IMF Lending Research Articles

Statement by the Managing Director to the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) on the IMF's Lending Role and Surveillance Priorities

Statement by the Managing Director to the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) on the IMF's Lending Role and Surveillance Priorities

IMF bailouts and moral hazard

This paper empirically investigates the extent of investor moral hazard associated with IMF bailouts by analyzing the responses of sovereign bond spreads to the changes in the perceived probability of IMF bailouts of countries undergoing financial crisis. By allowing the probability of being bailed out by the IMF to differ across countries, we find that the expectations of IMF lending attenuate the relationship between spreads and country fundamentals, consistent with the presence of IMF moral hazard. Our findings indicate that this effect persists even after the non-bailout of Russian crisis in August 1998.

The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence

A review of recent quantitative studies on the International Monetary Fund reveals that much of the conventional wisdom is incorrect. Recent studies have demonstrated a new degree of methodological rigor, have drawn more heavily upon insights from political science, and have asked a number of new questions. We review studies of participation in IMF programs, design of IMF conditionality, implementation and enforcement of IMF conditions, conventional program effects and catalytic effects. At every stage, we find substantial evidence of the influence of major IMF shareholders, of the Fund’s own organizational imperatives, and of domestic politics within borrowing countries. We conclude that very little is known with certainty about the effects of IMF lending, but that a great deal has been learned about the mechanics of IMF programs that will have to be taken into account in order to obtain unbiased estimates of those effects.

IMF Lending and Geopolitics

There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of the borrowers. This paper focuses on the fact that the IMF may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of IMF loans, differentiating between concessional and non-concessional facilities. To carry out the empirical analysis, we construct a new database that compiles proxies for geopolitical importance for 107 IMF countries over 1990-2003, focusing on emerging and developing economies. We use a factor analysis to capture the common underlying characteristic of countries' geo-political importance as well as a potential analysis since we also want to account for the geographical situation of the loan recipients. While controlling for economic and political determinants, our results show that geopolitical factors influence notably lending decisions when loans are nonconcessional, whereas results are less robust and in opposite direction for concessional loans. This study provides empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping IMF lending decisions, potentially affecting the institution's effectiveness and credibility.

Simplification of IMF Lending: Why Not Just One Flexible Credit Facility?

This paper proposes updating and improving the IMF's lending mechanism, by replacing all of its credit lines with a single financial facility. Under this single facility, costs would rise with the volume drawn down and the time elapsed. At the same time, arrangement and repayment periods would be more flexible. The result would be a less complicated financing mechanism, more readily adaptable to borrowers' needs, stronger incentives to avoid excessive use of IMF resources and equitable treatment for all member countries.

A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality

We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-ex ante conditionality.

A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality

We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts - ex ante conditionality.

The Development Dimension of IMF Lending Policies

The debate on the role of the IMF in low-income countries has recently gained strength in light of the commitment by the international community to support achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. The IMF fulfils an important role as an information provider to low-income aid-recipient countries and their bilateral donors, who consider Fund signals as a useful device in their allocation decisions. The IMF also provides lending to low-income countries through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), established in 1999. The PRGF was designed to address earlier criticism claiming that IMF lending programs to low-income countries had privileged stabilisation over poverty-reducing growth through financial arrangements that had shown little ownership by those countries. The PRGF was meant to support a balanced macroeconomic framework in which low-income economies could pursue growth-enhancing measures with relevant poverty-reducing effects, reflecting policy priorities put forward by the countries themselves. Based on the available evidence, PRGF-supported countries have recorded a favourable growth performance vis-à-vis non-PRGF-supported countries, although the extent to which this outcome has translated into poverty reduction has yet to be assessed.

The economic and political determinants of IMF and world bank lending in the Middle East and North Africa

MENA assumes both political and economic significance. Politically, it is arguably the epicentre of world crisis, chronically war-prone and the site of the world’s most protracted conflicts (Hinnebusch 2003 p.1); economically, it owns the bulk of the world’s oil reserves, driving in particular the USA economic engine. In light of the region’s geopolitically and economically strategic position in the world economy it is clear that economic and political factors are inextricably linked when it comes to the manner in which the West, particularly the USA, responds to the region’s needs.

On US politics and IMF lending

The political factors shaping IMF lending to developing countries have attracted attention in recent empirical work. This goes in particular for the role and influence of the US. However, scant formal modelling makes interpretation of empirical results difficult. In this paper, we propose a model in which the US acts as principal within the IMF and seeks to maximize its impact on the policy stance of debtor countries. We derive an optimal loan allocation mechanism, which leads to the testable hypothesis that the probability of an IMF loan is increasing in the amount of political concessions countries make. A political concession is defined as the distance between a country's bliss point and its actual policy stance measured relative to the US. We introduce a bliss-point proxy and demonstrate that our hypothesis is strongly supported in the data. Moreover, we show that not accounting for bliss points may lead to endogeneity bias in empirical work.

IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?

IMF loans react to economic conditions but are also sensitive to political-economy variables. Loans tend to be larger and more frequent when a country has a bigger quota and more professional staff at the IMF and when a country is more connected politically and economically to the United States and major European countries. These results are of considerable interest for their own sake. More importantly for present purposes, the results provide instrumental variables for estimating the effects of IMF loan programs on economic growth and other variables. This instrumental estimation allows us to sort out the economic effects of the loan programs from the responses of IMF lending to economic conditions. The estimates show that a higher IMF loan-participation rate reduces economic growth. IMF lending does not have significant effects on investment, inflation, government consumption, and international openness. However, IMF loan participation has small negative effects on democracy and the rule of law. The reduction in the rule of law implies an additional, indirect channel whereby IMF lending reduces economic growth.

