Reverse inference is the most commonly used inferential strategy for bringing images of brain activation to bear on psychological hypotheses, but its inductive validity has recently been questioned. In this article, I show that, when it is analyzed in likelihoodist terms, reverse inference does not suffer from the problems highlighted in the recent literature, and I defend the appropriateness of treating reverse inference in these terms. 1 Introduction 2 Reverse Inference 3 Reverse Inference Defended 3.1 Typical reverse inferences are fallacious 3.2 No quick and easy fix 3.3 A likelihoodist defense of reverse inference 3.4 An example 4 Appropriateness of the Likelihoodist Approach 4.1 Likelihoodist reverse inference is not applicable 4.2 Cognitive neuroscientists are not interested in comparative conclusions 4.3 Reverse inference and negative hypotheses 4.4 Likelihoodist reverse inference may confuse cognitive neuroscientists 4.5 Bayesian reverse inferences should be preferred to likelihoodist reverse inferences 5 Conclusion