Immaterial Soul Research Articles

Medicine, connoisseurship, and the animal body.

This essay reconsiders the links between medicine, connoisseurship, and aesthetic theory in early eighteenth-century Britain. Taking a satire on the body of the physician and collector John Woodward as its starting point, I show that medicine and connoisseurship shared a deep preoccupation with the possibility that the animal body could excessively influence the workings of the mind. Pursuing this line of argument, moreover, I will reconsider the place of mind-body dualism in eighteenth-century British medicine and aesthetics. With the exception of materialists such as the philosopher-physician Bernard Mandeville, medics and aesthetic theorists tended to identify the exercise of judgment with the operations of a disembodied mind, unsullied by the embodied mechanisms of the lower body. In practice, however, the insistence that the most refined forms of judgment depended on the presence and activity of a disembodied, immaterial soul was less meaningful than it seems. When confronted by failures of judgment, medics and connoisseurs alike sought explanations in the mechanisms of the animal body. Whether or not they believed in the immateriality of the soul, they pictured the mind as a malfunctioning animal machine, to be cured through the material agency of medical therapeutics.

PERCEIVING THINGS IN THEMSELVES: ABŪ L-BARAKĀT AL-BAĠDĀDĪ’S CRITIQUE OF REPRESENTATIONALISM

AbstractWhat are the proper objects of perception? Two famous responses to this question hold that they are either the images of extramental objects, that is, the way in which they appear to us (representationalism), or they are the objects themselves (direct realism). In this paper, I present an analysis of this issue by Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī (d. 1164/65), a post-Avicennian scholar whose impact on the history of Islamic philosophy has been largely neglected. Abū l-Barakāt argued against the traditional Aristotelian-Avicennian epistemological dualism, which distinguishes between the sense-perception of material particulars and the conception of immaterial universals in terms of the perceiver and/or the structure of perception. In Abū l-Barakāt's own theory, all epistemic acts have the unified structure of direct relation between one and the same perceiver (immaterial soul) and the objects themselves – both material and immaterial. His main thesis is that having corporeal organs is not necessary for sense-perception. In the final section of the paper, I show that Abū l-Barakāt's critique of the Aristotelian-Avicennian tradition was received as a breakthrough in epistemology. It may have also determined the epistemological theories of two of the most important post-Avicennian Islamic philosophers: Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) and Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191).

Editor’s Note

Editor’s Note

The Historical Account Of ʿabd Al-Jabbār Al-Hamadani’s Physicalist Conception Of Human Soul

This study aims to go through Muʿtazilite understandings of a man briefly and expounds on Qadi ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadani’s (d. 1025) strong rejection of any non-physicalist view of man and his soul. Amongst the Mu'tazilite school prevailed three distinct views on man, hence of the soul; the non-physicalist tradition represented by Ibrāhīm b. Sayyār an-Naẓẓām (d. 836) who claimed that man is the dwelling soul in the human corpse. The dualist view as advocated by Muʿammar b. ʿAbbād (d. 830) who understood man as a combination of the material body and immaterial soul. The third view is the so-called materialist stance on the human being. Qadi ʿAbd al-Jabbār as one of the advocates of this view argues that man does not possess any immaterial or immortal soul. This paper proposes that such a peculiar view of man was the natural outcome of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s cosmological setting and his sensitivity towards legal matters (talkif). ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s image of man does not need other; a soul, to make him will or capable of certain actions, for man is this corporeal body which could be seen in its actuality, and experienced in its totality. Therefore, he defines man (šaẖs) as a living being (ḥayy), having volition (murid), capable of acting voluntarily (qādir) and consequently entitles him with the responsibility for moral and religious obligations (al-mukallaf). It could be widely observed that Qadi, though admits the presence of soul in the body for its being alive, does not consider it to be living in itself or eternal. The soul, however, is the contingent breath, by which lightweight bodies (air) are inhaled and exhaled. It is an integral part of a living human being such as his flesh, blood or body structures.

A History of Death in the Hebrew Bible

A History of Death in the Hebrew Bible

Remembering by Heart: Giulio Aleni on the Heart, Brain, and Soul

Unlike similar works, Xingxue Cushu 性學觕述 (General Introduction to the Learning on [Human] Nature) by the Italian Jesuit missionary Giulio Aleni (1582–1649) sought to deliver the Christian doctrine into China by introducing Western medicine. The conflict between the Christian concept of the soul and the traditional psychic concept in China made the task difficult. Scholasticism rejects the idea that an individual’s soul may be physically divided or localized, whereas the Chinese tradition largely assumes the contrary and regards the heart as the center of one’s psychic powers or vitality. Aleni addressed this conflict by reducing the mind to the function of the brain for sensitive memory. Chinese physicians accepted Aleni’s concept of brain-related memory. However, his claim of an immaterial soul was ignored, and the Western connection between brain and memory was misinterpreted and subjected to Chinese cardiocentrism; thus, the physically centered psychic concept that underlies Chinese philosophy persisted.