Reform of IMF Conditionality - A Proposal for Self-Imposed Conditionality

The IMF has faced criticism of its expansive use of conditionality. The paper proposes a new procedure for IMF lending designed to meet these criticisms by arguing for the legalization and formalization of the procedure for IMF lending in the light of legal concepts derived mainly from national administrative laws. The gist of the procedure is that, rather than have the IMF determine loan conditions following informal negotiations with member countries, countries seeking Fund assistance will design the conditions themselves. The IMF will have specified powers under which to review these conditions. Apart from other procedural requirements, conditions will have to meet the standard of reasonableness. Subject to reasonableness, the IMF will have to lend on the conditions proposed by the country approaching it. Submissions to the IMF, IMF decisions and the reasons for them will be published. This proposal has many advantages over the current practice. It promotes transparency and accountability of the IMF and the participation of developing countries. It induces countries to initiate effective economic reforms while maintaining their economic sovereignty. Finally, I argue that self-imposed conditionality is not more costly than the current procedure and that legalization and transparency will not disrupt the operation of the IMF.

WHICH VARIABLES EXPLAIN DECISIONS ON IMF CREDIT? AN EXTREME BOUNDS ANALYSIS

This paper analyses which economic and political factors affect the chance that a country receives IMF credit or signs an agreement with the Fund. We use a panel model for 128 countries over the period 1972-1998. Our results, based on Extreme Bounds Analysis, suggest that it are mostly economic variables that are robustly related to IMF lending activity, while most political variables that have been put forward in previous studies on IMF involvement are non-significant. To the extent that political factors matter, they seem more closely related to the conclusion of IMF agreements than to the disbursement of IMF credits.

The Efficient Resolution of Capital Account Crises: How to Avoid Moral Hazard

This paper presents a model of capital account crises and uses it to study resolution mechanisms for both liquidity and solvency crises. It shows that liquidity crises should be dealt with by a standstill combined with IMF lending into arrears, whereas solvency crises should be resolved by debt write-downs. Dealing with solvency crises by lending would require a subsidy and this creates moral hazard, such as incentives for excessive borrowing, for too little equity financing and for investment in projects that are inefficient. The analysis underlines the importance of accurately assessing whether a crisis is rooted in a liquidity or a solvency problem.

Reform of IMF Conditionality

The IMF has faced criticism of its expansive use of conditionality. The paper proposes a new procedure for IMF lending designed to meet these criticisms by arguing for the legalization and formalization of the procedure for IMF lending in the light of legal concepts derived mainly from national administrative laws. The gist of the procedure is that, rather than have the IMF determine loan conditions following informal negotiations with member countries, countries seeking Fund assistance will design the conditions themselves. The IMF will have specified powers under which to review these conditions. Apart from other procedural requirements, conditions will have to meet the standard of reasonableness. Subject to reasonableness, the IMF will have to lend on the conditions proposed by the country approaching it. Submissions to the IMF, IMF decisions and the reasons for them will be published. This proposal has many advantages over the current practice. It promotes transparency and accountability of the IMF and the participation of developing countries. It induces countries to initiate effective economic reforms while maintaining their economic sovereignty. Finally, I argue that self-imposed conditionality is not more costly than the current procedure and that legalization and transparency will not disrupt the operation of the IMF.

The Effects of IMF and World Bank Lending on Long-Run Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis

Summary The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, frequently, and often repeatedly, extend loans to developing nations. These loans have been blamed for generating adverse economic outcomes. The growth impact of Fund and Bank loan programs is assessed using an empirical growth model that controls for other determinants of growth. A unique feature of this study is the use of the value of loans rather than the number of programs. The estimates indicate that Bank lending stimulates growth in some cases, primarily by increasing public investment. Fund lending is either neutral or detrimental to growth. The channel for this effect is a negative impact of Fund lending on public as well as private investment.

Implicit Transfers in IMF Lending, 1973-2003

We compute realized transfers implicit in IMF lending from 1973-2003, based on 2003 IMF repayment projections and promised debt relief. IMF lending rates to high-and middleincome countries fell short of industrial country borrowing rates by 30-150 basis points over the period as a whole, but exhibited a small premium after 1987. The subsidy received by low-income and HIPC countries was much higher (400-600 basis points, respectively). In 2002 NPV terms, cumulative transfers were 12-15 percent of 2002 GDP for the HIPCs, 2-3 percent for low income countries, and less than ¾ percent for the emerging market countries.

Implicit Transfers in IMF Lending, 1973-2003

We compute realized transfers implicit in IMF lending from 1973-2003, based on 2003 IMF repayment projections and promised debt relief. IMF lending rates to high- and middle-income countries fell short of industrial country borrowing rates by 30-150 basis points over the period as a whole, but exhibited a small premium after 1987. The subsidy received by low-income and HIPC countries was much higher (400-600 basis points, respectively). In 2002 NPV terms, cumulative transfers were 12-15 percent of 2002 GDP for the HIPCs, 2-3 percent for low income countries, and less than ¾ percent for the emerging market countries.

The efficient resolution of capital account crises: how to avoid moral hazard

This paper presents a model of capital account crises and uses it to study resolution mechanisms for both liquidity and solvency crises. It shows that liquidity crises should be dealt with by a standstill combined with IMF lending into arrears, whereas solvency crises should be resolved by debt write-downs. Dealing with solvency crises by lending would require a subsidy and this creates moral hazard, such as incentives for excessive borrowing, for too little equity financing and for investment in projects that are inefficient. The analysis underlines the importance of accurately assessing whether a crisis is rooted in a liquidity or a solvency problem. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)

Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the IMF cannot cause moral hazard, as argued by Michael Mussa (1999 and 2004). It follows that examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing costs is not a useful strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. Instead, empirical research on moral hazard should focus on the assumptions of the Mussa theorem. Copyright 2005, International Monetary Fund