ethnic communities, 5) the reluctance of those already undergoing the naturalization process to risk the legalization process; and 6) the reluctance of employees to admit employment of undocumented aliens. In the end, more than 90% of applicants are expected to be granted temporary resident alien status (and about 70% of agricultural workers), for a total of more than 2 million people. Researchers estimate that 2.5 - 3 million more persons remain in an undocumented status in the US.

Preliminary results of the IRCA legalization programs at the end of phase I.

A remarkable gulf in interpretation and evaluation of the 1986 implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) exists between various schools of analysts. Some feel that the law has not changed conditions much, while others consider the legalization program and employer sanctions successful. Altogether, IRCA included 6 specific legalization opportunities. The 2 major ones concerned aliens who had resided illegally in the US since January 1, 1982 and alien farm workers who had worked illegally in the US for at least 90 days between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986. Issues concerning the pre-1982 or general legalization program include 1) the 5-year gap between the eligibility cutoff and the start of the legalization program made the principal US legalization program more restrictive than comparable legalization policies in other market economy countries, 2) it did not provide for immediate derivative legislation for family members of an illegal alien eligible for legalization, and 3) analysts disagree on the evaluation and the effectiveness of the public information campaign to inform eligible aliens of the legalization opportunity. The application procedure for the Special Agricultural Worker or SAW was much simpler than for the general legalization program. SAW applicants could apply at US borders. 10% of SAW applications were denied, due to fraud and other reasons, as opposed to 2% for applicants to the major legalization program. Both programs attracted mainly Mexican applicants. The total number of SAW applications received will help to determine future need for alien farm workers. 1 of the most important differences between the SAW and the pre-1982 legalization programs is the legal status of the newly legalized: 1) to secure permanent resident alien status, pre-1982 program applicants must pass civics and English examinations within a set period of time, whereas SAW applicants do not; and 2) SAW applicants are eligible for a broader range of social benefits than those in the major program.

Immigration Reform and Social Work

IMMIGRATION REFORM has been a legislative topic of many states and the federal government for nearly 10 years. In 1985, legislation finally was at tained with passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 (P.L. 99-603, Immigration and Natural ization Service [INS], 1986). Still, in 1986, there was extensive discussion concerning the impact of the act—par ticularly on the employment status of Hispanics, because it was assumed that the majority of undocumented workers were of Hispanic origin. Implementation of the provisions of the act began in 1987. The implications of this immigration reform legislation for social welfare have not been addressed in these discussions. As is often the case, social workers experience firsthand the effects of social policy decisions on their clients. Unless the majority of undocumented aliens returns to their native country, social workers will find themselves attempting to remedy the effects of an immigration policy that prevents the undocumented alien from attaining satisfactory living conditions. In addition, social workers will have to confront problems involving health care, intergenerational assis tance, depression, domestic violence, homelessness, or criminal behavior. Social workers will confront these prob lems in mental health settings, state and county protective service agencies as well as in prisons. Social workers in public protective service agencies may become frustrated in trying to obtain services for their clients because of their illegal resident status. Social workers seeking to obtain ser vices for undocumented aliens will re quire knowledge not common among the majority of practitioners. Applicants for legal residence come from a wide range of countries, including many African and Asian countries whose citizens were formerly unable to migrate to the United States in any substantial numbers because of discriminatory immigration policies. Social workers who assist these clients will need to understand the dif Donald E. Gelfand Rebeca Bialik-Gilad

Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed in the closing days of the 1986 legislative session. The primary purpose of IRCA is to remove illegal aliens from the U.S. labor market. It has two primary policy instruments. One is granting legal status or amnesty for certain illegal aliens, thereby in part “wiping the slate clean.” The other is imposing penalties, referred to as employer sanctions, against employers who “knowingly” hire illegal aliens. Employer sanctions are intended to reduce the demand for illegal alien labor. The first sections of this paper develop an economic analysis of the illegal alien labor market, including the determinants of illegal migration and the impact on the economy. Then, that model is applied to the major provisions of IRCA and used to describe its likely consequences. A concluding section argues that because IRCA does not address the economic realities it is not likely to accomplish its objectives. The partial amnesty and impotent employer sanctions have not solved the illegal alien dilemma.

INITIAL EFFECTS OF THE NEW IMMIGRATION LAW ON CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE

Abstract Not Available – First paragraph follows: The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 prohibits the employment of persons not legally entitled to work in the United States. It imposes on all employers new hiring and record-keeping obligations, with stiff fines for noncompliance. It creates a means of obtaining legal resident status, particularly for “special agricultural workers” (SAWS) employed during 1985-86 in fruits, vegetables, and other perishable commodities specified by the Secretary of Agriculture.

A Count of the Uncountable: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States Census

This paper presents estimates that show that 2 million undocumented aliens were included in the 1980 US census. Of these 1.1 million were born in Mexico. The estimates derived with a residual method are developed by comparing a census-based estimate of aliens with estimates of the legally resident alien population based on data collected by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service in January 1980. Estimates are presented by age sex and period of entry for all aliens residing in the US for aliens from Mexico and for all other selected countries of origin. In addition to setting a lower limit on the number of undocumented aliens residing in the US in 1980 the estimates provide a framework for assessing the total number of undocumented aliens in the country. These estimates suggest that 46% of the undocumented aliens counted arrived in the US in the 5 years prior to the US Census; thus the Simpson-Mazzoli bill which was nearly passed in 1984 would have excluded recent arrivals from its legalization provisions leaving a sizeable portion of the undocumented population in an illegal status.