Response to “Mere Theistic Evolution”

Murray and Churchill argue correctly that theistic evolution as they define it is theologically compatible with orthodox Christian doctrines concerning divine providence, natural theology, miracles, and immaterial souls. I close with some reflections on mutual misunderstandings of Intelligent Design proponents and theistic evolutionists that arise because each sees the other as a distorted mirror image of himself.

Occasionalism: From Metaphysics to Science ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano

Reviewed by: Occasionalism: From Metaphysics to Science ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano Fred Ablondi Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, editors. Occasionalism: From Metaphysics to Science. The Age of Descartes 2. Giulia Belgioioso, series editor. Turnhout: Brepols, 2018. Pp. 293. Paper, €65.00. This volume consists of papers originally presented at the international conference "Occasionalism: History and Problems," held in Venice in 2015; it contains twelve chapters, nine of which are in English, three in French. In their introduction, the editors describe occasionalism as a theory that was viewed by Medieval Christian philosophers as a "dangerous and treacherous" threat (7), only later to be "proudly asserted" in the post-Descartes era (9). This raises the question of to what degree this transition should be seen as a result of interpretations of the commitments of Cartesian metaphysics, particularly with regard to questions concerning mind-body interaction. Many scholars have pointed out that to view the acceptance of occasionalism as an ad hoc solution to explain interaction between an immaterial soul and a physically extended body ignores the numerous philosophers who adopted occasionalism to cover other varieties—and in some cases, all varieties—of interaction in a world consisting only of minds and bodies. As the editors observe, "occasionalism now appears less and less a cheap solution to the mind-problem and more and more a family of theories on causality, which share the fundamental claim that God is the only real causal agent" (12). This said, one cannot entirely separate the increased acceptance of occasionalism in the early modern period from ties to Cartesian philosophy, including issues that arise from substance dualism. (On this point, see the chapter of the present volume by Sandrine Roux.) If the rise in popularity of occasionalism is not tied to Cartesian metaphysics, there is the question of just why there was such a proliferation of occasionalists in the years after Descartes's death. Indeed, this collection seeks to address this two-fold question: what reasons did early modern philosophers have for embracing occasionalism (to the varying degrees that they did), and what was going on at the time philosophically/historically that led many to adopt the theory then? As it is not uncommon for volumes consisting of conference contributions to address its theme to varying degrees, I will highlight some of the chapters that more closely relate to the editors explicitly stated goal for the collection. Tad Schmaltz, Sukjae Lee, and Andrea Sangiacomo each examine the relation between divine conservation, specifically when it is understood as a matter of continuous creation, and occasionalism. The question is whether the former entails the latter, for if continuous creation is really a matter of continuous re-creation, it could be argued that God, in recreating bodies in their locations and minds with their thoughts at each consecutive instant, must be posited as the only true cause at work in the world. Did any early modern occasionalists accept occasionalism because they saw it as following from continuous creation? Schmaltz answers in the negative with regard to both Malebranche and La Forge. Lee claims that while Malebranche takes continuous creation as a matter of divine maintenance rather than a literal recreation, even so understood, the doctrine does play a part in his occasionalism. Sangiacomo makes the argument that in addition to the three traditional positions regarding any putative human causal contributions to effects in the world—namely, occasionalism at one extreme, mere conservation at the other, and concurrentism somewhere in the middle—there is a fourth option offered by Pierre-Sylvain Régis, one that at once denies (against the Thomists) that secondary causes are per se causes and (against the occasionalists) that only per se causes can be true causes. Contributions by Mariangela Priarolo and Nicholas Jolley highlight the changing understanding of the concept of "law" in the early modern period and the role that this [End Page 404] new conception played in Malebranche's formulation of occasionalism. According to Priarolo, Malebranche takes laws to be both rules for the behavior of bodies (Descartes) and instruments of God's providence (Aquinas), while Jolley leaves it as an open question as to whether...

Leibniz on the Divine Preformation of Souls and Bodies

For the mature Leibniz, a living being is a created substance composed of an infinitely complex organic body and a simple, immaterial soul. Soul and body do not interact directly, but rather their ...

Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism.

For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet no consensus has emerged. The present work provides one potential explanation for these discrepant findings: People are strongly motivated to preserve free will and moral responsibility, and thus do not have stable, logically rigorous notions of free will. Seven studies support this hypothesis by demonstrating that a variety of logically irrelevant (but motivationally relevant) features influence compatibilist judgments. In Study 1, participants who were asked to consider the possibility that our universe is deterministic were more compatibilist than those not asked to consider this possibility, suggesting that determinism poses a threat to moral responsibility, which increases compatibilist responding (thus reducing the threat). In Study 2, participants who considered concrete instances of moral behavior found compatibilist free will more sufficient for moral responsibility than participants who were asked about moral responsibility more generally. In Study 3a, the order in which participants read free will and determinism descriptions influenced their compatibilist judgments–and only when the descriptions had moral significance: Participants were more likely to report that determinism was compatible with free will than that free will was compatible with determinism. In Study 3b, participants who read the free will description first (the more compatibilist group) were particularly likely to confess that their beliefs in free will and moral responsibility and their disbelief in determinism influenced their conclusion. In Study 4, participants reduced their compatibilist beliefs after reading a passage that argued that moral responsibility could be preserved even in the absence of free will. Participants also reported that immaterial souls were compatible with scientific determinism, most strongly among immaterial soul believers (Study 5), and evaluated information about the capacities of primates in a biased manner favoring the existence of human free will (Study 6). These results suggest that people do not have one intuition about whether free will is compatible with determinism. Instead, people report that free will is compatible with determinism when desiring to uphold moral responsibility. Recommendations for future work are discussed.

The eminent role of imagination in Burton’s treatment of melancholy

Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy conveys an impressive body of medical and humanist knowledge through a multitude of voices and styles, leading some of its interpreters to reject its unity and originality. We sustain that, along with its curative strategies, Burton’s understanding of the imagination, «the queen of mental powers», is probably the most innovative contribution of his work. Grounded on the Aristotelian model, Burton develops an operative conception of imagination that is central in the fulfilment of the prophylactic and therapeutic goals of the Anatomy. Burton describes the normal functioning of imagination, bridging between the physical and the immaterial soul with reproductive and creative features, but also its abnormal and/or pathological manifestations, particularly the way it has «the power to arouse the [melancholic] passions». The particular kind of delirium in which melancholy consists is described by Burton as the consequence of unbounded imagination, «first step and fountain of all grievances», initiating damaging forms of enjoyment. On the other hand, a kind of «guided imagining» is required for the inoculation and relief of melancholic syndromes. These goals are not simply stated, through dietetic prescriptions and truncated spiritual measures. Burton constructs a reading experience that relies on the imagination as a way to understand, prevent and cure sensory, emotional, and cognitive iterations of melancholy. Inspired by the story of Zisca’s drum, Burton designed the Anatomy so that it has incantatory gifts for its reader, affirming that it must «drive away melancholy (thou I be gone)».

Distinguishing the Imago Dei from the Soul

This article contends that the ‘structural’ view of the imago Dei, which identifies the image of God with (or as being a property of) the human soul, requires revision in light of exegesis of Genesis 1, and that philosophical reflection following aftersuch exegesis reveals that the imago Dei needs to be distinguishedconceptually from the soul. In dialogue with, and (grateful) response to, Joshua Farris ‐ the most recent proponent of the (or ‘a’) structural view, the article counters the position, arguing that instead of the image of God being (a property of) the human soul(entailing a human having a body contingently), the emphasis of Scripture is that the image of God is a human in their entirety (a view entailing their having an immaterial soul).

Editor’s Note

Editor’s Note

Editor’s Note

Editor’s Note

Animals with Soul

I argue that ensouled animalism—the view that we are identical to animals that have immaterial souls as parts—has a pair of advantages over its two nearest rivals, materialistic animalism and pure dualism. Contra pure dualism, ensouled animalism can explain how physical predications can be literally true of us. Contra materialistic animalism, ensouled animalism can explain how animals can survive death (without resorting to body snatching or body fissioning). Furthermore, ensouled animalism has these advantages without creating any problems beyond those already faced by animalism and by belief in souls. However, some animalists, including Eric Olson, think that animals cannot have immaterial parts. I present a sufficient condition for animal parthood that implies animals can have immaterial parts. Ensouled animalism is not only possible, but also doubly attractive.