College Educated Immigrants in the American Labor Force: A Study of Locational Behavior

Over the past twenty years many questions have been raised concerning the internal manpower provisions of the Immigration Act of 1965. In general, these questions have focused on the effectiveness, and equity, of both the labor certification and occupational preference provisions of the Law (and its amendments). Two frequent observations based upon current immigration experience are that the Law tends to: (1) single out professional and technical personnel for special treatment, and (2) highly concentrate immigrants in states such as California and New York on the bases of family reunification and employment opportunity.' That the Immigration Act of 1965 helped foster the brain drain from both developing and developed countries to the United States is now well accepted.2 However, little is known about the locational behavior of these highly educated immigrants within this country, and how such behavior is governed by regional labor market conditions. The purpose of this paper is to provide such information by analyzing labor market and other determinants of the initial settlement pattern, as well as subsequent interstate remigration, of college educated immigrants. In addition, given that the remigration component of the study considers solely post-immigration locational behavior (independent of the 1965 Law preference provisions), policy conclusions are also relevant to highly-trained manpower expected to reenter the United States under legislation now pending before the 99th Congress (1985 version of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill). The initial settlement pattern of college educated immigrants in 1975 is examined below by origin region. In addition, the degree to which this pattern is dispersed between

Children's Health Needs in Seasonal Immigration

> a n HE Simpson-Mazzoli Bill has intensified the debate over b the increasing flow of undocumented immigrants who supposedly are taking advantage of and exacting a heavy toll on our health and economic system. In the health arena, this renewed focus on the undocumented concurs k5ev3 with a trend towards cost containment and deregulation. As a result, the undocumented are increasingly perceived as the "unworthy poor" and are becoming the target of blame for the undue strain put on the public health system. In California, this has become a particularly contested issue, because it is the main point of destination for the undocumented. According to the 1980 census more than 4% (1,024,000) of the state's population were immigrants and temporary residents without proper documentation. It is estimated that three-fourths of these residents came from Mexico. It is further believed that the census missed about 200,000 undocumented, predominantly seasonal immigrants temporarily residing in the U.S. in a given year (1). The size of the population is an indicator of the magnitude of this problem. As the population continues to grow, public health agencies are under increasing budgetary pressure. For instance, the Los Angeles County University of Southern California Medical Center claims that illegal aliens, predominantly of Mexican origin, use their services in great numbers, costing them $99.8 million in unpaid bills in 1983 (2). The financial burden has been the main source of outcry since California passed legislation transferring state responsibility for medically indigent adults to the counties. The debate on the undocumented is usually framed in terms of a problem of volume of utilizers of public health services that drain local resources. The arguments provided are primarily based on political premises rather than empirical research. An important research question raised by this debate is whether the alleged increase in utilization by the undocumented is real, and if so, whether it can be accounted for by changes in immigration patterns emerg-

Immigration reform, American style.

This article reviews the background of the proposed Immigration and Reform Act (also known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill), which seeks to overhaul US immigration law for the first time since 1952. This bill is consistent with President Reagan's hard line on border enforcement and mandates stiff penalties for those who transport illegal aliens for commercial advantage or private profit. It further offers Mexico preferential treatment in immigration (40,000 additional visas/year). It includes an amnesty program to offer legal status to qualified illegal residents. The bill directs the President to develop a secure national worker identification system and would create a large-scale temporary foreign agricultural program for perishable commodities. Agricultural workers' families would not be eligible to accompany them unless they also obtain temporary visas. Foreign temporary workers, employable only in cases where local domestic workers are not available, must be provided with wages and working conditions equal to those prevailing among domestic workers. Stiff penalties are stipulated for employers who fail to abide with the terms of the program. In the author's opinion, this bill fails to appreciate the global character of international migration and its complexity. It relects a fundamental ambivalence about a strictly controlled main gate versus a back door approach to immigration as well as the conflicting images of the US as a nation of immigrants versus the historical reality of American nativism and xenophobia. Needed are comprehensive initiatives whose mutually reinforcing components can address the multiple dimensions of the immigration problem within a framework that does not ignore workers who have contributed to the economic well-being of the US, regardless of their legal status.

Racial Disparity: The Unaddressed Issues of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill

Racial Disparity: The Unaddressed Issues of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill

Supply-Side Immigration Theory: Analysis of the Simpson/Mazzoli Bill

DESPITE predictions of nation-wide anti-immigrant xenophobia, rac ism and scapegoating, Senator Alan K. Simpson failed to win passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 19822 during the 97th Congress. With the impetus of a 1982 Senate favoring the bill 81 to 18,3 however, Senator Simpson reintroduced this legislation to the Senate Judiciary Committee of the 98th Congress on February 17, 1983. On the same day, Congressman Romano Mazzoli submitted his bill to the House Judiciary Committee. The two proposals S. 529 and H.R. 1510 con tain the same recommendations that were voted on and approved by the Senate and House Judiciary Committees in 1982. This chapter analyzes the major concepts and provisions of the Simp son-Mazzoli legislation. Introducing the bill, in 1982, Senator Simpson explained that in his view to the United States is out of control...[and] uncon trolled immigration is one of the greatest threats to this country. 4 Spe cifically, the harms caused to the United States by present levels of im migration, both lawful and unlawful, were described as excessive population growth, adverse job impacts, and the potential importa tion of social, political, and economic problems which exist in countries