The First-Person Perspective

According to the Constitution View, human persons are constituted by bodies. Constitution, as we have seen, is not identity. But if a person is constituted by a body to which she is not identical, what distinguishes a person from the body that constitutes her? My answer, which I shall explain in this chapter, is that a person has a capacity for a first-person perspective essentially; her constituting body has it contingently. The person/body case is thus analogous to the statue/piece-of-marble case. The statue has the property of being related to an artworld essentially; the constituting piece of marble has that property contingently. Having a capacity for a first–person perspective plays the same role in the human person case that being related to an artworld in such-and-such a way plays in the statue case. A first–person perspective makes possible an inner life. On the Constitution View, something with a capacity for an inner life is a fundamentally different kind of thing from anything that has no capacity for an inner life. (Thus, I am ontologically closer to a self-conscious Martian than I am to a racehorse or to an early-term fetus.) The body of a human person is (identical to) an animal. An animal, human or not, can exist without any capacity for an inner life; a person cannot. This view is not Cartesian: An inner life does not require an immaterial soul, nor is it independent of the world around us.

Forget the Folk: Conditions for Compatibilism

For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe. We argue that these attempts are misguided because (1) lay people do not have stable, logically rigorous notions of free will and (2) people are strongly motivated to preserve free will and moral responsibility. Seven studies support this hypothesis by demonstrating that a variety of logically irrelevant (but motivationally relevant) features influence compatibilist judgments. In Study 1, participants who were asked to consider the possibility that our universe is deterministic were more compatibilist than those not asked to consider this possibility, suggesting that compatibilism is particularly compelling when determinism poses potential threats to moral responsibility. In Study 2, participants who considered concrete instances of moral behavior found compatibilist free will more sufficient for moral responsibility than participants who were asked about moral responsibility more generally. In Study 3a, the order in which participants read free will and determinism arguments influenced their compatibilist judgments—and only when the arguments had moral significance: Participants were more likely to report that determinism was compatible with free will than that free will was compatible with determinism. In Study 3b, participants who read the free will argument first (the more compatibilist group) were particularly likely to confess that their beliefs in free will and moral responsibility and their disbelief in determinism influenced their conclusion. In Study 4, participants reduced their compatibilist beliefs after reading a passage that argued that moral responsibility can be preserved even in the absence of free will. Participants also reported that immaterial souls were compatible with scientific determinism, most strongly among immaterial soul believers (Study 5), and evaluated information about the capacities of primates in a biased manner favoring the existence of human free will (Study 6). These results suggest that people do not have one intuition about whether free will is compatible with determinism. Rather, people report that free will is compatible with determinism when desiring to uphold moral responsibility. Recommendations for future work are discussed.

Een Scotistisch argument voor dualisme

In his recent book Waar geest is, is vrijheid [Where there is mind, there is freedom], Guus Labooy sets forth an original and intriguing argument, inspired by the work of John Duns Scotus, for substance dualism in the philosophy of mind. In this paper we argue that his argument, although worthy of serious attention, is under-supported. In section 2 we question the significance of the particular scotistic notion of freedom he uses in his argument, even though we agree with his premise that humans do possess freedom in the libertarian sense. In section 3 we argue that Labooy fails to make his key contention that significant freedom requires an irreducible immaterial soul sufficiently plausible. The key problem is that he does not consider the work of physicalists who also believe in libertarian freedom. In addition, it is not self-evident that an immaterial soul, as opposed to a physical body, can possess significant freedom. This requires argument. In section 4 we comment on Labooy’s specific conception of dualism and advise him to change it into a conception in which the soul — and not the composition of soul and body — is the human person, for the latter conception has absurd consequences.

On Analogies in Leibniz’s Philosophy

This paper analyzes Leibniz's use of analogies in both natural philosophical and metaphysical contexts. Through an examination of Leibniz's notes on scientific methodology, I show that Leibniz explicitly recognizes the utility of analogies as heuristic tools that aid us in conceiving unfamiliar theoretical domains. I further argue that Leibniz uses the notion of a self-moving machine or automaton to help capture the activities of the immaterial soul. My account helps resist the conventional image of Leibniz as an arch-rationalist unconcerned with methods of empirical discovery and contributes to ongoing discussions on the nature of immaterial substance and mind in Leibniz.

John Locke, ‘Hobbist’: of sleeping souls and thinking matter

AbstractIn this paper, I consider Isaac Newton’s fevered accusation that John Locke is a ‘Hobbist.’ I suggest a number of ways in which Locke’s account of the mind–body relation could plausibly be construed as Hobbesian. Whereas Newton conceives of the human mind as an immaterial substance and venerates it as a finite image of the Divine Mind, I argue that Locke utterly deflates the religious, ethical, and metaphysical significance of an immaterial soul. Even stronger, I contend that there is good reason to suspect that Locke is a crypto-materialist, at least with respect to human beings, and in this respect, could reasonably be labeled a ‘Hobbist.’